feat(ios): device client-cert mTLS — ClientTLS package, transport wiring, install UX (C-iOS)

- ios/Packages/ClientTLS: SecIdentity wrapper, PKCS12 importer (typed errors), keychain store
  (AfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly), pure MutualTLSChallengeResponder truth table, cross-platform
  X.509 DER summary. 14/14 tests.
- Both transports (SessionCore URLSessionTermTransport, App URLSessionHTTPTransport) + SessionThumbnail
  take a lazy @Sendable ()->ClientIdentity? provider: WS resolves per-connect, HTTP per client-cert
  challenge, so a freshly-imported cert applies without an app relaunch. AppEnvironment injects
  { store.loadedIdentityOrNil() }.
- ClientCertScreen (.fileImporter([.pkcs12]) + passphrase -> import -> keychain), reachable via a
  设备证书 entry in SessionListScreen.hostMenu. PairingViewModel gates tunnel-host probes on cert
  presence and re-maps mTLS-reject to a clientCertRejected message.
Verified: ClientTLS 14/14, SessionCore 93/93, xcodegen + xcodebuild BUILD SUCCEEDED.
This commit is contained in:
Yaojia Wang
2026-07-07 09:42:12 +02:00
parent 5337281e85
commit e38e6d1689
25 changed files with 1510 additions and 30 deletions

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
import APIClient
import ClientTLS
import Foundation
import os
import SwiftUI
@@ -225,12 +226,19 @@ final class SessionThumbnailPipeline {
cache = SessionThumbnailCache(maxEntries: maxCacheEntries)
}
/// ephemeral URLSessionpreview
/// only T-iOS-19 RO GET
/// ephemeral URLSessionpreview
/// only T-iOS-19 RO GET C-iOS-2
/// mTLS nginx
/// provider keychain MEDIUM
/// =nil
static func live() -> SessionThumbnailPipeline {
SessionThumbnailPipeline(
let identityStore = KeychainClientIdentityStore()
let transport = URLSessionHTTPTransport(identityProvider: {
identityStore.loadedIdentityOrNil()
})
return SessionThumbnailPipeline(
loader: { request in
try await APIClient(endpoint: request.endpoint, http: liveTransport)
try await APIClient(endpoint: request.endpoint, http: transport)
.preview(id: request.sessionId)
},
renderer: { data, cols, rows in
@@ -239,8 +247,6 @@ final class SessionThumbnailPipeline {
)
}
private static let liveTransport = URLSessionHTTPTransport()
/// `.placeholder`
/// UI
func thumbnail(for request: SessionThumbnailRequest) async -> SessionThumbnailImage {

