Yaojia Wang
a5fa843f00
test(ios): ClientTLS coverage 55.76% -> 89.49%, gate it, fix the three dead CI legs
...
ClientTLS was the most security-sensitive package in the tree and the least
covered, and it was not in the coverage gate at all (the gate's 4-package set
predates it). 48 -> 84 tests against the real macOS keychain, serialized with a
custom Testing trait after a @globalActor proved insufficient (actors yield at
await, so cross-await critical sections got interleaved by other cases' cleanup).
CI: the app/ipad/ios17 legs ran a bundle containing LiveServerSmokeTests, which
spawns tsx, with no npm ci -- a hard failure, not a skip, on a bare checkout.
Adds the missing iPad UI-test leg, and makes a missing iOS 17 runtime fail loudly
instead of silently reporting green.
2026-07-30 12:45:26 +02:00
Yaojia Wang
07bcbf0c08
feat(ios): device enrollment flow + silent cert rotation (B3)
...
Wire the SecureEnclave enroll library into a real flow (login->bearer->CSR->
/device/enroll->keychain identity), presented on the existing mTLS path; add a
rotation scheduler. Atomic keychain replace (add-before-delete); renew body is
{csr}-only; renewal-failing surfaced in the UI. ClientTLS 48 tests pass.
2026-07-18 13:32:05 +02:00
Yaojia Wang
e7f3bd05f0
feat(tunnel): zero-touch tunnel enrollment — control-plane PKI, host agent, iOS, nginx isolation
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Customers install one command / log in once; hardware-generated keys never leave the
device; CSRs return certs + subdomain; frpc + base-app run as durable services. No .p12,
no manual cert import. Implements the MVP fast-path of docs/PLAN_TUNNEL_AUTOMATION.md.
Control-plane / PKI (control-plane/):
- ca/x509-assembler.ts: single KMS-signed real X.509 issuance primitive (Ed25519 + P-256)
- ca/csr-ec.ts: P-256 PKCS#10 proof-of-possession (verifyCsrPoPEc) + CSR-key routing
- ca/frpclient-issue.ts, ca/device-issue.ts: P-256 frp-client + device leaf signers
- ca/rotate.ts + api/renew.ts: real-X.509 /renew + /device/:id/renew (mTLS current cert)
- registry/devices.ts: device registry + per-account cap/rate-limit
- auth/session.ts: device:enroll capability token mint/verify
- api/device-enroll.ts: POST /device/enroll (ownership-gated, deny-by-default)
- pairing/native-redeem.ts + shared gateAndConsumePairingCode; api/provision.ts native arm
- boot/native-ca.ts + main.ts: wire two P-256 CAs + issuers + routers (dev / KMS fail-fast)
Contracts: relay-contracts enroll right; relay-auth SPIFFE /device/ arm + spiffeIdFor(kind)
Host agent (agent/):
- transport/frpcToml.ts; provision/frpcBinary.ts + untar.ts (verify-download + traversal-safe extract)
- keys P-256 keygen/CSR/loadIdentity; service two-unit install + BIND_HOST loopback S-GATE
- net/loopbackLiteral.ts strict guard; health/probe.ts + transport/frpSupervise.ts; cli pair --install
iOS (ios/Packages/ClientTLS): SecureEnclaveKey + CertificateSigningRequest + DeviceEnrollmentClient
+ Keychain enroll refactor (SecKey/Security.framework end-to-end, avoids the -25300 trap)
Isolation (deploy/nginx): njs/getCertSub.js SAN parser + zone-anchored map -> 403
Verified: 758 tests green (control-plane 246, agent 267, relay-auth 133, relay-contracts 85,
iOS ClientTLS 27), all tsc clean; real nginx+njs docker 403/200/400; Swift CSR accepted by
the real control-plane verifier; frpc extract byte-identical to `tar -xO`. Cross-validation
caught + fixed 5 real defects (1 critical, 4 high). Remaining = infra (KMS, nginx deploy,
VPS frps, physical iPhone) per PROGRESS_LOG runbook.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com >
2026-07-10 16:11:13 +02:00
Yaojia Wang
e38e6d1689
feat(ios): device client-cert mTLS — ClientTLS package, transport wiring, install UX (C-iOS)
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- ios/Packages/ClientTLS: SecIdentity wrapper, PKCS12 importer (typed errors), keychain store
(AfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly), pure MutualTLSChallengeResponder truth table, cross-platform
X.509 DER summary. 14/14 tests.
- Both transports (SessionCore URLSessionTermTransport, App URLSessionHTTPTransport) + SessionThumbnail
take a lazy @Sendable ()->ClientIdentity? provider: WS resolves per-connect, HTTP per client-cert
challenge, so a freshly-imported cert applies without an app relaunch. AppEnvironment injects
{ store.loadedIdentityOrNil() }.
- ClientCertScreen (.fileImporter([.pkcs12]) + passphrase -> import -> keychain), reachable via a
设备证书 entry in SessionListScreen.hostMenu. PairingViewModel gates tunnel-host probes on cert
presence and re-maps mTLS-reject to a clientCertRejected message.
Verified: ClientTLS 14/14, SessionCore 93/93, xcodegen + xcodebuild BUILD SUCCEEDED.
2026-07-07 09:42:12 +02:00
