feat(android): wire the dead code, render the git panel, make the token gate real

Four agents' worth of :app wiring. Everything here existed as tested code with
zero production call sites, or as a screen rendering a shape the server stopped
sending months ago.

Dead code that shipped as features. All three were fully implemented and
unit-tested while being reachable from nothing:

  - Session-list preview thumbnails. SessionsHome called SessionListScreen
    without the `thumbnails` argument, so the `= null` default won and every
    row rendered a placeholder forever — on the home session chooser, whose
    entire purpose is seeing what each session is doing.
  - Quick-reply chips and their palette editor.
  - PointerContextMenu (large-screen secondary click).

ThumbnailPipeline's formal cross-review had been explicitly skipped when it was
written — PROGRESS_ANDROID.md said so in as many words, and it is concurrency
code, so nothing had ever reviewed OR executed it. It has now been reviewed and
kept: the LruCache key, the fair Semaphore(2), the Mutex-guarded in-flight
dedup and the NonCancellable in-flight release are all sound, and a retained
map entry would have poisoned a key forever.

The v0.6 project-detail git panel. Android rendered the pre-w6 shape: one bare
dirty dot, a bare hash+subject commit row, and a worktree heading that renamed
itself to "Branch" at n=1 — the exact behaviour G5 removed. Now the sync band,
unpushed marking with a single upstream boundary, and "Worktrees (n)". The rule
that drives it is enforced, not documented: exactly one state may render green,
and no-upstream is not that state.

Remote approvals are no longer blind. status.preview reaches GateBanner and
PlanGateSheet, so the user can see the command or diff they are approving
instead of a tool name. Absent preview stays an ordinary gate, not an error.

The WEBTERM_TOKEN gate is no longer inert. NetworkModule was calling
OkHttpClientFactory.create(identityProvider) with no cookieJar, so the shared
client ran on CookieJar.NO_COOKIES and none of the cookie plumbing did
anything. It now installs the real AuthCookieJar — one client, so the cookie
rides the WS upgrade too — backed by the Tink-sealed store, and binds
InMemoryAuthCookieStore if a cipher cannot be constructed rather than ever
persisting a shell credential in the clear. The persister runs on an IO scope
because OkHttp calls a CookieJar synchronously and must never block on
DataStore or Tink.

And the user-facing half that made the gate unusable: a token-gated host
answers the pairing probe's unauthenticated GET with 401, which the frozen
taxonomy could only report as "this port is running something else" — so such
a host was impossible to pair AND the copy was misleading. Pairing now routes
to a token prompt and resumes through the same cert-gate choke point. The
token is a parameter, never a field and never part of any UI state.

Docs corrected rather than left aspirational: the plan asserted a cleartext
allowlist "permitted only for private LAN/Tailscale CIDRs", which the platform
cannot express at all — the network-security-config format has no netmask or
prefix syntax. PROGRESS_ANDROID.md now opens with what "COMPLETE" actually
meant, and PROGRESS_LOG.md records the whole pass including what is still
undone: A34/A35 have no code, and device QA remains ~0%.

Verified: ./gradlew test :app:assembleDebug :app:testDebugUnitTest koverVerify
-> BUILD SUCCESSFUL, 893 JVM tests, 0 failures (baseline was 617). The :app
run was re-measured with outputs deleted and --no-build-cache, and the APK
re-packaged, so Hilt graph validity is an observation rather than an
up-to-date claim.

docs/ANDROID_CLIENT_PLAN.md

@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ Reach functional parity with the iOS client's shipped feature set (P0 + P1). Eve
 - **`DELETE /live-sessions` kill-all / a "manage" page** — **iOS does NOT consume this route**; its swipe-to-kill and pointer-menu kill both use per-session `DELETE /live-sessions/:id`. Out of parity; do not build a kill-all surface iOS lacks.
 - **On-device WebView/xterm.js fidelity fallback** — only if Termux emulation fails QA (§6.8). Not built by default.
 - **System-`KeyChain` MDM cert path** — documented fallback only; wrong trust model for a per-device pinned identity.
-- **Self-signed-LAN `wss://` custom trust / pinning** — bare LAN uses `ws://` cleartext (allowlisted CIDRs); `wss` is only for the tunnel/Tailscale, which present real CA-signed certs. A `CertificatePinner`/custom `X509TrustManager` path is documented but not built (§6.9, §8).
+- **Self-signed-LAN `wss://` custom trust / pinning** — bare LAN uses `ws://` cleartext (permitted in `base-config`; see §6.9 — the platform has no CIDR syntax, so it CANNOT be scoped to RFC1918); `wss` is only for the tunnel/Tailscale, which present real CA-signed certs. A `CertificatePinner`/custom `X509TrustManager` path is documented but not built (§6.9, §8).
 - **Cross-device palette sync** — matches current design (iOS/web/Android stores are independent).
 - **Voice commands / editor-open / worktree-create** — server has routes (`/open-in-editor`, `/projects/worktree`) the iOS client does not consume; out of parity scope.
 
