6 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Yaojia Wang	97e39949a8	Merge ios-completion: device builds unblocked, access token on both clients, P2 wave ... Closes the six remediation items from the 2026-07-29 iOS completion audit plus the whole P2 wave and Android access-token parity. The audit's headline was that the client was code-complete but stuck at the device door: no DEVELOPMENT_TEAM, no entitlements, so it had never run on real hardware once, and it had fallen two months behind the server (Android had the git panel, iOS had none) while neither native client could connect at all once WEBTERM_TOKEN was set. Package tests 310 -> 452, app bundle 296 -> 550 (iPhone and iPad, zero known issues), integration 10 -> 32, Android 687 -> 691. ClientTLS went 55.76% -> 89.49% and is now actually in the coverage gate, which it never was. Device build now succeeds on the free personal team. src/ and public/ are untouched — the git-panel endpoints already existed server-side; iOS simply never consumed them. # Conflicts: # android/.gitignore # android/README.md # android/api-client/src/main/kotlin/wang/yaojia/webterm/api/routes/Endpoints.kt # android/app/src/main/java/wang/yaojia/webterm/screens/PairingScreen.kt # android/app/src/main/java/wang/yaojia/webterm/viewmodels/PairingViewModel.kt # android/app/src/main/java/wang/yaojia/webterm/wiring/AppEnvironment.kt # android/transport-okhttp/src/main/kotlin/wang/yaojia/webterm/transport/OkHttpClientFactory.kt # docs/PROGRESS_LOG.md	2026-07-30 18:12:03 +02:00
Yaojia Wang	390dd11202	feat(android): close the audit's remaining parity gaps ... Seven items the earlier repair waves deliberately left alone, so that the blocker fixes could land with a working safety net first. CERTIFICATE LIFECYCLE (the audit's only "high"). iOS ships a CertificateRotationScheduler; Android had no counterpart, so a device certificate simply expired and needed a manual re-enroll. The decision is a pure total function over five answers, with RE_ENROLL_REQUIRED checked first so it outranks any backoff. Renewal is single-flight — a second trigger coalesces, and a cancelled leader releases the slot so cancellation cannot wedge rotation for the process lifetime. Failure leaves the prior identity fully live (the existing atomic ping-pong flip already guaranteed that) and is published rather than swallowed. Two real defects surfaced while building it: renew() decoded its 201 with EnrollResponseDto, whose deviceId is required — but /device/:id/renew returns only {cert, caChain, notAfter}; only /device/enroll echoes deviceId. Every silent renewal would have thrown MalformedResponse. Fixed with a RenewResponseDto plus the deviceId from the path segment we addressed. And because no renew 201 carries renewAfter, a client that persisted it would rotate exactly once and then report not-due until the cert died. That is why renewAfter is re-derived from the live leaf as notBefore + 2/3·lifetime — the control plane's own formula. This is a latent iOS defect that Android now avoids rather than inherits. /device/:id/recover was confirmed real (control-plane/src/api/renew.ts:443, contract pinned by that suite's CP6e) and is now wired. It goes over a separate NON-mTLS client that throws rather than falling back, because an expired client certificate cannot authenticate its own recovery — the deadlock a previous session already hit and recorded. Asked explicitly about step-up: rotation is unaffected. stepUp appears nowhere in control-plane/src; it lives only on the relay's WebSocket upgrade. On a step-up host the SESSION is denied, not the rotation, so the certificate still stays alive and that principal gap is orthogonal. FOLLOW-UP QUEUE (W2). The queue frame decoded but the three routes managing it were missing, so Android could see "N queued" and not queue anything. One outcome union covers both guarded writes and distinguishes full / too-large / disabled / session-gone / rate-limited, because they need different copy. 429 is surfaced and never auto-retried — POST and DELETE share one 20/min bucket. Queued text is raw shell input and travels verbatim, proven with control characters and CJK. UNREAD WATERMARK now persists, so the unread state survives process death — which is exactly when it matters, since the product premise is walking away and coming back. It stores a plain map rather than an UnreadLedger: the reducer lives in :session-core, which :host-registry may not depend on, so the logic is