feat(relay-run): Phase 0 single-host relay — real data-plane wiring + integration test

New relay-run/ package boots the REAL term-relay relay-node between a browser WSS
listener and an agent mTLS listener, delegating every authz verdict to the real
relay-auth onUpgrade (Origin/CSWSH + capability verify + DPoP PoP + single-use jti),
with the real P4 E2E crypto. No audited package modified.

- P1 (done): in-process integration test round-trips a sealed payload both ways
  through the real createRelayNode splice + real createMuxSession; INV2 asserted
  (relay sees only ciphertext); negative controls (foreign Origin / missing DPoP -> 401).
- P2 (boots): main.ts brings up self-signed TLS + 3 listeners + in-memory control-plane.
- P3 (not landed): no agent dial / node-pty / relay-web serve yet.
- 4 tests green, tsc clean. node_modules via symlinks (gitignored).

Two real seam drifts surfaced (documented in PLAN_RELAY_RUN_PHASE0, not hacked):
(1) term-relay authz-port DpopContext shape vs relay-auth — reconciled (server-derived htu/htm);
(2) control-plane CapabilityVerifier.verify is sync but relay-auth verify is async — blocks
    HTTP account/pairing seeding until a 1-line async widen.

relay-run/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+{
+  "name": "relay-run",
+  "version": "0.0.0",
+  "private": true,
+  "type": "module",
+  "description": "Phase 0 single-host runnable rendezvous-relay. Composes the REAL P1 (term-relay data-plane), P4 (relay-e2e), and P5 (relay-auth) exports through in-memory control-plane stores + self-signed TLS, so a browser can click through to a local shell E2E-spliced by the real relay-node. Dev only. See docs/PLAN_RELAY_RUN_PHASE0.md.",
+  "engines": {
+    "node": ">=20"
+  },
+  "scripts": {
+    "start": "tsx src/main.ts",
+    "test": "vitest run",
+    "test:watch": "vitest",
+    "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit"
+  }
+}

relay-run/src/certs/dev-certs.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+/**
+ * Dev-only self-signed TLS material, generated at boot via the system `openssl`. NEVER for
+ * production: a throwaway CA + a browser server cert + an agent-facing server cert signed by that
+ * CA. Private keys are written 0600 and never logged (INV9). The dev CA must never be reused
+ * anywhere real.
+ */
+import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process'
+import { mkdtempSync, readFileSync, chmodSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs'
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
+import { join } from 'node:path'
+
+export interface DevCerts {
+  readonly dir: string
+  readonly browserCertPath: string
+  readonly browserKeyPath: string
+  readonly agentServerCertPath: string
+  readonly agentServerKeyPath: string
+  readonly caCertPath: string
+  readonly caCertPem: string
+  cleanup(): void
+}
+
+function openssl(args: readonly string[], cwd: string): void {
+  execFileSync('openssl', args, { cwd, stdio: ['ignore', 'ignore', 'pipe'] })
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate the dev PKI. Uses Ed25519 keys (OpenSSL 3). Throws if `openssl` is unavailable or a
+ * step fails — the caller fails fast rather than booting without TLS.
+ */
+export function generateDevCerts(browserCn: string): DevCerts {
+  const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'relay-run-certs-'))
+  const p = (name: string): string => join(dir, name)
+
+  // Throwaway CA (agent mTLS trust anchor).
+  openssl(
+    ['req', '-x509', '-newkey', 'ed25519', '-keyout', 'ca.key', '-out', 'ca.crt', '-days', '7',
+      '-nodes', '-subj', '/CN=relay-run-dev-ca'],
+    dir,
+  )
+
+  // Browser-facing server cert (self-signed; the user accepts it once).
+  openssl(
+    ['req', '-x509', '-newkey', 'ed25519', '-keyout', 'browser.key', '-out', 'browser.crt',
+      '-days', '7', '-nodes', '-subj', `/CN=${browserCn}`,
+      '-addext', `subjectAltName=DNS:${browserCn},DNS:localhost,IP:127.0.0.1`],
+    dir,
+  )
+
+  // Agent-facing server cert, signed by the dev CA (the agent pins this CA).
+  openssl(
+    ['req', '-new', '-newkey', 'ed25519', '-keyout', 'agent-server.key', '-out', 'agent-server.csr',
+      '-nodes', '-subj', '/CN=localhost',
+      '-addext', 'subjectAltName=DNS:localhost,IP:127.0.0.1'],
+    dir,
+  )
+  openssl(
+    ['x509', '-req', '-in', 'agent-server.csr', '-CA', 'ca.crt', '-CAkey', 'ca.key',
+      '-CAcreateserial', '-out', 'agent-server.crt', '-days', '7', '-copy_extensions', 'copy'],
+    dir,
+  )
+
+  for (const key of ['ca.key', 'browser.key', 'agent-server.key']) chmodSync(p(key), 0o600)
+
+  return {
+    dir,
+    browserCertPath: p('browser.crt'),
+    browserKeyPath: p('browser.key'),
+    agentServerCertPath: p('agent-server.crt'),
+    agentServerKeyPath: p('agent-server.key'),
+    caCertPath: p('ca.crt'),
+    caCertPem: readFileSync(p('ca.crt'), 'utf8'),
+    cleanup() {
+      rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
+    },
+  }
+}

