feat(android): pure-Kotlin foundation — AW0 scaffold + AW1 modules (218 tests green)

Implements the verifiable pure-Kotlin core of the Android client per
docs/ANDROID_CLIENT_PLAN.md, mirroring the iOS SPM package set as Gradle modules.
Built + reviewed via multi-agent workflow (explore→implement→verify→review),
then review findings fixed with regression tests.

Modules (all pure JVM, kotlin("jvm"); Android-framework modules scaffolded but
gated off in settings — no Android SDK in this env):
- :wire-protocol  — frozen wire contract (sealed Client/ServerMessage, enums,
  HostEndpoint CSWSH origin derivation, transport interfaces), hand-rolled codec
  byte-identical to the server's JSON.stringify + tolerant kotlinx decode.
- :session-core   — ReconnectMachine (1→2→4→8→16→30 backoff), PingScheduler,
  GateTracker (two-line epoch guard), AwayDigest, UnreadLedger, TitleSanitizer,
  KeyByteMap (byte-matches public/keybar.ts).
- :api-client     — all REST routes, tolerant decode, Origin-iff-guarded, prefs
  unknown-key preservation, pairing probe + host-tier classifier.
- :client-tls     — pure half: PKCS#12 parse, X509KeyManager alias logic,
  CertificateSummary, provider-agnostic wrong-passphrase classification.
- :test-support   — FakeTransport / FakeHttpTransport / virtual-clock fakes.

Verify: ./gradlew clean test → 218 tests, 0 failures (wire-protocol 47,
session-core 60, api-client 69, client-tls 27, test-support 15).

Review (3 lenses, 8/10 each) findings fixed: sessionId JSON-injection escape,
CancellationException propagation in PingScheduler, PairingProbe close-on-cancel
leak, HostEndpoint trim, HostClassifier hoisted to :wire-protocol (type unified),
BouncyCastle-portable wrong-passphrase detection, lone-surrogate escaping.

Known gap (documented, deferred): /push/fcm-token has no server route yet —
plan task A33 (src/push/fcm.ts) delivers it.
This commit is contained in:
Yaojia Wang
2026-07-08 13:45:07 +02:00
parent cf88e7c588
commit 4ea8f7862a
106 changed files with 7502 additions and 0 deletions

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package wang.yaojia.webterm.wire
/**
* Client -> server WS frames (FROZEN contract, plan §3.1). The Android analogue of
* `src/types.ts:87-92` `ClientMessage` and iOS `WireProtocol.ClientMessage`.
*
* Immutable value types. Encoding to the wire is A4 (`MessageCodec`) — this file only
* freezes the SHAPES so every other module reads stable names.
*
* Server-side validation the caller must respect (the server SILENTLY DISCARDS invalid
* frames — `src/protocol.ts:45-86` — no error reply comes back):
* - `attach` MUST be the FIRST frame on a connection (`src/server.ts:766-773`).
* - `resize` cols/rows must be integers in [WireConstants.RESIZE_RANGE] (1..1000).
* - `attach.cwd`, when present, must be an absolute path (leading '/').
* - `input.data` is raw keyboard bytes, passed through VERBATIM — never filtered
* (ARCHITECTURE invariant #9).
*
* DEVIATION NOTE (A2): the task brief listed `Attach(sessionId, cols, rows, cwd)`, but the
* server `attach` frame (`src/protocol.ts` validateAttach, `src/types.ts:88`) and the iOS
* `ClientMessage.attach(sessionId:cwd:)` carry NO cols/rows — the server hardcodes
* DEFAULT_COLS/ROWS on attach (`src/server.ts:774-781`) and takes real dimensions from a
* separate `resize` frame sent right after attach. Adding cols/rows here would make the
* encoded attach frame differ from the web client and break A4's byte-equality vectors, so
* the faithful wire contract (sessionId + optional cwd) is frozen instead.
*/
public sealed interface ClientMessage {
/**
* First frame. `sessionId == null` spawns a NEW session (A4 encodes this as an explicit
* JSON `"sessionId":null` — the key is REQUIRED by the server, `src/protocol.ts:132-134`).
* `cwd` = "new tab here" spawn directory (M6); appended only when [sessionId] is null.
*/
public data class Attach(val sessionId: String?, val cwd: String? = null) : ClientMessage
/** Raw keyboard bytes, verbatim (invariant #9 — no content filtering). */
public data class Input(val data: String) : ClientMessage
/** Own message type so the server can `ioctl(TIOCSWINSZ)` -> SIGWINCH for TUIs. */
public data class Resize(val cols: Int, val rows: Int) : ClientMessage
/**
* Resolve a held permission gate with allow. [mode] is only meaningful for a `plan` gate
* and is encoded as a TOP-LEVEL `mode` key — the server's WS wiring re-parses the raw
* frame for it (`src/server.ts:91-102`). No [mode] = a plain approve.
*/
public data class Approve(val mode: ApproveMode? = null) : ClientMessage
/** Resolve a held permission gate with deny. */
public data object Reject : ClientMessage
}
/**
* Permission mode written back when resolving a `plan` gate. Wire values mirror the server
* whitelist `PermissionMode` (`src/types.ts:371`). The Kotlin analogue of Swift's
* `enum ApproveMode: String` RawRepresentable — [wire] is the JSON string, [fromWire] the
* reverse lookup.
*
* Note: the plan-gate three-way UI only ever sends [ACCEPT_EDITS] / [DEFAULT]; raw [AUTO] is
* gated server-side by ALLOW_AUTO_MODE (default false) and downgraded to `default` otherwise.
*/
public enum class ApproveMode(public val wire: String) {
DEFAULT("default"),
ACCEPT_EDITS("acceptEdits"),
PLAN("plan"),
AUTO("auto");
public companion object {
public fun fromWire(value: String): ApproveMode? = entries.firstOrNull { it.wire == value }
}
}
/** The `type` discriminator whitelist for client frames (`src/protocol.ts:27` ALLOWED_TYPES). */
public enum class ClientMessageType(public val wire: String) {
ATTACH("attach"),
INPUT("input"),
RESIZE("resize"),
APPROVE("approve"),
REJECT("reject");
public companion object {
public fun fromWire(value: String): ClientMessageType? = entries.firstOrNull { it.wire == value }
}
}

