chore: track .claude/settings.json for the worktree base ref

`worktree.baseRef: head` is the setting CLAUDE.md's session workflow depends on:
without it EnterWorktree defaults to `fresh` and branches from `origin/main`,
which trails `develop` by ~75 commits. Shared config, so it belongs in the repo —
personal overrides still go in the ignored `.claude/settings.local.json`.

.claude/settings.json

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+{
+  "worktree": {
+    "baseRef": "head"
+  }
+}

.gitignore

@@ -3,6 +3,13 @@ node_modules/
 
 # build output
 dist/
+# EXCEPTION: `agent/src/dist/` holds SOURCE (the packaging config for the distributable binary),
+# not build output. The blanket `dist/` above swallowed it, so it was never committed — a fresh
+# clone was missing it and could neither typecheck `agent/src/index.ts` nor import it from the
+# committed `agent/test/buildBinary.test.ts`. The directory must be re-included FIRST: git does not
+# descend into an excluded directory, so un-ignoring only the file inside it would not work.
+!agent/src/dist/
+!agent/src/dist/**
 public/build/
 desktop/build/
 desktop/dist-app/
@@ -10,6 +17,9 @@ desktop/dist-app/
 # local Claude Code settings (not shared)
 .claude/settings.local.json
 
+# per-session git worktrees (EnterWorktree) — live on disk, never committed
+.claude/worktrees/
+
 # logs / OS cruft
 *.log
 npm-debug.log*

CLAUDE.md

@@ -16,6 +16,26 @@ This file provides guidance to Claude Code (claude.ai/code) when working with co
 
 **Language decision: TypeScript (`.ts`), not `.js`** — ARCHITECTURE §0 records this divergence from TECH_DOC's original `.js` filenames. Wherever the two docs conflict, ARCHITECTURE wins on *how* (it was cross-validated and corrected); TECH_DOC wins on *why/scope*.
 
+## Session Workflow: One Worktree per Session (MANDATORY)
+
+**Every session that changes files works in its own git worktree, and merges back to `develop` when the work is done.** Don't develop directly on `develop` in the main checkout (the one exception is a change to this workflow itself — the rule can't bootstrap inside its own worktree).
+
+1. **Start of session** — before touching any file, call the `EnterWorktree` tool with a task-descriptive name (e.g. `EnterWorktree({name: "fix-cjk-locale"})`). It creates `.claude/worktrees/<name>/` on branch **`worktree-<name>`** (the tool prefixes it — the name you pass is *not* the branch name) and moves the session's cwd into it. Do all work there.
+   - Base ref is `head` (configured in `.claude/settings.json` → `worktree.baseRef`), so the worktree branches from the **current `develop` HEAD**, not `origin/main`. This matters: `develop` runs ~75 commits ahead of `origin/main`, so the default `fresh` base ref would silently produce a badly stale worktree. `develop` is the working trunk; `main` is the release branch.
+   - It branches from the last **commit**, so uncommitted edits sitting in the main checkout do **not** carry over. Commit or stash them first if the task needs them.
+   - Read-only sessions (answering a question, inspecting a remote host) don't need a worktree — only create one when files will change.
+2. **During the session** — commit inside the worktree as normal (conventional-commit format, see the global git-workflow rule). Tests/`tsc` run against the worktree copy, so concurrent sessions never collide on the working tree; each holds a `locked` worktree of its own, so never `git worktree remove` a directory this session didn't create.
+3. **End of session — merge back.** Commit everything in the worktree first, then, **in this order**:
+   ```bash
+   # 1. ExitWorktree({action: "keep"})  → cwd returns to the main checkout, branch survives
+   git merge --no-ff worktree-<name>     # 2. from the main checkout, on develop
+   git worktree remove .claude/worktrees/<name> && git branch -d worktree-<name>   # 3. clean up
+   ```
+   **Order matters:** `ExitWorktree({action: "remove"})` deletes the branch along with the directory, so calling it before the merge throws the work away. (It does refuse when commits aren't yet on `develop` — a safety net, not a plan.) `keep` is also the right call whenever the work is unfinished and the session should be resumable.
+4. **Do not merge to `main`** as part of this flow — `main` is promoted from `develop` separately.
+
+Subagents dispatched with `isolation: worktree` (PLAN §4) get their own throwaway worktrees on top of this — that is a separate, nested mechanism and does not replace the session-level worktree.
+
 ## Development Workflow: Plan & Progress Log (MANDATORY)
 
 Work proceeds against a **phased plan** and is tracked in a **progress log that acts as cross-session memory**. A new Claude instance must be able to read the log and know exactly where things stand. Follow these rules:

agent/src/certs/nativeRenew.ts

@@ -18,13 +18,18 @@
  */
 import { request as httpsRequest } from 'node:https'
 import type { AgentConfig } from '../config/agentConfig.js'
+import { resolveHostIdentity } from '../config/hostRecord.js'
 import type { Keystore } from '../keys/keystore.js'
 import type { Logger } from '../log/logger.js'
 import type { TimerLike } from '../transport/seams.js'
 import { createBackoff } from '../transport/backoff.js'
 import { buildTlsOptions, type CertParser, type TlsClientOptions } from '../transport/dial.js'
 import { DEFAULT_CERT_RENEW_WINDOW_MS } from '../health/probe.js'
-import { createCertRotator, type CertRotator } from './rotation.js'
+import {
+  createCertRotator,
+  type CertExpiredBeyondGraceError,
+  type CertRotator,
+} from './rotation.js'
 
 /** Non-secret message from an unknown thrown value (never serializes cert/key material). */
 function errorMessage(err: unknown): string {
@@ -135,6 +140,8 @@ export function createMtlsFetch(
     // SYSTEM roots — its host (the LE-fronted control-plane) is publicly trusted; pinning the private
     // enroll caChain here fails with "unable to get local issuer certificate". So drop `ca` (absent →
     // node uses the default roots); rejectUnauthorized stays true.
+    // Deliberately still fail-closed on an EXPIRED leaf: nginx would refuse to forward it anyway, so
+    // a lapsed leaf is routed to the plain `/recover` endpoint by the rotator instead of through here.
     const full = buildTlsOptions(ks, { ...(opts.certParser ? { certParser: opts.certParser } : {}) })
     const tls: TlsClientOptions = { cert: full.cert, key: full.key, rejectUnauthorized: full.rejectUnauthorized }
     const reqInit: MtlsRequestInit = {
@@ -195,6 +202,16 @@ export function wireAutoRenew(
       error: errorMessage(err),
     })
   })
+  // Terminal: the grace window is spent, so every further attempt is guaranteed to fail. Say so once,
+  // at error level, naming the fix — and deliberately do NOT stop the supervisor: `pair` writes fresh
+  // cert files that the restart-on-exit frpc child picks up without a manual service restart.
+  rotator.onExhausted((err) => {
+    logger.log('error', 'frp-client cert expired beyond recovery grace — run `web-terminal-agent pair <CODE>` to re-pair this host', {
+      ...meta,
+      expiredForMs: err.expiredForMs,
+      graceMs: err.graceMs,
+    })
+  })
   rotator.start()
   return { stop: () => rotator.stop() }
 }
@@ -205,6 +222,10 @@ export function wireAutoRenew(
 export interface NativeAutoRenewOpts {
   readonly mtlsRequest?: MtlsRequest
   readonly certParser?: CertParser
+  /** Window in which an already-expired leaf may still be recovered via `/recover`. */
+  readonly expiredGraceMs?: number
+  /** Plain (NON-mTLS) fetch for the `/recover` call; unset ⇒ global fetch. */
+  readonly recoverFetchImpl?: typeof fetch
   readonly timer?: TimerLike
   readonly renewBeforeMs?: number
   readonly retryBaseMs?: number
@@ -235,6 +256,8 @@ export function startNativeAutoRenew(
   })
   const rotator = createCertRotator(cfg, id, ks, {
     fetchImpl,
+    ...(opts.expiredGraceMs !== undefined ? { expiredGraceMs: opts.expiredGraceMs } : {}),
+    ...(opts.recoverFetchImpl ? { recoverFetchImpl: opts.recoverFetchImpl } : {}),
     renewBeforeMs: opts.renewBeforeMs ?? DEFAULT_CERT_RENEW_WINDOW_MS,
     ...(opts.timer ? { timer: opts.timer } : {}),
     ...(opts.now ? { now: opts.now } : {}),
@@ -243,5 +266,8 @@ export function startNativeAutoRenew(
       ? { retryBackoff: createBackoff({ baseMs: opts.retryBaseMs, jitter: false }) }
       : {}),
   })
-  return wireAutoRenew(rotator, hooks, logger, { subdomain: cfg.subdomain, hostId: cfg.hostId })
+  // Prefer the resolved identity (config > enrolment record > leaf SPIFFE SAN) so renewal warnings
+  // actually name the host — `cfg` alone is null on every install that predates the record.
+  const ids = resolveHostIdentity(cfg, () => ks.loadCert()?.certPem ?? null)
+  return wireAutoRenew(rotator, hooks, logger, ids)
 }

agent/src/certs/rotation.ts

@@ -19,6 +19,30 @@ import { certResponseToPem } from './pem.js'
 
 export const DEFAULT_RENEW_BEFORE_MS = 5 * 60_000 // renew 5 min before expiry
 
+/**
+ * How long after `notAfter` a lapsed leaf may still be swapped for a fresh one (30 days).
+ *
+ * `/renew` is mTLS-authenticated by the very leaf it renews, so a lapsed leaf cannot renew itself —
+ * a deadlock that bricked a host for 8 days in production (the laptop slept through its renewal
+ * window, then the agent logged `client certificate has expired` 6380 times and never recovered).
+ * Inside this window the agent switches to the `/recover` endpoint instead; past it, only a re-pair
+ * can help and the rotator says so once and stops.
+ */
+export const DEFAULT_EXPIRED_RENEW_GRACE_MS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000
+
+/** The leaf lapsed longer ago than the recovery grace allows ⇒ operator must re-pair this host. */
+export class CertExpiredBeyondGraceError extends Error {
+  constructor(
+    /** How long ago the leaf expired (ms) — non-secret, safe to log. */
+    readonly expiredForMs: number,
+    /** The grace window that was exceeded (ms). */
+    readonly graceMs: number,
+  ) {
+    super('client certificate expired beyond the recovery grace window; re-pair required')
+    this.name = 'CertExpiredBeyondGraceError'
+  }
+}
+
 export interface CertRotator {
   start(): void
   stop(): void
@@ -26,6 +50,11 @@ export interface CertRotator {
   onRevoked(cb: () => void): void
   /** A renewal attempt failed (network/HTTP, NOT a 403 revoke). The rotator retries with backoff. */
   onError(cb: (err: unknown) => void): void
+  /**
+   * TERMINAL: the leaf expired past the renewal grace window, so no future attempt can succeed. The
+   * rotator has stopped; recovery requires an operator re-pair.
+   */
+  onExhausted(cb: (err: CertExpiredBeyondGraceError) => void): void
 }
 
 export type RenewOutcome = 'rotated' | 'revoked'
@@ -35,6 +64,23 @@ export function renewalUrlFor(cfg: AgentConfig): string {
   return cfg.enrollUrl.replace(/\/enroll$/, '/renew')
 }
 