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ Reach functional parity with the iOS client's shipped feature set (P0 + P1). Eve
 | Persistence (secret / device cert) | **Google Tink AEAD + AndroidKeystore master key**; **the private key is imported non-exportable into `AndroidKeyStore`** (the runtime home). Tink AEAD encrypts only the **cert chain + metadata** blob at rest. **No `.p12` blob or passphrase is persisted.** | Non-exportable, device-bound = the `…AfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly` analogue. **Not `EncryptedFile`/`security-crypto`** (that Jetpack Security API is deprecated — draft inconsistency resolved). |
 | Push | **Firebase Cloud Messaging (FCM) v1**, data-only high-priority | Only way to reproduce the lock-screen two-tap Allow/Deny loop (§4.5, §9 R1). |
 | mTLS | **`AndroidKeyStore`-imported non-exportable key + a custom re-reading `X509KeyManager`** (returns the AndroidKeyStore `PrivateKey`/chain per handshake) → `SSLContext` → OkHttp `sslSocketFactory`. **`KeyStore("PKCS12")` is used transiently only to *parse the import file*, never as the runtime key home.** | App-private identity (NOT system `KeyChain`); re-reading KeyManager + `connectionPool.evictAll()` gives the iOS "no-relaunch cert rotation" behavior. One key home, no contradiction (R4/mustFix). |
-| Server-cert trust | **Default system trust** (tunnel `*.terminal.yaojia.wang` + Tailscale MagicDNS present real LE certs). Bare LAN uses **`ws://` cleartext** via a `network_security_config` CIDR allowlist. | Closes the "how do we trust the server cert" gap without a custom trust manager for the common case. |
+| Server-cert trust | **Default system trust** (tunnel `*.terminal.yaojia.wang` + Tailscale MagicDNS present real LE certs). Bare LAN uses **`ws://` cleartext**, permitted in `network_security_config`'s `base-config` — the format has NO address-range syntax, so it cannot be narrowed to LAN literals (§6.9). | Closes the "how do we trust the server cert" gap without a custom trust manager for the common case. |
 | QR scan | **CameraX + ML Kit Barcode** (`com.google.mlkit:barcode-scanning`) | On-device, one validator shared with manual entry. |
 | Biometric | **`androidx.biometric:BiometricPrompt`** hosted in a `FragmentActivity` (the Allow trampoline) | Gates the Allow action. |
 | Testing | **JUnit5 + kotlinx-coroutines-test (virtual time) + Turbine + MockK** (unit); **Espresso + Compose UI Test** (instrumented; Robolectric only where it faithfully emulates); **Kover** (coverage) | Mirrors iOS's injected-clock/fake-transport discipline. `AndroidKeyStore`/Tink tests are **instrumented on a real emulator/device** — Robolectric does not provide the AndroidKeyStore provider (platform review). |
@@ -429,7 +429,20 @@ Two tiers, chosen by decision gate. **Note the blast radius:** the tier-2 WebVie
 OkHttp requires an `(SSLSocketFactory, X509TrustManager)` pair. Decision:
 