relay-run/src/main.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+/**
+ * Phase 0 live process — `npm start`. Boots the single-host rendezvous-relay with REAL security:
+ *   • self-signed TLS (dev CA + browser + agent-facing certs),
+ *   • the REAL relay-node data plane spliced between a browser WSS listener (:8443) and an agent
+ *     mTLS listener (:8444) — every upgrade runs the real Origin/CSWSH + capability verify + DPoP
+ *     path (P5 `onUpgrade`),
+ *   • an in-memory control-plane (:8080, best-effort).
+ * Prints a ready URL + a freshly-minted browser capability token + the tenant subdomain.
+ *
+ * A FULL browser click-through is NOT expected in Phase 0: browsers can't attach the DPoP header
+ * to a WS upgrade, and no agent tunnel is dialed here yet (P3). This process proves the servers
+ * boot and the authz/splice pipeline is wired end to end.
+ */
+import { createAuthorizer } from './wiring/authorizer.js'
+import { buildDataPlane, makeDataPlaneConfig } from './wiring/data-plane.js'
+import { buildPhase0World } from './wiring/relay-world.js'
+import { generateDevCerts } from './certs/dev-certs.js'
+import { makeAgentTlsServerFactory } from './servers/agent-tls.js'
+import { startBrowserServer } from './servers/browser-server.js'
+import { bootControlPlane } from './servers/control-plane-boot.js'
+
+const BIND_HOST = '127.0.0.1'
+const BROWSER_PORT = 8443
+const AGENT_PORT = 8444
+const CONTROL_PLANE_PORT = 8080
+// Capability tokens are deliberately short-lived (relay-auth caps connect TTL at 60s).
+const TOKEN_TTL_SEC = 60
+
+function landingHtml(subdomain: string): string {
+  return `<!doctype html><meta charset="utf-8"><title>relay-run (Phase 0)</title>
+<h1>rendezvous-relay · Phase 0 (dev)</h1>
+<p>Tenant subdomain: <code>${subdomain}</code></p>
+<p>This dev relay boots the REAL data-plane splice + P5 authz. A full terminal click-through needs
+a dialed agent tunnel and the browser DPoP transport (Phase 3).</p>`
+}
+
+async function main(): Promise<void> {
+  const now = () => Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)
+  const world = await buildPhase0World(now())
+  const subdomain = world.host.subdomain
+  const browserCn = `${subdomain}.${world.baseDomain}`
+
+  const certs = generateDevCerts(browserCn)
+
+  // A real browser's Origin includes the listener port, so the CSWSH allow-list must too
+  // (the world's default origin is port-less for the in-process test).
+  const allowedOrigins = [`https://${browserCn}:${BROWSER_PORT}`, ...world.allowedOrigins]
+
+  // Real-time authz (token exp / DPoP freshness advance with the wall clock).
+  const authorizer = createAuthorizer({
+    deps: world.deps,
+    allowedOrigins,
+    now,
+  })
+
+  const config = makeDataPlaneConfig({
+    baseDomain: world.baseDomain,
+    bindHost: BIND_HOST,
+    bindPort: BROWSER_PORT,
+    agentBindPort: AGENT_PORT,
+  })
+
+  // Boots the agent-facing mTLS server as part of the listener construction.
+  const dp = buildDataPlane({
+    config,
+    authorizer,
+    resolver: world.resolver,
+    mtls: world.mtls,
+    now,
+    caBundle: [Buffer.from(certs.caCertPem)],
+    onError: (e) => console.error('[data-plane]', e),
+    tlsServerFactory: makeAgentTlsServerFactory({
+      serverCertPath: certs.agentServerCertPath,
+      serverKeyPath: certs.agentServerKeyPath,
+      bindHost: BIND_HOST,
+      bindPort: AGENT_PORT,
+      onListening: () => console.log(`[agent-mtls] listening wss://${BIND_HOST}:${AGENT_PORT}`),
+      onError: (e) => console.error('[agent-mtls]', e),
+    }),
+  })
+
+  const browserServer = startBrowserServer({
+    certPath: certs.browserCertPath,
+    keyPath: certs.browserKeyPath,
+    bindHost: BIND_HOST,
+    bindPort: BROWSER_PORT,
+    node: dp.node,
+    landingHtml: landingHtml(subdomain),
+    onListening: () => console.log(`[browser-wss] listening https://${BIND_HOST}:${BROWSER_PORT}`),
+    onError: (e) => console.error('[browser-wss]', e),
+  })
+
+  let controlPlane: { close(): Promise<void> } | null = null
+  try {
+    controlPlane = await bootControlPlane({
+      publicRaw: world.publicRaw,
+      baseDomain: world.baseDomain,
+      caCertPath: certs.caCertPath,
+      bindHost: BIND_HOST,
+      bindPort: CONTROL_PLANE_PORT,
+    })
+    console.log(`[control-plane] listening http://${BIND_HOST}:${CONTROL_PLANE_PORT} (admin authz fail-closed — sync-verify seam)`)
+  } catch (e) {
+    console.warn('[control-plane] boot skipped:', e instanceof Error ? e.message : e)
+  }
+
+  // Mint a demo browser capability token bound to a fresh DPoP key (the raw token is a bearer
+  // secret — dev only; never log real tokens).
+  const cap = await world.issueCap({ now: now(), ttl: TOKEN_TTL_SEC })
+
+  console.log('\n=== relay-run Phase 0 READY ===')
+  console.log(`Origin      : https://${browserCn}:${BROWSER_PORT}`)
+  console.log(`Add to /etc/hosts:  127.0.0.1  ${browserCn}`)
+  console.log(`Subdomain   : ${subdomain}   hostId: ${world.host.hostId}`)
+  console.log(`Browser cap : ${cap.raw}`)
+  console.log(`DPoP proof  : ${cap.dpop.proofJws}`)
+  console.log('Note: no agent tunnel is dialed yet → browser upgrades resolve but 1013 (agent offline).')
+  console.log('Ctrl-C to stop.\n')
+
+  const shutdown = async (): Promise<void> => {
+    console.log('\nshutting down…')
+    browserServer.close()
+    dp.listener.close()
+    if (controlPlane) await controlPlane.close().catch(() => {})
+    certs.cleanup()
+    process.exit(0)
+  }
+  process.on('SIGINT', () => void shutdown())
+  process.on('SIGTERM', () => void shutdown())
+}
+
+main().catch((e) => {
+  console.error('fatal:', e)
+  process.exit(1)
+})

relay-run/src/servers/agent-tls.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+/**
+ * Real agent-facing mTLS server for `main.ts`. A `TlsServerFactory` that stands up an https server
+ * (`requestCert: true`, `rejectUnauthorized: true`, pinned dev CA) with a `ws` WebSocketServer over
+ * it, so an agent dials `wss://` under mTLS. The TLS layer rejects a no-cert / non-chaining peer
+ * BEFORE `attach()` runs (Finding-4 two-tier defense); `verifyPeer` (P5) then binds the cert to the
+ * registry. Every connection's DER cert is handed to the relay's `onPeer`.
+ */
+import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs'
+import { createServer } from 'node:https'
+import type { TLSSocket } from 'node:tls'
+import type { IncomingMessage } from 'node:http'
+import { WebSocketServer, type WebSocket as WsWebSocket } from 'ws'
+import type { TlsServerFactory, TlsServerLike } from 'term-relay/data-plane/agent-listener.js'
+import { wsToWebSocketLike } from '../wiring/socket-pipe.js'
+
+export interface AgentTlsOptions {
+  readonly serverCertPath: string
+  readonly serverKeyPath: string
+  readonly bindHost: string
+  readonly bindPort: number
+  readonly onListening?: () => void
+  readonly onError?: (e: unknown) => void
+}
+
+export function makeAgentTlsServerFactory(opts: AgentTlsOptions): TlsServerFactory {
+  return (tlsOpts, onPeer): TlsServerLike => {
+    const server = createServer({
+      cert: readFileSync(opts.serverCertPath),
+      key: readFileSync(opts.serverKeyPath),
+      ca: tlsOpts.ca.map((b) => Buffer.from(b)),
+      requestCert: tlsOpts.requestCert,
+      rejectUnauthorized: tlsOpts.rejectUnauthorized,
+    })
+    const wss = new WebSocketServer({ server })
+    wss.on('connection', (ws: WsWebSocket, req: IncomingMessage) => {
+      const peer = (req.socket as TLSSocket).getPeerCertificate(true)
+      const der = peer && peer.raw ? new Uint8Array(peer.raw) : new Uint8Array()
+      onPeer(wsToWebSocketLike(ws), der)
+    })
+    server.on('error', (e) => opts.onError?.(e))
+    server.listen(opts.bindPort, opts.bindHost, () => opts.onListening?.())
+    return {
+      close: () => {
+        wss.close()
+        server.close()
+      },
+    }
+  }
+}