+/**
+ * Recovery route for a leaf that has ALREADY EXPIRED — a sibling PATH on the same enroll host.
+ *
+ * It cannot be `/renew`, because nginx will not forward an expired client certificate at all: under
+ * `ssl_verify_client optional` it answers a bare `400 Bad Request`, and `optional_no_ca` does not
+ * help either — nginx only tolerates CHAIN errors there (`ngx_ssl_verify_error_optional` covers
+ * self-signed / unknown-issuer / unverifiable-leaf, NOT `X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED`). So recovery
+ * drops mTLS entirely: it is a plain HTTPS POST carrying the expired cert in the BODY. Nothing is
+ * lost by that — the accompanying CSR is self-signed by the same private key, and the control-plane
+ * signer already enforces CSR proof-of-possession plus `CSR key == registered key`, so possession is
+ * proven exactly as the TLS handshake used to prove it.
+ */
+export function recoveryUrlFor(cfg: AgentConfig): string {
+  if (cfg.recoverUrl != null && cfg.recoverUrl.length > 0) return cfg.recoverUrl
+  return cfg.enrollUrl.replace(/\/enroll$/, '/recover')
+}
+
 /** Ms until (validTo − renewBeforeMs), clamped to ≥ 0. */
 export function computeRenewDelayMs(
   certPem: string,
@@ -56,9 +102,10 @@ export async function renewCert(
   id: AgentIdentity,
   ks: Keystore,
   fetchImpl: typeof fetch,
+  opts: { url?: string } = {},
 ): Promise<RenewOutcome> {
   const csr = buildCsr(id, cfg.subdomain ?? 'web-terminal-agent')
-  const res = await fetchImpl(renewalUrlFor(cfg), {
+  const res = await fetchImpl(opts.url ?? renewalUrlFor(cfg), {
     method: 'POST',
     headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },
     body: JSON.stringify({ csr }),
@@ -73,6 +120,34 @@ export async function renewCert(
   return 'rotated'
 }
 
+/**
+ * One recovery round-trip for an EXPIRED leaf: plain HTTPS (no client cert — see `recoveryUrlFor`)
+ * POSTing the expired cert alongside a fresh CSR over the SAME key. Same outcome contract as
+ * `renewCert`: 'rotated' installs the new leaf, 403 ⇒ 'revoked', anything else throws to the retry.
+ */
+export async function recoverCert(
+  cfg: AgentConfig,
+  id: AgentIdentity,
+  ks: Keystore,
+  fetchImpl: typeof fetch,
+  url: string = recoveryUrlFor(cfg),
+): Promise<RenewOutcome> {
+  const certs = ks.loadCert()
+  if (certs === null) throw new Error('cannot recover without the expired leaf on disk')
+  const csr = buildCsr(id, cfg.subdomain ?? 'web-terminal-agent')
+  const res = await fetchImpl(url, {
+    method: 'POST',
+    headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },
+    body: JSON.stringify({ cert: certs.certPem, csr }),
+  })
+  if (res.status === 403) return 'revoked'
+  if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`cert recovery failed: HTTP ${res.status}`)
+  const json = (await res.json()) as { cert?: unknown; caChain?: unknown }
+  const { certPem, caChainPem } = certResponseToPem(json.cert, json.caChain)
+  ks.saveCert(certPem, caChainPem)
+  return 'rotated'
+}
+
 export function createCertRotator(
   cfg: AgentConfig,
   id: AgentIdentity,
@@ -85,6 +160,10 @@ export function createCertRotator(
     parseCert?: (pem: string) => Date
     /** Backoff policy for retrying a FAILED renewal (default 1s→30s). Reset after a success. */
     retryBackoff?: BackoffPolicy
+    /** Plain (NON-mTLS) fetch used only for the expired-leaf `/recover` call. */
+    recoverFetchImpl?: typeof fetch
+    /** Window in which an expired leaf may still be recovered. 0 ⇒ no recovery at all. */
+    expiredGraceMs?: number
   } = {},
 ): CertRotator {
   const renewBeforeMs = opts.renewBeforeMs ?? DEFAULT_RENEW_BEFORE_MS
@@ -96,12 +175,15 @@ export function createCertRotator(
     clearInterval: (h) => clearInterval(h as ReturnType<typeof setInterval>),
   }
   const doFetch = opts.fetchImpl ?? fetch
+  const recoverFetch = opts.recoverFetchImpl ?? fetch
+  const expiredGraceMs = opts.expiredGraceMs ?? DEFAULT_EXPIRED_RENEW_GRACE_MS
   const now = opts.now ?? (() => new Date())
   const retryBackoff = opts.retryBackoff ?? createBackoff({ jitter: true })
   let handle: unknown = null
   let rotatedCb: (() => void) | null = null
   let revokedCb: (() => void) | null = null
   let errorCb: ((err: unknown) => void) | null = null
+  let exhaustedCb: ((err: CertExpiredBeyondGraceError) => void) | null = null
 
   function schedule(): void {
     const certs = ks.loadCert()
@@ -110,8 +192,34 @@ export function createCertRotator(
     handle = timer.setTimeout(runRenewal, delay)
   }
 
+  /**
+   * How this attempt must be made, derived from how stale the leaf on disk is:
+   *   `normal`    — still valid ⇒ ordinary mTLS `/renew`;
+   *   `recover`   — expired but inside the grace window ⇒ plain `/recover` with the cert in the body;
+   *   `exhausted` — expired past the grace window ⇒ nothing can succeed; only an operator re-pair.
+   */
+  function attemptPlan(): { mode: 'normal' | 'recover' | 'exhausted'; expiredForMs: number } {
+    const certs = ks.loadCert()
+    if (certs === null) return { mode: 'normal', expiredForMs: 0 }
+    const expiredForMs = now().getTime() - parseCert(certs.certPem).getTime()
+    if (expiredForMs <= 0) return { mode: 'normal', expiredForMs: 0 }
+    return { mode: expiredForMs > expiredGraceMs ? 'exhausted' : 'recover', expiredForMs }
+  }
+
   function runRenewal(): void {
-    void renewCert(cfg, id, ks, doFetch)
+    const plan = attemptPlan()
+    if (plan.mode === 'exhausted') {
+      // Terminal: report ONCE and arm nothing. The old code retried forever, which is how a single
+      // real failure turned into 6380 identical warnings that buried the signal.
+      handle = null
+      exhaustedCb?.(new CertExpiredBeyondGraceError(plan.expiredForMs, expiredGraceMs))
+      return
+    }
+    const attempt =
+      plan.mode === 'recover'
+        ? recoverCert(cfg, id, ks, recoverFetch)
+        : renewCert(cfg, id, ks, doFetch)
+    void attempt
       .then((outcome) => {
         if (outcome === 'revoked') {
           revokedCb?.()
@@ -147,5 +255,8 @@ export function createCertRotator(
     onError(cb): void {
       errorCb = cb
     },
+    onExhausted(cb): void {
+      exhaustedCb = cb
+    },
   }
 }

agent/src/cli/deps.ts

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import { dirname, join } from 'node:path'
 import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'
 import type { CliDeps, NativeEnrollResult } from '../cli.js'
 import type { AgentConfig } from '../config/agentConfig.js'
+import { resolveHostIdentity, saveHostRecord } from '../config/hostRecord.js'
 import { loadAgentConfig } from '../config/agentConfig.js'
 import { openKeystore } from '../keys/keystore.js'
 import { generateIdentity, generateP256Identity } from '../keys/identity.js'
@@ -100,6 +101,9 @@ async function enrollNative(
   ks: Keystore,
 ): Promise<NativeEnrollResult> {
   const enroll = await redeemPairingCode(cfg.enrollUrl, code, id, ks, { allowMissingContentSecret: true })
+  // Write the identifiers down: the long-running `run` process has no other way to learn them, and
+  // without them every log line from the tunnel reads `{"subdomain":null,"hostId":null}`.
+  saveHostRecord(cfg.stateDir, { hostId: enroll.hostId, subdomain: enroll.subdomain })
   return { hostId: enroll.hostId, subdomain: enroll.subdomain }
 }
 
@@ -184,7 +188,8 @@ function superviseNative(cfg: AgentConfig, ks: Keystore): Promise<number> {
       }),
     (report) => {
       // INV9: only non-secret identifiers (subdomain/host id/expiry date) + boolean flags are logged.
-      const ids = { subdomain: cfg.subdomain, hostId: cfg.hostId, certNotAfter: certNotAfter(ks) }
+      const host = resolveHostIdentity(cfg, () => ks.loadCert()?.certPem ?? null)
+      const ids = { ...host, certNotAfter: certNotAfter(ks) }
       for (const line of renderHealthStatus(ids, report)) logger.log('info', line)
     },
   )

agent/src/config/agentConfig.ts

@@ -18,6 +18,13 @@ export interface AgentConfig {
   readonly localTargetUrl: string
   readonly subdomain: string | null
   readonly hostId: string | null
+  /**
+   * Renewal endpoint used ONLY when the current leaf has already expired (the strict `/renew` vhost
+   * rejects an expired client cert before it reaches the control-plane). Optional: when unset it is
+   * derived from `enrollUrl` by swapping the `enroll.` label for `recover.` — see
+   * `certs/rotation.ts` `recoveryRenewalUrlFor`.
+   */
+  readonly recoverUrl?: string | null | undefined
 }
 
 /**
@@ -59,6 +66,11 @@ export const AgentConfigSchema = z
       .refine(isLoopbackWsUrl, 'localTargetUrl must be a ws:// loopback URL (anti-SSRF)'),
     subdomain: z.string().min(1).nullable(),
     hostId: z.string().min(1).nullable(),
+    recoverUrl: z
+      .string()
+      .refine((u) => hasScheme(u, 'https:'), 'recoverUrl must be an https:// URL')
+      .nullable()
+      .optional(),
   })
   .strict()
   .readonly()
@@ -85,6 +97,7 @@ export function loadAgentConfig(
     localTargetUrl: argv.localTargetUrl ?? env.LOCAL_TARGET_URL ?? DEFAULT_LOCAL_TARGET,
     subdomain: argv.subdomain ?? env.SUBDOMAIN ?? null,
     hostId: argv.hostId ?? env.HOST_ID ?? null,
+    recoverUrl: argv.recoverUrl ?? env.RECOVER_URL ?? null,
   }
   return AgentConfigSchema.parse(merged)
 }

agent/src/config/hostRecord.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+/**
+ * Enrolment identifiers (`hostId` / `subdomain`) persisted next to the keystore.
+ *
+ * WHY: `pair --install` learns both from the control-plane's enroll response, but nothing ever wrote
+ * them down — so the long-running `run` process had `cfg.subdomain === null` and `cfg.hostId === null`
+ * and every log line came out as `{"subdomain":null,"hostId":null}`. When the tunnel broke in
+ * production, 6380 warnings named no host at all, which is exactly the moment you want them to.
+ *
+ * They are NOT secrets (the subdomain is a public DNS label), so this is a plain JSON file — kept in
+ * `stateDir` only because that is the one directory the agent already owns on every platform.
+ *
+ * Legacy installs enrolled before this existed have no record. Their leaf still carries the
+ * subdomain in its SPIFFE URI SAN, so `resolveHostIdentity` recovers it from there rather than
+ * forcing a re-pair just to get an identifier back into the logs.
+ */
+import { X509Certificate } from 'node:crypto'
+import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs'
+import { join } from 'node:path'
+import type { AgentConfig } from './agentConfig.js'
+
+const RECORD_FILE = 'host.json'
+const DIR_MODE = 0o700
+
+/** Non-secret identifiers assigned by the control-plane at enrolment. */
+export interface HostRecord {
+  readonly hostId: string | null
+  readonly subdomain: string | null
+}
+
+/** A non-empty string, or null — anything else on disk is treated as absent (never trusted). */
+function stringOrNull(value: unknown): string | null {
+  return typeof value === 'string' && value.length > 0 ? value : null
+}
+
+/** Persist the enrolment identifiers into `stateDir`. Overwrites any previous record. */
+export function saveHostRecord(stateDir: string, record: HostRecord): void {
+  if (!existsSync(stateDir)) mkdirSync(stateDir, { recursive: true, mode: DIR_MODE })
+  writeFileSync(join(stateDir, RECORD_FILE), `${JSON.stringify(record, null, 2)}\n`)
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read the persisted identifiers, or null if this host has none. A missing, unreadable, or
+ * malformed file is reported as "no record" — this feeds a logging path and must never throw into
+ * the run loop.
+ */
+export function loadHostRecord(stateDir: string): HostRecord | null {
+  const path = join(stateDir, RECORD_FILE)
+  if (!existsSync(path)) return null
+  try {
+    const parsed: unknown = JSON.parse(readFileSync(path, 'utf8'))
+    if (typeof parsed !== 'object' || parsed === null) return null
+    const rec = parsed as Record<string, unknown>
+    return { hostId: stringOrNull(rec['hostId']), subdomain: stringOrNull(rec['subdomain']) }
+  } catch {
+    return null
+  }
+}
+
+/** SPIFFE IDs issued for hosts end in `/host/<subdomain>` (see relay-auth `spiffeIdFor`). */
+const SPIFFE_HOST_RE = /URI:(spiffe:\/\/[^\s,]*\/host\/([^\s,/]+))/
+
+/**
+ * Recover the subdomain from a leaf's SPIFFE URI SAN, or null if it carries none. Parse failures
+ * are null, never throws — a legacy install with a damaged cert must still start.
+ */
+export function subdomainFromCertPem(certPem: string): string | null {
+  try {
+    const san = new X509Certificate(certPem).subjectAltName ?? ''
+    const match = SPIFFE_HOST_RE.exec(san)
+    return match?.[2] ?? null
+  } catch {
+    return null
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Resolve the identifiers to log for this host, most authoritative first:
+ *   1. explicit config (argv/env `SUBDOMAIN` / `HOST_ID`) — an operator override always wins;
+ *   2. the enrolment record written by `pair`;
+ *   3. the subdomain embedded in the stored leaf (legacy installs; yields no hostId).
+ *
+ * `readCertPem` is injected so this stays a pure decision over a supplied cert.
+ */
+export function resolveHostIdentity(
+  cfg: AgentConfig,
+  readCertPem: () => string | null,
+): HostRecord {
+  const record = loadHostRecord(cfg.stateDir)
+  const subdomain =
+    cfg.subdomain ??
+    record?.subdomain ??
+    ((): string | null => {
+      const pem = readCertPem()
+      return pem === null ? null : subdomainFromCertPem(pem)
+    })()
+  return { hostId: cfg.hostId ?? record?.hostId ?? null, subdomain }
+}