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package wang.yaojia.webterm.wire
import java.net.URI
/**
* The four network tiers of the pairing/warning table (plan §5.4). The SINGLE canonical type —
* hoisted into :wire-protocol so :api-client and :client-tls share ONE classifier (the two module
* copies had drifted). Faithful port of iOS `APIClient.HostNetworkTier`; the UI layers
* (PairingViewModel scheme+address 分层提示) consume ONE classification instead of re-deriving it.
*
* | tier | matches | §5.4 hint |
* |---|---|---|
* | [LOOPBACK] | localhost · 127.0.0.0/8 · ::1 | no warning |
* | [PRIVATE_LAN] | RFC1918 (10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16) · 169.254/16 · mDNS .local | non-blocking ws:// cleartext notice |
* | [TAILSCALE] | CGNAT 100.64.0.0/10 · MagicDNS *.ts.net | no cleartext warning (WireGuard-encrypted) |
* | [PUBLIC] | everything else (incl. out-of-range / malformed — fail-safe) | strongest blocking warning |
*/
public enum class HostNetworkTier {
LOOPBACK,
PRIVATE_LAN,
TAILSCALE,
PUBLIC,
}
/**
* Pure, stateless classifier over a URL host string (plan §5.4 tiers). Faithful port of iOS
* `HostClassifier`.
*
* IPv6 note: only loopback `::1` is tiered; other IPv6 literals (incl. ULA `fd00::/8`) fall to
* [HostNetworkTier.PUBLIC] — fail-safe over-warning, matching v1 scope (the app dials IPv4 LAN /
* CGNAT / MagicDNS targets). The finer IPv6 handling lives in the UI layer if ever needed.
*/
public object HostClassifier {
private const val MAGIC_DNS_SUFFIX = ".ts.net"
private const val MDNS_SUFFIX = ".local"
private val LOOPBACK_NAMES: Set<String> = setOf("localhost", "::1", "[::1]")
private const val IPV4_OCTET_COUNT = 4
private val IPV4_OCTET_RANGE = 0..255
/**
* Classify a bare host string (as returned by URL host parsing — no scheme, no port).
* Unknown/malformed input is [HostNetworkTier.PUBLIC] by design (fail-safe).
*/
public fun classify(host: String): HostNetworkTier {
val lowered = host.lowercase()
if (lowered in LOOPBACK_NAMES) return HostNetworkTier.LOOPBACK
if (lowered.endsWith(MAGIC_DNS_SUFFIX)) return HostNetworkTier.TAILSCALE
if (lowered.endsWith(MDNS_SUFFIX)) return HostNetworkTier.PRIVATE_LAN
val octets = ipv4Octets(lowered) ?: return HostNetworkTier.PUBLIC
return classifyIpv4(octets)
}
/**
* Convenience for callers holding a [HostEndpoint] (the VM's shape). A `baseUrl` that no longer
* yields a host classifies as [HostNetworkTier.PUBLIC] (fail-safe).
*/
public fun classify(endpoint: HostEndpoint): HostNetworkTier = classify(hostOf(endpoint))
/**
* Extract the bare host from a (validated) [HostEndpoint]. Shared by [classify] and pairing-error
* diagnosis so host derivation happens in ONE place. Trims defensively (never trust at a
* boundary) and returns "" on any parse failure (→ PUBLIC, fail-safe).
*/
public fun hostOf(endpoint: HostEndpoint): String =
runCatching { URI(endpoint.baseUrl.trim()).host }.getOrNull() ?: ""
private fun classifyIpv4(octets: List<Int>): HostNetworkTier {
val first = octets[0]
val second = octets[1]
return when {
first == 127 -> HostNetworkTier.LOOPBACK // loopback 127/8
first == 10 -> HostNetworkTier.PRIVATE_LAN // RFC1918 10/8
first == 192 && second == 168 -> HostNetworkTier.PRIVATE_LAN // RFC1918 192.168/16
first == 172 && second in 16..31 -> HostNetworkTier.PRIVATE_LAN // RFC1918 172.16/12
first == 169 && second == 254 -> HostNetworkTier.PRIVATE_LAN // link-local 169.254/16
first == 100 && second in 64..127 -> HostNetworkTier.TAILSCALE // CGNAT 100.64/10 (Tailscale)
else -> HostNetworkTier.PUBLIC
}
}
/**
* Strict dotted-quad parse; anything else (hostnames, IPv6, out-of-range octets, wrong arity)
* → null. Public so pairing-error diagnosis can reuse the exact same rule.
*/
public fun ipv4Octets(host: String): List<Int>? {
val parts = host.split(".")
if (parts.size != IPV4_OCTET_COUNT) return null
val octets = parts.map { it.toIntOrNull() ?: return null }
if (octets.any { it !in IPV4_OCTET_RANGE }) return null
return octets
}
}

