Closes the six remediation items from the 2026-07-29 iOS completion audit plus the
whole P2 wave and Android access-token parity.
The audit's headline was that the client was code-complete but stuck at the device
door: no DEVELOPMENT_TEAM, no entitlements, so it had never run on real hardware
once, and it had fallen two months behind the server (Android had the git panel,
iOS had none) while neither native client could connect at all once WEBTERM_TOKEN
was set.
Package tests 310 -> 452, app bundle 296 -> 550 (iPhone and iPad, zero known
issues), integration 10 -> 32, Android 687 -> 691. ClientTLS went 55.76% -> 89.49%
and is now actually in the coverage gate, which it never was. Device build now
succeeds on the free personal team.
src/ and public/ are untouched — the git-panel endpoints already existed
server-side; iOS simply never consumed them.
# Conflicts:
# android/.gitignore
# android/README.md
# android/api-client/src/main/kotlin/wang/yaojia/webterm/api/routes/Endpoints.kt
# android/app/src/main/java/wang/yaojia/webterm/screens/PairingScreen.kt
# android/app/src/main/java/wang/yaojia/webterm/viewmodels/PairingViewModel.kt
# android/app/src/main/java/wang/yaojia/webterm/wiring/AppEnvironment.kt
# android/transport-okhttp/src/main/kotlin/wang/yaojia/webterm/transport/OkHttpClientFactory.kt
# docs/PROGRESS_LOG.md
App layer, four sequential slices (a shared .xcodeproj means adding files
regenerates it, so these could not run in parallel):
- token UX end to end: pairing prompts for a token when a host 401s, POST /auth
validates it, and 204-without-Set-Cookie is correctly read as "this server has
auth disabled" rather than "authenticated". A host paired before the token was
turned on recovers by re-pairing in place. Remove-host now exists and finally
gives PushRegistrar.handleHostRemoved a caller.
- project git panel + worktree lifecycle (T-iOS-32) + claude --resume history —
the parity gap with Android and the web front end.
- terminal search (T-iOS-33) and voice PTT (T-iOS-31) with an epoch guard so a
session switch between dictation and confirm cannot inject into the wrong
session.
- theme + Dynamic Type (T-iOS-34) and web ?join= interop (T-iOS-35). RootView no
longer hard-locks .preferredColorScheme(.dark).
Also unpins SwiftTerm to 1.15.0 by dropping the local hasActiveSelection that
collided with the upstream one, verified green from a fresh derivedDataPath.
Includes the two HIGH fixes the security review found:
- iOS resolved the WS token host-independently, so a token-gated host sitting
next to an open one could never open a terminal and no on-screen remedy could
fix it. Now one transport per host; cross-host leakage is structurally
impossible since both read paths return only that host's own value.
- Android reported the host's own git-credential 401 (git-ops.ts:108, "Push
authentication required on the host.") as "your access token is wrong", because
a blanket 401 mapping ran ahead of the per-route one. Git-write routes are now
ROUTE_DEFINED and keep the server's message.
And the doc sync: README/ios README no longer claim the client is unmerged on
feat/ios-client, the Clients section finally lists Android, and the plan
checkboxes reflect what is actually built.
iOS 534 app tests + 452 package tests; Android 687 tests.
APIClient (77 -> 125 tests, coverage 92.22%): POST /auth probe with the four
distinct outcomes from the frozen contract, Cookie/Accept landed at the same
single header choke point that already enforces Origin-iff-G, plus the whole
project-ops surface the server has had since late July and iOS consumed none of:
/projects/log, /projects/pr, /projects/worktree/state, git stage/commit/push/
fetch, worktree create/remove/prune, GET /sessions, follow-up queue.
HostRegistry (30 -> 73 tests, 88.12% -> 92.49%): per-host token in the Keychain
under the existing SecItemShim conventions (device-only, never synchronizable),
charset/length validated at the boundary, old token-less records still decode.
SessionCore (93 -> 108 tests, 96.74%): the WS upgrade carries the cookie from
the same point that writes Origin, and a 401 handshake is a terminal
.unauthorized -- never entering the backoff loop, since retrying one wrong
shared token is a brute-force generator against the server's 10/min limiter.
T-iOS-1: ios/ XcodeGen project (iOS 17, Swift 6 strict concurrency, ATS per PLAN §5.2), 5 SPM package shells, CI skeleton
T-iOS-2: Origin spike vs real server — URLSessionWebSocketTask custom Origin CONFIRMED (no Starscream); 16MiB replay + EMSGSIZE(40) errno correction written back to plan
T-iOS-3: WireProtocol frozen contract, 59 tests, 100% line coverage, cross-impl vectors vs src/protocol.ts via tsx
T-iOS-4: FakeTransport/FakeClock/FakeHTTPTransport doubles
Verify: independent agent re-ran all acceptance — 6/6 PASS