relay-run/src/servers/browser-server.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+/**
+ * Browser-facing WSS server for `main.ts`. Terminates HTTPS on the tenant origin and, on WS
+ * upgrade, builds the P1 `UpgradeRequest` from the raw request headers and hands it to the REAL
+ * relay-node (→ real `authorizeUpgrade` → P5 `onUpgrade`: Origin/CSWSH + capability verify + DPoP).
+ * The handshake echoes ONLY `APP_SUBPROTOCOL` — never the token entry (INV15).
+ */
+import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs'
+import { createServer, type Server } from 'node:https'
+import type { IncomingMessage, ServerResponse } from 'node:http'
+import { WebSocketServer, type WebSocket as WsWebSocket } from 'ws'
+import { APP_SUBPROTOCOL } from 'relay-contracts'
+import type { UpgradeRequest } from 'term-relay/data-plane/upgrade.js'
+import type { RelayNode } from 'term-relay/data-plane/relay-node.js'
+import { wsToWebSocketLike } from '../wiring/socket-pipe.js'
+
+export interface BrowserServerOptions {
+  readonly certPath: string
+  readonly keyPath: string
+  readonly bindHost: string
+  readonly bindPort: number
+  readonly node: RelayNode
+  readonly landingHtml: string
+  readonly onListening?: () => void
+  readonly onError?: (e: unknown) => void
+}
+
+function parseCookies(header: string | undefined): Record<string, string> {
+  const out: Record<string, string> = {}
+  if (!header) return out
+  for (const part of header.split(';')) {
+    const idx = part.indexOf('=')
+    if (idx === -1) continue
+    out[part.slice(0, idx).trim()] = part.slice(idx + 1).trim()
+  }
+  return out
+}
+
+function buildUpgradeRequest(req: IncomingMessage): UpgradeRequest {
+  const proto = req.headers['sec-websocket-protocol']
+  const subprotocols = (typeof proto === 'string' ? proto.split(',') : [])
+    .map((v) => v.trim())
+    .filter((v) => v.length > 0)
+  const dpopHeader = req.headers['dpop']
+  return {
+    host: req.headers.host ?? '',
+    origin: typeof req.headers.origin === 'string' ? req.headers.origin : undefined,
+    url: req.url ?? '/',
+    subprotocols,
+    cookies: parseCookies(req.headers.cookie),
+    remoteAddr: req.socket.remoteAddress ?? '',
+    dpop: { proof: typeof dpopHeader === 'string' ? dpopHeader : null, publicKeyThumbprint: null },
+    activeSessionCount: 0,
+  }
+}
+
+export function startBrowserServer(opts: BrowserServerOptions): Server {
+  const server = createServer(
+    { cert: readFileSync(opts.certPath), key: readFileSync(opts.keyPath) },
+    (_req: IncomingMessage, res: ServerResponse) => {
+      res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'text/html; charset=utf-8' })
+      res.end(opts.landingHtml)
+    },
+  )
+  const wss = new WebSocketServer({
+    server,
+    handleProtocols: (protocols: Set<string>) =>
+      protocols.has(APP_SUBPROTOCOL) ? APP_SUBPROTOCOL : false,
+  })
+  wss.on('connection', (ws: WsWebSocket, req: IncomingMessage) => {
+    opts.node
+      .handleBrowserUpgrade(buildUpgradeRequest(req), wsToWebSocketLike(ws))
+      .catch((e) => opts.onError?.(e))
+  })
+  server.on('error', (e) => opts.onError?.(e))
+  server.listen(opts.bindPort, opts.bindHost, () => opts.onListening?.())
+  return server
+}

relay-run/src/servers/control-plane-boot.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+/**
+ * Best-effort control-plane (P3) boot for `main.ts`: in-memory stores + the dev in-process CA
+ * signer, listening for admin/enroll HTTP. Wrapped so a failure degrades gracefully (the data-plane
+ * is the security-critical surface and boots independently).
+ *
+ * KNOWN SEAM (reported, not hacked): P3's injected `CapabilityVerifier.verify` is SYNCHRONOUS, but
+ * relay-auth's real `verifyCapabilityToken` is ASYNC (WebCrypto). The real P5 verifier therefore
+ * cannot be injected without an additive change to control-plane, so the admin routes run on the
+ * default fail-closed verifier here (deny-by-default, never bypassed). Programmatic account/pairing
+ * seeding through those routes is consequently BLOCKED in Phase 0 — see the report.
+ */
+import { buildControlPlane } from 'control-plane'
+import { loadEnv } from 'control-plane/src/env.js'
+import { createMemoryStores } from 'control-plane/src/store/memory.js'
+
+export interface ControlPlaneBootOptions {
+  readonly publicRaw: Uint8Array
+  readonly baseDomain: string
+  readonly caCertPath: string
+  readonly bindHost: string
+  readonly bindPort: number
+}
+
+export interface ControlPlaneHandle {
+  close(): Promise<void>
+}
+
+export async function bootControlPlane(opts: ControlPlaneBootOptions): Promise<ControlPlaneHandle> {
+  const env = loadEnv({
+    PG_URL: 'postgres://localhost:5432/relay_run_dev',
+    REDIS_URL: 'redis://localhost:6379',
+    CAPABILITY_SIGN_PUBKEY_B64: Buffer.from(opts.publicRaw).toString('base64'),
+    CA_INTERMEDIATE_KMS_KEY_REF: 'dev-inprocess-signer',
+    CA_INTERMEDIATE_CERT_PATH: opts.caCertPath,
+    NODE_MTLS_TRUST_BUNDLE_PATH: opts.caCertPath,
+    BASE_DOMAIN: opts.baseDomain,
+  })
+  const { app } = await buildControlPlane(env, { stores: createMemoryStores() })
+  await app.listen({ port: opts.bindPort, host: opts.bindHost })
+  return { close: () => app.close() }
+}