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package wang.yaojia.webterm.wire
import java.net.URI
/**
* A paired web-terminal host (FROZEN contract, plan §3.1). The SINGLE point of derivation for
* the `Origin` header and the WS URL — hand-assembling either anywhere else is a review
* CRITICAL (CSWSH defence, TECH_DOC §7). Android analogue of iOS `WireProtocol.HostEndpoint`.
*
* Derivations are computed once by [fromBaseUrl] and stored immutably:
* - [originHeader] = `<scheme>://<host>[:<port>]`, omitting the scheme's default port
* (http/80, https/443), scheme+host lowercased, IPv6 bracketed — byte-identical to the
* browser's Origin serialization. The server re-parses BOTH sides via `new URL()` and
* compares protocol/hostname/port (`src/http/origin.ts:31-51`), so this must match one of
* the server's NIC-derived allowed origins exactly or the WS upgrade 401s.
* - [wsUrl] = same host+port as dialed, scheme http->ws / https->wss, path replaced by
* [WireConstants.WS_PATH]; query/fragment/credentials dropped. The dialed port is kept
* verbatim here (unlike the origin, which drops default ports).
*
* Pure Kotlin/JVM only — `java.net.URI` is JVM stdlib parsing, not an Android import.
* Persistence (A12 host-registry) stores the [baseUrl] string and reconstructs via
* [fromBaseUrl], re-validating on load (untrusted at rest).
*/
public class HostEndpoint private constructor(
/** The URL the user dialed (`http(s)://<host>[:<port>]`). Path/query/fragment/credentials it carried are ignored by the derivations. */
public val baseUrl: String,
/** Derived WS endpoint (`ws(s)://…/term`). Read-only. */
public val wsUrl: String,
/** Derived `Origin` header value — see class doc. Never hand-assemble elsewhere. */
public val originHeader: String,
) {
override fun equals(other: Any?): Boolean =
other is HostEndpoint &&
baseUrl == other.baseUrl &&
wsUrl == other.wsUrl &&
originHeader == other.originHeader
override fun hashCode(): Int {
var result = baseUrl.hashCode()
result = 31 * result + wsUrl.hashCode()
result = 31 * result + originHeader.hashCode()
return result
}
override fun toString(): String = "HostEndpoint(baseUrl=$baseUrl, wsUrl=$wsUrl, originHeader=$originHeader)"
public companion object {
private val WS_SCHEME_BY_HTTP: Map<String, String> = mapOf("http" to "ws", "https" to "wss")
private val DEFAULT_PORT_BY_SCHEME: Map<String, Int> = mapOf("http" to 80, "https" to 443)
/**
* Validating factory: returns null unless [baseUrl] parses as an http(s) URL with a
* non-empty host. QR-scan / manual-entry payloads are untrusted external input — reject
* early (plan §5).
*/
public fun fromBaseUrl(baseUrl: String): HostEndpoint? {
// Trim ONCE, here, and store the trimmed value: downstream re-parsers (PairingProbe
// httpBaseUrl, HostClassifier.hostOf) do `URI(endpoint.baseUrl)` and would otherwise
// throw / misclassify on stray surrounding whitespace from a QR scan or manual entry.
val trimmed = baseUrl.trim()
val uri = try {
URI(trimmed)
} catch (_: Exception) {
return null
}
val scheme = uri.scheme?.lowercase() ?: return null
val wsScheme = WS_SCHEME_BY_HTTP[scheme] ?: return null // rejects non-http(s)
val host = uri.host ?: return null
if (host.isEmpty()) return null
val port: Int? = uri.port.takeIf { it != -1 }
return HostEndpoint(
baseUrl = trimmed,
wsUrl = deriveWsUrl(wsScheme, host, port),
originHeader = deriveOrigin(scheme, host.lowercase(), port),
)
}
private fun deriveOrigin(scheme: String, host: String, port: Int?): String {
val serializedHost = bracketIfIpv6(host)
val defaultPort = DEFAULT_PORT_BY_SCHEME[scheme]
return if (port == null || port == defaultPort) {
"$scheme://$serializedHost"
} else {
"$scheme://$serializedHost:$port"
}
}
private fun deriveWsUrl(wsScheme: String, host: String, port: Int?): String {
val serializedHost = bracketIfIpv6(host)
val portPart = if (port == null) "" else ":$port"
return "$wsScheme://$serializedHost$portPart${WireConstants.WS_PATH}"
}
/**
* IPv6 literals need brackets in an Origin / URL. `URI.getHost()` has returned them both
* bare and pre-bracketed across JVMs — wrap idempotently.
*/
private fun bracketIfIpv6(host: String): String =
if (host.contains(":") && !host.startsWith("[")) "[$host]" else host
}
}

