web-terminal

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Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Yaojia Wang	95b9cccf07	feat(relay): Phase1 foundation — P3 Postgres store + async capability verifier + compose RELAY-PHASE1 Wave A (2/3) + E1 infra: - A1: createPgStores() Postgres adapter for all 9 P3 store ports + runMigrations(); writable-CTE atomic INV8 status swaps; 0002_routes.sql. 23/23 pg tests, 96.72% cov. - A3: real capability verifier delegating to relay-auth verifyCapabilityToken; sync->async seam across authz/provision/main. Full CP suite 15 files/101 pass, tsc clean. - E1: deploy/docker-compose.yml (Postgres16+Redis7, loopback-only) + .env.example. - docs: PLAN_RELAY_PHASE1.md file-level execution spec; PROGRESS_LOG RELAY-PHASE1 section.	2026-07-06 14:51:37 +02:00
Yaojia Wang	2af57e6686	feat(relay): rendezvous-relay service — 7 packages + plans (contracts/transport/agent/control-plane/e2e/auth/web) Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only (the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup. Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified: - relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model, capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog - term-relay: native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward) - agent: host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000) - control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning - relay-e2e: browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key) - relay-auth: Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation - relay-web: browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live (.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md. NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers. Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.	2026-07-02 06:10:16 +02:00

Author

SHA1

Message

Date

Yaojia Wang

95b9cccf07

feat(relay): Phase1 foundation — P3 Postgres store + async capability verifier + compose

RELAY-PHASE1 Wave A (2/3) + E1 infra:
- A1: createPgStores() Postgres adapter for all 9 P3 store ports + runMigrations();
  writable-CTE atomic INV8 status swaps; 0002_routes.sql. 23/23 pg tests, 96.72% cov.
- A3: real capability verifier delegating to relay-auth verifyCapabilityToken; sync->async
  seam across authz/provision/main. Full CP suite 15 files/101 pass, tsc clean.
- E1: deploy/docker-compose.yml (Postgres16+Redis7, loopback-only) + .env.example.
- docs: PLAN_RELAY_PHASE1.md file-level execution spec; PROGRESS_LOG RELAY-PHASE1 section.

2026-07-06 14:51:37 +02:00

Yaojia Wang

2af57e6686

feat(relay): rendezvous-relay service — 7 packages + plans (contracts/transport/agent/control-plane/e2e/auth/web)

Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.

Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
  capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay:   native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent:        host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e:    browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth:   Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web:    browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering

Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.

NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.

2026-07-02 06:10:16 +02:00

2 Commits