feat(tunnel): zero-touch tunnel enrollment — control-plane PKI, host agent, iOS, nginx isolation
Customers install one command / log in once; hardware-generated keys never leave the device; CSRs return certs + subdomain; frpc + base-app run as durable services. No .p12, no manual cert import. Implements the MVP fast-path of docs/PLAN_TUNNEL_AUTOMATION.md. Control-plane / PKI (control-plane/): - ca/x509-assembler.ts: single KMS-signed real X.509 issuance primitive (Ed25519 + P-256) - ca/csr-ec.ts: P-256 PKCS#10 proof-of-possession (verifyCsrPoPEc) + CSR-key routing - ca/frpclient-issue.ts, ca/device-issue.ts: P-256 frp-client + device leaf signers - ca/rotate.ts + api/renew.ts: real-X.509 /renew + /device/:id/renew (mTLS current cert) - registry/devices.ts: device registry + per-account cap/rate-limit - auth/session.ts: device:enroll capability token mint/verify - api/device-enroll.ts: POST /device/enroll (ownership-gated, deny-by-default) - pairing/native-redeem.ts + shared gateAndConsumePairingCode; api/provision.ts native arm - boot/native-ca.ts + main.ts: wire two P-256 CAs + issuers + routers (dev / KMS fail-fast) Contracts: relay-contracts enroll right; relay-auth SPIFFE /device/ arm + spiffeIdFor(kind) Host agent (agent/): - transport/frpcToml.ts; provision/frpcBinary.ts + untar.ts (verify-download + traversal-safe extract) - keys P-256 keygen/CSR/loadIdentity; service two-unit install + BIND_HOST loopback S-GATE - net/loopbackLiteral.ts strict guard; health/probe.ts + transport/frpSupervise.ts; cli pair --install iOS (ios/Packages/ClientTLS): SecureEnclaveKey + CertificateSigningRequest + DeviceEnrollmentClient + Keychain enroll refactor (SecKey/Security.framework end-to-end, avoids the -25300 trap) Isolation (deploy/nginx): njs/getCertSub.js SAN parser + zone-anchored map -> 403 Verified: 758 tests green (control-plane 246, agent 267, relay-auth 133, relay-contracts 85, iOS ClientTLS 27), all tsc clean; real nginx+njs docker 403/200/400; Swift CSR accepted by the real control-plane verifier; frpc extract byte-identical to `tar -xO`. Cross-validation caught + fixed 5 real defects (1 critical, 4 high). Remaining = infra (KMS, nginx deploy, VPS frps, physical iPhone) per PROGRESS_LOG runbook. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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95
control-plane/test/registry/devices.test.ts
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95
control-plane/test/registry/devices.test.ts
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/**
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* A4 — device registry (mirrors registry/hosts.ts). Proves: create/get; versioned status swap
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* (INV8 append-only companion rows + atomic pointer swap); per-account device CAP enforcement;
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* per-account enroll RATE-LIMIT; ownership deny-by-default.
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*/
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import { describe, test, expect } from 'vitest'
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import {
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createDeviceRegistry,
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createMemoryDeviceStore,
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DeviceLimitError,
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type RegisterDeviceInput,
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} from '../../src/registry/devices.js'
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const ACCOUNT_A = '11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111'
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const ACCOUNT_B = '22222222-2222-4222-8222-222222222222'
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function input(overrides: Partial<RegisterDeviceInput> = {}): RegisterDeviceInput {
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return {
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accountId: ACCOUNT_A,
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subdomainScope: 'alice',
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ecPubkeySpki: new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3, 4]),
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attestationLevel: 'none',
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...overrides,
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}
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}
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describe('A4 device registry', () => {
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test('registerDevice → getDevice returns the persisted record with a serial + notAfter', async () => {
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const devices = createDeviceRegistry({ devices: createMemoryDeviceStore() })
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const rec = await devices.registerDevice(input())
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expect(rec.deviceId.length).toBeGreaterThan(0)
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expect(rec.accountId).toBe(ACCOUNT_A)
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expect(rec.subdomainScope).toBe('alice')
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expect(rec.status).toBe('active')
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expect(rec.serial.length).toBeGreaterThan(0)
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expect(Date.parse(rec.notAfter)).toBeGreaterThan(Date.now())
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expect(await devices.getDevice(rec.deviceId)).toEqual(rec)
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})
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test('ecPubkeySpki is defensively copied (public key only, immutable)', async () => {
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const devices = createDeviceRegistry({ devices: createMemoryDeviceStore() })
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const src = new Uint8Array([9, 9, 9])
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const rec = await devices.registerDevice(input({ ecPubkeySpki: src }))
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src[0] = 0 // mutate the caller's buffer
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expect(Array.from(rec.ecPubkeySpki)).toEqual([9, 9, 9])
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})
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test('setDeviceStatus revokes with a versioned snapshot (INV8)', async () => {
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const store = createMemoryDeviceStore()
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const devices = createDeviceRegistry({ devices: store })
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const rec = await devices.registerDevice(input())
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const revoked = await devices.setDeviceStatus(rec.deviceId, 'revoked')
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expect(revoked.status).toBe('revoked')
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expect(revoked.revokedAt).not.toBeNull()
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const versions = await store.versions(rec.deviceId)
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expect(versions.length).toBe(2) // insert + revoke
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expect(versions[1]?.status).toBe('revoked')
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})
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test('ownsDevice is deny-by-default (unknown device / foreign account ⇒ false)', async () => {
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const devices = createDeviceRegistry({ devices: createMemoryDeviceStore() })
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const rec = await devices.registerDevice(input())
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expect(await devices.ownsDevice(ACCOUNT_A, rec.deviceId)).toBe(true)
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expect(await devices.ownsDevice(ACCOUNT_B, rec.deviceId)).toBe(false)
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expect(await devices.ownsDevice(ACCOUNT_A, 'nope')).toBe(false)
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})
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test('per-account device CAP is enforced (active count only)', async () => {
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const devices = createDeviceRegistry({ devices: createMemoryDeviceStore(), deviceCap: 2 })
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await devices.assertUnderCap(ACCOUNT_A) // 0 < 2
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const r1 = await devices.registerDevice(input())
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await devices.registerDevice(input())
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await expect(devices.assertUnderCap(ACCOUNT_A)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(DeviceLimitError)
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// a different account is unaffected
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await devices.assertUnderCap(ACCOUNT_B)
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// revoking one frees a slot
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await devices.setDeviceStatus(r1.deviceId, 'revoked')
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await devices.assertUnderCap(ACCOUNT_A)
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})
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test('per-account enroll RATE-LIMIT throws after the window budget', () => {
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const devices = createDeviceRegistry({ devices: createMemoryDeviceStore(), rateMax: 2 })
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devices.checkRateLimit(ACCOUNT_A)
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devices.checkRateLimit(ACCOUNT_A)
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expect(() => devices.checkRateLimit(ACCOUNT_A)).toThrow(DeviceLimitError)
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// a different account has its own budget
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expect(() => devices.checkRateLimit(ACCOUNT_B)).not.toThrow()
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})
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test('DeviceLimitError carries a machine code (cap vs rate) but a uniform message', async () => {
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const devices = createDeviceRegistry({ devices: createMemoryDeviceStore(), deviceCap: 0 })
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await devices.registerDevice(input()).catch(() => undefined)
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await expect(devices.assertUnderCap(ACCOUNT_A)).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'cap_exceeded' })
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})
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})
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