The server half shipped 2026-07-30 as feature A (4892fa7/f6ef19e/d39a0ab) and
both native clients are at zero. This is NOT a regression — OrphanSessionInfo is
deliberately a separate type rather than a flag on LiveSessionInfo, and
src/server.ts:600 names the reason: the clients decode /live-sessions, so a
variant shape there would have broken them.
It is worth planning anyway because SessionManager.shutdown only detaches the
tmux client for tmux-backed sessions (manager.ts:410-417), so a server restart
or a desktop-app quit turns every session into an orphan. The web launcher lists
them and re-adopts on tap; the phone still shows an empty list — which is the
walk-away case this product exists for.
The plan doc carries the eleven traps a client implementer will hit, each one a
shipped review finding or a documented server subtlety — notably that preview
returns cols/rows of literally 0 (both clients currently size thumbnails from
that response), that a 429 must not collapse to "no orphans", and that the
destructive confirmation must come from count-idle rather than card count (that
one nearly ended 33 shells while the dialog said 24).
Also corrects two now-false claims found while cross-referencing: the ROADMAP
row for tmux discovery was half-stale, and ANDROID_CLIENT_PLAN's do-not-consume
list still listed POST /projects/worktree (both clients consume it now) and
GET /sessions (iOS consumes it, Android does not — so "match iOS" now argues
for building it, not against).
An OPTIONAL shared token so the app can be used off-LAN (via the relay/tunnel) more
safely than "anyone who reaches the port gets a shell". Sits IN FRONT OF the existing
Origin/CSRF model — never replacing it — and is fully inert when unset.
- src/http/auth.ts (new, pure): constantTimeEqual hashes both inputs to sha256 (32
bytes) then crypto.timingSafeEqual — no `===`, no length side-channel, never throws.
parseCookieHeader / cookieIsAuthed / buildSetCookie / isAuthEnabled.
- WEBTERM_TOKEN in config: 16–512 URL/cookie-safe chars or the server refuses to start.
- GET /?token=<t> or POST /auth (rate-limited 10/min) validates → sets
HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict; Secure-when-https cookie; public/login.html (no <script>).
- When enabled: the WS handshake (AFTER the Origin check, before handleUpgrade) + a
central authGate over all remote HTTP require the cookie. Open: /login, /auth.
Loopback bypass scoped to /hook* ONLY (tighter than the plan — gates the local
browser too).
- Unset ⇒ isAuthEnabled false ⇒ pure passthrough (LAN zero-config unchanged).
Honest tradeoff (in code + CLAUDE.md + login page): a bar-raiser, NOT a TLS/Tailscale
substitute — on bare ws:// the token is cleartext + replayable; only hardens the
TLS-terminated relay path. Verified: typecheck + build:web clean, 2118 pass at
--test-timeout=30000 (disabled-mode regression proven; only the known tmux flake red);
auth.ts 100% line coverage.