relay-run/src/wiring/authorizer.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+/**
+ * Authorizer adapter — implements the term-relay (P1) `Authorizer` port by DELEGATING every verdict
+ * to the REAL relay-auth (P5) `onUpgrade`/`onReattach`. P1 holds no authz logic; this file only
+ * reconciles two structurally-drifted-but-equivalent seam shapes:
+ *
+ *   1. DpopContext. P1's port carries `{ proof, publicKeyThumbprint }`; P5 needs `{ proofJws, htu,
+ *      htm }`. The relay derives `htu`/`htm` from the request's OWN authority (`expectedAud` = the
+ *      resolved subdomain), never from client-supplied claims — the spec-faithful DPoP binding.
+ *   2. AuthzOutcome. P5's `principal` is a full AuthenticatedPrincipal; P1's port only needs a
+ *      string, so we surface `principal.accountId` (P1's adapter reads only `hostId`/`jti`).
+ *
+ * F2 (step-up principal wiring): Phase 0 uses a not-required step-up policy, so P5 resolves identity
+ * from the signed token (INV3) and a null session-principal is correct. `resolvePrincipal` is the
+ * seam a later phase injects to pass an authenticated principal for step-up-required hosts.
+ */
+import {
+  onUpgrade as p5OnUpgrade,
+  onReattach as p5OnReattach,
+  type EnforceDeps,
+  type AuthenticatedPrincipal,
+  type AuthzOutcome as P5AuthzOutcome,
+} from 'relay-auth'
+import type {
+  Authorizer,
+  UpgradeContext as PortUpgradeContext,
+  AuthzOutcome as PortAuthzOutcome,
+} from 'term-relay/data-plane/authz-port.js'
+import { DPOP_HTM, htuFor } from './capability.js'
+
+export interface AuthorizerDeps {
+  readonly deps: EnforceDeps
+  readonly allowedOrigins: readonly string[]
+  readonly now: () => number
+  /** F2 seam: resolve the authenticated session principal for step-up. Phase 0 default → null. */
+  readonly resolvePrincipal?: (ctx: PortUpgradeContext) => AuthenticatedPrincipal | null
+}
+
+function toP5Context(
+  ctx: PortUpgradeContext,
+  resolvePrincipal: (ctx: PortUpgradeContext) => AuthenticatedPrincipal | null,
+) {
+  return {
+    capabilityRaw: ctx.capabilityRaw,
+    originHeader: ctx.originHeader,
+    expectedAud: ctx.expectedAud,
+    requestedHostId: ctx.requestedHostId,
+    requiredRight: ctx.requiredRight,
+    remoteAddrHash: ctx.remoteAddrHash,
+    activeSessionCount: ctx.activeSessionCount,
+    // Reconstruct the full DPoP context; htu/htm come from the relay's authority, not the client.
+    dpop: { proofJws: ctx.dpop.proof ?? '', htu: htuFor(ctx.expectedAud), htm: DPOP_HTM },
+    principal: resolvePrincipal(ctx),
+  }
+}
+
+function toPortOutcome(outcome: P5AuthzOutcome): PortAuthzOutcome {
+  return outcome.ok
+    ? { ok: true, hostId: outcome.hostId, principal: outcome.principal.accountId, jti: outcome.jti }
+    : { ok: false, status: outcome.status }
+}
+
+/** Build the P1 `Authorizer` port backed by the real P5 enforcement pipeline. */
+export function createAuthorizer(deps: AuthorizerDeps): Authorizer {
+  const resolvePrincipal = deps.resolvePrincipal ?? (() => null)
+  return {
+    async onUpgrade(ctx, now) {
+      const outcome = await p5OnUpgrade(
+        toP5Context(ctx, resolvePrincipal),
+        deps.deps,
+        deps.allowedOrigins,
+        now,
+      )
+      return toPortOutcome(outcome)
+    },
+    async onReattach(ctx, now) {
+      const outcome = await p5OnReattach(
+        { ...toP5Context(ctx, resolvePrincipal), sessionId: ctx.sessionId },
+        deps.deps,
+        deps.allowedOrigins,
+        now,
+      )
+      return toPortOutcome(outcome)
+    },
+  }
+}

relay-run/src/wiring/capability.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+/**
+ * P5 signing-key setup + capability-token / DPoP bundle builder for Phase 0. Wires the REAL
+ * relay-auth issue + DPoP primitives (deep-imported test/internal helpers — relay-auth has no
+ * `exports` map, so subpath imports resolve through the relay-run node_modules symlink). Lifted
+ * from `e2e/harness/dpop.ts`.
+ *
+ * The DPoP `htu`/`htm` are LOAD-BEARING: the browser signs them into the proof and the relay
+ * re-derives them from the request's own authority (never from client claims). `htuFor` is the
+ * SINGLE source of truth used by BOTH sides so issuance and verification agree.
+ */
+import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto'
+import { issueCapabilityToken, type DpopContext } from 'relay-auth'
+import type { CapabilityRight } from 'relay-contracts'
+import {
+  configureVerifyKey,
+  resetVerifyKeyForTest,
+} from 'relay-auth/src/config/keys.js'
+import {
+  generateEd25519KeyPair,
+  exportEd25519PublicRaw,
+} from 'relay-auth/src/crypto/ed25519.js'
+import { buildDpopProof, resetDpopCacheForTest } from 'relay-auth/src/capability/verify.js'
+import { jwkThumbprint } from 'relay-auth/src/crypto/thumbprint.js'
+import { principal } from './memory-stores.js'
+
+export { resetDpopCacheForTest }
+
+/** DPoP HTTP method the browser binds into every proof (WS upgrade is a GET). */
+export const DPOP_HTM = 'GET' as const
+
+/**
+ * Canonical DPoP `htu` for a subdomain/aud. The relay derives this from the resolved subdomain
+ * (its own authority) and the browser signs the identical value — the ONE place the string is
+ * defined, so the two never drift.
+ */
+export function htuFor(aud: string): string {
+  return `https://${aud}/ws`
+}
+
+export interface P5Key {
+  readonly signingKey: CryptoKey
+  readonly publicRaw: Uint8Array
+}
+
+/** Configure the P5 verifying key globally and return the matching private signing key. */
+export async function setupP5SigningKey(): Promise<P5Key> {
+  resetVerifyKeyForTest()
+  const pair = await generateEd25519KeyPair()
+  configureVerifyKey(pair.publicKey)
+  const publicRaw = await exportEd25519PublicRaw(pair.publicKey)
+  return { signingKey: pair.privateKey, publicRaw }
+}
+
+interface Ephemeral {
+  readonly privateKey: CryptoKey
+  readonly publicRaw: Uint8Array
+}
+
+async function makeEphemeral(): Promise<Ephemeral> {
+  const pair = await generateEd25519KeyPair()
+  return { privateKey: pair.privateKey, publicRaw: await exportEd25519PublicRaw(pair.publicKey) }
+}
+
+export interface IssueOpts {
+  readonly accountId: string
+  readonly host: string
+  readonly aud: string
+  readonly rights?: readonly CapabilityRight[]
+  readonly ttl?: number
+  readonly now: number
+}
+
+/**
+ * A capability token bundled with a matching DPoP proof. `newDpop(at?)` mints a FRESH DPoP proof
+ * (new jti) bound to the SAME ephemeral key — needed to re-present the same token under a distinct
+ * DPoP without tripping the DPoP replay cache.
+ */
+export interface CapBundle {
+  readonly raw: string
+  readonly dpop: DpopContext
+  readonly newDpop: (at?: number) => Promise<DpopContext>
+}
+
+export async function issueCapBundle(signingKey: CryptoKey, o: IssueOpts): Promise<CapBundle> {
+  const eph = await makeEphemeral()
+  const cnfJkt = await jwkThumbprint(eph.publicRaw)
+  const raw = await issueCapabilityToken(
+    {
+      principal: principal(o.accountId),
+      aud: o.aud,
+      host: o.host,
+      rights: o.rights ?? ['attach'],
+      ttlSeconds: o.ttl ?? 45,
+      cnfJkt,
+    },
+    signingKey,
+    o.now,
+  )
+  const htu = htuFor(o.aud)
+  const newDpop = async (at: number = o.now): Promise<DpopContext> => ({
+    proofJws: await buildDpopProof(eph.privateKey, eph.publicRaw, {
+      htu,
+      htm: DPOP_HTM,
+      jti: randomUUID(),
+      iat: at,
+    }),
+    htu,
+    htm: DPOP_HTM,
+  })
+  return { raw, dpop: await newDpop(o.now), newDpop }
+}

