feat(android): device enrollment library + rotation (B4)
Hardware-backed (StrongBox/TEE) key + PKCS#10 CSR + /device/enroll client in
:api-client, presented via the existing X509KeyManager; renew body {csr}-only;
DeviceKeyProvider seam makes the orchestration JVM-testable. api-client tests +
koverVerify 80% gate pass.
This commit is contained in:
Yaojia Wang
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package wang.yaojia.webterm.tlsandroid
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import android.util.Log
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import java.security.cert.CertificateFactory
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import java.security.cert.X509Certificate
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import kotlinx.coroutines.sync.Mutex
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import kotlinx.coroutines.sync.withLock
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import okhttp3.OkHttpClient
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import wang.yaojia.webterm.api.enroll.CertificateSigningRequest
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import wang.yaojia.webterm.api.enroll.DeviceEnrollmentClient
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import wang.yaojia.webterm.api.enroll.EnrollmentResult
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import wang.yaojia.webterm.clienttls.CertificateSummary
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import wang.yaojia.webterm.clienttls.CertificateSummaryReader
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/**
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* B4 · The Android device-enroll orchestrator — the `.p12`-free path that mirrors iOS
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* `KeychainClientIdentityStore.enroll/renew`. It composes the five B4 pieces:
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*
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* 1. generate a NON-EXPORTABLE hardware key ([HardwareKeyStore]: StrongBox → TEE),
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* 2. self-sign a P-256 PKCS#10 CSR with it ([CertificateSigningRequest], `:api-client`),
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* 3. run the login → `POST /device/enroll` flow ([DeviceEnrollmentClient], `:api-client`),
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* 4. store the returned leaf + issuer chain into the SAME [CertStore] + AndroidKeyStore slot the
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* existing [AndroidIdentityRepository] resolves from — so it is presented on the EXISTING
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* re-reading `X509KeyManager` mTLS path with no change to that module, and
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* 5. expose a silent [renew] against `/device/:id/renew` using the SAME hardware key.
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*
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* The mutating methods are serialized by a [Mutex] so an enroll and a rotation can never interleave
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* the two-store commit (cert live-pointer + enrollment record).
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*
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* ### The commit
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* The cert-store save is THE durable live-pointer flip (identical to the import/rotation path). It is
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* written LAST, after the enrollment record, so a successful cert-store save always means the mTLS
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* identity is fully live; the pool is then evicted so the next handshake presents the new leaf.
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*/
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public class DeviceEnroller(
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private val client: DeviceEnrollmentClient,
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private val certStore: CertStore,
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private val recordStore: EnrollmentRecordStore,
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private val sharedClient: OkHttpClient,
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private val keyAlias: String = AndroidKeyStoreImporter.DEFAULT_ALIAS,
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private val keyProvider: DeviceKeyProvider = HardwareDeviceKeyProvider,
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) {
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private val commitMutex = Mutex()
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/** Raised when a state-changing enroll/renew precondition is not met. Never leaks a secret. */
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public class EnrollmentStateException(message: String) : Exception(message)
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/**
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* One-time enrollment: login (operator password → short-lived `device:enroll` bearer) → generate
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* a non-exportable hardware key → CSR → `POST /device/enroll` → store the leaf + present it.
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* Returns the installed leaf's display summary. The bearer is held only for this call, never
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* persisted or logged.
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*/
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public suspend fun enroll(
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password: String,
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subdomain: String,
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deviceName: String,
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): CertificateSummary = commitMutex.withLock {
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val login = client.login(password)
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// Generate the hardware key ONLY after a successful login, so a rejected credential never
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// burns a fresh key slot; overwrites any stale key at the alias.
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val key = keyProvider.generate(keyAlias)
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try {
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val csr = CertificateSigningRequest.der(deviceName, key)
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val result = client.enroll(login.enrollToken, csr, subdomain, deviceName)
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commitIdentity(result, deviceName, key.alias)
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summaryOf(result)
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} catch (e: Exception) {
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// The enroll failed AFTER keygen: drop the orphan key so a retry starts clean and no
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// unreferenced key lingers in secure hardware.
