fix(relay): close F6 replay K_content nonce reuse via per-generation epoch-in-key

The recoverable replay key was stable per (hostContentSecret, sessionId) while the
agent-side sealer resets its deterministic-nonce seq to 0 on every restart/re-attach
→ two sealer generations sealed distinct plaintext under the SAME (key, nonce).

Add a required 'epoch' to ReplayKeyParams, fold it into the K_content HKDF salt
(sessionId U+001F epoch), mint a fresh epoch per createReplaySealer generation and
expose it, and thread it through ReplaySource so the browser re-derives the matching
key. Fresh epoch per generation ⇒ fresh key ⇒ seq=0 can never collide; recoverability
within a generation is preserved.

Touches relay-contracts/relay-e2e/agent/relay-web. Green: contracts 81, e2e 78,
agent 133, web 99; tsc clean. Regression proves same seq-0 nonce, different key.
This commit is contained in:
Yaojia Wang
2026-07-02 16:41:19 +02:00
parent a09c131539
commit 3020184054
13 changed files with 243 additions and 33 deletions

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@@ -16,11 +16,23 @@ import { createApiClient } from '../api-client'
import { mountPreviewGrid } from '../preview-grid'
import type { ReplaySource } from '../preview-client'
/**
* FIX 3b / F6 placeholder epoch. The real per-generation `epoch` MUST be served by P1/P2 alongside
* the ciphertext ring buffer (the agent stamps a fresh epoch each time it reconstructs the sealer and
* resets seq to 0). This constant only keeps the `ReplaySource` shape explicit until those endpoints
* land; the stub still throws, so no frame is ever decrypted under it.
*/
const PLACEHOLDER_EPOCH = 'PENDING_P1_P2_EPOCH'
async function loadReplay(
_hostId: string,
): Promise<{ replay: ReplaySource; hostContentSecret: Uint8Array }> {
// TODO(P5/P1): fetch ciphertext replay + hostContentSecret (post auth/step-up). Not yet available.
throw new Error('replay source not yet wired (pending P5/P1 endpoints)')
// TODO(P5/P1/P2): fetch ciphertext replay + hostContentSecret (post auth/step-up) AND the real
// per-generation `epoch` (FIX 3b / F6) that the frames were sealed under. Until then the shape is:
// { replay: { sessionId, alg, epoch: PLACEHOLDER_EPOCH, frames }, hostContentSecret }
// Not yet available → throw so a card shows "unavailable" rather than a fabricated screen.
void PLACEHOLDER_EPOCH
throw new Error('replay source not yet wired (pending P5/P1/P2 endpoints)')
}
function boot(): void {

