feat(relay): rendezvous-relay service — 7 packages + plans (contracts/transport/agent/control-plane/e2e/auth/web)

Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.

Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
  capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay:   native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent:        host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e:    browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth:   Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web:    browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering

Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.

NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.

relay-auth/test/revocation.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest'
+import { revoke, revokeToken } from '../src/revocation/revoke.js'
+import { isTokenRevoked, killsScope } from '../src/revocation/check.js'
+import { REVOCATION_PUSH_BUDGET_MS } from '../src/types.js'
+import type { KillSignal, RevocationBus } from '../src/types.js'
+import { fakeHostRegistry, fakeRevocationStore, makeHost, uuid } from './_helpers.js'
+
+const NOW = 1_700_000_000
+
+/** A fake bus + a fake P1 subscriber holding an already-open, authorized stream. */
+function fakeBusWithSubscriber(stream: { hostAccountId: string; hostId: string; open: boolean }) {
+  const published: KillSignal[] = []
+  const bus: RevocationBus = {
+    publish: async (signal) => {
+      published.push(signal)
+      // P1 subscriber: inject an RST for every covered stream (force-close).
+      if (killsScope(signal, stream.hostAccountId, stream.hostId)) stream.open = false
+    },
+  }
+  return { bus, published }
+}
+
+describe('revocation (INV12)', () => {
+  it('host revoke publishes a KillSignal that tears down the live tunnel within budget', async () => {
+    const hostId = uuid()
+    const hosts = fakeHostRegistry([makeHost('acct-A', hostId)])
+    const store = fakeRevocationStore()
+    const stream = { hostAccountId: 'acct-A', hostId, open: true }
+    const { bus, published } = fakeBusWithSubscriber(stream)
+
+    const t0 = Date.now()
+    const signal = await revoke({ kind: 'host', hostId }, store, hosts, bus, NOW)
+    const elapsedMs = Date.now() - t0
+
+    expect(published).toHaveLength(1)
+    expect(signal.scope).toEqual({ kind: 'host', hostId })
+    expect(stream.open).toBe(false) // live shell dropped, not left alive
+    expect(elapsedMs).toBeLessThan(REVOCATION_PUSH_BUDGET_MS)
+  })
+
+  it('account revocation covers only that account, not another tenant', () => {
+    const signal: KillSignal = { scope: { kind: 'account', accountId: 'acct-A' }, at: NOW, reason: 'x' }
+    expect(killsScope(signal, 'acct-A', uuid())).toBe(true)
+    expect(killsScope(signal, 'acct-B', uuid())).toBe(false) // foreign tenant untouched
+  })
+
+  it('global revocation covers all hosts (GOAWAY)', () => {
+    const signal: KillSignal = { scope: { kind: 'global' }, at: NOW, reason: 'drain' }
+    expect(killsScope(signal, 'acct-A', uuid())).toBe(true)
+    expect(killsScope(signal, 'acct-B', uuid())).toBe(true)
+  })
+
+  it('revoked token jti stops validating; a subsequent reconnect is refused', async () => {
+    const store = fakeRevocationStore()
+    await revokeToken('jti-1', NOW + 60, store)
+    expect(await isTokenRevoked('jti-1', store)).toBe(true)
+    expect(await isTokenRevoked('jti-2', store)).toBe(false)
+  })
+
+  it('revocation is idempotent (re-publish is a no-op teardown)', async () => {
+    const hostId = uuid()
+    const hosts = fakeHostRegistry([makeHost('acct-A', hostId)])
+    const store = fakeRevocationStore()
+    const stream = { hostAccountId: 'acct-A', hostId, open: true }
+    const { bus, published } = fakeBusWithSubscriber(stream)
+    await revoke({ kind: 'host', hostId }, store, hosts, bus, NOW)
+    await revoke({ kind: 'host', hostId }, store, hosts, bus, NOW)
+    expect(published).toHaveLength(2)
+    expect(stream.open).toBe(false)
+  })
+})