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runCatching { keyProvider.delete(key.alias) }
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throw e
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}
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}
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/**
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* Silent rotation: re-CSR from the SAME hardware key and replace the leaf via
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* `POST /device/:id/renew`. [bearerToken] is supplied by the caller (the app-layer rotation
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* scheduler) — the renew-endpoint auth model (mTLS-with-current-cert vs. a fresh bearer) is the
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* server's A6 concern, so this method does not bake in a credential policy; it only re-signs and
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* re-commits. Throws [EnrollmentStateException] if there is nothing enrolled to renew or the key
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* is gone.
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*/
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public suspend fun renew(bearerToken: String): CertificateSummary = commitMutex.withLock {
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val record = recordStore.load()
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?: throw EnrollmentStateException("no enrollment record — nothing to renew")
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val key = keyProvider.load(record.keyStoreAlias)
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?: throw EnrollmentStateException("device key missing — a fresh enroll is required")
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val csr = CertificateSigningRequest.der(record.deviceName, key)
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val result = client.renew(bearerToken, record.deviceId, csr)
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commitIdentity(result, record.deviceName, record.keyStoreAlias)
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summaryOf(result)
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}
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/** Remove the enrolled identity: cert pointer, enrollment record, and the hardware key. */
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public suspend fun remove(): Unit = commitMutex.withLock {
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certStore.clear()
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recordStore.clear()
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keyProvider.delete(keyAlias)
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sharedClient.connectionPool.evictAll()
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}
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/**
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* Persist the enrollment record (deviceId → renew), THEN commit the cert live-pointer (the mTLS
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* flip), THEN evict pooled/resumed connections so the next handshake presents the new leaf via
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* the existing re-reading `X509KeyManager`. The key already lives in AndroidKeyStore at [alias];
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* the private key never enters storage.
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*/
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private fun commitIdentity(result: EnrollmentResult, deviceName: String, alias: String) {
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val leaf = parseCertificate(result.certificate)
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val issuers = result.caChain.map { parseCertificate(it) }
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recordStore.save(
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EnrollmentRecord(
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deviceId = result.deviceId,
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deviceName = deviceName,
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keyStoreAlias = alias,
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renewAfterEpochSeconds = result.renewAfter?.epochSecond ?: 0L,
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),
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)
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certStore.save(
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StoredIdentityMetadata(
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alias = alias,
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keyAlgorithm = KEY_ALGORITHM_EC,
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keyStoreAlias = alias,
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certificateChain = listOf(leaf) + issuers,
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),
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)
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sharedClient.connectionPool.evictAll()
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Log.i(TAG, "Device identity enrolled/renewed and committed for alias '$alias'")
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}
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private fun summaryOf(result: EnrollmentResult): CertificateSummary =
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CertificateSummaryReader.summarize(parseCertificate(result.certificate))
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private fun parseCertificate(der: ByteArray): X509Certificate =
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CertificateFactory.getInstance(X509).generateCertificate(der.inputStream()) as X509Certificate
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private companion object {
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const val TAG = "DeviceEnroller"
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const val X509 = "X.509"
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/** AndroidKeyStore EC keys report algorithm "EC" — matched by `ClientKeyManagerLogic`. */
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const val KEY_ALGORITHM_EC = "EC"
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}
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
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package wang.yaojia.webterm.tlsandroid
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/**
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* B4 · A seam over the three non-exportable hardware-key operations [DeviceEnroller]'s
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* enroll/renew orchestration needs. Production wires the real AndroidKeyStore-backed
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* [HardwareKeyStore] (StrongBox → TEE); a JVM unit test wires a software P-256 double, so the
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* enroll/commit orchestration (request shaping, error handling, the two-store commit sequencing)
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* can be exercised without an emulator. NOTHING about the hardware-key policy leaks through this
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* seam beyond generate/load/delete — the key stays non-exportable in the real implementation.
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*/
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public interface DeviceKeyProvider {
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/** Generate a fresh non-exportable key at [alias], overwriting any prior entry there. */
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public fun generate(alias: String): HardwareBackedKey
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/** Load a previously-generated key by [alias], or null if no entry exists (pre-enroll state). */
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public fun load(alias: String): HardwareBackedKey?
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/** Delete the key entry at [alias]. Idempotent (a missing alias is a no-op). */
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public fun delete(alias: String)
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}
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/**
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* The production [DeviceKeyProvider] — a thin delegate to the AndroidKeyStore-backed
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* [HardwareKeyStore]. Kept as a stateless object so it can be the [DeviceEnroller] constructor
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* default without any wiring.