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package wang.yaojia.webterm.wire
/**
* Thin HTTP I/O boundary (FROZEN contract, plan §3.1). The Android analogue of iOS
* `WireProtocol.HTTPTransport`. `:api-client` (A8/A9) builds [HttpRequest]s (stamping `Origin`
* IFF the route is a mutating/guarded one, plan §4.3) and sends them through this seam;
* `:transport-okhttp` (A7) implements it over OkHttp, the fake in `:test-support` (A3) queues
* canned responses. Pure interface — the request/response DTOs are OkHttp-free so both sides
* share them without an Android dependency.
*/
public interface HttpTransport {
/**
* Perform one HTTP exchange. Implementations throw on transport-level failure; a non-2xx
* status is RETURNED (not thrown) — classification (e.g. `PairingError`) is the caller's job.
*/
public suspend fun send(request: HttpRequest): HttpResponse
}
/** HTTP verbs used by the client surface (`src/http` routes: GET reads, POST/PUT/DELETE guarded). */
public enum class HttpMethod {
GET,
POST,
PUT,
DELETE,
}
/**
* A pure HTTP request DTO built by `:api-client`. [headers] carries `Origin` only for guarded
* routes (plan §4.3 铁律). [body] is opaque bytes (JSON for the mutating routes); null for GET.
*
* NOTE: [body] is a `ByteArray`, so generated equality is by reference — these are transient
* I/O carriers, not value-equality keys.
*/
public data class HttpRequest(
val method: HttpMethod,
val url: String,
val headers: Map<String, String> = emptyMap(),
val body: ByteArray? = null,
)
/**
* A pure HTTP response DTO. [status] is the HTTP status code (204/404/403/429 all meaningful
* to callers — see plan §4.2/§4.3); [body] is the raw bytes (may be empty for 204).
*
* NOTE: [body] is a `ByteArray`, so generated equality is by reference — see [HttpRequest].
*/
public data class HttpResponse(
val status: Int,
val body: ByteArray,
val headers: Map<String, String> = emptyMap(),
)