agent/src/dist/buildBinary.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+/**
+ * Static-binary build spec — PLAN_RELAY_AGENT T16 (EXPLORE §6 distribution rank 2). Produces a
+ * `bun --compile` spec for a one-`curl | sh` install. `npx web-terminal-agent` stays the MVP path
+ * (rank 1). The bundle EXCLUDES dev/test deps and any terminal parser (INV11 re-check at the
+ * package boundary — the agent is a byte-shuttle, never an ANSI interpreter).
+ */
+export type BinaryTarget = 'darwin-arm64' | 'darwin-x64' | 'linux-x64' | 'linux-arm64'
+
+export const BINARY_TARGETS: readonly BinaryTarget[] = [
+  'darwin-arm64',
+  'darwin-x64',
+  'linux-x64',
+  'linux-arm64',
+]
+
+export interface BuildSpec {
+  readonly tool: 'bun'
+  readonly entry: string
+  readonly target: BinaryTarget
+  readonly bunTarget: string // bun's --target triple
+  readonly outfile: string
+  readonly minify: true
+  /** Package-name substrings that must NOT appear in the bundle graph (INV11 tripwire). */
+  readonly forbiddenDeps: readonly string[]
+}
+
+const BUN_TRIPLE: Readonly<Record<BinaryTarget, string>> = {
+  'darwin-arm64': 'bun-darwin-arm64',
+  'darwin-x64': 'bun-darwin-x64',
+  'linux-x64': 'bun-linux-x64',
+  'linux-arm64': 'bun-linux-arm64',
+}
+
+/** Build the `bun --compile` spec for a target triple. Entry is the CLI. */
+export function buildBinaryConfig(target: BinaryTarget): BuildSpec {
+  return {
+    tool: 'bun',
+    entry: 'src/cli.ts',
+    target,
+    bunTarget: BUN_TRIPLE[target],
+    outfile: `dist/web-terminal-agent-${target}`,
+    minify: true,
+    forbiddenDeps: ['xterm', 'ansi', 'vt100'],
+  }
+}

agent/test/hostRecord.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
+import { mkdtempSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs'
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
+import { join } from 'node:path'
+import type { AgentConfig } from '../src/config/agentConfig.js'
+import {
+  loadHostRecord,
+  resolveHostIdentity,
+  saveHostRecord,
+  subdomainFromCertPem,
+} from '../src/config/hostRecord.js'
+
+const CFG: AgentConfig = {
+  relayUrl: 'wss://relay/agent',
+  enrollUrl: 'https://enroll.terminal.example.com/enroll',
+  stateDir: '/tmp/x',
+  localTargetUrl: 'ws://127.0.0.1:3000',
+  subdomain: null,
+  hostId: null,
+}
+
+function tmpState(): string {
+  return mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'wta-hr-'))
+}
+
+/** A real frp-client leaf as issued by the control-plane (SPIFFE URI SAN carries the subdomain). */
+const LEAF_PEM = `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----`
+
+describe('host record persistence', () => {
+  it('round-trips the enrolment identifiers through stateDir', () => {
+    const dir = tmpState()
+    saveHostRecord(dir, { hostId: 'h-1', subdomain: 'h7fd8' })
+    expect(loadHostRecord(dir)).toEqual({ hostId: 'h-1', subdomain: 'h7fd8' })
+    rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
+  })
+
+  it('returns null when nothing was ever enrolled here', () => {
+    const dir = tmpState()
+    expect(loadHostRecord(dir)).toBeNull()
+    rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
+  })
+
+  it('treats a corrupt record as absent rather than throwing (never crashes the run loop)', () => {
+    const dir = tmpState()
+    writeFileSync(join(dir, 'host.json'), '{not json')
+    expect(loadHostRecord(dir)).toBeNull()
+    rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
+  })
+
+  it('ignores a record whose fields are the wrong shape', () => {
+    const dir = tmpState()
+    writeFileSync(join(dir, 'host.json'), JSON.stringify({ hostId: 42, subdomain: [] }))
+    expect(loadHostRecord(dir)).toEqual({ hostId: null, subdomain: null })
+    rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
+  })
+})
+
+describe('subdomainFromCertPem', () => {
+  it('reads the subdomain out of the leaf SPIFFE URI SAN', () => {
+    expect(subdomainFromCertPem(LEAF_PEM)).toBe('h7fd8')
+  })
+
+  it('returns null for a certificate with no SPIFFE SAN', () => {
+    expect(subdomainFromCertPem('-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nnope\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----')).toBeNull()
+  })
+
+  it('returns null for garbage instead of throwing', () => {
+    expect(subdomainFromCertPem('not a cert')).toBeNull()
+  })
+})
+
+describe('resolveHostIdentity precedence', () => {
+  it('keeps explicit config (env/argv) over everything else', () => {
+    const dir = tmpState()
+    saveHostRecord(dir, { hostId: 'from-file', subdomain: 'from-file' })
+    const out = resolveHostIdentity(
+      { ...CFG, stateDir: dir, subdomain: 'from-env', hostId: 'from-env' },
+      () => LEAF_PEM,
+    )
+    expect(out).toEqual({ hostId: 'from-env', subdomain: 'from-env' })
+    rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
+  })
+
+  it('falls back to the persisted enrolment record', () => {
+    const dir = tmpState()
+    saveHostRecord(dir, { hostId: 'h-1', subdomain: 'h7fd8' })
+    expect(resolveHostIdentity({ ...CFG, stateDir: dir }, () => null)).toEqual({
+      hostId: 'h-1',
+      subdomain: 'h7fd8',
+    })
+    rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
+  })
+
+  /**
+   * Hosts enrolled before the record existed have no `host.json`. Their leaf still carries the
+   * subdomain, so they get an identifier in the logs without needing a re-pair.
+   */
+  it('falls back to the leaf SPIFFE SAN when there is no record (legacy installs)', () => {
+    const dir = tmpState()
+    expect(resolveHostIdentity({ ...CFG, stateDir: dir }, () => LEAF_PEM)).toEqual({
+      hostId: null,
+      subdomain: 'h7fd8',
+    })
+    rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
+  })
+
+  it('yields nulls when nothing is known (unenrolled host)', () => {
+    const dir = tmpState()
+    expect(resolveHostIdentity({ ...CFG, stateDir: dir }, () => null)).toEqual({
+      hostId: null,
+      subdomain: null,
+    })
+    rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
+  })
+})

agent/test/nativeRenew.test.ts

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ import {
   type MtlsRequest,
 } from '../src/certs/nativeRenew.js'
 import { FakeTimer } from './fixtures/fakes.js'
+import { CertExpiredBeyondGraceError } from '../src/certs/rotation.js'
 
 const CFG: AgentConfig = {
   relayUrl: 'wss://relay/agent',
@@ -109,11 +110,21 @@ describe('createMtlsFetch (A5)', () => {
 describe('wireAutoRenew (A5)', () => {
   function fakeRotator(): {
     rotator: CertRotator
-    fire: { rotated?: () => void; revoked?: () => void; error?: (e: unknown) => void }
+    fire: {
+      rotated?: () => void
+      revoked?: () => void
+      error?: (e: unknown) => void
+      exhausted?: (e: CertExpiredBeyondGraceError) => void
+    }
     start: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>
     stop: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>
   } {
-    const fire: { rotated?: () => void; revoked?: () => void; error?: (e: unknown) => void } = {}
+    const fire: {
+      rotated?: () => void
+      revoked?: () => void
+      error?: (e: unknown) => void
+      exhausted?: (e: CertExpiredBeyondGraceError) => void
+    } = {}
     const start = vi.fn()
     const stop = vi.fn()
     const rotator: CertRotator = {
@@ -128,6 +139,9 @@ describe('wireAutoRenew (A5)', () => {
       onError: (cb) => {
         fire.error = cb
       },
+      onExhausted: (cb) => {
+        fire.exhausted = cb
+      },
     }
     return { rotator, fire, start, stop }
   }
@@ -277,3 +291,60 @@ describe('startNativeAutoRenew (A5 end-to-end)', () => {
     rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
   })
 })
+
+/**
+ * The mTLS renew transport stays STRICT about expiry: nginx refuses to forward an expired client
+ * cert at all, so an expired leaf must be routed to the plain `/recover` endpoint by the rotator
+ * rather than smuggled through this transport.
+ */
+describe('createMtlsFetch stays fail-closed on an expired leaf', () => {
+  it('refuses to present a lapsed leaf (recovery is the rotator\'s job, not this transport\'s)', async () => {
+    const { dir, ks } = enrolledKs()
+    let called = 0
+    const request: MtlsRequest = async () => {
+      called += 1
+      return { status: 201, body: '{}' }
+    }
+    const f = createMtlsFetch(ks, {
+      request,
+      certParser: () => ({ validTo: new Date(Date.now() - 86_400_000) }),
+    })
+    await expect(f('https://cp.example.com/renew', { method: 'POST' })).rejects.toThrow(
+      /expired/i,
+    )
+    expect(called).toBe(0)
+    rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
+  })
+})
+
+describe('wireAutoRenew exhausted routing', () => {
+  it('logs an actionable re-pair alarm and leaves the supervisor running', () => {
+    const fire: { exhausted?: (e: CertExpiredBeyondGraceError) => void } = {}
+    const rotator: CertRotator = {
+      start: vi.fn(),
+      stop: vi.fn(),
+      onRotated: () => {},
+      onRevoked: () => {},
+      onError: () => {},
+      onExhausted: (cb) => {
+        fire.exhausted = cb
+      },
+    }
+    const restartChild = vi.fn()
+    const stop = vi.fn()
+    const lines: string[] = []
+    wireAutoRenew(rotator, { restartChild, stop }, createLogger('info', (l) => lines.push(l)), {
+      subdomain: 'h7fd8',
+      hostId: 'h-1',
+    })
+    fire.exhausted?.(new CertExpiredBeyondGraceError(40 * 86_400_000, 30 * 86_400_000))
+
+    const alarm = lines.find((l) => /re-pair/i.test(l))
+    expect(alarm).toBeDefined()
+    expect(alarm).toContain('h7fd8')
+    // The supervisor keeps running: a later `pair` writes fresh cert files that the restarting
+    // frpc child picks up. Tearing down here would make recovery need a manual restart too.
+    expect(stop).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+    expect(restartChild).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+})

agent/test/rotation.test.ts

@@ -8,9 +8,12 @@ import { openKeystore } from '../src/keys/keystore.js'
 import {
   computeRenewDelayMs,
   createCertRotator,
+  recoverCert,
+  recoveryUrlFor,
   renewCert,
   renewalUrlFor,
 } from '../src/certs/rotation.js'
+import { CertExpiredBeyondGraceError } from '../src/certs/rotation.js'
 import { createBackoff } from '../src/transport/backoff.js'
 import { FakeTimer } from './fixtures/fakes.js'
 