relay-run/src/wiring/data-plane.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+/**
+ * Data-plane composition — assembles the REAL term-relay (P1) `createRelayNode` +
+ * `createAgentListener` and routes every browser upgrade through the REAL `authorizeUpgrade`
+ * adapter (→ our P5 `Authorizer`). The relay-node performs the OPAQUE byte splice (INV2): it never
+ * decodes DATA. This is the one composition both the integration test and `main.ts` reuse.
+ */
+import { createRelayNode, type RelayNode } from 'term-relay/data-plane/relay-node.js'
+import {
+  createAgentListener,
+  type AgentListener,
+  type AgentTunnel,
+  type MtlsVerifier,
+  type RouteRegistrar,
+  type TlsServerFactory,
+} from 'term-relay/data-plane/agent-listener.js'
+import {
+  authorizeUpgrade,
+  type UpgradeRequest,
+  type UpgradeDecision,
+} from 'term-relay/data-plane/upgrade.js'
+import type { RouteResolver } from 'term-relay/data-plane/subdomain-router.js'
+import type { DataPlaneConfig } from 'term-relay/data-plane/config.js'
+import type { Authorizer } from 'term-relay/data-plane/authz-port.js'
+import type { CapabilityRight } from 'relay-contracts'
+import type { ScheduleHandle } from 'term-relay/mux/heartbeat.js'
+
+const RELAY_NODE_ID = 'relay-run-node-0'
+const REMOTE_ADDR_SALT = 'relay-run-dev-salt'
+
+/** Build a frozen DataPlaneConfig without touching disk (cert paths are informational here — the
+ *  live TLS servers are constructed by main.ts, not from these fields). */
+export function makeDataPlaneConfig(overrides: Partial<DataPlaneConfig> = {}): DataPlaneConfig {
+  return Object.freeze({
+    baseDomain: 'term.localhost',
+    bindHost: '127.0.0.1',
+    bindPort: 8443,
+    agentBindPort: 8444,
+    tlsCertPath: '(in-memory)',
+    tlsKeyPath: '(in-memory)',
+    agentCaCertPath: '(in-memory)',
+    agentCaChainPath: '(in-memory)',
+    relayNodeId: RELAY_NODE_ID,
+    maxFrameBytes: 1024 * 1024,
+    initialWindowBytes: 256 * 1024,
+    heartbeatIntervalMs: 15_000,
+    routeTtlMs: 45_000,
+    ...overrides,
+  })
+}
+
+/** A no-op route registrar (Phase 0 has no Redis routing table; routes live in the listener's Map). */
+export function noopRegistrar(): RouteRegistrar {
+  return {
+    register: async () => {},
+    heartbeat: async () => {},
+    deregister: async () => {},
+  }
+}
+
+export interface DataPlaneDeps {
+  readonly config: DataPlaneConfig
+  readonly authorizer: Authorizer
+  readonly resolver: RouteResolver
+  readonly mtls: MtlsVerifier
+  readonly now: () => number
+  readonly requiredRight?: CapabilityRight
+  readonly caBundle?: readonly Uint8Array[]
+  readonly registrar?: RouteRegistrar
+  readonly onTunnel?: (t: AgentTunnel) => void
+  /** Inject a manual scheduler to keep heartbeat timers out of unit tests. */
+  readonly schedule?: (fn: () => void, ms: number) => ScheduleHandle
+  readonly onError?: (e: unknown) => void
+  /** Real agent-facing mTLS server factory (main.ts). Omitted in tests → no TLS server started. */
+  readonly tlsServerFactory?: TlsServerFactory
+}
+
+export interface DataPlane {
+  readonly node: RelayNode
+  readonly listener: AgentListener
+  authorize(req: UpgradeRequest): Promise<UpgradeDecision>
+}
+
+export function buildDataPlane(deps: DataPlaneDeps): DataPlane {
+  const listener = createAgentListener({
+    config: deps.config,
+    mtls: deps.mtls,
+    registrar: deps.registrar ?? noopRegistrar(),
+    onTunnel: deps.onTunnel ?? (() => {}),
+    caBundle: deps.caBundle ?? [],
+    ...(deps.tlsServerFactory ? { tlsServerFactory: deps.tlsServerFactory } : {}),
+    ...(deps.schedule ? { schedule: deps.schedule } : {}),
+    ...(deps.onError ? { onError: deps.onError } : {}),
+  })
+
+  const authorize = (req: UpgradeRequest): Promise<UpgradeDecision> =>
+    authorizeUpgrade(req, {
+      authorizer: deps.authorizer,
+      resolver: deps.resolver,
+      baseDomain: deps.config.baseDomain,
+      now: deps.now,
+      remoteAddrSalt: REMOTE_ADDR_SALT,
+      requiredRight: deps.requiredRight ?? 'attach',
+    })
+
+  const node = createRelayNode({ config: deps.config, listener, authorize })
+  return { node, listener, authorize }
+}
+
+/** In-memory RouteResolver: subdomain label → resolved host (P3's job in production). */
+export function memoryRouteResolver(
+  hosts: ReadonlyMap<string, { hostId: string; accountId: string }>,
+): RouteResolver {
+  return {
+    resolveSubdomain: async (subdomain) => {
+      const h = hosts.get(subdomain)
+      return h ? { hostId: h.hostId, accountId: h.accountId, subdomain } : null
+    },
+  }
+}