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
import ClientTLS
import Foundation
import Observation
import SwiftUI
import UniformTypeIdentifiers
/// C-iOS-3 · Device-certificate install / rotation screen.
///
/// Flow: `.fileImporter([.pkcs12])` secure passphrase import (validates via
/// `SecPKCS12Import`) persist in the keychain show issuer CN + expiry, with
/// replace/rotate + remove. This is the in-app, app-sandboxed install path (a
/// `.p12` delivered via AirDrop/Files), NOT a configuration profile.
///
/// INTEGRATION NOTE: presenting this screen needs a one-line nav/Settings entry
/// ("Device certificate") in the app chrome (RootView / PairingScreen), which
/// live outside this task's ownership. The screen is fully self-contained so
/// that wiring is a single `NavigationLink { ClientCertScreen() }`.
struct ClientCertScreen: View {
@State private var model: ClientCertViewModel
init(model: ClientCertViewModel = ClientCertViewModel()) {
_model = State(initialValue: model)
}
var body: some View {
Form {
installedSection
importSection
if model.summary != nil {
removeSection
}
}
.navigationTitle(ClientCertCopy.title)
.fileImporter(
isPresented: $model.isPickingFile,
allowedContentTypes: [.pkcs12],
allowsMultipleSelection: false
) { result in
model.handleFileSelection(result)
}
.task { model.refresh() }
}
// MARK: - Sections
@ViewBuilder private var installedSection: some View {
Section(ClientCertCopy.installedHeader) {
if let summary = model.summary {
LabeledContent(ClientCertCopy.subject, value: summary.subjectCommonName ?? "")
LabeledContent(ClientCertCopy.issuer, value: summary.issuerCommonName ?? "")
LabeledContent(ClientCertCopy.expiry, value: model.expiryText(summary))
if summary.isExpired() {
Label(ClientCertCopy.expiredWarning, systemImage: "exclamationmark.triangle")
.foregroundStyle(.orange)
}
} else {
Text(ClientCertCopy.noneInstalled).foregroundStyle(.secondary)
}
}
}
@ViewBuilder private var importSection: some View {
Section {
if let name = model.pendingFileName {
LabeledContent(ClientCertCopy.selectedFile, value: name)
SecureField(ClientCertCopy.passphrase, text: $model.passphrase)
.textContentType(.password)
.autocorrectionDisabled()
Button(ClientCertCopy.importAction) { model.importPending() }
.disabled(!model.canImport)
Button(ClientCertCopy.cancelAction, role: .cancel) { model.clearPending() }
} else {
Button {
model.beginPicking()
} label: {
Label(
model.summary == nil
? ClientCertCopy.chooseFile
: ClientCertCopy.replaceFile,
systemImage: "doc.badge.plus"
)
}
}
if let error = model.errorMessage {
Text(error).foregroundStyle(.red).font(.footnote)
}
} header: {
Text(model.summary == nil ? ClientCertCopy.importHeader : ClientCertCopy.rotateHeader)
} footer: {
Text(ClientCertCopy.importFooter)
}
}
@ViewBuilder private var removeSection: some View {
Section {
Button(ClientCertCopy.removeAction, role: .destructive) { model.remove() }
}
}
}
/// State machine for the install screen. Errors are mapped to actionable copy
/// and never swallowed; a failed import leaves any prior identity intact.
@MainActor
@Observable
final class ClientCertViewModel {
private(set) var summary: ClientCertificateSummary?
var isPickingFile = false
var passphrase = ""
private(set) var pendingData: Data?
private(set) var pendingFileName: String?
private(set) var errorMessage: String?
@ObservationIgnored private let store: any ClientIdentityStore
init(store: any ClientIdentityStore = KeychainClientIdentityStore()) {
self.store = store
}
var canImport: Bool { pendingData != nil && !passphrase.isEmpty }
func refresh() {
do {
summary = try store.loadSummary()
} catch {
summary = nil
errorMessage = ClientCertCopy.loadFailed
}
}
func beginPicking() {
errorMessage = nil
isPickingFile = true
}
func handleFileSelection(_ result: Result<[URL], Error>) {
switch result {
case .failure:
errorMessage = ClientCertCopy.fileReadFailed
case .success(let urls):
guard let url = urls.first else { return }
readFile(at: url)
}
}
private func readFile(at url: URL) {
let didAccess = url.startAccessingSecurityScopedResource()
defer { if didAccess { url.stopAccessingSecurityScopedResource() } }
do {
pendingData = try Data(contentsOf: url)
pendingFileName = url.lastPathComponent
passphrase = ""
errorMessage = nil
} catch {
pendingData = nil
pendingFileName = nil
errorMessage = ClientCertCopy.fileReadFailed
}
}
func importPending() {
guard let data = pendingData else { return }
do {
try store.save(p12Data: data, passphrase: passphrase)
clearPending()
refresh()
} catch {
errorMessage = Self.copy(for: error)
}
}
func clearPending() {
pendingData = nil
pendingFileName = nil
passphrase = ""
errorMessage = nil
}
func remove() {
do {
try store.remove()
summary = nil
errorMessage = nil
} catch {
errorMessage = ClientCertCopy.removeFailed
}
}
func expiryText(_ summary: ClientCertificateSummary) -> String {
guard let notAfter = summary.notAfter else { return "" }
return notAfter.formatted(date: .abbreviated, time: .omitted)
}
/// Map an import/storage error to install-UX copy (never swallowed).
private static func copy(for error: any Error) -> String {
switch error {
case PKCS12ImportError.wrongPassphrase:
return ClientCertCopy.errWrongPassphrase
case PKCS12ImportError.corruptFile:
return ClientCertCopy.errCorruptFile
case PKCS12ImportError.unsupported:
return ClientCertCopy.errUnsupported
case PKCS12ImportError.noIdentity:
return ClientCertCopy.errNoIdentity
case ClientIdentityStoreError.keychain, ClientIdentityStoreError.corruptStoredBlob:
return ClientCertCopy.errKeychain
default:
return ClientCertCopy.errUnknown
}
}
}
/// User-facing copy (Chinese, matching the rest of the app).
enum ClientCertCopy {
static let title = "设备证书"
static let installedHeader = "已安装证书"
static let subject = "设备 (CN)"
static let issuer = "签发 CA"
static let expiry = "有效期至"
static let expiredWarning = "证书已过期,请重新导入。"
static let noneInstalled = "尚未安装设备证书。"
static let importHeader = "导入证书"
static let rotateHeader = "替换证书"
static let chooseFile = "选择 .p12 文件"
static let replaceFile = "选择新的 .p12 文件"
static let selectedFile = "已选文件"
static let passphrase = "证书密码"
static let importAction = "导入"
static let cancelAction = "取消"
static let removeAction = "移除证书"
static let importFooter =
"证书用于连接你自己的隧道主机 (mTLS)。通过 AirDrop / 文件 把 .p12 传到本机后在此导入;证书与密码只保存在本设备钥匙串。"
static let errWrongPassphrase = "密码错误,请重试。"
static let errCorruptFile = "文件无法识别,请确认是有效的 .p12 证书。"
static let errUnsupported = "证书格式不受支持(请用 openssl pkcs12 -export -legacy 生成)。"
static let errNoIdentity = "该 .p12 不含身份(缺少私钥),无法用于客户端认证。"
static let errKeychain = "保存到钥匙串失败,请重试。"
static let errUnknown = "导入失败,请重试。"
static let loadFailed = "读取已安装证书失败。"
static let fileReadFailed = "无法读取所选文件。"
static let removeFailed = "移除证书失败,请重试。"
}