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*/
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public object HardwareDeviceKeyProvider : DeviceKeyProvider {
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override fun generate(alias: String): HardwareBackedKey = HardwareKeyStore.generate(alias)
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override fun load(alias: String): HardwareBackedKey? = HardwareKeyStore.load(alias)
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override fun delete(alias: String): Unit = HardwareKeyStore.delete(alias)
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
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package wang.yaojia.webterm.tlsandroid
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import android.content.Context
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import android.content.SharedPreferences
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import android.util.Base64
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import com.google.crypto.tink.Aead
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import com.google.crypto.tink.KeyTemplates
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import com.google.crypto.tink.RegistryConfiguration
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import com.google.crypto.tink.aead.AeadConfig
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import com.google.crypto.tink.integration.android.AndroidKeysetManager
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import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream
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import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream
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import java.io.DataInputStream
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import java.io.DataOutputStream
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/**
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* B4 · The auxiliary enrollment record needed to drive silent rotation: the server-minted
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* [deviceId] (the `/device/:id/renew` path segment), the [deviceName] re-used as the renew CSR
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* subject CN, the AndroidKeyStore [keyStoreAlias] holding the SAME non-exportable key to re-sign
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* with, and [renewAfterEpochSeconds] (0 = unknown) for the rotation scheduler.
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*
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* This is deliberately SEPARATE from [StoredIdentityMetadata] (the mTLS live-pointer): the cert
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* identity is what the handshake presents; this record only exists so renew can find the device and
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* its key. The private key is never here — it stays non-exportable in AndroidKeyStore.
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*/
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public data class EnrollmentRecord(
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val deviceId: String,
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val deviceName: String,
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val keyStoreAlias: String,
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val renewAfterEpochSeconds: Long,
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) {
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init {
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require(deviceId.isNotBlank()) { "deviceId must not be blank" }
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require(keyStoreAlias.isNotBlank()) { "keyStoreAlias must not be blank" }
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}
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}
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/** Length-prefixed binary codec for [EnrollmentRecord] (KISS — three UTF strings + one long). */
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public object EnrollmentRecordCodec {
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public fun encode(record: EnrollmentRecord): ByteArray {
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val out = ByteArrayOutputStream()
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DataOutputStream(out).use { data ->
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data.writeUTF(record.deviceId)
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data.writeUTF(record.deviceName)
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data.writeUTF(record.keyStoreAlias)
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data.writeLong(record.renewAfterEpochSeconds)
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}
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return out.toByteArray()
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}
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/** Decode [bytes]; any structural failure → [CorruptStoredIdentityException]. */
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public fun decode(bytes: ByteArray): EnrollmentRecord =
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try {
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DataInputStream(ByteArrayInputStream(bytes)).use { data ->
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EnrollmentRecord(
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deviceId = data.readUTF(),
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deviceName = data.readUTF(),
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keyStoreAlias = data.readUTF(),
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renewAfterEpochSeconds = data.readLong(),
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)
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}
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} catch (e: Exception) {
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throw CorruptStoredIdentityException("Stored enrollment record was truncated/malformed", e)
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}
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}
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/**
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* Storage contract for the [EnrollmentRecord] — repository pattern so [DeviceEnroller] depends on
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* the operation set and a fault/blank can be injected in tests. Idempotent [clear].
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*/
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public interface EnrollmentRecordStore {
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public fun save(record: EnrollmentRecord)
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public fun load(): EnrollmentRecord?
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public fun clear()
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}
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/**
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* Tink-AEAD-encrypted [EnrollmentRecordStore] over an app-private `SharedPreferences` file, mirroring
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* [TinkCertStore]'s custody model (AndroidKeystore-wrapped master key; uninstall-wiped; useless off
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* this device). Kept in its own key/file namespace so it never collides with the cert live-pointer.
