feat(tunnel): zero-touch tunnel enrollment — control-plane PKI, host agent, iOS, nginx isolation

Customers install one command / log in once; hardware-generated keys never leave the
device; CSRs return certs + subdomain; frpc + base-app run as durable services. No .p12,
no manual cert import. Implements the MVP fast-path of docs/PLAN_TUNNEL_AUTOMATION.md.

Control-plane / PKI (control-plane/):
- ca/x509-assembler.ts: single KMS-signed real X.509 issuance primitive (Ed25519 + P-256)
- ca/csr-ec.ts: P-256 PKCS#10 proof-of-possession (verifyCsrPoPEc) + CSR-key routing
- ca/frpclient-issue.ts, ca/device-issue.ts: P-256 frp-client + device leaf signers
- ca/rotate.ts + api/renew.ts: real-X.509 /renew + /device/:id/renew (mTLS current cert)
- registry/devices.ts: device registry + per-account cap/rate-limit
- auth/session.ts: device:enroll capability token mint/verify
- api/device-enroll.ts: POST /device/enroll (ownership-gated, deny-by-default)
- pairing/native-redeem.ts + shared gateAndConsumePairingCode; api/provision.ts native arm
- boot/native-ca.ts + main.ts: wire two P-256 CAs + issuers + routers (dev / KMS fail-fast)

Contracts: relay-contracts enroll right; relay-auth SPIFFE /device/ arm + spiffeIdFor(kind)

Host agent (agent/):
- transport/frpcToml.ts; provision/frpcBinary.ts + untar.ts (verify-download + traversal-safe extract)
- keys P-256 keygen/CSR/loadIdentity; service two-unit install + BIND_HOST loopback S-GATE
- net/loopbackLiteral.ts strict guard; health/probe.ts + transport/frpSupervise.ts; cli pair --install

iOS (ios/Packages/ClientTLS): SecureEnclaveKey + CertificateSigningRequest + DeviceEnrollmentClient
+ Keychain enroll refactor (SecKey/Security.framework end-to-end, avoids the -25300 trap)

Isolation (deploy/nginx): njs/getCertSub.js SAN parser + zone-anchored map -> 403

Verified: 758 tests green (control-plane 246, agent 267, relay-auth 133, relay-contracts 85,
iOS ClientTLS 27), all tsc clean; real nginx+njs docker 403/200/400; Swift CSR accepted by
the real control-plane verifier; frpc extract byte-identical to `tar -xO`. Cross-validation
caught + fixed 5 real defects (1 critical, 4 high). Remaining = infra (KMS, nginx deploy,
VPS frps, physical iPhone) per PROGRESS_LOG runbook.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

relay-auth/src/agent/spiffe.ts

@@ -1,10 +1,14 @@
 /**
- * T9 · SPIFFE-ID scheme for per-host agent identity (INV4/INV14).
- * Form: `spiffe://relay.<domain>/account/<accountId>/host/<hostId>`.
+ * T9 · SPIFFE-ID scheme for per-host / per-device agent identity (INV4/INV14).
+ * Forms: `spiffe://relay.<domain>/account/<accountId>/host/<hostId>` (frp control channel) and
+ * `.../account/<accountId>/device/<deviceId>` (device data path, FIX H-cp-2 / H-native-6).
  */
 import type { SpiffeId } from '../types.js'
 import { SpiffeIdSchema } from '../types.js'
 
+/** Which identity arm a SPIFFE-ID names: a host agent or an end-user device. */
+export type SpiffeKind = 'host' | 'device'
+
 export class SpiffeError extends Error {
   constructor(message: string) {
     super(message)
@@ -18,21 +22,30 @@ export function trustDomain(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): string {
   return d !== undefined && d.length > 0 ? d : 'example.com'
 }
 
-export function spiffeIdFor(accountId: string, hostId: string, domain = trustDomain()): SpiffeId {
-  if (accountId.length === 0 || hostId.length === 0) {
-    throw new SpiffeError('accountId and hostId are required')
+/**
+ * Build a SPIFFE-ID. The optional 4th `kind` param defaults to `'host'`, so existing 3-arg
+ * callers (e.g. control-plane `ca/issue.ts`) are UNCHANGED. Pass `'device'` for device leaves.
+ */
+export function spiffeIdFor(
+  accountId: string,
+  id: string,
+  domain = trustDomain(),
+  kind: SpiffeKind = 'host',
+): SpiffeId {
+  if (accountId.length === 0 || id.length === 0) {
+    throw new SpiffeError('accountId and id are required')
   }
-  const id = `spiffe://relay.${domain}/account/${accountId}/host/${hostId}`
-  return SpiffeIdSchema.parse(id)
+  const uri = `spiffe://relay.${domain}/account/${accountId}/${kind}/${id}`
+  return SpiffeIdSchema.parse(uri)
 }
 
 const PARSE_RE =
-  /^spiffe:\/\/relay\.[a-z0-9.-]+\/account\/([A-Za-z0-9_-]+)\/host\/([A-Za-z0-9_-]+)$/
+  /^spiffe:\/\/relay\.[a-z0-9.-]+\/account\/([A-Za-z0-9_-]+)\/(host|device)\/([A-Za-z0-9_-]+)$/
 
