fix(relay-auth): close 5 pre-production security findings (F1–F5)
F1 (HIGH): bind step-up freshness to the required method (stepUpMethod) so a login-time or weaker (TOTP) factor can no longer satisfy a passkey requirement. F2 (HIGH): make the step-up gate host-driven and fail-closed on connect+reattach (deny when policy.required and the principal is missing/stale/wrong-method). F3 (MED): bind the WebAuthn assertion to the stored credential (credentialId cross-check + forward publicKey/credentialId to the verifier). F4 (LOW): make verifyDpopProof totally fail-safe (no unhandled throw), wrap the authz boundary into a clean audited 401, and validate cnfJkt format at issue. F5 (LOW): return newSignCount from finishAuthentication so the caller can persist the advanced counter (WebAuthn clone detection). All fixes ship regression tests. relay-auth: 122 tests green, tsc clean.
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@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ const NOW = 1_700_000_000
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const AUD_A = 'alice.term.example.com'
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const AUD_B = 'bob.term.example.com'
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const ORIGIN_A = `https://${AUD_A}`
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const NEVER: StepUpPolicy = { maxAgeSeconds: Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER, requiredMethod: 'passkey' }
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const NEVER: StepUpPolicy = { required: false, maxAgeSeconds: Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER, requiredMethod: 'passkey' }
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describe('PERMANENT TRIPWIRE — device A can never reach host B (INV1)', () => {
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let signingKey: CryptoKey
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