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package wang.yaojia.webterm.wire
import kotlinx.serialization.json.Json
import kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonNull
import kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonObject
import kotlinx.serialization.json.JsonPrimitive
import kotlinx.serialization.json.booleanOrNull
import kotlinx.serialization.json.doubleOrNull
import kotlinx.serialization.json.intOrNull
import kotlinx.serialization.json.longOrNull
/**
* Pure codec for the WS text-frame protocol (frozen contract, plan §3.1). NEVER throws in
* either direction — the Android analogue of iOS `WireProtocol.MessageCodec`.
*
* - [encode] client → server. HAND-ROLLED so the bytes are IDENTICAL to the web
* client / server `JSON.stringify` (explicit `sessionId:null`, top-level
* `approve.mode`, JS control-char escaping). Every [ClientMessage] has a
* representation, so encode is total.
* - [decodeServer] server → client (UNTRUSTED). Tolerant kotlinx.serialization decode into a
* [ServerMessage]; a malformed / unknown / wrong-typed-required frame → null
* (drop + count, never crash — mirrors the server's own resilience).
* - [decodeClient] the boundary validator — the Android mirror of the server's
* `parseClientMessage` (type whitelist, `resize` 1..1000, `input.data`
* passthrough, `attach.sessionId` UUID-v4 / explicit-null). Invalid → null.
* Exact inverse of [encode] for round-trip verification.
*/
public object MessageCodec {
private val json = Json {
ignoreUnknownKeys = true
isLenient = true
}
// ─── encode (client → server) ────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Encode a [ClientMessage] as a JSON text frame the server's `parseClientMessage` accepts,
* BYTE-IDENTICAL to the web client. String escaping matches `JSON.stringify` (short escapes
* for `\b \t \n \f \r`, `\u00xx` lowercase-hex for the other C0 control bytes); `attach`
* always carries an explicit `sessionId` key (null when absent); UUIDs are lowercased;
* `approve.mode` is a TOP-LEVEL key (the server re-reads the raw frame for it).
*/
public fun encode(message: ClientMessage): String = when (message) {
is ClientMessage.Attach -> encodeAttach(message.sessionId, message.cwd)
is ClientMessage.Input -> """{"type":"input","data":${jsonString(message.data)}}"""
is ClientMessage.Resize -> """{"type":"resize","cols":${message.cols},"rows":${message.rows}}"""
is ClientMessage.Approve ->
message.mode?.let { """{"type":"approve","mode":"${it.wire}"}""" } ?: """{"type":"approve"}"""
ClientMessage.Reject -> """{"type":"reject"}"""
}
private fun encodeAttach(sessionId: String?, cwd: String?): String {
// The sessionId is escaped via jsonString (like every other string field) so encode stays
// TOTAL and byte-identical to JSON.stringify — never interpolate an id raw (JSON injection).
val sid = if (sessionId != null) jsonString(sessionId.lowercase()) else "null"
val cwdPart = if (cwd != null) ",\"cwd\":${jsonString(cwd)}" else ""
return """{"type":"attach","sessionId":$sid$cwdPart}"""
}
/** JSON string literal with `JSON.stringify`-identical escaping (iterates UTF-16 units). */
private fun jsonString(value: String): String {
val sb = StringBuilder(value.length + 2)
sb.append('"')
var i = 0
while (i < value.length) {
val c = value[i]
when (c) {
'"' -> sb.append("\\\"")
'\\' -> sb.append("\\\\")
'\b' -> sb.append("\\b") // 0x08
'\t' -> sb.append("\\t") // 0x09
'\n' -> sb.append("\\n") // 0x0A
'\u000C' -> sb.append("\\f") // 0x0C
'\r' -> sb.append("\\r") // 0x0D
else ->
when {
c.code < 0x20 ->
sb.append("\\u").append(c.code.toString(16).padStart(4, '0'))
// Valid high+low surrogate pair: emit both UTF-16 units verbatim
// (JSON.stringify keeps the astral character as-is).
c.isHighSurrogate() && i + 1 < value.length && value[i + 1].isLowSurrogate() -> {
sb.append(c).append(value[i + 1])
i++ // consume the low surrogate too
}
// Lone surrogate (a high without a low, or a bare low): ES2019
// well-formed JSON.stringify emits \udXXX lowercase-hex.
c.isSurrogate() ->
sb.append("\\u").append(c.code.toString(16).padStart(4, '0'))
else -> sb.append(c)
}
}
i++
}
sb.append('"')
return sb.toString()
}
// ─── decodeServer (server → client, untrusted) ───────────────────────────────
/**
* Decode an untrusted server text frame into a [ServerMessage], or null to DROP it (bad
* JSON, non-object, unknown `type`, or a missing/wrong-typed REQUIRED field). Wrong-typed
* OPTIONAL fields are tolerated as absent (mirrors the server's tolerant parsing). Unknown
* keys are ignored. Never throws.
*/
public fun decodeServer(raw: String): ServerMessage? {
val root = parseObject(raw) ?: return null
val type = root.stringField("type") ?: return null
return when (ServerMessageType.fromWire(type)) {
ServerMessageType.ATTACHED -> decodeAttached(root)
ServerMessageType.OUTPUT -> root.stringField("data")?.let { ServerMessage.Output(it) }
ServerMessageType.EXIT -> decodeExit(root)
ServerMessageType.STATUS -> decodeStatus(root)
ServerMessageType.TELEMETRY -> decodeTelemetry(root)
null -> null
}
}
private fun decodeAttached(obj: JsonObject): ServerMessage? {
val raw = obj.stringField("sessionId") ?: return null
if (!Validation.isValidSessionId(raw)) return null
return ServerMessage.Attached(raw.lowercase())
}
private fun decodeExit(obj: JsonObject): ServerMessage? {
val code = obj.intField("code") ?: return null
return ServerMessage.Exit(code, obj.stringField("reason"))
}
private fun decodeStatus(obj: JsonObject): ServerMessage? {
val status = obj.stringField("status")?.let { ClaudeStatus.fromWire(it) } ?: return null
val detail = obj.stringField("detail")
val pending = obj.boolField("pending") ?: false
val gate = obj.stringField("gate")?.let { GateKind.fromWire(it) }
return ServerMessage.Status(status, detail, pending, gate)
}
private fun decodeTelemetry(obj: JsonObject): ServerMessage? {
val tel = obj["telemetry"] as? JsonObject ?: return null
val at = tel.longField("at") ?: return null // only required field
return ServerMessage.Telemetry(
StatusTelemetry(
contextUsedPct = tel.doubleField("contextUsedPct"),
costUsd = tel.doubleField("costUsd"),
linesAdded = tel.intField("linesAdded"),
linesRemoved = tel.intField("linesRemoved"),
model = tel.stringField("model"),
effort = tel.stringField("effort"),
pr = tel.decodeNested("pr", PrInfo.serializer()),
rate = tel.decodeNested("rate", RateInfo.serializer()),
at = at,
),
)
}
// ─── decodeClient (boundary validator — server-parseClientMessage mirror) ─────
/**
* Validate + decode a client text frame the way the server's `parseClientMessage` would
* ACCEPT/REJECT it: `type` in [ClientMessageType]; `resize` cols/rows non-string integers in
* 1..1000; `input.data` a string (passed through VERBATIM); `attach.sessionId` present as
* explicit null or a UUID-v4; `attach.cwd` (when present) an absolute path. Invalid → null.
* The exact inverse of [encode], so `decodeClient(encode(m)) == m` for canonical `m`.
*/
public fun decodeClient(raw: String): ClientMessage? {
val root = parseObject(raw) ?: return null
val type = root.stringField("type") ?: return null
return when (ClientMessageType.fromWire(type)) {
ClientMessageType.ATTACH -> decodeAttach(root)
ClientMessageType.INPUT -> root.stringField("data")?.let { ClientMessage.Input(it) }
ClientMessageType.RESIZE -> decodeResize(root)
ClientMessageType.APPROVE ->
ClientMessage.Approve(root.stringField("mode")?.let { ApproveMode.fromWire(it) })
ClientMessageType.REJECT -> ClientMessage.Reject
null -> null
}
}
private fun decodeResize(obj: JsonObject): ClientMessage? {
val cols = obj.intField("cols")?.takeIf { it in WireConstants.RESIZE_RANGE } ?: return null
val rows = obj.intField("rows")?.takeIf { it in WireConstants.RESIZE_RANGE } ?: return null
return ClientMessage.Resize(cols, rows)
}
private fun decodeAttach(obj: JsonObject): ClientMessage? {
if ("sessionId" !in obj) return null // the key is REQUIRED (present as null or uuid)
val cwd: String? =
obj["cwd"]?.let { el ->
val c = (el as? JsonPrimitive)?.takeIf { it.isString }?.content ?: return null
if (!Validation.isAbsoluteCwd(c)) return null
c
}
val sidEl = obj.getValue("sessionId")
if (sidEl is JsonNull) return ClientMessage.Attach(null, cwd)
val sid = (sidEl as? JsonPrimitive)?.takeIf { it.isString }?.content ?: return null
if (!Validation.isValidSessionId(sid)) return null
return ClientMessage.Attach(sid.lowercase(), cwd)
}
// ─── shared JSON helpers (tolerant, never throw) ─────────────────────────────
private fun parseObject(raw: String): JsonObject? =
runCatching { json.parseToJsonElement(raw) }.getOrNull() as? JsonObject
/** A JSON STRING value only (a number/bool/null/object → null → treated as absent). */
private fun JsonObject.stringField(key: String): String? =
(this[key] as? JsonPrimitive)?.takeIf { it.isString }?.content
/** A JSON non-string INTEGER only (`"80"`, `80.5`, null → null). */
private fun JsonObject.intField(key: String): Int? =
(this[key] as? JsonPrimitive)?.takeIf { !it.isString }?.intOrNull
/** A JSON non-string integral LONG only (for the millisecond `at` timestamp). */
private fun JsonObject.longField(key: String): Long? =
(this[key] as? JsonPrimitive)?.takeIf { !it.isString }?.longOrNull
/** A JSON non-string NUMBER as Double (a quoted number/other → null → treated as absent). */
private fun JsonObject.doubleField(key: String): Double? =
(this[key] as? JsonPrimitive)?.takeIf { !it.isString }?.doubleOrNull
/** A JSON BOOLEAN only (a quoted "true" / other → null → caller defaults to false). */
private fun JsonObject.boolField(key: String): Boolean? =
(this[key] as? JsonPrimitive)?.takeIf { !it.isString }?.booleanOrNull
/** Decode a nested @Serializable object tolerantly: any decode failure → null (absent). */
private fun <T> JsonObject.decodeNested(
key: String,
deserializer: kotlinx.serialization.DeserializationStrategy<T>,
): T? = this[key]?.let { runCatching { json.decodeFromJsonElement(deserializer, it) }.getOrNull() }
}