@@ -159,3 +162,149 @@ describe('createCertRotator (T13)', () => {
     rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
   })
 })
+
+/**
+ * Expired-leaf recovery (production deadlock, 2026-07): `/renew` is mTLS-authenticated by the leaf
+ * it renews, so a lapsed leaf can never renew itself — and nginx will not even forward an expired
+ * client cert. Recovery is therefore a PLAIN POST to `/recover` carrying the expired cert in the
+ * body, plus a terminal signal once the grace window is spent so the agent stops retrying forever.
+ */
+describe('expired-leaf recovery', () => {
+  const HOUR = 3_600_000
+
+  it('derives /recover as a sibling PATH on the same enroll host', () => {
+    expect(recoveryUrlFor({ ...CFG, enrollUrl: 'https://enroll.terminal.example.com/enroll' })).toBe(
+      'https://enroll.terminal.example.com/recover',
+    )
+  })
+
+  it('honours an explicit recoverUrl over the derivation', () => {
+    expect(recoveryUrlFor({ ...CFG, recoverUrl: 'https://elsewhere.example.com/recover' })).toBe(
+      'https://elsewhere.example.com/recover',
+    )
+  })
+
+  it('recoverCert posts the EXPIRED cert plus a CSR, with no client cert, and installs the result', async () => {
+    const { dir, ks } = enrolledKs()
+    let seenUrl = ''
+    let seenBody: { cert?: string; csr?: string } = {}
+    const fetchImpl = (async (u: string, init: { body: string }) => {
+      seenUrl = u
+      seenBody = JSON.parse(init.body)
+      return jsonRes(201, { cert: 'FRESHCERT', caChain: ['FRESHCA'] })
+    }) as unknown as typeof fetch
+
+    const outcome = await recoverCert(
+      { ...CFG, enrollUrl: 'https://enroll.terminal.example.com/enroll' },
+      ks.loadIdentity()!,
+      ks,
+      fetchImpl,
+    )
+    expect(outcome).toBe('rotated')
+    expect(seenUrl).toBe('https://enroll.terminal.example.com/recover')
+    expect(seenBody.cert).toBe('OLDCERT') // the lapsed leaf travels in the BODY, not the TLS layer
+    expect(seenBody.csr).toBeTruthy()
+    expect(ks.loadCert()!.certPem).toContain('FRESHCERT')
+    rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
+  })
+
+  it('a still-valid leaf uses the mTLS /renew fetch, never the recovery one', async () => {
+    const { dir, ks } = enrolledKs()
+    const timer = new FakeTimer()
+    let renewCalls = 0
+    let recoverCalls = 0
+    const rotator = createCertRotator(CFG, ks.loadIdentity()!, ks, {
+      timer,
+      renewBeforeMs: 1000,
+      fetchImpl: (async () => {
+        renewCalls += 1
+        return jsonRes(200, { cert: 'NEWCERT', caChain: ['NEWCA'] })
+      }) as unknown as typeof fetch,
+      recoverFetchImpl: (async () => {
+        recoverCalls += 1
+        return jsonRes(200, {})
+      }) as unknown as typeof fetch,
+      now: () => new Date(0),
+      parseCert: () => new Date(2000), // valid at now=0
+    })
+    rotator.start()
+    timer.advance(1000)
+    await flush()
+    expect(renewCalls).toBe(1)
+    expect(recoverCalls).toBe(0)
+    rotator.stop()
+    rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
+  })
+
+  it('an expired leaf INSIDE the grace window switches to the recovery fetch', async () => {
+    const { dir, ks } = enrolledKs()
+    const timer = new FakeTimer()
+    let renewCalls = 0
+    let recoverCalls = 0
+    const rotator = createCertRotator(CFG, ks.loadIdentity()!, ks, {
+      timer,
+      renewBeforeMs: 1000,
+      expiredGraceMs: 30 * 24 * HOUR,
+      fetchImpl: (async () => {
+        renewCalls += 1
+        return jsonRes(200, {})
+      }) as unknown as typeof fetch,
+      recoverFetchImpl: (async () => {
+        recoverCalls += 1
+        return jsonRes(201, { cert: 'NEWCERT', caChain: ['NEWCA'] })
+      }) as unknown as typeof fetch,
+      now: () => new Date(8 * 24 * HOUR), // 8 days after the leaf lapsed
+      parseCert: () => new Date(0),
+    })
+    let rotated = 0
+    rotator.onRotated(() => {
+      rotated += 1
+    })
+    rotator.start()
+    timer.advance(0)
+    await flush()
+    expect(recoverCalls).toBe(1)
+    expect(renewCalls).toBe(0)
+    expect(rotated).toBe(1)
+    rotator.stop()
+    rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
+  })
+
+  it('BEYOND the grace window it fires onExhausted, issues no request, and stops retrying', async () => {
+    const { dir, ks } = enrolledKs()
+    const timer = new FakeTimer()
+    let requests = 0
+    const countingFetch = (async () => {
+      requests += 1
+      return jsonRes(201, {})
+    }) as unknown as typeof fetch
+    const rotator = createCertRotator(CFG, ks.loadIdentity()!, ks, {
+      timer,
+      renewBeforeMs: 1000,
+      expiredGraceMs: 30 * 24 * HOUR,
+      retryBackoff: createBackoff({ baseMs: 500, jitter: false }),
+      fetchImpl: countingFetch,
+      recoverFetchImpl: countingFetch,
+      now: () => new Date(31 * 24 * HOUR), // 31 days stale ⇒ past a 30-day grace
+      parseCert: () => new Date(0),
+    })
+    const errors: unknown[] = []
+    let exhausted: CertExpiredBeyondGraceError | null = null
+    rotator.onError((e) => errors.push(e))
+    rotator.onExhausted((e) => {
+      exhausted = e
+    })
+    rotator.start()
+    timer.advance(0)
+    await flush()
+
+    expect(exhausted).toBeInstanceOf(CertExpiredBeyondGraceError)
+    expect(requests).toBe(0) // nothing is even attempted — it cannot succeed
+    expect(errors).toHaveLength(0)
+    // Terminal: no retry armed. Retrying forever is what produced 6380 identical warnings.
+    timer.advance(60_000)
+    await flush()
+    expect(requests).toBe(0)
+    rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
+  })
+})

control-plane/src/api/renew.ts

@@ -51,12 +51,29 @@ export const DEFAULT_RENEW_RATE_WINDOW_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000
 export const RENEW_RATE_MAX_IDENTITIES = 10_000
 /** Max base64 length of a submitted CSR (a P-256 PKCS#10 is well under 1 KB; this is generous slack). */
 export const MAX_CSR_B64_LEN = 8192
+/** Max wire length of a body-carried certificate (a P-256 leaf PEM is ~1 KB; generous slack). */
+export const MAX_PRESENTED_CERT_LEN = 16384
 /**
  * Default header the mTLS terminator forwards the verified client cert in (base64 DER). The terminator
  * MUST set this from `$ssl_client_cert` AND strip any client-supplied copy — a client can never provide
  * its own current cert. Production wiring can swap in a socket-peer-cert resolver instead.
  */
 export const DEFAULT_CLIENT_CERT_HEADER = 'x-client-cert'
+/**
+ * How long after `notAfter` a presented leaf may still authenticate its OWN re-issuance (30 days).
+ *
+ * `/renew` is authenticated by the very leaf it renews, so a strict expiry check means a host whose
+ * leaf lapsed can never renew it — it is bricked until an operator re-pairs (this happened: a laptop
+ * slept through its renewal window and the tunnel stayed down for 8 days). Accepting a recently
+ * expired leaf FOR RE-ISSUANCE ONLY breaks that deadlock.
+ *
+ * Nothing else is relaxed: the leaf must still chain to the CA anchor set, its SPIFFE identity must
+ * still resolve to a registry record that is `active` and account-consistent, and `notBefore` is NOT
+ * graced. The residual risk is that a stale stolen leaf stays usable for this window — an attacker
+ * holding an unexpired stolen leaf can already renew indefinitely, so this widens an existing
+ * exposure rather than opening a new one. Set to 0 to restore the strict behaviour.
+ */
+export const DEFAULT_EXPIRED_RENEW_GRACE_MS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000
 
 /** Uniform reject: 401 = no/invalid current cert (unauthenticated); 403 = cert valid but not allowed. */
 export class RenewRejectError extends Error {
@@ -170,10 +187,18 @@ export function headerPresentedCert(headerName: string = DEFAULT_CLIENT_CERT_HEA
       const raw = req.headers[name]
       const value = Array.isArray(raw) ? raw[0] : raw
       if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.length === 0) return null
+      return certWireToDer(value)
+    },
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Normalize a certificate carried over the wire to raw DER. Accepts base64 DER, PEM, and nginx's
+ * header-safe `$ssl_client_escaped_cert` (URL-encoded PEM): URL-decode if escaped, then strip PEM
+ * armor + whitespace to recover the base64 body. Returns null on anything unparseable.
+ */
+export function certWireToDer(value: string): Uint8Array | null {
   try {
-        // The terminator may forward the verified cert as base64 DER, OR as PEM — including nginx's
-        // header-safe `$ssl_client_escaped_cert` (URL-encoded PEM). Normalize all three to raw DER:
-        // URL-decode if escaped, then strip PEM armor + whitespace to recover the base64 DER body.
     let s = value.includes('%') ? safeDecodeUri(value) : value
     if (s.includes('BEGIN CERTIFICATE')) {
       s = s.replace(/-----[^-]+-----/g, '').replace(/\s+/g, '')
@@ -183,8 +208,6 @@ export function headerPresentedCert(headerName: string = DEFAULT_CLIENT_CERT_HEA
   } catch {
     return null
   }
-    },
-  }
 }
 
 /** URL-decode `value`, returning it unchanged if it is not valid percent-encoding. */
@@ -207,6 +230,7 @@ function assertPresentedCertTrusted(
   der: Uint8Array,
   caAnchorsDer: readonly Uint8Array[],
   nowMs: number,
+  expiredGraceMs: number,
 ): void {
   let leaf: NodeX509Certificate
   let anchors: NodeX509Certificate[]
@@ -220,7 +244,10 @@ function assertPresentedCertTrusted(
   const notBefore = new Date(leaf.validFrom).getTime()
   const notAfter = new Date(leaf.validTo).getTime()
   if (Number.isNaN(notBefore) || Number.isNaN(notAfter)) throw new RenewRejectError(401)
-  if (nowMs < notBefore || nowMs > notAfter) throw new RenewRejectError(401)
+  // `notBefore` is never graced — a not-yet-valid cert is nonsense, not a recoverable lapse. Only
+  // `notAfter` gets the bounded renewal grace (see DEFAULT_EXPIRED_RENEW_GRACE_MS).
+  if (nowMs < notBefore) throw new RenewRejectError(401)
+  if (nowMs > notAfter + Math.max(0, expiredGraceMs)) throw new RenewRejectError(401)
 }
 
