Two real-deploy renew bugs (found running the live /renew):
- the /renew mTLS request pinned the enroll caChain as the server CA → TLS
'unable to get local issuer certificate' (the LE-fronted CP is publicly
trusted). Verify the server against SYSTEM roots (drop ca), keep the client
cert + rejectUnauthorized:true. (TlsClientOptions.ca now optional.)
- renewCert parsed {cert, caChain:string}, but the CP returns cert=base64(DER)
+ caChain=base64(DER)[]; normalize to PEM (shared certs/pem.ts, reused by
native enroll). Verified live: cert rotated 13:41→next-day, frpc restarted,
tunnel stayed up. 281 tests pass.
Fixes found deploying `pair --install` against the live control-plane:
- native enroll tolerates hostContentSecret:null and converts the base64-DER
cert + caChain[] the CP returns into PEM for frpc/keystore
- launchd/systemd units use an absolute node (process.execPath) + a PATH with
/usr/local/bin (bare `node` died with EX_CONFIG 78)
- the agent unit now carries ENROLL_URL/RELAY_URL/STATE_DIR/LOCAL_TARGET_URL
(`run` loadConfig()-validates them; missing → supervisor exited 1)
281 tests pass. Follow-up: add unit tests for the native-enroll tolerance +
agent-unit env (only install node-path is covered so far).
Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.
Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay: native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent: host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e: browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth: Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web: browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering
Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.
NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