-export function parseSpiffeId(uri: SpiffeId): { accountId: string; hostId: string } {
+export function parseSpiffeId(uri: SpiffeId): { accountId: string; id: string; kind: SpiffeKind } {
   const parsed = SpiffeIdSchema.safeParse(uri) // rejects path-traversal / wildcard / malformed
   if (!parsed.success) throw new SpiffeError('invalid SPIFFE-ID (malformed / traversal / wildcard)')
   const m = PARSE_RE.exec(uri)
   if (m === null) throw new SpiffeError('unparseable SPIFFE-ID')
-  return { accountId: m[1]!, hostId: m[2]! }
+  return { accountId: m[1]!, kind: m[2]! as SpiffeKind, id: m[3]! }
 }

relay-auth/src/agent/verify-mtls.ts

@@ -102,17 +102,20 @@ export async function verifyAgentCert(
   if (now > cert.notAfter) return { ok: false, reason: 'expired' }
   if (cert.spiffeUri === null) return { ok: false, reason: 'no_spiffe_san' }
 
-  let ids: { accountId: string; hostId: string }
+  let ids: ReturnType<typeof parseSpiffeId>
   try {
     ids = parseSpiffeId(cert.spiffeUri)
   } catch {
     return { ok: false, reason: 'bad_spiffe_id' }
   }
+  // Host channel is host-only. A /device/ cert must never be accepted here (its enforcement
+  // gate is nginx :8470), so an id that collides with an enrolled hostId can't cross tenants.
+  if (ids.kind !== 'host') return { ok: false, reason: 'not_host_cert' }
 
-  const host = await hosts.getById(ids.hostId)
+  const host = await hosts.getById(ids.id)
   if (host === null) return { ok: false, reason: 'host_not_enrolled' } // INV4: not in registry
   if (host.accountId !== ids.accountId) return { ok: false, reason: 'spiffe_account_mismatch' }
   if (host.status === 'revoked') return { ok: false, reason: 'host_revoked' }
 
-  return { ok: true, hostId: ids.hostId, accountId: ids.accountId }
+  return { ok: true, hostId: ids.id, accountId: ids.accountId }
 }

relay-auth/src/index.ts

@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ export {
 
 // T9 mTLS / SPIFFE
 export { spiffeIdFor, parseSpiffeId, trustDomain, SpiffeError } from './agent/spiffe.js'
+export type { SpiffeKind } from './agent/spiffe.js'
 export {
   verifyAgentCert,
   defaultParseX509,

relay-auth/src/types.ts

@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ export interface AuditEvent {
   readonly remoteAddrHash: string
 }
 
-export type SpiffeId = string // 'spiffe://relay.<domain>/account/<accountId>/host/<hostId>'
+export type SpiffeId = string // 'spiffe://relay.<domain>/account/<accountId>/(host|device)/<id>'
 
 export interface RateLimitPolicy {
   readonly connectPerMin: number
@@ -227,11 +227,13 @@ export const RateLimitPolicySchema = z
   .strict()
 
 /**
- * SPIFFE-ID validator: accepts the `spiffe://relay.<domain>/account/<a>/host/<h>` form and
- * REJECTS path-traversal (`..`) or wildcard (`*`). Segment chars are restricted (no `/`).
+ * SPIFFE-ID validator: accepts BOTH the host arm `spiffe://relay.<domain>/account/<a>/host/<h>`
+ * and the device arm `.../account/<a>/device/<d>` (FIX H-cp-2 / H-native-6, added in lockstep
+ * with the control-plane device issuer). REJECTS path-traversal (`..`) or wildcard (`*`); the
+ * kind segment is exactly `host` or `device`. Segment chars are restricted (no `/`).
  */
 const SPIFFE_ID_RE =
-  /^spiffe:\/\/relay\.[a-z0-9.-]+\/account\/[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\/host\/[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/
+  /^spiffe:\/\/relay\.[a-z0-9.-]+\/account\/[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\/(?:host|device)\/[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/
 export const SpiffeIdSchema = z
   .string()
   .regex(SPIFFE_ID_RE, 'invalid SPIFFE-ID form')