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@@ -6,10 +6,11 @@
* Ring-buffer replay survives a reload because the agent (P2) sealed each stored frame with
* `sealReplayFrame` under the RECOVERABLE content key `K_content` — NOT the ephemeral live
* `DirectionalKeys` (which are re-derived per handshake and lost on reload). The browser re-derives
* the SAME `K_content` via `deriveContentKey({ hostContentSecret, sessionId, alg })` (§4.4 FIX 3;
* the SAME `K_content` via `deriveContentKey({ hostContentSecret, sessionId, alg, epoch })` (§4.4 FIX 3;
* `hostContentSecret` obtained via P5 after auth/step-up) and decrypts each payload with
* `openReplayCiphertext`. A wrong/ephemeral key throws (AEAD tag) → the card shows "unavailable",
* never a torn/garbled screen (cross-host/session isolation, INV1).
* `openReplayCiphertext`. A wrong/ephemeral key — or a `ReplaySource.epoch` that doesn't match the
* generation the frames were sealed under (FIX 3b / F6) — throws (AEAD tag) → the card shows
* "unavailable", never a torn/garbled screen (cross-host/session isolation, INV1).
*
* The §4.4 crypto (`deriveContentKey`/`openReplayCiphertext`) is imported from `relay-e2e` and
* injected — cited verbatim, never re-implemented. `hostContentSecret`/`K_content` are transient in
@@ -17,10 +18,17 @@
*/
import type { AeadAlg, AeadKey, ReplayKeyParams } from 'relay-contracts'
/** Ciphertext ring-buffer replay for one host/session. */
/** Ciphertext ring-buffer replay for one host/session (one sealer generation). */
export interface ReplaySource {
readonly sessionId: string
readonly alg: AeadAlg // negotiated aead (matches how P2 sealed the replay)
// FIX 3b / F6: the per-generation `epoch` under which THESE frames were sealed. The agent resets
// its deterministic-nonce seq to 0 on every reconstruction (restart/re-attach); folding a fresh
// epoch into K_content gives each generation a fresh key, so a seq=0 reset can never collide with
// a prior generation's (key, nonce). NON-SECRET — carried with the ring buffer so the browser
// re-derives the matching key. Frames from a DIFFERENT epoch derive a different key → AEAD tag
// fails → "unavailable" (never a torn screen).
readonly epoch: string
readonly frames: readonly Uint8Array[] // stored DATA payloads, each a sealReplayFrame envelope
}
@@ -85,6 +93,7 @@ export function mountPreviewClient(
hostContentSecret,
sessionId: replay.sessionId,
alg: replay.alg,
epoch: replay.epoch, // F6: bind the key to THIS generation; a mismatched epoch → wrong key.
})
} catch {
showUnavailable()

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@@ -52,10 +52,12 @@ describe('default (real-xterm) loaders behind the DI seam', () => {
it('mountPreviewClient renders via the default read-only xterm loader', async () => {
const secret = randomBytes(32)
const k = deriveContentKey({ hostContentSecret: secret, sessionId: 's', alg: 'aes-256-gcm' })
const epoch = 'gen-1' // FIX 3b / F6: seal + declare under the same generation.
const k = deriveContentKey({ hostContentSecret: secret, sessionId: 's', alg: 'aes-256-gcm', epoch })
const replay: ReplaySource = {
sessionId: 's',
alg: 'aes-256-gcm',
epoch,
frames: [encodeEnvelope(sealReplayFrame(k, 0n, new TextEncoder().encode('DEFAULT-XTERM')))],
}
const card = document.createElement('div')

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@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ describe('preview-client unavailable path', () => {
const card = document.createElement('div')
const client = mountPreviewClient(
card,
{ sessionId: 's', alg: 'aes-256-gcm', frames: [new Uint8Array([1])] },
{ sessionId: 's', alg: 'aes-256-gcm', epoch: 'gen-1', frames: [new Uint8Array([1])] },
new Uint8Array(32),
{ cols: 80, rows: 24 },
{