not restated anywhere. COPY-OUT. Text selection was a recorded feature gap: the stock ActionMode's own Copy handler dereferences the absent TerminalSession, so making it reachable puts an NPE on the button — worse than no selection. The refusal was re-verified from the bytecode, and the same disassembly showed the way out: TerminalBuffer.getSelectedText touches only mLines/TerminalRow, no session and no view. A first-party selection layer now builds on that, with a pure row-major model so a backwards drag normalises correctly. Terminal content reaches the clipboard only on an explicit user copy; OSC 52 stays declined. HOST REMOVAL. PushRegistrar.unregisterHost had zero call sites, so a removed host kept receiving pushes. Removal is now confirm-gated and cleans everything keyed by host id — a half-removed host is worse than none. /config/ui is finally honoured. It was implemented and never called, so allowAutoMode was ignored and the plan gate offered "approve + auto" even where the operator had disabled it. It fails CLOSED: an unfetchable config treats auto as disabled, because the permissive default is the dangerous one. Verified: ./gradlew test :app:assembleDebug :app:assembleDebugAndroidTest :macrobenchmark:assembleBenchmark koverVerify -> BUILD SUCCESSFUL, 1150 JVM tests, 0 failures (903 -> 1150). Instrumented suite re-run on emulator-5554 against live servers: 67 tests, 0 failures, 0 skipped — no device regression.	2026-07-30 15:37:09 +02:00
Yaojia Wang	9114630c3a	feat(android): access-token support — same frozen contract as iOS ... Android could not connect at all once the server set WEBTERM_TOKEN. Hand-written Cookie header on every request and on the WS upgrade (no CookieJar, matching the frozen decision), POST /auth pairing probe, Keystore-backed storage, and a 401 upgrade as a terminal state with no reconnect loop.	2026-07-30 12:45:27 +02:00
Yaojia Wang	3e5cfdc1cf	fix(android): make the terminal actually usable on a device ... The client built to an APK and 617 JVM tests passed, but nothing had ever run on hardware, and three defects made it unusable the moment it did. All three were invisible to the JVM suite because none of those tests instantiate an Android View. 1. Every key press crashed. `RemoteTerminalView` bound the forked emulator but never installed a `TerminalViewClient`, and the stock Termux view dereferences `mClient` with no null guard on the first line of the paths a user actually hits (`onKeyDown` offset 82, `onCreateInputConnection` offset 0, `onKeyUp`, `onKeyPreIme`). Installing any client is not enough: returning false continues into `mTermSession.write()` at offset 150, and `mTermSession` is null forever because `TerminalSession` is final and forking a process is what this app must not do. So the client consumes the key itself and `KeyRouting` has no defer-to-stock branch at all — the crash is unrepresentable, not merely avoided. Termux's `KeyHandler` stays the authority for the key tables, so DECCKM still emits `ESC O A`. 2. The PTY never learned the real size. Nothing called `RemoteTerminalSession.updateSize`, and the stock fallback is dead (`TerminalView.updateSize` early-returns without a session), so every full-screen TUI rendered into 80x24. `TerminalResizeDriver` now drives it from real cell metrics — read through the public `getFontWidth()` / `getFontLineSpacing()` accessors rather than reflection, which would break silently under R8, or a re-measured Paint, which would drift from what the renderer actually draws (plan risk R5). 3. Bare-LAN connections were impossible. `network_security_config.xml` was a self-labelled STUB denying all cleartext while `HostEndpoint` accepts http and derives ws://. The format has no CIDR syntax, so the allowlist its own comment promised cannot be written; cleartext is permitted in base-config, the tunnel domain keeps a TLS block, trust anchors are pinned to system-only, and the guard moves to the §5.4 pairing tiers. Adversarial review then found three more, and one it got wrong: - Swipe-scrolling inside an alternate-screen TUI still crashed. The touch path bypasses `TerminalViewClient` entirely: `doScroll` turns a scroll into `handleKeyCode` whenever the alternate buffer is active, and that dereferences `mTermSession`. Claude Code is an alternate-screen TUI, so this was a crash during normal use on the app's main screen. `TerminalScrollGesture` claims the vertical drag first and reproduces all three `doScroll` branches, closing