View File

@@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ struct SessionListScreen: View {
var onOpen: (SessionListViewModel.OpenRequest) -> Void = { _ in }
/// Host-switch header hook: "" entry (pairing sheet, T-iOS-15).
var onAddHost: () -> Void = {}
/// C-iOS-3 (HIGH reachability fix) · "" entry presents
/// `ClientCertScreen` (import / rotate the mTLS device cert). The device
/// cert is a global concern, but the toolbar host-menu is the app's only
/// settings-like surface and is present in every empty state, so this is the
/// nav idiom that makes the orphaned screen reachable.
var onDeviceCert: () -> Void = {}
/// T-iOS-28 (additive slot) · shared thumbnail pipeline: one cache + one
/// render-concurrency gate across ALL rows (scrolling must never spawn
/// unbounded offscreen terminals). `@State` keeps it stable across body
@@ -213,6 +219,12 @@ struct SessionListScreen: View {
} label: {
Label(ScreenCopy.addHost, systemImage: "plus")
}
Button {
onDeviceCert()
} label: {
Label(ScreenCopy.deviceCert, systemImage: "lock.shield")
}
.accessibilityIdentifier("sessions.deviceCert")
} label: {
Label(
viewModel.activeHost?.name ?? ScreenCopy.hostMenuFallback,
@@ -342,6 +354,7 @@ private enum ScreenCopy {
static let newSession = "新建会话"
static let kill = "结束"
static let addHost = "配对新主机"
static let deviceCert = "设备证书"
static let hostMenuFallback = "主机"
static let notPairedTitle = "还没有配对的主机"
static let notPairedHint = "先配对你电脑上的 web-terminal扫码或手输地址会话会出现在这里。"