relay-run/src/wiring/memory-stores.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+/**
+ * Phase 0 in-memory control-plane stores — the ONLY seams that stand in for the true I/O
+ * boundaries P1/P3 own (host registry / session registry / revocation store / token buckets /
+ * audit sink / revocation bus). Every security DECISION still runs through the REAL relay-auth
+ * exports; these fakes only supply storage. Lifted verbatim from `e2e/harness/fakes.ts` — the
+ * reference wiring named in docs/PLAN_RELAY_RUN_PHASE0.md.
+ */
+import type { HostRecord, KillSignal, RevocationBus } from 'relay-contracts'
+import type {
+  AuthenticatedPrincipal,
+  AuditEvent,
+  AuditSink,
+  HostRegistryPort,
+  SessionRegistryPort,
+  RevocationStore,
+  TokenBucketStore,
+} from 'relay-auth'
+
+/** An authenticated principal (the ONLY source of accountId, INV3). */
+export function principal(
+  accountId: string,
+  overrides: Partial<AuthenticatedPrincipal> = {},
+): AuthenticatedPrincipal {
+  return {
+    kind: 'human',
+    accountId,
+    principalId: 'cred-' + accountId,
+    amr: ['passkey'],
+    authAt: 1000,
+    stepUpAt: null,
+    ...overrides,
+  }
+}
+
+/** A minimal online HostRecord for the authz registry (agentPubkey here is unused by authz). */
+export function makeHostRecord(
+  accountId: string,
+  hostId: string,
+  subdomain: string,
+  status: HostRecord['status'] = 'online',
+): HostRecord {
+  return {
+    hostId,
+    accountId,
+    subdomain,
+    agentPubkey: new Uint8Array(32),
+    enrollFpr: 'fpr-' + hostId,
+    status,
+    lastSeen: '2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z',
+    createdAt: '2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z',
+    revokedAt: null,
+  }
+}
+
+export function fakeHostRegistry(hosts: readonly HostRecord[]): HostRegistryPort {
+  const map = new Map(hosts.map((h) => [h.hostId, h]))
+  return { getById: async (id) => map.get(id) ?? null }
+}
+
+export interface MutableSessionRegistry extends SessionRegistryPort {
+  add(entry: { sessionId: string; hostId: string; accountId: string }): void
+}
+
+export function fakeSessionRegistry(
+  seed: readonly { sessionId: string; hostId: string; accountId: string }[] = [],
+): MutableSessionRegistry {
+  const map = new Map(seed.map((s) => [s.sessionId, { hostId: s.hostId, accountId: s.accountId }]))
+  return {
+    getById: async (id) => map.get(id) ?? null,
+    add: (e) => {
+      map.set(e.sessionId, { hostId: e.hostId, accountId: e.accountId })
+    },
+  }
+}
+
+export interface RevocationFake extends RevocationStore {
+  readonly revoked: Set<string>
+  readonly consumed: Set<string>
+}
+
+export function fakeRevocationStore(): RevocationFake {
+  const revoked = new Set<string>()
+  const consumed = new Set<string>()
+  return {
+    revoked,
+    consumed,
+    isRevoked: async (jti) => revoked.has(jti),
+    revokeJti: async (jti) => {
+      revoked.add(jti)
+    },
+    consumeOnce: async (jti) => {
+      if (consumed.has(jti)) return false
+      consumed.add(jti)
+      return true
+    },
+  }
+}
+
+export interface TokenBucketFake extends TokenBucketStore {
+  readonly blocked: Set<string>
+  readonly calls: string[]
+}
+
+/** Token bucket that always allows unless a key is added to `blocked`. */
+export function fakeTokenBucket(): TokenBucketFake {
+  const blocked = new Set<string>()
+  const calls: string[] = []
+  return {
+    blocked,
+    calls,
+    take: async (key) => {
+      calls.push(key)
+      return !blocked.has(key)
+    },
+  }
+}
+
+export interface AuditFake extends AuditSink {
+  readonly events: AuditEvent[]
+}
+
+export function fakeAuditSink(): AuditFake {
+  const events: AuditEvent[] = []
+  return { events, append: async (e) => void events.push(e) }
+}
+
+export interface RevocationBusFake extends RevocationBus {
+  readonly published: KillSignal[]
+}
+
+export function fakeRevocationBus(): RevocationBusFake {
+  const published: KillSignal[] = []
+  return { published, publish: async (s) => void published.push(s) }
+}

