- T-iOS-34's stated acceptance is "最大字号不破版" and it was failing: the key bar
froze its height at 52pt while an AX5 keycap needs 108.24pt, so caps clipped —
recorded as a withKnownIssue rather than fixed. Height now derives from the
content size category (and tracks live changes via registerForTraitChanges);
the known-issue marker is gone, replaced by positive assertions including a
12-category no-clip sweep and a guard that stays red if anyone writes the
constant back. Honest tradeoff: the keycap font is clamped at .accessibility2,
the same policy the design system already applies to dense content, because an
unclamped AX5 bar would eat the terminal. A test pins the clamp so the two
cannot drift.
- Thumbnails silently 401'd on a token-gated host: the pipeline built its own
transport with no token source, and by design never throws, so every preview
degraded to a placeholder with no signal. Assembled from AppEnvironment now.
- Android had zero CI while the token wave shipped 24 files of secret-handling
code. The instrumented leg is workflow_dispatch-only and says why in the file:
no one has ever seen it green on a runner, and a required leg nobody trusts
just produces a false green.
- Android persisted a validated token before the host probe succeeded, stranding
a secret for a host that never paired.
App bundle 534 -> 550 on both simulators, zero known issues. Android 687 -> 691.
ClientTLS was the most security-sensitive package in the tree and the least
covered, and it was not in the coverage gate at all (the gate's 4-package set
predates it). 48 -> 84 tests against the real macOS keychain, serialized with a
custom Testing trait after a @globalActor proved insufficient (actors yield at
await, so cross-await critical sections got interleaved by other cases' cleanup).
CI: the app/ipad/ios17 legs ran a bundle containing LiveServerSmokeTests, which
spawns tsx, with no npm ci -- a hard failure, not a skip, on a bare checkout.
Adds the missing iPad UI-test leg, and makes a missing iOS 17 runtime fail loudly
instead of silently reporting green.
Opens WebTerm to iPhone + iPad: TARGETED_DEVICE_FAMILY 1→1,2 (project + all
targets), iPad gets all four orientations (~ipad key), ios.yml gains an
ipad-tests leg (iPad Pro 11 sim). Built plist verified UIDeviceFamily [1,2];
app launches natively full-screen on iPad Pro 11 sim (no letterbox). Adaptive
layout (NavigationSplitView) lands in T-iPad-2. Plan: docs/PLAN_IOS_IPAD.md.
T-iOS-18 (F-iOS-1..13 walkthrough) + T-iOS-19 (security audit vs built artifacts): both
PASS_WITH_FINDINGS, 0 CRITICAL/HIGH; real-device items DEFERRED with manual checklists.
Fixes (1 MED + 3 LOW, all closed):
- WebTermUITests: the single scripted happy path (manual-entry pair → list → attach →
KeyBar ^L → injected held gate via POST /hook/permission → tap Approve → server-side
behavior==allow assertion). Green twice locally (fresh + already-paired branches).
- ios.yml: ui-test leg (server boot + TEST_RUNNER_ env as PROCESS env) + iOS17-floor leg
(loud-skip if runtime absent, hard-fail if present and red); dropped CODE_SIGNING_ALLOWED=NO
from app-tests leg (unsigned hosts get -34018 from the real keychain — measured)
- URLSessionHTTPTransport defaults to .ephemeral (no disk cache of preview terminal bytes)
- TARGETED_DEVICE_FAMILY moved to target level (built plist now UIDeviceFamily [1] only)
Final: 306 automated checks green (214 pkg + 76 app + 10 integration + XCUITest); server src/
untouched; P0 complete (19/19 tasks)
T-iOS-1: ios/ XcodeGen project (iOS 17, Swift 6 strict concurrency, ATS per PLAN §5.2), 5 SPM package shells, CI skeleton
T-iOS-2: Origin spike vs real server — URLSessionWebSocketTask custom Origin CONFIRMED (no Starscream); 16MiB replay + EMSGSIZE(40) errno correction written back to plan
T-iOS-3: WireProtocol frozen contract, 59 tests, 100% line coverage, cross-impl vectors vs src/protocol.ts via tsx
T-iOS-4: FakeTransport/FakeClock/FakeHTTPTransport doubles
Verify: independent agent re-ran all acceptance — 6/6 PASS
Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.
Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay: native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent: host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e: browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth: Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web: browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering
Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.
NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