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
import APIClient
import ClientTLS
import Foundation
import HostRegistry
import Observation
@@ -116,10 +117,21 @@ final class PairingViewModel {
@ObservationIgnored private let store: any HostStore
@ObservationIgnored private let probe: Probe
/// C-iOS-3 · Whether a device client certificate is installed. Used to gate
/// the probe for tunnel hosts (mTLS-only). Injected so tests control it;
/// production reads the keychain. Defaulted so existing call sites compile.
@ObservationIgnored private let isDeviceCertInstalled: @Sendable () -> Bool
init(store: any HostStore, probe: @escaping Probe) {
init(
store: any HostStore,
probe: @escaping Probe,
isDeviceCertInstalled: @escaping @Sendable () -> Bool = {
KeychainClientIdentityStore().hasInstalledIdentity()
}
) {
self.store = store
self.probe = probe
self.isDeviceCertInstalled = isDeviceCertInstalled
}
// MARK: - Input boundaries (untrusted, validated via HostEndpoint)
@@ -205,10 +217,20 @@ final class PairingViewModel {
private func runProbe(for pending: PendingHost) async {
needsPublicRiskAcknowledgement = false
// C-iOS-3 · Tunnel hosts are mTLS-only: refuse to probe (which would
// fail at the TLS handshake) until a device certificate is installed.
// This is the single choke point both confirmConnect and retry funnel
// through, so the gate can't be bypassed via retry().
if Self.isTunnelHost(pending.endpoint), !isDeviceCertInstalled() {
phase = .failed(pending, FailureDisplay(
message: PairingCopy.deviceCertRequired, action: .retry
))
return
}
phase = .probing(pending)
switch await probe(pending.endpoint) {
case .failure(let error):
phase = .failed(pending, Self.display(for: error))
phase = .failed(pending, Self.display(for: error, endpoint: pending.endpoint))
case .success(let endpoint):
await storePairedHost(endpoint: endpoint, pending: pending)
}
@@ -239,6 +261,19 @@ final class PairingViewModel {
// MARK: - PairingError copy + action (task RED list, one case each)
/// C-iOS-3 · Host-aware display. nginx rejects an invalid/absent/revoked
/// client cert at the TLS layer; URLSession surfaces that as
/// secureConnectionFailed / connection-reset `PairingError.classify` maps
/// it to `.tlsFailure` ("server cert invalid"), which is the WRONG diagnosis
/// for an mTLS tunnel host. Re-map that one case to the device-cert copy;
/// everything else falls through to the per-case mapping.
static func display(for error: PairingError, endpoint: HostEndpoint) -> FailureDisplay {
if case .tlsFailure = error, isTunnelHost(endpoint) {
return FailureDisplay(message: PairingCopy.clientCertRejected, action: .retry)
}
return display(for: error)
}
static func display(for error: PairingError) -> FailureDisplay {
switch error {
case .localNetworkDenied:
@@ -270,6 +305,14 @@ final class PairingViewModel {
/// block regardless of scheme (§5.4 table: https is included in the
/// public-host confirm warning); otherwise https clears every notice.
static func warning(for endpoint: HostEndpoint) -> SecurityWarning {
// C-iOS-3 · A *.terminal.yaojia.wang tunnel host is gated by the device
// client certificate (mTLS), so the "anyone who can reach the port gets
// a shell" blocking warning is FALSE here and would only deter the
// intended flow. The real gate is the cert-install check in runProbe.
// Genuinely public NON-tunnel hosts still hit .publicHostBlocking below.
if isTunnelHost(endpoint) {
return .none
}
let hostClass = classifyHost(endpoint.baseURL.host ?? "")
if hostClass == .publicHost {
return .publicHostBlocking
@@ -353,8 +396,17 @@ final class PairingViewModel {
return octets
}
/// C-iOS-3 · A native mTLS reverse-tunnel host (`<name>.terminal.yaojia.wang`).
/// These reach a loopback base app through the VPS and are protected ONLY by
/// the device client certificate hence the softened warning + the
/// cert-install gate + the client-cert-rejected re-classification.
static func isTunnelHost(_ endpoint: HostEndpoint) -> Bool {
(endpoint.baseURL.host ?? "").lowercased().hasSuffix(tunnelZoneSuffix)
}
// MARK: - Named constants (no magic values, plan §4)
private static let tunnelZoneSuffix = ".terminal.yaojia.wang"
private static let schemeSeparator = "://"
private static let defaultManualScheme = "http://"
private static let httpsScheme = "https"
@@ -385,6 +437,13 @@ enum PairingCopy {
"TLS 连接失败:证书无效或不受信任。"
static let timeout =
"连接超时。请确认主机在线、与手机在同一网络后重试。"
/// C-iOS-3 · Tunnel host reached without a device certificate installed.
static let deviceCertRequired =
"请先安装本设备证书:到 设置 →「设备证书」导入 .p12 后,再连接该隧道主机。"
/// C-iOS-3 · nginx rejected the presented client certificate (invalid /
/// revoked). Surfaced in place of the mis-classified "server cert invalid".
static let clientCertRejected =
"本设备证书无效或已吊销,请重新导入。"
static func hostUnreachable(_ underlying: String) -> String {
"无法连接主机:\(underlying)"