relay-run/src/wiring/relay-world.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+/**
+ * Phase 0 world — composes the REAL relay-auth (P5) enforcement + relay-e2e (P4) handshake through
+ * the in-memory stores, tailored for the live data-plane path: a host's capability-token `aud` is
+ * the SINGLE subdomain label (what `authorizeUpgrade` derives from the Host header), not the FQDN.
+ * Directly modelled on `e2e/harness/world.ts` (the reference wiring named in the build spec).
+ *
+ * Only the true I/O boundaries are faked; every security check (Origin/CSWSH, token verify, DPoP
+ * PoP, cross-tenant gate, single-use jti) is the production relay-auth path.
+ */
+import { randomUUID, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto'
+import type { AeadAlg, E2ESession, HostHello } from 'relay-contracts'
+import {
+  createClientHandshake,
+  createHostHandshake,
+  createE2ESession,
+  MemoryDevicePinStore,
+} from 'relay-e2e'
+import {
+  signDeviceAuthProof,
+  verifyDeviceProof,
+  type EnforceDeps,
+  type StepUpPolicy,
+} from 'relay-auth'
+import {
+  generateEd25519KeyPair,
+  exportEd25519PublicRaw,
+  importEd25519PublicRaw,
+  signEd25519,
+  verifyEd25519,
+} from 'relay-auth/src/crypto/ed25519.js'
+import type { MtlsVerifier } from 'term-relay/data-plane/agent-listener.js'
+import type { Authorizer } from 'term-relay/data-plane/authz-port.js'
+import type { RouteResolver } from 'term-relay/data-plane/subdomain-router.js'
+import {
+  fakeAuditSink,
+  fakeHostRegistry,
+  fakeRevocationStore,
+  fakeSessionRegistry,
+  fakeTokenBucket,
+  makeHostRecord,
+  principal,
+  type AuditFake,
+  type MutableSessionRegistry,
+  type RevocationFake,
+  type TokenBucketFake,
+} from './memory-stores.js'
+import { issueCapBundle, setupP5SigningKey, resetDpopCacheForTest, type CapBundle } from './capability.js'
+import { createAuthorizer } from './authorizer.js'
+import { memoryRouteResolver } from './data-plane.js'
+
+export const DEFAULT_NOW = 1_700_000_000
+const REPLAY_ALG: AeadAlg = 'xchacha20-poly1305'
+
+/** Phase 0 default: step-up never required (F2: null session-principal is correct). */
+export const NO_STEP_UP: StepUpPolicy = {
+  required: false,
+  maxAgeSeconds: Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER,
+  requiredMethod: 'passkey',
+}
+
+/** A seeded host: authz identity (hostId/accountId/label) + §4.4 e2e identity + replay secret. */
+export interface HostFixture {
+  readonly label: string
+  readonly hostId: string
+  readonly accountId: string
+  readonly subdomain: string
+  readonly origin: string
+  readonly agentPubkey: Uint8Array
+  readonly hostContentSecret: Uint8Array
+  readonly replayAlg: AeadAlg
+  readonly signingPriv: CryptoKey
+}
+
+async function makeHostFixture(
+  label: string,
+  accountId: string,
+  baseDomain: string,
+): Promise<HostFixture> {
+  const kp = await generateEd25519KeyPair()
+  const agentPubkey = await exportEd25519PublicRaw(kp.publicKey)
+  return {
+    label,
+    hostId: randomUUID(),
+    accountId,
+    subdomain: label,
+    origin: `https://${label}.${baseDomain}`,
+    agentPubkey,
+    hostContentSecret: new Uint8Array(randomBytes(32)),
+    replayAlg: REPLAY_ALG,
+    signingPriv: kp.privateKey,
+  }
+}
+
+export interface EstablishedSessions {
+  readonly client: E2ESession
+  readonly host: E2ESession
+  readonly agentPubkey: Uint8Array
+}
+
+export interface Phase0World {
+  readonly now: number
+  readonly signingKey: CryptoKey
+  /** Raw 32-byte Ed25519 P5 verify pubkey (for CAPABILITY_SIGN_PUBKEY_B64). */
+  readonly publicRaw: Uint8Array
+  readonly baseDomain: string
+  readonly host: HostFixture
+  readonly allowedOrigins: readonly string[]
+  readonly deps: EnforceDeps
+  readonly audit: AuditFake
+  readonly revocation: RevocationFake
+  readonly buckets: TokenBucketFake
+  readonly sessions: MutableSessionRegistry
+  readonly resolver: RouteResolver
+  readonly authorizer: Authorizer
+  readonly mtls: MtlsVerifier
+  issueCap(o?: { ttl?: number; now?: number }): Promise<CapBundle>
+  establishSession(opts?: {
+    now?: number
+    verifyAgainstPubkey?: Uint8Array
+    tamperHostHello?: (h: HostHello) => HostHello
+  }): Promise<EstablishedSessions>
+}
+
+export async function buildPhase0World(now: number = DEFAULT_NOW): Promise<Phase0World> {
+  const baseDomain = 'term.localhost'
+  const { signingKey, publicRaw } = await setupP5SigningKey()
+  resetDpopCacheForTest()
+
+  const host = await makeHostFixture('alice', 'acct-alice', baseDomain)
+  const hosts = fakeHostRegistry([makeHostRecord(host.accountId, host.hostId, host.subdomain)])
+  const sessions = fakeSessionRegistry([])
+  const revocation = fakeRevocationStore()
+  const buckets = fakeTokenBucket()
+  const audit = fakeAuditSink()
+  const allowedOrigins = [host.origin]
+
+  const deps: EnforceDeps = {
+    hosts,
+    sessions,
+    revocation,
+    buckets,
+    audit,
+    stepUpPolicyFor: () => NO_STEP_UP,
+  }
+
+  const routeMap = new Map([[host.subdomain, { hostId: host.hostId, accountId: host.accountId }]])
+  const resolver = memoryRouteResolver(routeMap)
+  const authorizer = createAuthorizer({ deps, allowedOrigins, now: () => now })
+  const mtls: MtlsVerifier = {
+    verifyPeer: () => ({ hostId: host.hostId, accountId: host.accountId }),
+  }
+
+  return {
+    now,
+    signingKey,
+    publicRaw,
+    baseDomain,
+    host,
+    allowedOrigins,
+    deps,
+    audit,
+    revocation,
+    buckets,
+    sessions,
+    resolver,
+    authorizer,
+    mtls,
+    issueCap(o = {}) {
+      return issueCapBundle(signingKey, {
+        accountId: host.accountId,
+        host: host.hostId,
+        aud: host.subdomain,
+        ttl: o.ttl,
+        now: o.now ?? now,
+      })
+    },
+    async establishSession(opts = {}): Promise<EstablishedSessions> {
+      const hsNow = opts.now ?? now
+      const client = createClientHandshake({
+        aeadOffer: ['xchacha20-poly1305', 'aes-256-gcm'],
+        deviceAuthProofProvider: {
+          proofFor: (_hostId, binding) =>
+            signDeviceAuthProof(principal(host.accountId), binding, signingKey, hsNow),
+        },
+        verifier: {
+          verify: async (pub, transcript, sig) =>
+            verifyEd25519(await importEd25519PublicRaw(pub), sig, transcript),
+        },
+        pinStore: new MemoryDevicePinStore(),
+        hostId: host.hostId,
+      })
+      const hostHs = createHostHandshake({
+        signer: { sign: (transcript) => signEd25519(host.signingPriv, transcript) },
+        agentPubkey: host.agentPubkey,
+        supported: ['xchacha20-poly1305', 'aes-256-gcm'],
+        verifyDeviceProof: (proof, binding) => verifyDeviceProof(proof, binding, hsNow),
+      })
+      const clientHello = await client.start()
+      const rawHostHello = await hostHs.onClientHello(clientHello)
+      const hostHello = opts.tamperHostHello ? opts.tamperHostHello(rawHostHello) : rawHostHello
+      const clientResult = await client.onHostHello(
+        hostHello,
+        opts.verifyAgainstPubkey ?? host.agentPubkey,
+      )
+      return {
+        client: createE2ESession('client', clientResult),
+        host: createE2ESession('host', hostHs.result!),
+        agentPubkey: host.agentPubkey,
+      }
+    },
+  }
+}

