fix(relay): close F6 replay K_content nonce reuse via per-generation epoch-in-key
The recoverable replay key was stable per (hostContentSecret, sessionId) while the agent-side sealer resets its deterministic-nonce seq to 0 on every restart/re-attach → two sealer generations sealed distinct plaintext under the SAME (key, nonce). Add a required 'epoch' to ReplayKeyParams, fold it into the K_content HKDF salt (sessionId U+001F epoch), mint a fresh epoch per createReplaySealer generation and expose it, and thread it through ReplaySource so the browser re-derives the matching key. Fresh epoch per generation ⇒ fresh key ⇒ seq=0 can never collide; recoverability within a generation is preserved. Touches relay-contracts/relay-e2e/agent/relay-web. Green: contracts 81, e2e 78, agent 133, web 99; tsc clean. Regression proves same seq-0 nonce, different key.
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@@ -37,8 +37,8 @@ describe('T11 multi-device adapters (authenticated channel, NOT a QR)', () => {
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expect(result.aead).toBe('xchacha20-poly1305')
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expect(label).toBeTruthy()
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}
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const kA = deriveContentKey({ hostContentSecret: secret, sessionId: 's', alg: 'aes-256-gcm' })
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const kB = deriveContentKey({ hostContentSecret: secret, sessionId: 's', alg: 'aes-256-gcm' })
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const kA = deriveContentKey({ hostContentSecret: secret, sessionId: 's', alg: 'aes-256-gcm', epoch: 'gen-0' })
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const kB = deriveContentKey({ hostContentSecret: secret, sessionId: 's', alg: 'aes-256-gcm', epoch: 'gen-0' })
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expect(bytesToHex(unwrapAeadKey(kA).raw)).toBe(bytesToHex(unwrapAeadKey(kB).raw))
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})
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