View File

@@ -51,6 +51,9 @@ struct AdaptiveRootView: View {
) {
projectsSheet
}
.sheet(isPresented: $coordinator.isDeviceCertPresented) {
deviceCertSheet
}
}
// MARK: - Layout branch (the SOLE size-class consumer)
@@ -107,4 +110,20 @@ struct AdaptiveRootView: View {
}
}
}
// MARK: - Device certificate sheet (C-iOS-3, HIGH reachability fix)
/// NavigationStack`ClientCertScreen` `.navigationTitle`+
/// .p12 `ClientCertScreen`
/// `ClientCertViewModel`keychain store
@ViewBuilder private var deviceCertSheet: some View {
NavigationStack {
ClientCertScreen()
.toolbar {
ToolbarItem(placement: .topBarTrailing) {
Button(RootCopy.done) { coordinator.isDeviceCertPresented = false }
}
}
}
}
}

View File

@@ -31,6 +31,11 @@ final class AppCoordinator {
/// prefs
private(set) var projectsViewModel: ProjectsViewModel?
var isProjectsPresented = false
/// C-iOS-3 (HIGH reachability fix) · "" sheet (import / rotate the
/// mTLS device cert via `ClientCertScreen`). No VM state the screen owns
/// its own `ClientCertViewModel` over the keychain store; dismissal needs no
/// refresh because the transports resolve the identity lazily per connection.
var isDeviceCertPresented = false
let sessionList: SessionListViewModel
@ObservationIgnored let environment: AppEnvironment
@@ -108,6 +113,13 @@ final class AppCoordinator {
projectsViewModel = nil
}
// MARK: - Device certificate (C-iOS-3)
/// Toolbar host-menu / sheet
func presentDeviceCert() {
isDeviceCertPresented = true
}
/// "" sheet fresh spawn`attach(null, cwd)`+
/// attach `claude\r` engine attach-first
func openProject(_ request: ProjectOpenRequest) {

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
import APIClient
import ClientTLS
import Foundation
import HostRegistry
import SessionCore
@@ -37,8 +38,20 @@ struct AppEnvironment: Sendable {
var unreadStore: any UnreadWatermarkStore = UserDefaultsUnreadWatermarkStore()
static func production() -> AppEnvironment {
let http = URLSessionHTTPTransport()
let termTransport = URLSessionTermTransport()
// C-iOS-2 (MEDIUM no-relaunch fix) · Resolve the installed device client
// identity LAZILY from the keychain on each connect/challenge, injected
// into BOTH transports + the probe as a provider. This way a certificate
// imported from the "" screen takes effect on the NEXT connection
// without relaunching a snapshot captured here would stay stale. A
// missing cert is the normal pre-install state ( nil); genuine faults
// are logged, not fatal (`loadedIdentityOrNil`). mTLS challenges only
// fire for tunnel hosts, so a `nil` result is inert for local hosts.
let identityStore = KeychainClientIdentityStore()
let identityProvider: @Sendable () -> ClientIdentity? = {
identityStore.loadedIdentityOrNil()
}
let http = URLSessionHTTPTransport(identityProvider: identityProvider)
let termTransport = URLSessionTermTransport(identityProvider: identityProvider)
return AppEnvironment(
hostStore: KeychainHostStore(),
lastSessionStore: UserDefaultsLastSessionStore(),

View File

@@ -74,7 +74,8 @@ struct StackRootView: View {
SessionListScreen(
viewModel: coordinator.sessionList,
onOpen: { coordinator.open($0) },
onAddHost: { coordinator.presentAddHost() }
onAddHost: { coordinator.presentAddHost() },
onDeviceCert: { coordinator.presentDeviceCert() }
)
.safeAreaInset(edge: .bottom) { continueLastBanner }
// / DS reduceMotion
@@ -178,4 +179,5 @@ struct ProjectsToolbarItem: ToolbarContent {
enum RootCopy {
static let continueLast = "继续上次会话"
static let projects = "项目"
static let done = "完成"
}

View File

@@ -39,7 +39,8 @@ struct SplitRootView: View {
// selectSidebarItem
coordinator.selectSidebarItem(sidebarItem(for: request))
},
onAddHost: { coordinator.presentAddHost() }
onAddHost: { coordinator.presentAddHost() },
onDeviceCert: { coordinator.presentDeviceCert() }
)
.safeAreaInset(edge: .bottom) { continueLastBanner }
.animation(

