feat(relay): rendezvous-relay service — 7 packages + plans (contracts/transport/agent/control-plane/e2e/auth/web)

Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.

Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
  capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay:   native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent:        host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e:    browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth:   Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web:    browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering

Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.

NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.

control-plane/bin/provision.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/**
+ * T0 (v0.8) — manual provisioning CLI. `node bin/provision.ts <subdomain>` mints an account
+ * in the flat store and prints the raw agent/client tokens ONCE (they are never stored raw).
+ * This is the throwaway MVP admin path; T11 promotes it to an authenticated HTTP API.
+ */
+import { createFlatStore } from '../src/flat-store.js'
+
+async function main(): Promise<void> {
+  const subdomain = process.argv[2]
+  if (subdomain === undefined || subdomain.trim() === '') {
+    process.stderr.write('usage: provision <subdomain>\n')
+    process.exitCode = 2
+    return
+  }
+  const store = createFlatStore()
+  const { accountId, agentToken, clientToken } = await store.provisionFlat(subdomain.trim())
+  // Raw tokens printed ONCE for the operator to copy; they are not recoverable afterwards.
+  process.stdout.write(
+    JSON.stringify({ accountId, subdomain: subdomain.trim(), agentToken, clientToken }, null, 2) + '\n',
+  )
+}
+
+main().catch((err: unknown) => {
+  process.stderr.write(`provision failed: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}\n`)
+  process.exitCode = 1
+})