the fling runnable and `onGenericMotionEvent` with it. - `autofill()` dereferences `mTermSession` unguarded while the view advertises itself autofillable, so any password manager crashed it. The subtree is excluded from the autofill structure. - The review asked for stock text selection to be restored. It cannot be: the ActionMode's own Copy and Paste handlers dereference the absent session, so a reachable selection UI has an NPE on its Copy button. Long press stays consumed and copy-out is recorded as a feature gap. Also: the WEBTERM_TOKEN cookie is carried on REST and the WS upgrade and sealed with Tink AEAD under an AndroidKeyStore key (fail-closed — a seal failure persists nothing rather than falling back to plaintext), and `allowBackup=false` keeps a 30-day shell credential off Google Drive. Verified: ./gradlew test :app:assembleDebug -> 757 JVM tests, 0 failures. Nothing here is device-verified yet; that is the next step.	2026-07-30 08:59:01 +02:00
Yaojia Wang	e254918b1c	feat(android): native Android client — full app parity build (A1–A36 + S1) ... Mirror the iOS P0+P1 client as a Gradle multi-module app. Pure-JVM (Kover ≥80% gated): :wire-protocol (frozen contract + HostEndpoint CSWSH origin + byte-exact codec), :session-core (SessionEngine + reconnect/ping/gate/digest reducers), :api-client, :client-tls (pure PKCS12/keymanager), :transport-okhttp (OkHttp WS+REST). Framework: :app (Compose M3 Adaptive, Hilt, FCM, 11 screens + NavGraph), :terminal-view (Termux terminal-emulator/-view via JitPack, Apache-2.0 — the renderer seam proven headless), :host-registry (DataStore), :client-tls-android (AndroidKeyStore + Tink). Highlights: single-key-home mTLS (non-exportable AndroidKeyStore key + re-reading X509KeyManager + connectionPool.evictAll on rotation, ping-pong single-commit so a failed rotation never clobbers the prior identity); FCM Allow/Deny trust split (Deny=BroadcastReceiver, Allow=trampoline Activity hosting BiometricPrompt); per-consumer-Channel EventBus (R10); config-surviving RetainedSessionHolder; byte-exact KeyByteMap; §5.4 pairing warning tiers. Verified: ~484 JVM tests + Kover ≥80% on the pure modules + :app assembles to an APK; all framework modules assemble. Device behaviors (rendering/IME/FCM/biometric/camera, E2E A34/A35, S2 real-handset FCM spike) deferred to android/DEVICE_QA_CHECKLIST.md per plan §7 (no emulator/Firebase here). Built via multi-agent orchestration (TDD builders → adversarial cross-review → fix → re-verify → independent gate); progress in android/PROGRESS_ANDROID.md.	2026-07-10 16:41:21 +02:00
Yaojia Wang	4ea8f7862a	feat(android): pure-Kotlin foundation — AW0 scaffold + AW1 modules (218 tests green) ... Implements the verifiable pure-Kotlin core of the Android client per docs/ANDROID_CLIENT_PLAN.md, mirroring the iOS SPM package set as Gradle modules. Built + reviewed via multi-agent workflow (explore→implement→verify→review), then review findings fixed with regression tests. Modules (all pure JVM, kotlin("jvm"); Android-framework modules scaffolded but gated off in settings — no Android SDK in this env): - :wire-protocol — frozen wire contract (sealed Client/ServerMessage, enums, HostEndpoint CSWSH origin derivation, transport interfaces), hand-rolled codec byte-identical to the server's JSON.stringify + tolerant kotlinx decode. - :session-core — ReconnectMachine (1→2→4→8→16→30 backoff), PingScheduler, GateTracker (two-line epoch guard), AwayDigest, UnreadLedger, TitleSanitizer, KeyByteMap (byte-matches public/keybar.ts). - :api-client — all REST routes, tolerant decode, Origin-iff-guarded, prefs unknown-key preservation, pairing probe + host-tier classifier. - :client-tls — pure half: PKCS#12 parse, X509KeyManager alias logic, CertificateSummary, provider-agnostic wrong-passphrase classification. - :test-support — FakeTransport / FakeHttpTransport / virtual-clock fakes. Verify: ./gradlew clean test → 218 tests, 0 failures (wire-protocol 47, session-core 60, api-client 69, client-tls 27, test-support 15). Review (3 lenses, 8/10 each) findings fixed: sessionId JSON-injection escape, CancellationException propagation in PingScheduler, PairingProbe close-on-cancel leak, HostEndpoint trim, HostClassifier hoisted to :wire-protocol (type unified), BouncyCastle-portable wrong-passphrase detection, lone-surrogate escaping. Known gap (documented, deferred): /push/fcm-token has no server route yet — plan task A33 (src/push/fcm.ts) delivers it.	2026-07-08 13:45:07 +02:00