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*/
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public class TinkEnrollmentRecordStore(
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context: Context,
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private val keysetName: String = DEFAULT_KEYSET_NAME,
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private val prefFileName: String = DEFAULT_PREF_FILE,
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private val masterKeyUri: String = DEFAULT_MASTER_KEY_URI,
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) : EnrollmentRecordStore {
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private val appContext: Context = context.applicationContext
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private val aead: Aead by lazy { buildAead() }
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override fun save(record: EnrollmentRecord) {
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val ciphertext = aead.encrypt(EnrollmentRecordCodec.encode(record), ASSOCIATED_DATA)
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val committed = prefs().edit()
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.putString(BLOB_KEY, Base64.encodeToString(ciphertext, Base64.NO_WRAP))
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.commit()
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if (!committed) throw java.io.IOException("Failed to durably persist the device enrollment record")
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}
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override fun load(): EnrollmentRecord? {
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val encoded = prefs().getString(BLOB_KEY, null) ?: return null
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val ciphertext = try {
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Base64.decode(encoded, Base64.NO_WRAP)
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} catch (e: IllegalArgumentException) {
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throw CorruptStoredIdentityException("Enrollment record blob was not valid base64", e)
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}
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val plaintext = try {
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aead.decrypt(ciphertext, ASSOCIATED_DATA)
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} catch (e: java.security.GeneralSecurityException) {
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throw CorruptStoredIdentityException("Enrollment record blob failed AEAD decryption", e)
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}
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return EnrollmentRecordCodec.decode(plaintext)
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}
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override fun clear() {
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val committed = prefs().edit().remove(BLOB_KEY).commit()
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if (!committed) throw java.io.IOException("Failed to durably clear the device enrollment record")
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}
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private fun buildAead(): Aead {
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AeadConfig.register()
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val keysetHandle = AndroidKeysetManager.Builder()
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.withSharedPref(appContext, keysetName, prefFileName)
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.withKeyTemplate(KeyTemplates.get(AEAD_KEY_TEMPLATE))
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.withMasterKeyUri(masterKeyUri)
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.build()
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.keysetHandle
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return keysetHandle.getPrimitive(RegistryConfiguration.get(), Aead::class.java)
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}
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private fun prefs(): SharedPreferences =
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appContext.getSharedPreferences(prefFileName, Context.MODE_PRIVATE)
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public companion object {
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private const val DEFAULT_KEYSET_NAME = "webterm_enroll_keyset"
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private const val DEFAULT_PREF_FILE = "webterm_enroll_record_prefs"
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private const val DEFAULT_MASTER_KEY_URI = "android-keystore://webterm_enroll_master_key"
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private const val AEAD_KEY_TEMPLATE = "AES256_GCM"
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private const val BLOB_KEY = "enrollment_record_blob"
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private val ASSOCIATED_DATA: ByteArray = "webterm.client-tls.enrollment-record".toByteArray()
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}
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
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package wang.yaojia.webterm.tlsandroid
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import android.security.keystore.KeyGenParameterSpec
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import android.security.keystore.KeyProperties
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import android.security.keystore.StrongBoxUnavailableException
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import android.util.Log
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import java.security.KeyPair
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import java.security.KeyPairGenerator
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import java.security.KeyStore
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import java.security.PrivateKey
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import java.security.Signature
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import java.security.cert.X509Certificate
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import java.security.interfaces.ECPublicKey
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import java.security.spec.ECGenParameterSpec
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import wang.yaojia.webterm.api.enroll.CsrSigner
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import wang.yaojia.webterm.api.enroll.EcPointEncoding
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/**
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* B4 · A P-256 signing key that lives ENTIRELY inside AndroidKeyStore and is NON-EXPORTABLE by
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* construction (AndroidKeyStore has no key-material getter). It is the Android analogue of the iOS
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* `SecureEnclaveKey`: `sign` runs inside secure hardware (StrongBox → TEE) and drives the same
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* `Signature("SHA256withECDSA")` path the JVM-unit-test software key uses, so [CsrSigner] callers
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* (`CertificateSigningRequest`) are exercised identically.
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*
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* The wrapped [privateKey] is the opaque AndroidKeyStore handle — presented to the re-reading
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* `X509KeyManager` for the TLS `CertificateVerify` and never exported. [publicKey] is only used to
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* emit the CSR's `SubjectPublicKeyInfo`.