 /**
@@ -234,7 +261,11 @@ function assertPresentedCertTrusted(
 function parsePresentedCertIdentity(
   der: Uint8Array,
   expectedKind: SpiffeKind,
-  verify?: { readonly caAnchorsDer: readonly Uint8Array[]; readonly nowMs: number },
+  verify?: {
+    readonly caAnchorsDer: readonly Uint8Array[]
+    readonly nowMs: number
+    readonly expiredGraceMs: number
+  },
 ): CertIdentity {
   let leaf: x509.X509Certificate
   try {
@@ -242,7 +273,8 @@ function parsePresentedCertIdentity(
   } catch {
     throw new RenewRejectError(401)
   }
-  if (verify !== undefined) assertPresentedCertTrusted(der, verify.caAnchorsDer, verify.nowMs)
+  if (verify !== undefined)
+    assertPresentedCertTrusted(der, verify.caAnchorsDer, verify.nowMs, verify.expiredGraceMs)
   const san = leaf.getExtension(x509.SubjectAlternativeNameExtension)
   const uri = san?.names.toJSON().find((n) => n.type === 'url')?.value
   if (uri === undefined) throw new RenewRejectError(401)
@@ -262,6 +294,13 @@ function parsePresentedCertIdentity(
 }
 
 const RenewBodySchema = z.object({ csr: z.string().min(1).max(MAX_CSR_B64_LEN) }).strict()
+/** `/recover` additionally carries the EXPIRED leaf itself (base64 DER or PEM). */
+const RecoverBodySchema = z
+  .object({
+    cert: z.string().min(1).max(MAX_PRESENTED_CERT_LEN),
+    csr: z.string().min(1).max(MAX_CSR_B64_LEN),
+  })
+  .strict()
 
 export interface RenewDeps {
   readonly hosts: HostRegistry
@@ -279,6 +318,11 @@ export interface RenewDeps {
   readonly hostCaAnchorsDer?: readonly Uint8Array[]
   /** device-CA anchor DER(s) — same role for the DEVICE renew path. */
   readonly deviceCaAnchorsDer?: readonly Uint8Array[]
+  /**
+   * Window after `notAfter` in which a presented leaf may still authenticate its own re-issuance.
+   * Defaults to `DEFAULT_EXPIRED_RENEW_GRACE_MS`; 0 restores the strict fail-closed behaviour.
+   */
+  readonly expiredRenewGraceMs?: number
 }
 
 /** Map any thrown error to a uniform HTTP reject — never leak which internal check failed. */
@@ -298,6 +342,9 @@ function sendError(reply: FastifyReply, err: unknown): void {
 export function buildRenewRouter(deps: RenewDeps): FastifyPluginAsync {
   const presentedCert = deps.presentedCert ?? headerPresentedCert()
   const rateLimiter = deps.rateLimiter ?? createRenewRateLimiter()
+  // `/renew` stays STRICT (0): the mTLS terminator would never forward an expired cert to it anyway.
+  // The grace belongs to `/recover`, the route built for exactly that case.
+  const recoverGraceMs = deps.expiredRenewGraceMs ?? DEFAULT_EXPIRED_RENEW_GRACE_MS
 
   return async (app) => {
     app.post('/renew', async (req, reply) => {
@@ -307,7 +354,9 @@ export function buildRenewRouter(deps: RenewDeps): FastifyPluginAsync {
         const identity = parsePresentedCertIdentity(
           der,
           'host',
-          deps.hostCaAnchorsDer ? { caAnchorsDer: deps.hostCaAnchorsDer, nowMs: Date.now() } : undefined,
+          deps.hostCaAnchorsDer
+            ? { caAnchorsDer: deps.hostCaAnchorsDer, nowMs: Date.now(), expiredGraceMs: 0 }
+            : undefined,
         )
         rateLimiter.check(`host:${identity.accountId}:${identity.id}`)
 
@@ -333,6 +382,105 @@ export function buildRenewRouter(deps: RenewDeps): FastifyPluginAsync {
       }
     })
 
+    /**
+     * Expired-leaf recovery. The lapsed cert arrives in the BODY because no TLS terminator will
+     * forward an expired client certificate (nginx `optional` → bare 400; `optional_no_ca` tolerates
+     * only chain errors, never `X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED`). That makes this route the SOLE
+     * verifier, so it runs the identical trust pipeline as `/renew` — real X.509 path validation to
+     * the frp-client-CA anchors, SPIFFE parse, `notBefore`, registry `active` + account match — and
+     * differs ONLY in allowing a bounded overrun on `notAfter`.
+     *
+     * Possession of the private key is still proven: the CSR is self-signed by it, and the host
+     * signer's delegated gate enforces CSR PoP plus `CSR key == registered key`. A replayed cert
+     * without the key therefore yields, at most, a certificate the attacker cannot authenticate with.
+     * The header channel is deliberately IGNORED here — on this route only the body speaks.
+     */
+    app.post('/recover', async (req, reply) => {
+      try {
+        const body = RecoverBodySchema.parse(req.body)
+        const der = certWireToDer(body.cert)
+        if (der === null) throw new RenewRejectError(401)
+        const identity = parsePresentedCertIdentity(
+          der,
+          'host',
+          deps.hostCaAnchorsDer
+            ? {
+                caAnchorsDer: deps.hostCaAnchorsDer,
+                nowMs: Date.now(),
+                expiredGraceMs: recoverGraceMs,
+              }
+            : undefined,
+        )
+        rateLimiter.check(`recover:${identity.accountId}:${identity.id}`)
+
+        const host = await deps.hosts.getHostBySubdomain(identity.id)
+        if (host === null || host.status === 'revoked' || host.accountId !== identity.accountId) {
+          throw new RenewRejectError(403)
+        }
+
+        const leaf = await deps.renewer.renewHostLeaf(
+          host.hostId,
+          identity.publicKeySpki,
+          decodeCsrWire(body.csr),
+        )
+        await reply.code(201).send({
+          cert: bytesToBase64(leaf.cert),
+          caChain: leaf.caChain.map((c) => bytesToBase64(c)),
+          notAfter: leaf.notAfter.toISOString(),
+        })
+      } catch (err) {
+        sendError(reply, err)
+      }
+    })
+
+    /**
+     * Device counterpart of `/recover` (phone track). Same reason it exists, same shape: the lapsed
+     * cert arrives in the BODY because no terminator forwards an expired client certificate, so this
+     * route is the sole verifier — device-CA path validation, SPIFFE parse, `notBefore`, and the full
+     * registry consistency check (active + same account + `:id` matches the cert + same key). Only
+     * the `notAfter` bound is relaxed, by `expiredRenewGraceMs`.
+     */
+    app.post('/device/:id/recover', async (req, reply) => {
+      try {
+        const body = RecoverBodySchema.parse(req.body)
+        const der = certWireToDer(body.cert)
+        if (der === null) throw new RenewRejectError(401)
+        const identity = parsePresentedCertIdentity(
+          der,
+          'device',
+          deps.deviceCaAnchorsDer
+            ? {
+                caAnchorsDer: deps.deviceCaAnchorsDer,
+                nowMs: Date.now(),
+                expiredGraceMs: recoverGraceMs,
+              }
+            : undefined,
+        )
+        const id = (req.params as { id: string }).id
+        rateLimiter.check(`device-recover:${identity.id}`)
+
+        const record = await deps.devices.getDevice(id)
+        if (
+          record === null ||
+          record.status === 'revoked' ||
+          record.accountId !== identity.accountId ||
+          identity.id !== id ||
+          !timingSafeEqualBytes(record.ecPubkeySpki, identity.publicKeySpki)
+        ) {
+          throw new RenewRejectError(403)
+        }
+
+        const leaf = await deps.renewer.renewDeviceLeaf(id, decodeCsrWire(body.csr))
+        await reply.code(201).send({
+          cert: bytesToBase64(leaf.cert),
+          caChain: leaf.caChain.map((c) => bytesToBase64(c)),
+          notAfter: leaf.notAfter.toISOString(),
+        })
+      } catch (err) {
+        sendError(reply, err)
+      }
+    })
+
     app.post('/device/:id/renew', async (req, reply) => {
       try {
         const der = presentedCert.presentedCertDer(req)
@@ -340,7 +488,9 @@ export function buildRenewRouter(deps: RenewDeps): FastifyPluginAsync {
         const identity = parsePresentedCertIdentity(
           der,
           'device',
-          deps.deviceCaAnchorsDer ? { caAnchorsDer: deps.deviceCaAnchorsDer, nowMs: Date.now() } : undefined,
+          deps.deviceCaAnchorsDer
+            ? { caAnchorsDer: deps.deviceCaAnchorsDer, nowMs: Date.now(), expiredGraceMs: 0 }
+            : undefined,
         )
         const id = (req.params as { id: string }).id
         rateLimiter.check(`device:${identity.id}`)

control-plane/test/renew.test.ts

@@ -502,6 +502,8 @@ describe('CP6c POST /renew — presented current-cert chain + expiry verificatio
       headers: { 'x-client-cert': certHeader(expired) },
       payload: { csr: b64Csr(ctx.csr) },
     })
+    // STRICT on this route: nginx would never forward an expired client cert here anyway, so the
+    // deadlock escape hatch lives on `/recover` (below) and NOT on the mTLS renewal path.
     expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401)
   })
 