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@@ -11,16 +11,38 @@ import {
const HOST_SECRET = randomBytes(32)
const SESSION_ID = 'sess-1'
const ALG = 'aes-256-gcm' as const
const EPOCH = 'gen-1' // FIX 3b / F6: the sealer generation these fixtures seal + declare under.
/** Seal a screen (as a P2 agent stub would) under K_content with sealReplayFrame. */
function sealedReplay(lines: readonly string[], secret = HOST_SECRET): ReplaySource {
const k = deriveContentKey({ hostContentSecret: secret, sessionId: SESSION_ID, alg: ALG })
interface SealOpts {
readonly secret?: Uint8Array
/** Epoch the FRAMES are actually sealed under (the key that encrypts). */
readonly sealEpoch?: string
/** Epoch the ReplaySource DECLARES (the key the browser will re-derive). Defaults to sealEpoch. */
readonly declaredEpoch?: string
}
/**
* Seal a screen (as a P2 agent stub would) under K_content with sealReplayFrame. Recoverability
* holds because the frames are sealed with the SAME (secret, sessionId, alg, epoch) the returned
* ReplaySource declares. For the F6 regression, `sealEpoch` and `declaredEpoch` are set apart so the
* browser derives a different key than the frames were sealed under.
*/
function sealedReplay(lines: readonly string[], opts: SealOpts = {}): ReplaySource {
const secret = opts.secret ?? HOST_SECRET
const sealEpoch = opts.sealEpoch ?? EPOCH
const declaredEpoch = opts.declaredEpoch ?? sealEpoch
const k = deriveContentKey({
hostContentSecret: secret,
sessionId: SESSION_ID,
alg: ALG,
epoch: sealEpoch,
})
const frames = lines.map((line, i) =>
// sealReplayFrame → E2EEnvelope, encoded to a DATA payload the browser opens.
// openReplayCiphertext decodes+opens; we mirror the encode via the session envelope codec.
encodeReplayFrame(sealReplayFrame(k, BigInt(i), new TextEncoder().encode(line))),
)
return { sessionId: SESSION_ID, alg: ALG, frames }
return { sessionId: SESSION_ID, alg: ALG, epoch: declaredEpoch, frames }
}
// The replay codec: relay-e2e's openReplayCiphertext expects the encoded envelope bytes.
@@ -67,6 +89,35 @@ describe('mountPreviewClient (T9)', () => {
expect(term.written).toEqual([]) // never wrote a torn screen
})
it('F6: a ReplaySource epoch that does NOT match the sealed generation → "unavailable", never a torn screen', async () => {
const card = document.createElement('div')
const term = mockTerminal()
// Frames sealed under generation "gen-1", but the ReplaySource declares a DIFFERENT epoch
// ("gen-2") — as if the ring buffer were mislabeled with the wrong generation. The browser
// re-derives a different K_content → AEAD tag fails → unavailable (no garbled render).
const replay = sealedReplay(['stale-screen'], { sealEpoch: 'gen-1', declaredEpoch: 'gen-2' })
const client = mountPreviewClient(card, replay, HOST_SECRET, { cols: 80, rows: 24 }, {
...realDeps,
createTerminal: () => term,
})
await client.render()
expect(card.querySelector('.preview-unavailable')?.textContent).toBe('unavailable')
expect(term.written).toEqual([]) // never wrote a torn screen from the wrong generation
})
it('F6: a matching per-generation epoch preserves recoverability (frames render)', async () => {
const card = document.createElement('div')
const term = mockTerminal()
// sealEpoch === declaredEpoch (both "gen-7") ⇒ same key within one generation ⇒ replay recovers.
const replay = sealedReplay(['line-A', 'line-B'], { sealEpoch: 'gen-7', declaredEpoch: 'gen-7' })
const client = mountPreviewClient(card, replay, HOST_SECRET, { cols: 80, rows: 24 }, {
...realDeps,
createTerminal: () => term,
})
await client.render()
expect(term.written).toEqual(['line-A', 'line-B'])
})
it('read-only: the preview terminal exposes NO input path (no onData/send)', async () => {
const card = document.createElement('div')
const term = mockTerminal()

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@@ -27,9 +27,16 @@ function host(sub: string): HostRecord {
}
}
const EPOCH = 'gen-1' // FIX 3b / F6: per-generation key diversifier (seal + declare under the same one).
function sealed(sessionId: string, secret: Uint8Array, line: string): ReplaySource {
const k = deriveContentKey({ hostContentSecret: secret, sessionId, alg: ALG })
return { sessionId, alg: ALG, frames: [encodeEnvelope(sealReplayFrame(k, 0n, new TextEncoder().encode(line)))] }
const k = deriveContentKey({ hostContentSecret: secret, sessionId, alg: ALG, epoch: EPOCH })
return {
sessionId,
alg: ALG,
epoch: EPOCH,
frames: [encodeEnvelope(sealReplayFrame(k, 0n, new TextEncoder().encode(line)))],
}
}
function fakeApi(hosts: readonly HostRecord[]): ApiClient {