feat(tunnel): zero-touch tunnel enrollment — control-plane PKI, host agent, iOS, nginx isolation

Customers install one command / log in once; hardware-generated keys never leave the
device; CSRs return certs + subdomain; frpc + base-app run as durable services. No .p12,
no manual cert import. Implements the MVP fast-path of docs/PLAN_TUNNEL_AUTOMATION.md.

Control-plane / PKI (control-plane/):
- ca/x509-assembler.ts: single KMS-signed real X.509 issuance primitive (Ed25519 + P-256)
- ca/csr-ec.ts: P-256 PKCS#10 proof-of-possession (verifyCsrPoPEc) + CSR-key routing
- ca/frpclient-issue.ts, ca/device-issue.ts: P-256 frp-client + device leaf signers
- ca/rotate.ts + api/renew.ts: real-X.509 /renew + /device/:id/renew (mTLS current cert)
- registry/devices.ts: device registry + per-account cap/rate-limit
- auth/session.ts: device:enroll capability token mint/verify
- api/device-enroll.ts: POST /device/enroll (ownership-gated, deny-by-default)
- pairing/native-redeem.ts + shared gateAndConsumePairingCode; api/provision.ts native arm
- boot/native-ca.ts + main.ts: wire two P-256 CAs + issuers + routers (dev / KMS fail-fast)

Contracts: relay-contracts enroll right; relay-auth SPIFFE /device/ arm + spiffeIdFor(kind)

Host agent (agent/):
- transport/frpcToml.ts; provision/frpcBinary.ts + untar.ts (verify-download + traversal-safe extract)
- keys P-256 keygen/CSR/loadIdentity; service two-unit install + BIND_HOST loopback S-GATE
- net/loopbackLiteral.ts strict guard; health/probe.ts + transport/frpSupervise.ts; cli pair --install

iOS (ios/Packages/ClientTLS): SecureEnclaveKey + CertificateSigningRequest + DeviceEnrollmentClient
+ Keychain enroll refactor (SecKey/Security.framework end-to-end, avoids the -25300 trap)

Isolation (deploy/nginx): njs/getCertSub.js SAN parser + zone-anchored map -> 403

Verified: 758 tests green (control-plane 246, agent 267, relay-auth 133, relay-contracts 85,
iOS ClientTLS 27), all tsc clean; real nginx+njs docker 403/200/400; Swift CSR accepted by
the real control-plane verifier; frpc extract byte-identical to `tar -xO`. Cross-validation
caught + fixed 5 real defects (1 critical, 4 high). Remaining = infra (KMS, nginx deploy,
VPS frps, physical iPhone) per PROGRESS_LOG runbook.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Yaojia Wang
2026-07-10 16:11:13 +02:00
parent 31054450fc
commit e7f3bd05f0
79 changed files with 9920 additions and 385 deletions