@@ -521,3 +523,281 @@ describe('CP6c POST /renew — presented current-cert chain + expiry verificatio
     expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401)
   })
 })
+
+/**
+ * CP6d · POST /recover — the expired-leaf escape hatch.
+ *
+ * Unlike `/renew` this route is NOT mTLS-authenticated: nginx cannot forward an expired client cert
+ * (under `ssl_verify_client optional` it 400s, and `optional_no_ca` only tolerates CHAIN errors, not
+ * `X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED`). The lapsed cert therefore arrives in the BODY, and the
+ * control-plane becomes the sole verifier. These tests pin down that nothing except the `notAfter`
+ * bound was relaxed — chain, SPIFFE, `notBefore`, and registry status all still decide.
+ */
+describe('CP6d POST /recover — expired-leaf recovery', () => {
+  async function mintLeaf(
+    ctx: HostCtx,
+    notBefore: Date,
+    notAfter: Date,
+    signer = ctx.ca.caSigner,
+  ): Promise<Uint8Array> {
+    const spiffe = `spiffe://relay.terminal.yaojia.wang/account/${ctx.accountId}/host/${ctx.subdomain}`
+    return assembleCertificate({
+      subjectPublicKey: ctx.spki,
+      subject: `CN=${ctx.subdomain}`,
+      issuer: ctx.ca.caCert.subjectName,
+      serialNumber: Uint8Array.from([0x0b]),
+      notBefore,
+      notAfter,
+      extensions: [
+        new x509.SubjectAlternativeNameExtension([
+          { type: 'dns', value: `${ctx.subdomain}.terminal.yaojia.wang` },
+          { type: 'url', value: spiffe },
+        ]),
+        new x509.BasicConstraintsExtension(false, undefined, true),
+        new x509.KeyUsagesExtension(x509.KeyUsageFlags.digitalSignature, true),
+        new x509.ExtendedKeyUsageExtension([x509.ExtendedKeyUsage.clientAuth]),
+      ],
+      signer,
+      sigAlg: 'ecdsa-p256',
+    })
+  }
+
+  const b64 = (der: Uint8Array): string => Buffer.from(der).toString('base64')
+
+  async function post(ctx: HostCtx, cert: Uint8Array, extra?: Partial<RenewDeps>) {
+    const app = appWith(hostDeps(ctx, { hostCaAnchorsDer: [ctx.ca.caDer], ...extra }))
+    await app.ready()
+    return app.inject({
+      method: 'POST',
+      url: '/recover',
+      payload: { cert: b64(cert), csr: b64Csr(ctx.csr) },
+    })
+  }
+
+  test('a leaf expired INSIDE the grace window is re-issued → 201 (breaks the deadlock)', async () => {
+    const ctx = await hostCtx('alice')
+    const now = Date.now()
+    const res = await post(ctx, await mintLeaf(ctx, new Date(now - 9 * DAY_MS), new Date(now - 8 * DAY_MS)))
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(201)
+    expect(JSON.parse(res.payload).cert).toBeTruthy()
+  })
+
+  test('a leaf expired BEYOND the grace window is refused → 401', async () => {
+    const ctx = await hostCtx('alice')
+    const now = Date.now()
+    const res = await post(ctx, await mintLeaf(ctx, new Date(now - 60 * DAY_MS), new Date(now - 31 * DAY_MS)))
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401)
+  })
+
+  test('grace 0 disables recovery entirely → 401', async () => {
+    const ctx = await hostCtx('alice')
+    const now = Date.now()
+    const res = await post(
+      ctx,
+      await mintLeaf(ctx, new Date(now - 2 * DAY_MS), new Date(now - DAY_MS)),
+      { expiredRenewGraceMs: 0 },
+    )
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401)
+  })
+
+  /**
+   * THE load-bearing test for this route. nginx no longer validates the chain here, so a forged
+   * self-signed cert carrying a correct-looking SPIFFE SAN must be rejected by the control-plane
+   * alone. If this ever goes green-to-red, `/recover` becomes an unauthenticated cert vending machine.
+   */
+  test('a self-signed cert with a FORGED SPIFFE SAN is refused → 401', async () => {
+    const ctx = await hostCtx('alice')
+    const rogueCa = await makeP256Ca('rogue-CA')
+    const now = Date.now()
+    const rogue = await mintLeaf(
+      ctx,
+      new Date(now - 9 * DAY_MS),
+      new Date(now - 8 * DAY_MS),
+      rogueCa.caSigner,
+    )
+    const res = await post(ctx, rogue)
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401)
+  })
+
+  test('recovery NEVER bypasses revocation — revoked host → 403', async () => {
+    const ctx = await hostCtx('alice')
+    const now = Date.now()
+    const cert = await mintLeaf(ctx, new Date(now - 9 * DAY_MS), new Date(now - 8 * DAY_MS))
+    const host = await ctx.hosts.getHostBySubdomain('alice')
+    await ctx.hosts.setHostStatus(host!.hostId, 'revoked')
+    const res = await post(ctx, cert)
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(403)
+  })
+
+  test('grace covers notAfter ONLY — a not-yet-valid leaf is refused → 401', async () => {
+    const ctx = await hostCtx('alice')
+    const now = Date.now()
+    const res = await post(ctx, await mintLeaf(ctx, new Date(now + DAY_MS), new Date(now + 2 * DAY_MS)))
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401)
+  })
+
+  test('a still-valid leaf may also use /recover → 201', async () => {
+    const ctx = await hostCtx('alice')
+    const res = await post(ctx, ctx.currentCertDer)
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(201)
+  })
+
+  test('a missing cert field is rejected → 400 (uniform schema reject, same as a missing csr)', async () => {
+    const ctx = await hostCtx('alice')
+    const app = appWith(hostDeps(ctx, { hostCaAnchorsDer: [ctx.ca.caDer] }))
+    await app.ready()
+    const res = await app.inject({ method: 'POST', url: '/recover', payload: { csr: b64Csr(ctx.csr) } })
+    // The module answers with uniform rejects that never say which check failed: 400 for a malformed
+    // body, 401 for a cert that parses but is not trusted, 403 for a trusted cert that is not allowed.
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(400)
+  })
+
+  /**
+   * The header is the mTLS terminator's channel. On `/recover` the cert comes from the body, so a
+   * client-supplied header must not be able to substitute an identity.
+   */
+  test('an x-client-cert HEADER cannot override the body identity → 401', async () => {
+    const ctx = await hostCtx('alice')
+    const rogueCa = await makeP256Ca('rogue-CA')
+    const now = Date.now()
+    const rogue = await mintLeaf(ctx, new Date(now - 9 * DAY_MS), new Date(now - 8 * DAY_MS), rogueCa.caSigner)
+    const app = appWith(hostDeps(ctx, { hostCaAnchorsDer: [ctx.ca.caDer] }))
+    await app.ready()
+    const res = await app.inject({
+      method: 'POST',
+      url: '/recover',
+      headers: { 'x-client-cert': certHeader(ctx.currentCertDer) },
+      payload: { cert: b64(rogue), csr: b64Csr(ctx.csr) },
+    })
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401)
+  })
+})
+
+/**
+ * CP6e · POST /device/:id/recover — the phone-track counterpart of `/recover`.
+ *
+ * A device certificate hits the identical deadlock as a host leaf: `/device/:id/renew` is
+ * mTLS-authenticated by the cert being renewed, and nginx refuses to forward an expired client cert
+ * in any mode. Without this route a phone whose cert lapsed has to be re-enrolled by hand.
+ */
+describe('CP6e POST /device/:id/recover — expired device-cert recovery', () => {
+  async function mintDeviceLeaf(
+    ctx: DeviceCtx,
+    accountId: string,
+    notBefore: Date,
+    notAfter: Date,
+    signer = ctx.ca.caSigner,
+  ): Promise<Uint8Array> {
+    const spiffe = `spiffe://relay.terminal.yaojia.wang/account/${accountId}/device/${ctx.deviceId}`
+    return assembleCertificate({
+      subjectPublicKey: ctx.spki,
+      subject: `CN=web-terminal-device`,
+      issuer: ctx.ca.caCert.subjectName,
+      serialNumber: Uint8Array.from([0x0d]),
+      notBefore,
+      notAfter,
+      extensions: [
+        new x509.SubjectAlternativeNameExtension([
+          { type: 'dns', value: `alice.${ZONE}` },
+          { type: 'url', value: spiffe },
+        ]),
+        new x509.BasicConstraintsExtension(false, undefined, true),
+        new x509.KeyUsagesExtension(x509.KeyUsageFlags.digitalSignature, true),
+        new x509.ExtendedKeyUsageExtension([x509.ExtendedKeyUsage.clientAuth]),
+      ],
+      signer,
+      sigAlg: 'ecdsa-p256',
+    })
+  }
+
+  const b64 = (der: Uint8Array): string => Buffer.from(der).toString('base64')
+
+  async function post(ctx: DeviceCtx, cert: Uint8Array, extra?: Partial<RenewDeps>) {
+    const app = appWith({ ...deviceDeps(ctx), deviceCaAnchorsDer: [ctx.ca.caDer], ...extra })
+    await app.ready()
+    return app.inject({
+      method: 'POST',
+      url: `/device/${ctx.deviceId}/recover`,
+      payload: { cert: b64(cert), csr: b64Csr(ctx.csr) },
+    })
+  }
+
+  test('a device cert expired INSIDE the grace window is re-issued → 201', async () => {
+    const ctx = await deviceCtx('alice')
+    const rec = await ctx.devices.getDevice(ctx.deviceId)
+    const now = Date.now()
+    const res = await post(
+      ctx,
+      await mintDeviceLeaf(ctx, rec!.accountId, new Date(now - 9 * DAY_MS), new Date(now - 8 * DAY_MS)),
+    )
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(201)
+    expect(JSON.parse(res.payload).cert).toBeTruthy()
+  })
+
+  test('a device cert expired BEYOND the grace window is refused → 401', async () => {
+    const ctx = await deviceCtx('alice')
+    const rec = await ctx.devices.getDevice(ctx.deviceId)
+    const now = Date.now()
+    const res = await post(
+      ctx,
+      await mintDeviceLeaf(ctx, rec!.accountId, new Date(now - 60 * DAY_MS), new Date(now - 31 * DAY_MS)),
+    )
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401)
+  })
+
+  /** Same load-bearing check as the host route: nginx validates nothing on this path. */
+  test('a self-signed cert with a FORGED device SPIFFE SAN is refused → 401', async () => {
+    const ctx = await deviceCtx('alice')
+    const rogueCa = await makeP256Ca('rogue-CA')
+    const rec = await ctx.devices.getDevice(ctx.deviceId)
+    const now = Date.now()
+    const res = await post(
+      ctx,
+      await mintDeviceLeaf(
+        ctx,
+        rec!.accountId,
+        new Date(now - 9 * DAY_MS),
+        new Date(now - 8 * DAY_MS),
+        rogueCa.caSigner,
+      ),
+    )
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401)
+  })
+
+  test('recovery NEVER bypasses revocation — revoked device → 403', async () => {
+    const ctx = await deviceCtx('alice')
+    const rec = await ctx.devices.getDevice(ctx.deviceId)
+    const now = Date.now()
+    const cert = await mintDeviceLeaf(ctx, rec!.accountId, new Date(now - 9 * DAY_MS), new Date(now - 8 * DAY_MS))
+    await ctx.devices.setDeviceStatus(ctx.deviceId, 'revoked')
+    const res = await post(ctx, cert)
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(403)
+  })
+
+  test('the path :id must match the cert identity — no cross-device smuggling → 403', async () => {
+    const ctx = await deviceCtx('alice')
+    const rec = await ctx.devices.getDevice(ctx.deviceId)
+    const now = Date.now()
+    const cert = await mintDeviceLeaf(ctx, rec!.accountId, new Date(now - 9 * DAY_MS), new Date(now - 8 * DAY_MS))
+    const app = appWith({ ...deviceDeps(ctx), deviceCaAnchorsDer: [ctx.ca.caDer] })
+    await app.ready()
+    const res = await app.inject({
+      method: 'POST',
+      url: `/device/someone-else/recover`,
+      payload: { cert: b64(cert), csr: b64Csr(ctx.csr) },
+    })
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(403)
+  })
+
+  test('grace 0 disables device recovery entirely → 401', async () => {
+    const ctx = await deviceCtx('alice')
+    const rec = await ctx.devices.getDevice(ctx.deviceId)
+    const now = Date.now()
+    const res = await post(
+      ctx,
+      await mintDeviceLeaf(ctx, rec!.accountId, new Date(now - 2 * DAY_MS), new Date(now - DAY_MS)),
+      { expiredRenewGraceMs: 0 },
+    )
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401)
+  })
+})