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package wang.yaojia.webterm.wire
/**
* Server -> client WS frames (FROZEN contract, plan §3.1). The Android analogue of
* `src/types.ts:109-120` `ServerMessage` and iOS `WireProtocol.ServerMessage`.
*
* Every frame is UNTRUSTED input: A4's `MessageCodec.decodeServer` maps a raw text frame to
* one of these or to `null` (drop the frame) — an undecodable frame is counted and dropped,
* NEVER a crash (`src/protocol.ts` resilience). This file only freezes the SHAPES.
*/
public sealed interface ServerMessage {
/**
* Attach confirmation. ALWAYS adopt the server-issued id — attaching with an unknown UUID
* yields a fresh session id (`src/session/manager.ts`). [sessionId] is the raw string here;
* A4's decode enforces the UUID-v4 shape before constructing this.
*/
public data class Attached(val sessionId: String) : ServerMessage
/** Opaque ANSI/UTF-8 bytes; ring-buffer replay and the live stream share this shape. */
public data class Output(val data: String) : ServerMessage
/**
* Shell exit (terminal). `code == WireConstants.SPAWN_FAILED_EXIT_CODE` (-1) means the
* spawn never succeeded (M4) and [reason] is required server-side in that case.
*/
public data class Exit(val code: Int, val reason: String? = null) : ServerMessage
/**
* Claude Code activity derived from hooks (H2/H3/B4). [pending] = a tool approval is held
* server-side and the client may approve/reject; [gate] says which kind. An absent
* `pending` decodes as false; an unrecognized `gate` decodes as null (tolerated as absent
* so the pending signal is never lost).
*/
public data class Status(
val status: ClaudeStatus,
val detail: String? = null,
val pending: Boolean = false,
val gate: GateKind? = null,
) : ServerMessage
/** Latest statusLine telemetry broadcast (B2). */
public data class Telemetry(val telemetry: StatusTelemetry) : ServerMessage
}
/**
* Claude Code activity (`src/types.ts:97` `ClaudeStatus`). `unknown` = no hook signal yet;
* `stuck` (A5) = output silent past STUCK_TTL while not idle/exited.
*/
public enum class ClaudeStatus(public val wire: String) {
WORKING("working"),
WAITING("waiting"),
IDLE("idle"),
UNKNOWN("unknown"),
STUCK("stuck");
public companion object {
public fun fromWire(value: String): ClaudeStatus? = entries.firstOrNull { it.wire == value }
}
}
/**
* Which held approval a `status` carries (`src/types.ts:101` `PermissionGate`). `plan` = an
* ExitPlanMode three-way gate; `tool` = an ordinary tool gate.
*/
public enum class GateKind(public val wire: String) {
TOOL("tool"),
PLAN("plan");
public companion object {
public fun fromWire(value: String): GateKind? = entries.firstOrNull { it.wire == value }
}
}
/** The `type` discriminator whitelist for server frames (`src/types.ts:109-120`). */
public enum class ServerMessageType(public val wire: String) {
ATTACHED("attached"),
OUTPUT("output"),
EXIT("exit"),
STATUS("status"),
TELEMETRY("telemetry");
public companion object {
public fun fromWire(value: String): ServerMessageType? = entries.firstOrNull { it.wire == value }
}
}

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package wang.yaojia.webterm.wire
import kotlinx.serialization.Serializable
/**
* Per-session statusLine telemetry (B2), broadcast in a `telemetry` frame. FROZEN shape,
* mirrors `src/types.ts:412-422` `StatusTelemetry` and iOS `WireProtocol.StatusTelemetry`.
*
* Every metric is OPTIONAL; [at] (server receive time, ms since epoch) is REQUIRED — a frame
* without it is dropped by A4's decoder. Property names match the server JSON keys exactly so
* the tolerant `Json` decode configured in A4 maps them directly. `@Serializable` here only
* freezes the SHAPE; the tolerant-decode CONFIG (ignoreUnknownKeys / wrong-typed-optional ->
* absent) lives in A4.
*/
@Serializable
public data class StatusTelemetry(
val contextUsedPct: Double? = null,
val costUsd: Double? = null,
val linesAdded: Int? = null,
val linesRemoved: Int? = null,
val model: String? = null,
val effort: String? = null,
val pr: PrInfo? = null,
val rate: RateInfo? = null,
/** Server receive timestamp (ms since epoch). REQUIRED — frames without it are dropped. */
val at: Long,
)
/** Pull-request summary carried in [StatusTelemetry.pr] (`src/types.ts:419`). */
@Serializable
public data class PrInfo(
val number: Int,
val url: String,
val reviewState: String? = null,
)
/** Rate-limit summary carried in [StatusTelemetry.rate] (`src/types.ts:420`). */
@Serializable
public data class RateInfo(
val fiveHourPct: Double? = null,
val sevenDayPct: Double? = null,
)

