feat(relay): rendezvous-relay service — 7 packages + plans (contracts/transport/agent/control-plane/e2e/auth/web)
Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.
Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay: native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent: host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e: browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth: Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web: browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering
Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.
NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
This commit is contained in:
87
agent/src/config/agentConfig.ts
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87
agent/src/config/agentConfig.ts
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/**
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* Agent configuration — PLAN_RELAY_AGENT T2. Zod-validated at the startup boundary (INV9):
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* - relayUrl MUST be wss:// (encrypted tunnel only)
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* - enrollUrl MUST be https:// (enrollment over TLS only)
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* - localTargetUrl MUST be ws:// to a LOOPBACK host (anti-SSRF: the agent forwards ONLY to
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* the local web-terminal, never an arbitrary target).
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* Fail-fast on missing/invalid values — never silently default a security-relevant field.
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*/
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import { homedir } from 'node:os'
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import { join } from 'node:path'
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import { z } from 'zod'
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export interface AgentConfig {
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readonly relayUrl: string
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readonly enrollUrl: string
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readonly stateDir: string
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readonly localTargetUrl: string
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readonly subdomain: string | null
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readonly hostId: string | null
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}
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const LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES: readonly string[] = ['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1', '[::1]']
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/** True iff `url` is ws:// to a loopback host (127.0.0.0/8, localhost, or ::1). */
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export function isLoopbackWsUrl(url: string): boolean {
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let parsed: URL
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try {
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parsed = new URL(url)
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} catch {
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return false
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}
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if (parsed.protocol !== 'ws:') return false
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const host = parsed.hostname
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return LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES.includes(host) || host.startsWith('127.')
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}
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function hasScheme(url: string, scheme: string): boolean {
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try {
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return new URL(url).protocol === scheme
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} catch {
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return false
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}
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}
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export const AgentConfigSchema = z
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.object({
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relayUrl: z
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.string()
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.refine((u) => hasScheme(u, 'wss:'), 'relayUrl must be a wss:// URL'),
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enrollUrl: z
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.string()
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.refine((u) => hasScheme(u, 'https:'), 'enrollUrl must be an https:// URL'),
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stateDir: z.string().min(1),
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localTargetUrl: z
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.string()
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.refine(isLoopbackWsUrl, 'localTargetUrl must be a ws:// loopback URL (anti-SSRF)'),
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subdomain: z.string().min(1).nullable(),
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hostId: z.string().min(1).nullable(),
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})
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.strict()
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.readonly()
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const DEFAULT_LOCAL_TARGET = 'ws://127.0.0.1:3000'
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/** Default state dir where key/cert/content-secret live (~/.web-terminal-agent). */
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export function defaultStateDir(): string {
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return join(homedir(), '.web-terminal-agent')
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}
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/**
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* Build + validate an AgentConfig from env + explicit argv overrides (argv wins). Throws a
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* ZodError (fail-fast) if any required field is missing or fails a scheme/loopback refinement.
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*/
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export function loadAgentConfig(
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env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv,
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argv: Partial<AgentConfig> = {},
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): AgentConfig {
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const merged = {
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relayUrl: argv.relayUrl ?? env.RELAY_URL,
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enrollUrl: argv.enrollUrl ?? env.ENROLL_URL,
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stateDir: argv.stateDir ?? env.STATE_DIR ?? defaultStateDir(),
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localTargetUrl: argv.localTargetUrl ?? env.LOCAL_TARGET_URL ?? DEFAULT_LOCAL_TARGET,
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subdomain: argv.subdomain ?? env.SUBDOMAIN ?? null,
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hostId: argv.hostId ?? env.HOST_ID ?? null,
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}
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return AgentConfigSchema.parse(merged)
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}
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