relay-run/src/wiring/socket-pipe.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+/**
+ * `WebSocketLike` adapters. Two of them:
+ *   - `makeSocketPair()` — an in-process duplex pair used to drive the REAL relay-node/mux in tests
+ *     (no sockets, deterministic). Delivery is synchronous but non-reentrant (a per-endpoint
+ *     trampoline) so a send emitted while draining the peer's inbox can't recurse unboundedly.
+ *   - `wsToWebSocketLike()` — wraps a real `ws` WebSocket to the same interface for `main.ts`.
+ * Bytes are COPIED on send (the mux slices/retains buffers) so no caller can alias another's memory.
+ */
+import type { WebSocket as WsWebSocket } from 'ws'
+import type { WebSocketLike } from 'term-relay/data-plane/ws-like.js'
+
+interface Endpoint extends WebSocketLike {
+  /** Internal: deliver bytes that the peer sent to THIS endpoint. */
+  _deliver(data: Uint8Array): void
+  _closed(): void
+}
+
+function makeEndpoint(): Endpoint {
+  let onMessage: ((data: Uint8Array) => void) | null = null
+  let onClose: (() => void) | null = null
+  let peer: Endpoint | null = null
+  const inbox: Uint8Array[] = []
+  let draining = false
+  let closed = false
+
+  const ep: Endpoint & { _link(p: Endpoint): void } = {
+    _link(p: Endpoint) {
+      peer = p
+    },
+    send(data: Uint8Array) {
+      if (closed || peer === null) return
+      peer._deliver(new Uint8Array(data)) // copy: never alias the sender's buffer
+    },
+    close(_code?: number) {
+      if (closed) return
+      closed = true
+      onClose?.()
+      peer?._closed()
+    },
+    onMessage(handler) {
+      onMessage = handler
+    },
+    onClose(handler) {
+      onClose = handler
+    },
+    _deliver(data: Uint8Array) {
+      inbox.push(data)
+      if (draining) return
+      draining = true
+      try {
+        while (inbox.length > 0) {
+          const next = inbox.shift()!
+          onMessage?.(next)
+        }
+      } finally {
+        draining = false
+      }
+    },
+    _closed() {
+      if (closed) return
+      closed = true
+      onClose?.()
+    },
+  }
+  return ep as Endpoint & { _link(p: Endpoint): void }
+}
+
+/** An in-process duplex `WebSocketLike` pair: `a.send` → `b`'s message handler and vice versa. */
+export function makeSocketPair(): { a: WebSocketLike; b: WebSocketLike } {
+  const a = makeEndpoint() as Endpoint & { _link(p: Endpoint): void }
+  const b = makeEndpoint() as Endpoint & { _link(p: Endpoint): void }
+  a._link(b)
+  b._link(a)
+  return { a, b }
+}
+
+function toUint8(data: unknown): Uint8Array | null {
+  if (data instanceof Uint8Array) return data
+  if (data instanceof ArrayBuffer) return new Uint8Array(data)
+  if (Array.isArray(data)) return Buffer.concat(data.map((d) => (d instanceof Uint8Array ? d : Buffer.from(d))))
+  if (Buffer.isBuffer(data)) return new Uint8Array(data)
+  return null
+}
+
+/** Adapt a live `ws` WebSocket to `WebSocketLike` (binary frames only). */
+export function wsToWebSocketLike(ws: WsWebSocket): WebSocketLike {
+  return {
+    send(data: Uint8Array) {
+      ws.send(data, { binary: true })
+    },
+    close(code?: number) {
+      ws.close(code)
+    },
+    onMessage(handler) {
+      ws.on('message', (data: unknown) => {
+        const bytes = toUint8(data)
+        if (bytes !== null) handler(bytes)
+      })
+    },
+    onClose(handler) {
+      ws.on('close', () => handler())
+    },
+  }
+}

relay-run/tests/smoke.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest'
+// Cross-package resolution smoke test: prove relay-run can bare-import the REAL exports of the
+// relay packages it wires — including the term-relay data-plane DEEP imports (term-relay has no
+// barrel index / exports map, so subpath `.js` specifiers resolve to the `.ts` sources).
+import { onUpgrade, onReattach, issueCapabilityToken, configureVerifyKey } from 'relay-auth'
+import { createClientHandshake, createHostHandshake, createE2ESession } from 'relay-e2e'
+import { APP_SUBPROTOCOL, encodeTokenSubprotocol } from 'relay-contracts'
+import { createRelayNode } from 'term-relay/data-plane/relay-node.js'
+import { createAgentListener } from 'term-relay/data-plane/agent-listener.js'
+import { authorizeUpgrade } from 'term-relay/data-plane/upgrade.js'
+import { createMuxSession } from 'term-relay/mux/mux-session.js'
+
+describe('relay-run cross-package import smoke', () => {
+  it('resolves relay-auth / relay-e2e / relay-contracts + term-relay data-plane deep imports', () => {
+    expect(typeof onUpgrade).toBe('function')
+    expect(typeof onReattach).toBe('function')
+    expect(typeof issueCapabilityToken).toBe('function')
+    expect(typeof configureVerifyKey).toBe('function')
+    expect(typeof createClientHandshake).toBe('function')
+    expect(typeof createHostHandshake).toBe('function')
+    expect(typeof createE2ESession).toBe('function')
+    expect(APP_SUBPROTOCOL).toBe('term.relay.v1')
+    expect(typeof encodeTokenSubprotocol).toBe('function')
+    expect(typeof createRelayNode).toBe('function')
+    expect(typeof createAgentListener).toBe('function')
+    expect(typeof authorizeUpgrade).toBe('function')
+    expect(typeof createMuxSession).toBe('function')
+  })
+})

relay-run/tsconfig.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "compilerOptions": {
+    "target": "ES2022",
+    "module": "NodeNext",
+    "moduleResolution": "NodeNext",
+    "lib": ["ES2022", "DOM"],
+    "strict": true,
+    "noEmit": true,
+    "esModuleInterop": true,
+    "skipLibCheck": true,
+    "allowImportingTsExtensions": true,
+    "types": ["node"]
+  },
+  "include": ["src/**/*.ts", "tests/**/*.ts"]
+}

relay-run/vitest.config.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+import { defineConfig } from 'vitest/config'
+
+export default defineConfig({
+  test: {
+    include: ['tests/**/*.test.ts'],
+    environment: 'node',
+  },
+})