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package wang.yaojia.webterm.wire
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.Flow
/**
* The ONLY WS I/O boundary (FROZEN contract, plan §3.1/§3.2). The Android analogue of iOS
* `WireProtocol.TermTransport`.
*
* `:transport-okhttp` (A7) and the `FakeTransport` in `:test-support` (A3) both implement this;
* `SessionEngine` (A14) cannot tell them apart. Pure interface — NO OkHttp/Android imports.
*/
public interface TermTransport {
/**
* Open a WS connection to [HostEndpoint.wsUrl], stamping `Origin: endpoint.originHeader` on
* the upgrade (CSWSH defence, plan §5.1). Throws on connect-time failure (the underlying
* error is rethrown verbatim so the pairing probe, A9, can classify POSIX/TLS codes).
*/
public suspend fun connect(endpoint: HostEndpoint): TransportConnection
}
/**
* One live WS connection, as an immutable capability handle (FROZEN contract). The Android
* analogue of iOS `WireProtocol.TransportConnection` (Swift's closure struct becomes an
* interface here so both the OkHttp impl and the fake can implement it).
*/
public interface TransportConnection {
/**
* Server JSON text frames, in arrival order. Normal completion of the flow = a clean close;
* an exception thrown by the flow = a transport error. The two MUST stay distinguishable
* (the engine treats clean-close vs error differently, A14).
*/
public val frames: Flow<String>
/** Send one client JSON text frame (produced by A4's `MessageCodec.encode`). */
public suspend fun send(frame: String)
/** Close the connection (client detach — the server-side PTY keeps running). */
public suspend fun close()
}
/**
* One live connection's ping capability (see [PingableTermTransport]). Android analogue of the
* iOS SessionCore-internal `ConnectionPinger`.
*/
public interface ConnectionPinger {
/**
* Send one WS ping; returns true iff the pong arrived in time (false = a miss, counted by
* the PingScheduler against [Tunables.PONG_MISS_LIMIT]).
*/
public suspend fun ping(): Boolean
}
/**
* A [TermTransport] that also exposes a per-connection ping hook, so the pure `PingScheduler`
* (A5) can drive keep-alive pings only through transports that support it. Android analogue of
* the iOS `transport as? any PingableTermTransport` downcast: `SessionEngine` opens the
* connection via [connectPingable] when the transport implements this, otherwise falls back to
* plain [TermTransport.connect]. The `FakeTransport` (A3) intentionally does NOT implement this,
* so engine tests drive the PingScheduler through an injected closure instead.
*/
public interface PingableTermTransport : TermTransport {
/**
* Like [connect], but also hands back the ping hook for that same connection (for
* PingScheduler wiring).
*/
public suspend fun connectPingable(endpoint: HostEndpoint): PingableConnection
}
/** The frozen [TransportConnection] PLUS its ping capability (iOS: a `(connection, pinger)` tuple). */
public data class PingableConnection(
val connection: TransportConnection,
val pinger: ConnectionPinger,
)

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package wang.yaojia.webterm.wire
import kotlinx.serialization.SerialName
import kotlinx.serialization.Serializable
/**
* One activity-timeline entry from `GET /live-sessions/:id/events` (FROZEN shape, plan §3.1;
* mirrors `src/types.ts:434-439` and iOS `WireProtocol.TimelineEvent`).
*
* The server derives [eventClass] semantically (`src/types.ts:429`: tool/waiting/done/stuck/
* user) — the client never re-derives it from hook names. [eventClass] stays a raw String so
* the SHAPE decodes even for future/unknown classes; consumers drop unknowns via
* [hasKnownClass]. The tolerant list decode (per-element drop, non-array -> empty) is A8.
*/
@Serializable
public data class TimelineEvent(
/** Server ingest timestamp (ms since epoch). */
val at: Long,
/** Server-derived semantic class; see [KNOWN_CLASSES]. JSON key is `class`. */
@SerialName("class") val eventClass: String,
/** Sanitized tool name (server-side: <=200 chars, control chars stripped). */
val toolName: String? = null,
/** Server-derived human phrase ("ran Bash", "edited 3 files"). */
val label: String,
) {
/** True when [eventClass] is one the server currently emits. */
public val hasKnownClass: Boolean get() = eventClass in KNOWN_CLASSES
public companion object {
/** The server's `TimelineClass` union (`src/types.ts:429`). */
public val KNOWN_CLASSES: Set<String> = setOf("tool", "waiting", "done", "stuck", "user")
}
}