 - **Tunnel (`*.terminal.yaojia.wang`) + Tailscale MagicDNS:** real CA-signed (LE) certs → **default system trust**. No custom trust manager.
-- **Bare LAN:** use **`ws://` cleartext**, permitted only for private LAN/Tailscale CIDRs via `network_security_config` (global `usesCleartextTraffic=false`).
+- **Bare LAN:** use **`ws://` cleartext**, permitted in `network_security_config`'s `base-config`.
+  **CORRECTED (was wrong in this plan until the A19 fix):** the original text said cleartext would be
+  "permitted only for private LAN/Tailscale CIDRs via `network_security_config`". That is not
+  expressible. The network-security-config format has NO netmask/prefix/CIDR attribute anywhere — a
+  `<domain>` holds one hostname or one IP literal, and `includeSubdomains` walks DNS labels, so it cannot
+  generalise `192.168.0.0/16`. Enumerating ~18.9M addresses is not an option either. Since a LAN address
+  is user-typed at runtime and this file is a build-time resource, it also cannot be scoped to "the IP the
+  user actually entered". So: cleartext is ON in `base-config`, `*.terminal.yaojia.wang` keeps an explicit
+  `cleartextTrafficPermitted="false"` block (the one hostname known at build time), trust anchors are
+  pinned to `system` only, and the real guard moves into the app — the §5.4 warning tiers plus
+  confirm-before-network. The scoping the platform cannot express is additionally enforced at
+  transport time in `OkHttpClientFactory`, which refuses a plaintext dial to a non-private host.
+  Honest tradeoff: on bare `ws://` the terminal bytes and the `WEBTERM_TOKEN` cookie are readable and
+  replayable by anyone on the path. This is a LAN/Tailscale posture, never an internet-exposure one.
 - **Self-signed LAN `wss`:** DEFERRED — a documented `CertificatePinner`/custom `X509TrustManager` path, not built by default.
 
 ---
@@ -468,7 +481,7 @@ Gesture/IME/CJK composition, camera-QR, haptics, lock-screen Allow/Deny, FCM end
 - [ ] **mTLS trust model (one key home)** — private key **imported non-exportable into `AndroidKeyStore`**; a **custom re-reading `X509KeyManager`** returns the AndroidKeyStore `PrivateKey`/chain per handshake; `KeyStore("PKCS12")` is import-parse-only (transient), never the runtime home; **NOT** system `KeyChain`. Client cert presented on both WS and REST via one shared `OkHttpClient`. On rotation, `connectionPool.evictAll()` so pooled/resumed connections drop the old identity.
 - [ ] **Cert storage** — private key non-exportable/device-bound; only the **cert chain + metadata** blob is stored, encrypted with **Tink AEAD + AndroidKeystore master key**; app-private, uninstall-wiped, never in backups/cloud. **No `.p12` blob or passphrase persisted.** Import validates before persisting so a bad passphrase can't clobber a prior identity.
 - [ ] **No system-wide credential leakage** — no ephemeral/disk HTTP cache (`OkHttpClient.cache(null)`) — preview/diff bodies can contain terminal secrets.
-- [ ] **Cleartext posture** — `usesCleartextTraffic=false` globally; a `network_security_config` allowlist permits `ws://` only for LAN/Tailscale CIDRs; `wss` (tunnel/Tailscale) uses default system trust; §5.4 warning tiers reproduced in-app (public-host blocking needs explicit acknowledge; tunnel host = cert-gated, warning softened, TLS failure re-mapped to "client cert invalid/revoked").
+- [x] **Cleartext posture** — cleartext permitted in `base-config` (NO CIDR syntax exists — see §6.9), `*.terminal.yaojia.wang` explicitly denied, trust anchors `system`-only, no `debug-overrides`, and a transport-time private-host check in `OkHttpClientFactory`; locked by `NetworkSecurityConfigTest`; `wss` (tunnel/Tailscale) uses default system trust; §5.4 warning tiers reproduced in-app (public-host blocking needs explicit acknowledge; tunnel host = cert-gated, warning softened, TLS failure re-mapped to "client cert invalid/revoked").
 - [ ] **Tunnel-host cert gate** — `runProbe` refuses to probe `*.terminal.yaojia.wang` unless a device cert is installed; both confirm and retry funnel through the one choke point (retry can't bypass).
 - [ ] **Push token discipline** — single-use `/hook/decision` capability token validated as v4 UUID, passed only to the POST, **never persisted, never logged, never in fallback copy**; payload minimized (`sessionId`/`cls`/`token` only).
 - [ ] **Notification-action trust split** — **Deny → `BroadcastReceiver`** (`goAsync()`, no UI, expedited POST). **Allow → a translucent, `excludeFromRecents` trampoline `Activity`** that hosts `BiometricPrompt` then POSTs — a `BroadcastReceiver`/`Service` cannot present `BiometricPrompt` and `goAsync()`'s ~10s budget would blow. (Corrects the draft's "no app open" claim for Allow.) All `PendingIntent`s `FLAG_IMMUTABLE` (API 31+). Deny is auth-free (fail-safe). The decision POST is **expedited** (not deferrable `WorkManager`); the single-use token makes a retried-after-success POST return 403 → idempotent retry-safety.