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
/**
* B1 acceptance (FIX H-host-2, H-host-4) — the P-256 HOST frp-client leaf signer. Proves an issued
* leaf is a REAL, tool-parseable, signature-verifiable X.509 v3 cert off the P-256 frp-client-CA,
* carrying the dNSName ENFORCEMENT key + the host SPIFFE-ID (which relay-auth's parser accepts),
* EKU clientAuth + CA:false; that the registry gate rejects unregistered / revoked / pubkey-mismatch
* UNIFORMLY without ever invoking the CA signer; and that a P-256 CSR built by the AGENT's own
* `enroll/csr.ts` passes `verifyCsrPoPEc` and flows its embedded pubkey through to issuance.
*/
import 'reflect-metadata'
import { describe, test, expect, vi } from 'vitest'
import * as x509 from '@peculiar/x509'
import { AsnConvert } from '@peculiar/asn1-schema'
import { Certificate } from '@peculiar/asn1-x509'
import { webcrypto, generateKeyPairSync, randomUUID } from 'node:crypto'
import { parseSpiffeId, spiffeIdFor } from 'relay-auth/src/agent/spiffe.js'
import { createMemoryStores } from '../src/store/memory.js'
import { createHostRegistry } from '../src/registry/hosts.js'
import { fingerprint } from '../src/ca/fingerprint.js'
import { assembleCertificate } from '../src/ca/x509-assembler.js'
import { buildCsrEc, verifyCsrPoPEc } from '../src/ca/csr-ec.js'
import { inProcessP256CaSigner, type CaSigner } from '../src/boot/ca-wiring.js'
import { createFrpClientLeafSigner } from '../src/ca/frpclient-issue.js'
import { LeafSignError } from '../src/ca/sign.js'
// Cross-track proof (vi): drive the ACTUAL agent-side P-256 identity + CSR encoder.
import { generateP256Identity } from '../../agent/src/keys/identity.js'
import { buildCsr as buildAgentCsr } from '../../agent/src/enroll/csr.js'
x509.cryptoProvider.set(webcrypto)
const DAY_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000
const TRUST_DOMAIN = 'terminal.yaojia.wang'
const DNS_ZONE = 'terminal.yaojia.wang'
interface FrpClientCa {
readonly caSigner: CaSigner
readonly caCert: x509.X509Certificate
readonly caDer: Uint8Array
}
/** Self-signed P-256 `frp-client-CA` (subject key == signer key) so leaves chain to a real CA. */
async function makeFrpClientCa(): Promise<FrpClientCa> {
const caKeys = generateKeyPairSync('ec', { namedCurve: 'P-256' })
const caSpki = new Uint8Array(caKeys.publicKey.export({ format: 'der', type: 'spki' }))
const caSigner = inProcessP256CaSigner(caKeys.privateKey)
const now = Date.now()
const caDer = await assembleCertificate({
subjectPublicKey: caSpki,
subject: 'CN=frp-client-CA',
issuer: 'CN=frp-client-CA',
serialNumber: Uint8Array.from([0x01]),
notBefore: new Date(now - DAY_MS),
notAfter: new Date(now + 365 * DAY_MS),
extensions: [
new x509.BasicConstraintsExtension(true, undefined, true),
new x509.KeyUsagesExtension(x509.KeyUsageFlags.keyCertSign | x509.KeyUsageFlags.cRLSign, true),
],
signer: caSigner,
sigAlg: 'ecdsa-p256',
})
return { caSigner, caCert: new x509.X509Certificate(caDer), caDer }
}
async function importP256Public(spkiDer: Uint8Array): Promise<CryptoKey> {
return webcrypto.subtle.importKey('spki', new Uint8Array(spkiDer), { name: 'ECDSA', namedCurve: 'P-256' }, true, ['verify'])
}
async function spkiOf(pub: CryptoKey): Promise<Uint8Array> {
return new Uint8Array(await webcrypto.subtle.exportKey('spki', pub))
}
/** A memory-store host registry with a P-256 host bound under `subdomain`, plus its CSR + SPKI. */
async function boundHost(subdomain = 'alice') {
const stores = createMemoryStores()
const hosts = createHostRegistry({ hosts: stores.hosts })
const { der: csr, keys } = await buildCsrEc(`CN=${subdomain}`)
const spki = await spkiOf(keys.publicKey)
const accountId = randomUUID()
const host = await hosts.bindHost({ accountId, subdomain, agentPubkey: spki, enrollFpr: fingerprint(spki) })
return { stores, hosts, host, csr, spki, accountId }
}
function makeSigner(ca: FrpClientCa, stores: ReturnType<typeof createMemoryStores>) {
return createFrpClientLeafSigner({
hosts: stores.hosts,
signer: ca.caSigner,
issuerName: ca.caCert.subjectName,
caChainDer: [ca.caDer],
trustDomain: TRUST_DOMAIN,