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package wang.yaojia.webterm.wire
import kotlin.time.Duration
import kotlin.time.Duration.Companion.seconds
/**
* Client-side tuning constants (FROZEN contract, plan §3.2.1). The Android analogue of iOS
* `WireProtocol.Tunables`. Downstream modules (`:session-core` PingScheduler/AwayDigest/
* TitleSanitizer, `:transport-okhttp`, `:api-client`) read these — adding/changing one is a
* coordination point. All named; no magic numbers anywhere downstream.
*/
public object Tunables {
/**
* WS keep-alive ping period. OkHttp's `pingInterval` could drive this, but the miss policy
* ([PONG_MISS_LIMIT]) is driven by a `PingScheduler` on an injected clock so a half-dead
* connection ("looks connected but dead") is detected deterministically in tests.
*/
public val PING_INTERVAL: Duration = 25.seconds
/**
* Consecutive missed pongs after which the connection is declared dead: 1 miss is
* tolerated, the 2nd is a disconnect signal. Any answered ping resets the counter.
*/
public const val PONG_MISS_LIMIT: Int = 2
/** Foreground `/live-sessions` polling period (mirrors `public/launcher.ts` REFRESH_MS). */
public val LIST_POLL_INTERVAL: Duration = 5.seconds
/**
* Telemetry chips grey out when [StatusTelemetry.at] is older than this. Mirrors the server
* default STATUSLINE_TTL_MS (`src/config.ts`); the server value is env-overridable at
* runtime while the client bakes the default — accepted drift (plan §3.2.1).
*/
public const val TELEMETRY_STALE_TTL_MS: Long = 30_000L
/** Away-digest banner auto-fade delay. */
public val DIGEST_FADE_DELAY: Duration = 8.seconds
/**
* Max session-title length after sanitisation; OSC titles are host/attacker-controlled
* input (consumed by `:session-core` TitleSanitizer, A6).
*/
public const val TITLE_MAX_LENGTH: Int = 256
/**
* Overall pairing-probe deadline: if either probe step hangs past this the probe resolves
* `timeout` (`:api-client` pairing, A9).
*/
public val PAIRING_PROBE_TIMEOUT: Duration = 10.seconds
/**
* Client WS frame cap. The default (1 MiB on most stacks) is too small: ring-buffer replay
* arrives as ONE full-snapshot frame and JSON escaping inflates control bytes 1-6x, so the
* worst case is ~6 x SCROLLBACK_BYTES (default 2 MiB) plus envelope -> 16 MiB.
*
* COUPLING WARNING: SCROLLBACK_BYTES is a server env knob the client cannot discover at
* runtime. If the host raises it past ~2.7 MB (or replay is extremely escape-dense), the
* receive fails and MUST be classified as the non-retryable `replayTooLarge` failure —
* never fed into the backoff reconnect loop (plan §3.2 / §9 R6).
*/
public const val MAX_WS_MESSAGE_BYTES: Long = 16L * 1024 * 1024
}

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package wang.yaojia.webterm.wire
/**
* Boundary validation — the Android analogue of the server's `parseClientMessage` guards
* (`src/protocol.ts`) and iOS `WireProtocol.Validation`. Pure functions, NEVER throw.
*
* These are the primitives A4's [MessageCodec] uses at the trust boundary; they are also
* exposed so a caller can validate BEFORE sending (the server SILENTLY DISCARDS invalid
* frames — no error reply comes back, `src/protocol.ts:45-86`).
*/
public object Validation {
/**
* Byte-identical port of the server's `SESSION_ID_RE`
* (`src/protocol.ts:22-23`, exported there; housed here for the Android build):
* `^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-4[0-9a-f]{3}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}$` case-insensitive.
*
* UUID v4 — 8-4-4-4-12 hex groups, version nibble `4`, variant nibble `8/9/a/b`, `/i`
* (M7). `crypto.randomUUID()` values pass; strings like `"abc123"` are rejected.
*/
public val SESSION_ID_RE: Regex =
Regex(
"^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-4[0-9a-f]{3}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}$",
RegexOption.IGNORE_CASE,
)
/** True when [candidate] is a valid UUID-v4 session id (whole-string match, M7). */
public fun isValidSessionId(candidate: String): Boolean = SESSION_ID_RE.matches(candidate)
/**
* Mirrors the server's `isValidDimension` range check for `resize`: both cols and rows
* must fall in [WireConstants.RESIZE_RANGE] (1..1000). Frames outside the range are
* silently dropped by the server — validate before sending (`src/protocol.ts:113-115`).
*/
public fun isValidResize(cols: Int, rows: Int): Boolean =
cols in WireConstants.RESIZE_RANGE && rows in WireConstants.RESIZE_RANGE
/**
* Mirrors the server's `attach.cwd` check: must be an absolute path (leading `/`). Deeper
* normalisation stays server-side (`src/protocol.ts:142-149`, Sec L2).
*/
public fun isAbsoluteCwd(candidate: String): Boolean = candidate.startsWith("/")
/**
* Client-frame `type` whitelist (the server's `ALLOWED_TYPES`, `src/protocol.ts:27`).
* Delegates to the frozen [ClientMessageType] enum so the whitelist has ONE source.
*/
public fun isAllowedClientType(type: String): Boolean = ClientMessageType.fromWire(type) != null
/** Server-frame `type` whitelist (`src/types.ts:109-120`), the [ServerMessageType] enum. */
public fun isAllowedServerType(type: String): Boolean = ServerMessageType.fromWire(type) != null
}

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package wang.yaojia.webterm.wire
/**
* Wire-level constants shared with the server (FROZEN contract, plan §3.1). The Android
* analogue of iOS `WireProtocol.WireConstants`. No magic numbers downstream.
*/
public object WireConstants {
/** WS endpoint path (`src/config.ts` DEFAULT_WS_PATH). Stamped into [HostEndpoint.wsUrl]. */
public const val WS_PATH: String = "/term"
/**
* Soft-reset prefix (ESC `[0m`) the server prepends to ring-buffer replay as a safety net
* (`src/types.ts:167-170` / M2). Clients may use it to recognise the replay boundary;
* NEVER strip it — it is valid ANSI the emulator must consume.
*/
public const val REPLAY_SOFT_RESET_PREFIX: String = "\u001B[0m"
/**
* `exit.code` value meaning the PTY spawn never succeeded (M4); `exit.reason` is required
* server-side in that case. Not a retryable state.
*/
public const val SPAWN_FAILED_EXIT_CODE: Int = -1
/** Valid `resize` cols/rows range, inclusive (`src/protocol.ts:113-115`). */
public val RESIZE_RANGE: IntRange = 1..1000
}