feat(relay): rendezvous-relay service — 7 packages + plans (contracts/transport/agent/control-plane/e2e/auth/web)
Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.
Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay: native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent: host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e: browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth: Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web: browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering
Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.
NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
This commit is contained in:
53
agent/test/frpScaffold.test.ts
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53
agent/test/frpScaffold.test.ts
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import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
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import type { AgentConfig } from '../src/config/agentConfig.js'
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import {
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buildFrpcToml,
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isFrpRetired,
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spawnFrpc,
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type ChildLike,
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} from '../src/transport/frpScaffold.js'
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const CFG: AgentConfig = {
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relayUrl: 'wss://relay/agent',
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enrollUrl: 'https://x/enroll',
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stateDir: '/tmp/x',
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localTargetUrl: 'ws://127.0.0.1:3000',
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subdomain: 'host-42',
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hostId: null,
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}
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describe('frpScaffold (T6, v0.8 only)', () => {
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it('generates a loopback-only tls frpc.toml', () => {
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const toml = buildFrpcToml(CFG)
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expect(toml).toContain('local_ip = "127.0.0.1"')
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expect(toml).toContain('local_port = 3000')
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expect(toml).toContain('subdomain = "host-42"')
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expect(toml).toContain('tls_enable = true')
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expect(toml).not.toMatch(/local_ip = "(?!127\.0\.0\.1)/)
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})
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it('refuses a non-loopback local target (anti-SSRF)', () => {
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expect(() => buildFrpcToml({ ...CFG, localTargetUrl: 'ws://10.0.0.5:3000' })).toThrow()
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})
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it('propagates child exit to onExit', async () => {
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let exitHandler: ((code: number | null) => void) | null = null
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const child: ChildLike = {
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on: (_ev, cb) => {
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exitHandler = cb
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},
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kill: vi.fn(),
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}
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const scaffold = spawnFrpc(CFG, '/usr/bin/frpc', () => child)
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const seen: number[] = []
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scaffold.onExit((c) => seen.push(c))
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await scaffold.start()
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exitHandler!(7)
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expect(seen).toEqual([7])
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})
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it('retirement guard: retired once ed25519', () => {
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expect(isFrpRetired('ed25519')).toBe(true)
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expect(isFrpRetired('token')).toBe(false)
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})
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})
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