dnsZone: DNS_ZONE,
})
}
/** Assert a promise rejects with a `LeafSignError` and return it so the caller can check `.code`. */
async function expectLeafSignError(p: Promise<unknown>): Promise<LeafSignError> {
const err = await p.then(
() => {
throw new Error('expected the promise to reject with LeafSignError')
},
(e: unknown) => e,
)
expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(LeafSignError)
return err as LeafSignError
}
describe('frpclient-issue — (i) issued leaf re-parses as X.509 & (ii) chains to the frp-client-CA', () => {
test('leaf re-parses via new x509.X509Certificate and its signature verifies against the CA pubkey', async () => {
const ca = await makeFrpClientCa()
const { stores, host, csr, spki } = await boundHost()
const { cert, caChain } = await makeSigner(ca, stores).signHostLeaf(host.hostId, spki, csr)
expect(() => new x509.X509Certificate(cert)).not.toThrow()
const leaf = new x509.X509Certificate(cert)
expect(leaf.issuer).toBe(ca.caCert.subject) // issuer DN == CA subject DN (chain sanity)
const caPub = await importP256Public(ca.caSigner.publicKeyRaw)
expect(await leaf.verify({ publicKey: caPub, signatureOnly: true })).toBe(true)
// negative: does NOT verify under a different CA key
const otherCa = await importP256Public(inProcessP256CaSigner().publicKeyRaw)
expect(await leaf.verify({ publicKey: otherCa, signatureOnly: true })).toBe(false)
expect(caChain).toEqual([ca.caDer])
})
test('subject key is the enrolled host P-256 key (SPKI byte-equal)', async () => {
const ca = await makeFrpClientCa()
const { stores, host, csr, spki } = await boundHost()
const { cert } = await makeSigner(ca, stores).signHostLeaf(host.hostId, spki, csr)
const leaf = new x509.X509Certificate(cert)
expect(Buffer.from(leaf.publicKey.rawData).equals(Buffer.from(spki))).toBe(true)
})
})
describe('frpclient-issue — (iii) SAN carries dNSName + host SPIFFE URI', () => {
test("SAN = { dNSName '<sub>.terminal.yaojia.wang', URI host-SPIFFE } and parseSpiffeId accepts it as kind host", async () => {
const ca = await makeFrpClientCa()
const { stores, host, csr, spki, accountId } = await boundHost('alice')
const { cert } = await makeSigner(ca, stores).signHostLeaf(host.hostId, spki, csr)
const leaf = new x509.X509Certificate(cert)
const san = leaf.getExtension(x509.SubjectAlternativeNameExtension)
const names = san!.names.toJSON()
expect(names).toContainEqual({ type: 'dns', value: 'alice.terminal.yaojia.wang' })
const uri = names.find((n) => n.type === 'url')!.value
expect(uri).toBe(spiffeIdFor(accountId, 'alice', TRUST_DOMAIN, 'host'))
// relay-auth's OWN parser accepts the URI as a host identity (never drifts from the verifier).
expect(parseSpiffeId(uri)).toEqual({ accountId, id: 'alice', kind: 'host' })
})
})
describe('frpclient-issue — (iv) EKU clientAuth + CA:false + KeyUsage digitalSignature', () => {
test('leaf is a client-auth end-entity cert', async () => {
const ca = await makeFrpClientCa()
const { stores, host, csr, spki } = await boundHost()
const { cert } = await makeSigner(ca, stores).signHostLeaf(host.hostId, spki, csr)
const leaf = new x509.X509Certificate(cert)
const bc = leaf.getExtension(x509.BasicConstraintsExtension)
expect(bc!.ca).toBe(false)
const eku = leaf.getExtension(x509.ExtendedKeyUsageExtension)
expect(eku!.usages).toContain(x509.ExtendedKeyUsage.clientAuth)
const ku = leaf.getExtension(x509.KeyUsagesExtension)
expect(ku!.usages & x509.KeyUsageFlags.digitalSignature).not.toBe(0)
// signatureAlgorithm is ecdsa-with-SHA256 (a P-256 leaf, not Ed25519).
const parsed = AsnConvert.parse(cert.buffer.slice(cert.byteOffset, cert.byteOffset + cert.byteLength) as ArrayBuffer, Certificate)
expect(parsed.signatureAlgorithm.algorithm).toBe('1.2.840.10045.4.3.2')
})
})
describe('frpclient-issue — (v) registry gate rejects uniformly, CA signer never invoked', () => {
test('unregistered host → LeafSignError(not_registered), sign() never called', async () => {
const ca = await makeFrpClientCa()
const signSpy = vi.spyOn(ca.caSigner, 'sign')
const { stores, csr, spki } = await boundHost()
