Remote one-tap approval was blind (you'd tap Approve without seeing Claude wants
to run `rm -rf` or rewrite a config). The pending tool's actual command / diff now
renders above the approval bar, on every attached device, riding the same broadcast
+ late-joiner rails as the existing `gate` field.
- src/http/approval-preview.ts (new, pure, never-throws): deriveApprovalPreview —
Bash → command; Edit/Write/MultiEdit/NotebookEdit → a synthetic DiffFile; else null.
Every line sanitized via sanitizeField (strips control/ANSI); caps 40 lines /
200 chars/line / 4KB (security limits, UTF-8-safe byte clamp).
- src/types.ts: additive optional `preview?: ApprovalPreview` on the status
ServerMessage + handleHookEvent (older clients ignore it).
- src/server.ts /hook/permission: derive preview from tool_input, store on the
PendingApproval entry, re-send to late joiners exactly like `gate`.
- manager.ts threads it; public/tabs.ts renderApprovalPreview (command → <pre>
textContent; diff → reused innerHTML-free renderDiffFile). Unknown tools /
plan gates fall back to today's name-only bar.
Attacker-influenced tool input → rendered via textContent/diff-renderer only,
never innerHTML. Verified independently: typecheck + build:web clean, 1692 pass.
Terminal output URLs and file paths (e.g. src/app.ts:42) are now tappable — the
walk-away device is a phone, so this removes soft-keyboard copy gymnastics.
- public/link-paths.ts (new, pure): findPathMatches — links tokens with a '/',
a :line suffix, or a code extension (src/app.ts:42, /abs/main.rs:10, README.md)
while rejecting example.com / v1.2.3 / 12:34 / URL tails.
- terminal-session.ts: hardened URL handler (scheme allowlist http/https/mailto +
window.open noopener,noreferrer, blocks javascript:/data:/file:) replacing the
addon default; a path link provider → openPath() POSTs {file,line} to
/open-in-editor (resolves rel paths against the OSC-7 cwd; in-flight guard).
- src/http/editor.ts: additive openFileInEditor + isGotoEditor (--goto file:line
only for goto-capable editors; execFile, no shell). openInEditor untouched.
- src/server.ts: /open-in-editor branches on body.file vs body.path (same CSRF guard).
Deviation from the "no server change" brief: an additive openFileInEditor was
required because the existing route only opens directories, not file:line (Option A
in docs/plans/w1-clickable-links.md). Backward-compatible; src/types.ts untouched.
Verified independently: typecheck + build:web clean, 1661 tests pass (link-paths
95%+ cov). Note: xterm buffer-row indexing (getLine(n-1)/range.y=n) is asserted in
jsdom but merits a real-browser smoke check.
- src/session/tmux.ts: sync tmux CLI wrappers (available/has/kill), best-effort
- config: useTmux from USE_TMUX env (1/0/auto→detect tmux on PATH)
- session: when useTmux, spawn 'tmux new-session -A -s web_<id> <shell>' (the
node-pty proc is a tmux CLIENT); createSession takes an optional id for
re-attach; Session.tmuxName; kill() runs tmux kill-session
- manager: handleAttach re-attaches to a surviving 'web_<id>' tmux session after
a restart (Case 3.5); shutdown kills only the client pty for tmux sessions so
the shell keeps running
- tests: USE_TMUX:0 in shared integration cfg (no tmux leakage); unit CFGs
useTmux:false; integration 'H1' (real tmux): set var → restart server →
re-attach → var survived. 208 tests green.
- types/protocol: ClientMessage approve/reject; ServerMessage status.pending
- server: POST /hook/permission HELD until the client decides; approve/reject
ws messages resolve it with {hookSpecificOutput.decision.behavior allow|deny};
5-min timeout + release-on-disconnect fall back to Claude's own prompt
- manager.handleHookEvent threads pending flag
- setup-hooks: PermissionRequest uses the held curl (writes decision to stdout);
status events stay fire-and-forget
- FE: terminal-session approve()/reject() + pending state; tabs approval banner
(Approve/Reject) for the active tab's held request
- Tests: protocol approve/reject; integration ⑧ held→approve→allow. 207 green.
- Browser-verified: banner 'Claude wants to use Bash' → Approve → resolves allow.
6 cases against real startServer via ws client:
①bad-origin 401 ②wrong-path destroy ③oversized-frame 1009 ④spawn-fail exit(-1)
— all pass in sandbox; ⑤attach->output ⑥reconnect-replay gated by PTY_AVAILABLE
(auto-skip where posix_spawn is blocked). Orchestrator verified ⑤⑥ sandbox-off:
6/6 pass with real shell — F5/F6 confirmed (replay incl CJK/ANSI intact).