deploy/nginx/enroll-recover-location.md

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+# Enroll vhost addition — `/recover` (expired-leaf recovery)
+
+One `location` block to **merge into the existing** enroll vhost on the VPS
+(`/etc/nginx/conf.d/enroll.conf`, the `127.0.0.1:8471` server). No new server, no new SNI route, no
+DNS work.
+
+> **This is a MERGE, not a file to ship.** The enroll vhost also carries `/enroll`, `/device/enroll`,
+> `/auth/login`, `/crl/`, `/renew` and `/device/:id/renew` — do not replace it.
+
+## Why the route exists
+
+`POST /renew` is mTLS-authenticated by the very leaf it renews, so once that leaf lapses the host can
+never renew it and the tunnel stays down until an operator re-pairs. That is not hypothetical: a
+laptop slept through its 8h renewal window, its 24h leaf expired, and the agent then logged
+`client certificate has expired; renew before dialling` 6380 times over 8 days without recovering.
+
+## Why it cannot be fixed on `/renew` itself
+
+**nginx will not forward an expired client certificate, under any `ssl_verify_client` mode.**
+
+- `optional` → nginx answers a bare `400 The SSL certificate error` as soon as verification fails.
+  The request never reaches the `location`, so no `if ($ssl_client_verify …)` can rescue it.
+- `optional_no_ca` → does **not** help either. It only tolerates *chain* failures; see nginx's
+  `ngx_ssl_verify_error_optional()`, which covers `DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT`,
+  `SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN`, `UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY` and
+  `UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE` — and **not** `X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED`.
+- `ssl_verify_client` is a `server`-level directive, so it cannot be relaxed per-location anyway.
+
+So recovery drops mTLS: `/recover` takes **no client certificate**, and the lapsed cert travels in
+the request body instead.
+
+## Why that is still authenticated
+
+A certificate is public, so the body alone proves nothing — possession of the **private key** does,
+and it is still proven end to end:
+
+- the accompanying CSR is **self-signed by that key**, and the host signer's delegated gate enforces
+  CSR proof-of-possession plus `CSR key == registered key` (`control-plane/src/ca/csr.ts`
+  `verifyCsrPoP`);
+- `control-plane/src/api/renew.ts` runs the *same* trust pipeline as `/renew` — real X.509 path
+  validation to the frp-client-CA anchors, SPIFFE SAN parse, `notBefore`, and a registry lookup
+  requiring an `active`, account-consistent host — differing **only** in a bounded overrun allowance
+  on `notAfter` (`DEFAULT_EXPIRED_RENEW_GRACE_MS`, 30 days).
+
+Worst case for a replayed cert without the key: the attacker receives a certificate they cannot
+authenticate with. Revocation still bites, via registry status.
+
+## The blocks to add
+
+Two routes, same rationale: `/recover` re-issues an expired **host** frp-client leaf,
+`/device/:id/recover` does the same for an expired **device** cert (phone track).
+
+```nginx
+    # Expired-leaf recovery: NO client cert (see enroll-recover-location.md). The control-plane is
+    # the sole verifier; strip any client-supplied cert header so only the body can speak.
+    location = /recover {
+        limit_req zone=renew_recover burst=5 nodelay;
+        proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:8080;
+        proxy_http_version 1.1;
+        proxy_set_header Host $host;
+        proxy_set_header x-client-cert "";
+        proxy_read_timeout 60s;
+    }
+    # Same, for an expired DEVICE cert. Must sit ABOVE the `~ ^/device/[^/]+/renew$` mTLS location
+    # only if that regex could also match `/recover` — it cannot, but keep them adjacent so the pair
+    # is obvious to the next editor.
+    location ~ ^/device/[^/]+/recover$ {
+        limit_req zone=renew_recover burst=5 nodelay;
+        proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:8080;
+        proxy_http_version 1.1;
+        proxy_set_header Host $host;
+        proxy_set_header x-client-cert "";
+        proxy_read_timeout 60s;
+    }
+```
+
+And once, in the `http` context (top of `enroll.conf` is fine) — the route is reachable
+pre-authentication and costs the control-plane an X.509 path validation, so bound it. The
+control-plane additionally rate-limits per identity (`createRenewRateLimiter`, 30/hour):
+
+```nginx
+limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=renew_recover:1m rate=10r/m;
+```
+
+## Deploy gate
+
+```bash
+cp /etc/nginx/conf.d/enroll.conf{,.bak.$(date +%s)}   # snapshot first
+# ...merge the block above...
+nginx -t && systemctl restart nginx                   # NEVER reload on a failed -t
+```
+
+`restart`, not `reload`: a graceful reload has been observed keeping old workers alive for seconds,
+which makes post-deploy verification race the change.
+
+## Verify
+
+```bash
+# no cert needed — an in-grace expired leaf is re-issued
+curl -sS --resolve enroll.terminal.yaojia.wang:443:<vps> \
+  -X POST -H 'content-type: application/json' \
+  -d "{\"cert\":\"$(base64 -w0 expired.cert.pem)\",\"csr\":\"$(base64 -w0 new.csr.der)\"}" \
+  https://enroll.terminal.yaojia.wang/recover        # → 201 {cert,caChain,notAfter}
+
+# a forged self-signed cert with a correct-looking SPIFFE SAN must still be refused
+# → 401   (this is the load-bearing check; nginx is no longer validating the chain here)
+```

docs/PROGRESS_LOG.md

@@ -24,6 +24,59 @@
 
 > 新会话读到的第一块。保持准确,只描述"此刻"。
 
+### 🧹 [x] 补完上一条留下的三个遗留(2026-07-29,紧接死锁修复之后)
+
+- **① `.gitignore` 把源码吞了**: `agent/src/dist/buildBinary.ts` 是打包配置(源码),却被通配的 `dist/` 规则排除,**从未提交**——全新 clone 既过不了 `agent/src/index.ts` 的类型检查,也导入不了已提交的 `agent/test/buildBinary.test.ts`。修:**先解除目录排除**(`!agent/src/dist/` + `!agent/src/dist/**`)再提交文件 —— git **不会进入被排除的目录**,所以只否定文件名是无效的(实测确认)。反向验证 `agent/dist/`、`dist/`、`public/build/`、`desktop/dist-app/` 仍被忽略。
+- **② 隧道日志不带主机标识**: `pair` 从 enroll 响应拿到 hostId/subdomain 后直接丢弃,长跑的 `run` 进程无从得知,所以每条日志都是 `{"subdomain":null,"hostId":null}` —— 包括 8 天故障期那 6380 条告警,恰恰是最需要知道"是哪台机器"的时候。修:新增 `agent/src/config/hostRecord.ts`(`saveHostRecord`/`loadHostRecord`/`subdomainFromCertPem`/`resolveHostIdentity`),enroll 时落 `host.json`;解析优先级 **config(env/argv) > 记录文件 > 叶证书 SPIFFE SAN**。第三档是给**记录文件出现之前入网的老主机**的:它们的证书里本来就有子域名,因此**无需重新 pair** 就能把标识找回来。接入点:`certs/nativeRenew.ts`(续期告警)与 `cli/deps.ts`(健康状态行)。
+- **③ 手机轨没有恢复路径**: 新增 `POST /device/:id/recover`,与主机版同构 —— 证书走 body、device-CA 路径验证、SPIFFE 解析、`notBefore` **绝不宽限**,外加完整 registry 一致性检查(active + 同账户 + `:id` 与证书一致 + 同 key),**只放宽 `notAfter`**。nginx 在 enroll vhost 加 `location ~ ^/device/[^/]+/recover$`。
+- **验证**: 单测 agent **300/300**、control-plane **296/296**,两侧 `tsc` 干净(TDD 先 RED 后 GREEN)。
+  - **线上实测**:`/device/xyz/recover` 已能抵达 CP(返回 CP 的 `{"error":"rejected"}` JSON 而非 nginx 页面);回归 —— 伪造主机证书打 `/recover` 仍 401、过期证书打 `/renew` 仍被 nginx 拦为 400、`/enroll` 免证书路径未受影响。
+  - **标识实测(本机 h7fd8)**:写入 `host.json` 后日志出现 `subdomain: h7fd8` + `host_id: 7190ecd4-…`;**把 `host.json` 移走**后重启,新一跳仍能从证书 SPIFFE SAN 恢复出 `subdomain: h7fd8`(`host_id: (none)`,证书里本就没有)——老装机回退路径实盘确认。隧道端到端 **HTTP 200** 不受影响。
+- **遗留**: **iOS / Android 客户端尚未接线去调用 `/device/:id/recover`** —— 服务端能力已具备,客户端触发还没有。设备证书过期时目前仍需重新 enroll。
+- **commit**: `2a602d5`(合并 `d92caed`)。
+
+### 🔥 [x] 隧道断了 8 天 —— 证书过期后**自动续期死锁**,已修 + 已上线(2026-07-29)
+
+- **现象**: 用户问"远端 relay 是否在运行"。服务端**全绿**(nginx/frps/cp-zte/panel-zte/xray/pg/redis 全 active,LE 通配证书有效至 2026-10-05,`*.terminal.yaojia.wang` 通配 DNS 正常),但 **frps `:7000` 已建立连接数 = 0**,`h7fd8.terminal.yaojia.wang` 打不通。Mac 上 frpc 在跑,每 20s 重试一次,全部 `connect to server error: EOF`(frps 在 mTLS 阶段拒)。
+- **根因(死锁)**: Mac 的 frp-client 叶证书 **2026-07-21 13:55 UTC 过期**(TTL 仅 ~24h)。`POST /renew` 是**用它自己要续的那张证书做 mTLS 鉴权**的 —— 证书一过期就再也换不了证书。触发链:续期窗口(T-8h)那天 Mac 在睡眠,醒来时 DNS 未就绪 → 24 次 `getaddrinfo ENOTFOUND enroll.terminal.yaojia.wang` 错过窗口 → 过期后改报 `client certificate has expired; renew before dialling`,**重复 6380 次、8 天、永不自愈**(agent.log 涨到 3MB)。
+- **三层都 fail-closed**,只改一层没用:① agent `transport/dial.ts` `buildTlsOptions` 抛 `CertExpiredError`,连 socket 都不开;② nginx `enroll.conf` 的 `location = /renew` 要求 `$ssl_client_verify = SUCCESS`;③ CP `api/renew.ts` `assertPresentedCertTrusted` 再查一次有效期 → 401。
+- **两个假设被实测推翻(重要,别再踩)**:
+  1. `ssl_verify_client optional` 在客户端证书**验证失败时直接返回裸 400**(`400 The SSL certificate error`),请求**根本到不了 location** —— 所以任何 `if ($ssl_client_verify …)` 都救不了。
+  2. `optional_no_ca` **也不行**:它只容忍**链**错误。见 nginx 的 `ngx_ssl_verify_error_optional()` —— 只含 `DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT` / `SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN` / `UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY` / `UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE`,**不含 `X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED`**。已在 VPS 上用真过期证书打 :8472 实测确认。结论:**nginx 在任何模式下都不会转发过期客户端证书**。
+- **最终方案(用户选定:30 天宽限窗口 + 超窗回落配对码)**: 恢复路径**放弃 mTLS**,改为**不带客户端证书的普通 HTTPS POST,过期证书放进 body**。不丢鉴权 —— **CSR 是用同一把私钥自签的**,而签名网关本来就强制 CSR PoP(`ca/csr.ts` `verifyCsrPoP`)+ `CSR key == 注册 key`,持有私钥的证明与原来 TLS 握手给的完全等价。重放一张(公开的)证书而没有私钥,最多拿到一张**自己用不了**的证书。
+  - **agent**: `dial.ts` 与 mTLS renew 通道**保持严格 fail-closed**(放宽已从 TLS 层完全移除)。改由 rotator 逐次决策:有效 → mTLS `/renew`;过期但在宽限内 → 普通 `/recover`;超出宽限 → 终态 `onExhausted`,**一次告警后停止重试**(不再发任何请求),日志直接给出 `web-terminal-agent pair <CODE>`。新增 `recoverCert()`、`recoveryUrlFor()`、`DEFAULT_EXPIRED_RENEW_GRACE_MS`(30d)、`CertExpiredBeyondGraceError`;`AgentConfig` 加可选 `recoverUrl`(env `RECOVER_URL`)。
+  - **CP**: `/renew` **恢复严格**(grace 0,与终端器行为一致)。宽限只给新增的 `POST /recover` —— 证书从 **body** 读、**忽略 `x-client-cert` 头**,然后跑**与 `/renew` 完全相同**的信任链:frp-client-CA 锚点做真 X.509 路径验证 → SPIFFE 解析 → `notBefore`(**永不宽限**)→ registry `active` + 账户一致。**吊销照样生效**。
+  - **deploy**: 不需要新 vhost / 新 SNI / 新 DNS —— 只往现有 enroll vhost 加一个 `location = /recover`(+ `limit_req` 10r/m)。文档 `deploy/nginx/enroll-recover-location.md`(含 nginx 源码引证)。
+- **验证**:
+  - 单测:agent **289/289**、control-plane **290/290**,两侧 `tsc --noEmit` 干净。TDD 全程先 RED 后 GREEN。
+  - 承重测试:**「山寨 CA 签的、SPIFFE SAN 与真证书逐字节相同的伪造证书 → 401」**。这条最关键 —— 这条路径上 nginx 已不再验链,它一旦变红,`/recover` 就成了无鉴权发证机。已在**线上实测 401**。
+  - **线上端到端自愈实测**:把那张真·过期 8 天的证书塞回 keystore → 重启 agent → 日志 `frp-client cert rotated; restarting frpc onto the fresh leaf` → 证书自动换成新的 24h 叶(Jul30 08:06)→ frpc `login to server success` / `start proxy success` → 设备证书走完整链路 `:443 → SNI → :8470 mTLS → frps → frpc → Mac base app` 拿到 **HTTP 200**(返回本机真实 session 列表)→ 健康探针 `healthy: true`。**全程零人工介入** —— 正是生产卡死 8 天的那个场景。
+  - 回归:`/renew` 对过期证书仍 400(nginx 拦住,未放宽);4 区 SNI 探针(frp/通配/enroll/xray-Reality)全部未受影响。
+- **应急恢复(修复前先做的)**: 用 frp-client CA 给 h7fd8 补签了一张 7 天过桥证书(同一把私钥、同子域名、同 SPIFFE SAN,经 `openssl ca` 登记进 index.txt 因此可吊销),先把隧道救活。自愈生效后它已被换成 CP 正常签发的 24h 叶。
+- **遗留 / 待办**:
+  - **`agent/src/dist/buildBinary.ts` 是源码却被 `.gitignore` 的 `dist/` 规则吞掉,从未提交**(既有问题,与本次无关):任何全新 clone/worktree 都缺它 → `agent/src/index.ts` 类型检查失败、已提交的 `test/buildBinary.test.ts` 直接导入失败。建议加 `!agent/src/dist/` 例外。
+  - agent 日志里 `subdomain: (none)` / `host_id: (none)`:enroll 后未把 subdomain/hostId 落进配置,导致告警缺主机标识(既有问题)。
+  - 手机轨(device)目前**没有** `/recover` 对应路径,设备证书过期仍需重新 enroll;CP 侧宽限代码是通用的,补一条路由即可。
+  - 24h TTL + 单次定时续期 + 笔记本睡眠 的组合仍偏脆,宽限窗口是兜底而非根治。
+- **文件**: `agent/src/certs/rotation.ts` · `agent/src/certs/nativeRenew.ts` · `agent/src/config/agentConfig.ts` · `control-plane/src/api/renew.ts` · `deploy/nginx/enroll-recover-location.md`(新) · 各自测试。
+- **commit**: `f3f4d8b`(第一版,方向对但 nginx 那条路走不通)+ `5509c81`(实测后改为 body 传证书,最终版)。
+
+### 🐛 [x] Mac 版中文全变 `_` + 框线渲染错乱 —— PTY 缺 UTF-8 locale(2026-07-28)
+
+- **现象**(用户截图,Mac 版):Claude Code TUI 里所有中文变成 `_`;banner/输入框只剩零散横线,圆角边框消失。
+- **根因**(实测确认,不是字体也不是前端):`src/session/session.ts` spawn PTY 时用 `env: {...process.env}`,而**服务端由 launchd/Finder 启动,环境里根本没有 `LANG`/`LC_*`**(`~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.web-terminal.base-app.plist` 的 `EnvironmentVariables` 只有 PATH/PORT/BIND_HOST)。tmux 逐 client 从 `LC_ALL`/`LC_CTYPE`/`LANG` 判断 UTF-8 能力,全空 → 进入**非 UTF-8 模式**,在**服务端就把字节改写掉**:宽字符→`_`、`✓ ⏺` 等→`_`、`═║╔╗` 降级成 DEC Special Graphics(`ESC ( 0` + `qxlk`)。所以前端 xterm 收到的已经是残骸,改字体/renderer 救不回来。
+  - 用户 `~/.zshrc` 里其实**有** `LANG=sv_SE.UTF-8`,但没用:tmux 是 PTY 的根进程,它做完 UTF-8 判定之后 shell 才 source profile。登录 shell(`-l`)救不了 tmux。
+  - node-pty 探针实证:无 LANG → `MARK ________ ==BOX== \e(0qxlk`;有 LANG → `MARK 中文测试 ==BOX== ═║╔╗ ✓`。
+- **修复**: 新增 `src/session/locale.ts` → `withUtf8Locale(env)`,在 `createSession()` 的 spawn env 上先过一道。POSIX 优先级 `LC_ALL > LC_CTYPE > LANG`;**已是 UTF-8 就原样不动**(用户的 `zh_CN.UTF-8`/`ja_JP.UTF-8` 保留),只在缺失或非 UTF-8(`C`/`POSIX`/`ISO8859-1`)时补 `en_US.UTF-8`(并清掉会盖过它的非 UTF-8 `LC_ALL`/`LC_CTYPE`)。
+- **验证**:
+  - `test/locale.test.ts` 9 例(TDD:先 RED 再 GREEN);`tsc --noEmit` 干净。
+  - 端到端:用 `env -u LANG -u LC_ALL -u LC_CTYPE` 复现 launchd 环境跑 server → 新建 session → `中文测试:你好,世界!`/`🎉 ✅`/`╭─╮ ═║╔╗ █▓▒░ ⏺ ⎿` **DOM 里逐字符核对全部正确**(修复前同一条命令得到 `________`)。
+  - 之后 `npm run build` + `launchctl kickstart` 让真正的 launchd 单元(仍无 LANG)接管,再复验一次通过。
+  - 回归:`test/integration/server.test.ts`(含 ⑥ CJK ring-buffer replay、H1 tmux 重启存活)+ git-ops + worktree + projects 共 **107 例全绿**。(全量 79 文件并跑时有 4 例超时 flake,单跑全过,与本改动无关。)
+  - 存量 tmux session **无需重建**:探针证明用带 LANG 的新 client 重新 attach 一个"非 UTF-8 模式下创建"的旧 session,新输出即恢复正常(只有已滚进 scrollback 的旧 `_` 救不回)。
+- **遗留**: `/Applications/Web Terminal.app/Contents/Resources/dist/` 里打包的是 7/18 的旧代码,**仍未修**——桌面 Electron 版要 `cd desktop && npm run dist:mac` 重打包(或就地补 `dist/session/*.js`,注意 adhoc 签名会失效)。仓库内 `dist/` 与 launchd base-app 已修好。
+- **文件**: `src/session/locale.ts`(新)· `src/session/session.ts`(spawn env)· `test/locale.test.ts`(新)。
+
 ### 🔐 零接触隧道 Enrollment 产品化 + Control Panel(2026-07-18~23,当前活跃)
 