const err = await expectLeafSignError(makeSigner(ca, stores).signHostLeaf(randomUUID(), spki, csr))
expect(err.code).toBe('not_registered')
expect(signSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
test('revoked host → LeafSignError(not_registered), sign() never called', async () => {
const ca = await makeFrpClientCa()
const signSpy = vi.spyOn(ca.caSigner, 'sign')
const { stores, hosts, host, csr, spki } = await boundHost()
await hosts.setHostStatus(host.hostId, 'revoked')
const err = await expectLeafSignError(makeSigner(ca, stores).signHostLeaf(host.hostId, spki, csr))
expect(err.code).toBe('not_registered')
expect(signSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
test('registry pubkey mismatch (present a different key than registered) → not_registered', async () => {
const ca = await makeFrpClientCa()
const signSpy = vi.spyOn(ca.caSigner, 'sign')
const { stores, host } = await boundHost() // host registered under key A
// A DIFFERENT P-256 key B — CSR PoP + substitution checks pass (embedded == presented), but the
// registry stored key A, so step 3 rejects.
const { der: csrB, keys: keysB } = await buildCsrEc('CN=alice')
const spkiB = await spkiOf(keysB.publicKey)
const err = await expectLeafSignError(makeSigner(ca, stores).signHostLeaf(host.hostId, spkiB, csrB))
expect(err.code).toBe('not_registered')
expect(signSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
test('bad CSR proof-of-possession → LeafSignError(csr_rejected), sign() never called', async () => {
const ca = await makeFrpClientCa()
const signSpy = vi.spyOn(ca.caSigner, 'sign')
const { stores, host, csr, spki } = await boundHost()
const forged = Uint8Array.from(csr)
forged[forged.length - 1] = forged[forged.length - 1]! ^ 0xff // corrupt the signature
const err = await expectLeafSignError(makeSigner(ca, stores).signHostLeaf(host.hostId, spki, forged))
expect(err.code).toBe('csr_rejected')
expect(signSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
test('all rejects share the SAME uniform message (never leaks which check failed)', async () => {
const ca = await makeFrpClientCa()
const { stores, hosts, host, csr, spki } = await boundHost()
const signer = makeSigner(ca, stores)
const unregistered = await expectLeafSignError(signer.signHostLeaf(randomUUID(), spki, csr))
await hosts.setHostStatus(host.hostId, 'revoked')
const revoked = await expectLeafSignError(signer.signHostLeaf(host.hostId, spki, csr))
expect(unregistered.message).toBe(revoked.message)
expect(unregistered.message).toBe('leaf signing refused')
})
})
describe('frpclient-issue — (vi) an AGENT-built P-256 CSR passes verifyCsrPoPEc & issues', () => {
test('agent enroll/csr.ts CSR: verifyCsrPoPEc ok + embedded pubkey flows into the leaf', async () => {
// Drive the REAL agent-side encoder (not the control-plane test helper).
const id = generateP256Identity()
const agentCsrPem = buildAgentCsr(id, 'alice.terminal.yaojia.wang')
const agentCsrDer = new Uint8Array(
Buffer.from(agentCsrPem.replace(/-----[A-Z ]+-----/g, '').replace(/\s+/g, ''), 'base64'),
)
// (a) the control-plane P-256 PoP verifier accepts the agent's hand-rolled CSR.
const pop = await verifyCsrPoPEc(agentCsrDer)
expect(pop.ok).toBe(true)
// its embedded pubkey is exactly the agent identity's EC SPKI.
expect(Buffer.from(pop.embeddedPubSpki).equals(Buffer.from(id.publicKey))).toBe(true)
// (b) that same pubkey flows through issuance: register it, sign, and the leaf carries it.
const ca = await makeFrpClientCa()
const stores = createMemoryStores()
const hosts = createHostRegistry({ hosts: stores.hosts })
const accountId = randomUUID()
const host = await hosts.bindHost({
accountId,
subdomain: 'alice',
agentPubkey: id.publicKey,
enrollFpr: fingerprint(id.publicKey),
})
const { cert } = await makeSigner(ca, stores).signHostLeaf(host.hostId, id.publicKey, agentCsrDer)
const leaf = new x509.X509Certificate(cert)
expect(Buffer.from(leaf.publicKey.rawData).equals(Buffer.from(id.publicKey))).toBe(true)
const caPub = await importP256Public(ca.caSigner.publicKeyRaw)
expect(await leaf.verify({ publicKey: caPub, signatureOnly: true })).toBe(true)
})
})