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
import ClientTLS
import Foundation
import WireProtocol
@@ -9,14 +10,39 @@ import WireProtocol
/// bypass that single audited point (review CRITICAL).
struct URLSessionHTTPTransport: HTTPTransport {
private let session: URLSession
/// Strong reference to the mTLS delegate. URLSession retains its delegate
/// until invalidated, but this ephemeral session is never explicitly
/// invalidated, so holding it here documents the ownership and keeps the
/// transport a self-contained value.
private let tlsDelegate: LazyClientTLSSessionDelegate
/// Default is EPHEMERAL, not `.shared` (T-iOS-19 finding): RO GET bodies
/// include `/live-sessions/:id/preview` raw terminal ring-buffer bytes
/// that may contain printed secrets and `.shared`'s default URLCache
/// writes responses to disk. Ephemeral keeps them memory-only, matching
/// the WS transport and the privacy-shade posture.
init(session: URLSession = URLSession(configuration: .ephemeral)) {
self.session = session
/// Fixed-identity convenience (snapshot callers / tests): wraps a constant
/// provider, so behaviour is identical to capturing the identity directly.
init(identity: ClientIdentity? = nil) {
self.init(identityProvider: { identity })
}
/// C-iOS-2 (MEDIUM no-relaunch fix) · The session's mTLS delegate resolves
/// the device identity LAZILY, per client-certificate challenge, from
/// `identityProvider`. A `ClientCertificate` challenge from a tunneled host
/// is thus answered with whatever cert is installed AT CHALLENGE TIME so a
/// certificate imported mid-run is presented on the NEXT TLS handshake
/// without an app relaunch (a snapshot captured here would stay stale). The
/// session itself stays a single long-lived value (no per-request churn).
/// Local http/https hosts never issue that challenge, so the provider is
/// never even consulted for them (and a `nil` result is inert regardless).
///
/// EPHEMERAL, not `.shared` (T-iOS-19 finding): RO GET bodies include
/// `/live-sessions/:id/preview` raw terminal ring-buffer bytes that may
/// contain printed secrets and `.shared`'s default URLCache writes
/// responses to disk. Ephemeral keeps them memory-only, matching the WS
/// transport and the privacy-shade posture.
init(identityProvider: @escaping @Sendable () -> ClientIdentity?) {
let delegate = LazyClientTLSSessionDelegate(identityProvider: identityProvider)
self.tlsDelegate = delegate
self.session = URLSession(
configuration: .ephemeral, delegate: delegate, delegateQueue: nil
)
}
func send(_ request: URLRequest) async throws -> (Data, HTTPURLResponse) {
@@ -29,3 +55,40 @@ struct URLSessionHTTPTransport: HTTPTransport {
return (data, httpResponse)
}
}
/// C-iOS-2 (MEDIUM no-relaunch fix) · Session-level mTLS delegate that resolves
/// the device identity FRESH per client-certificate challenge the App-layer
/// twin of ClientTLS's fixed-identity `ClientTLSSessionDelegate` (which captures
/// the identity once). The provider is only consulted for a `ClientCertificate`
/// challenge, so a `ServerTrust` challenge never triggers a keychain read; the
/// pure decision itself is delegated to the shared `MutualTLSChallengeResponder`
/// (single truth table, unit-tested in ClientTLS).
///
/// `@unchecked Sendable`: URLSession retains its delegate and invokes it from
/// arbitrary queues; every stored field is an immutable `let` over a `@Sendable`
/// value (the provider is `@Sendable`, the responder is stateless).
private final class LazyClientTLSSessionDelegate:
NSObject, URLSessionDelegate, @unchecked Sendable {
private let identityProvider: @Sendable () -> ClientIdentity?
private let responder = MutualTLSChallengeResponder()
init(identityProvider: @escaping @Sendable () -> ClientIdentity?) {
self.identityProvider = identityProvider
super.init()
}
func urlSession(
_ session: URLSession,
didReceive challenge: URLAuthenticationChallenge,
completionHandler: @escaping (URLSession.AuthChallengeDisposition, URLCredential?) -> Void
) {
// Only a client-certificate challenge needs the identity; resolving it
// for a server-trust challenge would do a needless keychain read/import
// on every HTTPS handshake.
let isClientCert = challenge.protectionSpace.authenticationMethod
== NSURLAuthenticationMethodClientCertificate
let identity = isClientCert ? identityProvider() : nil
let resolution = responder.resolve(challenge, identity: identity)
completionHandler(resolution.disposition, resolution.credential)
}
}