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*/
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public class HardwareBackedKey internal constructor(
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public val alias: String,
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private val privateKey: PrivateKey,
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private val publicKey: ECPublicKey,
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) : CsrSigner {
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override fun publicKeyX963(): ByteArray = EcPointEncoding.x963(publicKey)
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override fun sign(message: ByteArray): ByteArray =
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Signature.getInstance(SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM).apply {
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initSign(privateKey)
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update(message)
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}.sign()
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/** The opaque, non-exportable AndroidKeyStore private-key handle presented on the mTLS path. */
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public val keyHandle: PrivateKey get() = privateKey
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public companion object {
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private const val SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM = "SHA256withECDSA"
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}
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}
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/**
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* Creates / loads / deletes the device's non-exportable P-256 key in AndroidKeyStore.
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*
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* Generation prefers **StrongBox** (dedicated secure element) and falls back to the **TEE** when the
|
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* device has no StrongBox — the security posture (non-exportable, hardware-backed, silent-signing)
|
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* is identical either way; StrongBox is a hardening bonus, not a requirement. The key is
|
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* `PURPOSE_SIGN` only with a broad digest set so TLS 1.2/1.3 signature negotiation for the client
|
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* `CertificateVerify` works, and NO user-authentication is required so silent enroll/renew never
|
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* blocks on a biometric prompt.
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*/
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public object HardwareKeyStore {
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private const val TAG = "HardwareKeyStore"
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private const val ANDROID_KEYSTORE = "AndroidKeyStore"
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private const val CURVE = "secp256r1"
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/**
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* Generate a fresh non-exportable P-256 key at [alias], overwriting any prior entry there.
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* StrongBox-backed when available, else TEE-backed. Throws the underlying keystore exception if
|
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* BOTH paths fail (never returns a half-generated key).
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*/
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public fun generate(alias: String): HardwareBackedKey {
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val keyPair = try {
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generateKeyPair(alias, strongBox = true)
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} catch (_: StrongBoxUnavailableException) {
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Log.i(TAG, "StrongBox unavailable; generating a TEE-backed device key (non-exportable)")
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delete(alias) // clear any partial StrongBox entry before the TEE retry
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generateKeyPair(alias, strongBox = false)
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}
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return HardwareBackedKey(alias, keyPair.private, keyPair.public as ECPublicKey)
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}
|
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|
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/**
|
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* Load a previously-generated key by [alias] (renew path, after relaunch). The public key is
|
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* recovered from the self-signed placeholder certificate AndroidKeyStore stored at generation.
|
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* Returns null if no key entry exists (the normal pre-enroll state).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
public fun load(alias: String): HardwareBackedKey? {
|
||||
val keyStore = androidKeyStore()
|
||||
val privateKey = keyStore.getKey(alias, null) as? PrivateKey ?: return null
|
||||
val publicKey = (keyStore.getCertificate(alias) as? X509Certificate)?.publicKey as? ECPublicKey
|
||||
?: return null
|
||||
return HardwareBackedKey(alias, privateKey, publicKey)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Delete the key entry at [alias]. Idempotent (a missing alias is a no-op). */
|
||||
public fun delete(alias: String) {
|
||||
val keyStore = androidKeyStore()
|
||||
if (keyStore.containsAlias(alias)) keyStore.deleteEntry(alias)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Cheap existence check (does NOT read key material). */
|
||||
public fun exists(alias: String): Boolean = androidKeyStore().containsAlias(alias)
|
||||
|
||||
private fun generateKeyPair(alias: String, strongBox: Boolean): KeyPair {
|
||||
val spec = KeyGenParameterSpec.Builder(alias, KeyProperties.PURPOSE_SIGN)
|
||||
.setAlgorithmParameterSpec(ECGenParameterSpec(CURVE))
|
||||
.setDigests(
|
||||
KeyProperties.DIGEST_NONE,
|
||||
KeyProperties.DIGEST_SHA256,
|
||||
KeyProperties.DIGEST_SHA384,
|
||||
KeyProperties.DIGEST_SHA512,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.setIsStrongBoxBacked(strongBox)
|
||||
.build()
|
||||
val generator = KeyPairGenerator.getInstance(KeyProperties.KEY_ALGORITHM_EC, ANDROID_KEYSTORE)
|
||||
generator.initialize(spec)
|
||||
return generator.generateKeyPair()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun androidKeyStore(): KeyStore =
|
||||
KeyStore.getInstance(ANDROID_KEYSTORE).apply { load(null) }
|
||||
}
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user