 - **需求**: 用户要"本机 app 一跑就自动连服务器、自动管证书;手机连接时自动搞定证书"——即**产品级零接触**(引导时一次动作,之后自动签发+续期,永不再管)。诚实边界:第一次签发无法零人类动作(否则谁碰端点谁拿证书),所以"引导一次,之后免管"。

src/session/locale.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/**
+ * src/session/locale.ts — guarantee the spawned PTY has a UTF-8 locale.
+ *
+ * The bug this fixes: when the server is launched from Finder / launchd (the Mac
+ * desktop app, or the launchd-managed tunnel agent) the process environment has
+ * NO `LANG` / `LC_*` at all — unlike a shell started from Terminal.app. tmux
+ * decides per client whether the terminal is UTF-8 capable purely from those
+ * variables, so with none set it falls back to its non-UTF-8 mode and:
+ *
+ *   - rewrites every wide character to `_`  →  `中文测试` renders as `________`
+ *   - rewrites other non-Latin-1 glyphs to `_` (`✓`, `⏺`, emoji …)
+ *   - downgrades double-line box drawing (`═║╔╗`) to DEC Special Graphics
+ *     (`ESC ( 0` + `qxlk`), i.e. single lines
+ *
+ * That mangling happens on the server side, *before* the bytes reach xterm.js,
+ * so no amount of frontend font work can recover it. The `-l` login shell can't
+ * fix it either: tmux is the PTY's root process and has already made its
+ * decision by the time the shell sources `~/.zprofile`.
+ *
+ * Policy: leave the environment alone whenever the effective charset is already
+ * UTF-8 — a user who picked `zh_CN.UTF-8` or `ja_JP.UTF-8` keeps it. Only a
+ * missing or non-UTF-8 charset is replaced. Precedence follows POSIX:
+ * `LC_ALL` > `LC_CTYPE` > `LANG`.
+ */
+
+/** Fallback locale when the environment specifies no UTF-8 charset. */
+export const DEFAULT_UTF8_LOCALE = 'en_US.UTF-8';
+
+/** Matches the charset suffix of a locale: `.UTF-8`, `.utf8`, or a bare `UTF-8`. */
+const UTF8_PATTERN = /utf-?8$/i;
+
+/** Environment mapping as node-pty / process.env exposes it. */
+type Env = Readonly<Record<string, string | undefined>>;
+
+function isUtf8(value: string | undefined): boolean {
+  return value !== undefined && value !== '' && UTF8_PATTERN.test(value);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Return a copy of `env` that is guaranteed to select a UTF-8 charset.
+ *
+ * Existing values are never rewritten — if the effective locale is already
+ * UTF-8 the env comes back unchanged (aside from being a fresh object).
+ */
+export function withUtf8Locale(env: Env): Record<string, string | undefined> {
+  // LC_ALL outranks everything; LC_CTYPE outranks LANG for character handling.
+  // If whichever one is in effect is already UTF-8, there is nothing to do.
+  const effective =
+    env.LC_ALL !== undefined && env.LC_ALL !== ''
+      ? env.LC_ALL
+      : env.LC_CTYPE !== undefined && env.LC_CTYPE !== ''
+        ? env.LC_CTYPE
+        : env.LANG;
+
+  if (isUtf8(effective)) return { ...env };
+
+  // Setting LANG (the lowest-precedence variable) is the least invasive fix, but
+  // it only takes effect if nothing above it is overriding — so clear a
+  // non-UTF-8 LC_ALL / LC_CTYPE that would otherwise win.
+  const next: Record<string, string | undefined> = { ...env, LANG: DEFAULT_UTF8_LOCALE };
+  if (env.LC_ALL !== undefined && env.LC_ALL !== '') delete next.LC_ALL;
+  if (env.LC_CTYPE !== undefined && env.LC_CTYPE !== '') delete next.LC_CTYPE;
+  return next;
+}

src/session/session.ts

@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ import { WS_OPEN } from '../types.js';
 import { serialize } from '../protocol.js';
 import { createRingBuffer } from './ring-buffer.js';
 import { tmuxName, killSession } from './tmux.js';
+import { withUtf8Locale } from './locale.js';
 
 /** Send a server message to `ws` only if it is OPEN (M5). Never throws on a
  *  closed socket; forwarding to a dead ws is simply a no-op. */
@@ -105,8 +106,11 @@ export function createSession(
     cols: dims.cols,
     rows: dims.rows,
     cwd: cwd ?? cfg.homeDir,
+    // A Finder/launchd-launched server has NO LANG/LC_* — which puts tmux in its
+    // non-UTF-8 mode and turns every CJK/wide character into `_` before the bytes
+    // ever reach xterm. withUtf8Locale() fills one in (and only then).
     env: {
-      ...process.env,
+      ...withUtf8Locale(process.env),
       WEBTERM_SESSION: id,
       WEBTERM_HOOK_URL: `http://127.0.0.1:${cfg.port}/hook`,
       // B2: statusLine scripts POST telemetry here; WEBTERM_NTFY_* vars forwarded

test/locale.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { withUtf8Locale, DEFAULT_UTF8_LOCALE } from '../src/session/locale.js';
+
+/**
+ * locale.ts — UTF-8 locale guarantee for the spawned PTY.
+ *
+ * Why this exists: when the server is launched from Finder / launchd (the Mac
+ * desktop app) the process env has NO `LANG`/`LC_*`. tmux then runs in its
+ * non-UTF-8 mode and rewrites every wide character to `_` and downgrades
+ * double-line box drawing (`═║╔╗`) to DEC Special Graphics single lines — so all
+ * CJK output in the Claude Code TUI is destroyed before it ever reaches xterm.
+ */
+describe('withUtf8Locale', () => {
+  it('adds LANG when no locale variable is set at all', () => {
+    const out = withUtf8Locale({ PATH: '/usr/bin' });
+
+    expect(out.LANG).toBe(DEFAULT_UTF8_LOCALE);
+    expect(out.PATH).toBe('/usr/bin');
+  });
+
+  it('keeps a UTF-8 LANG the user already has', () => {
+    const out = withUtf8Locale({ LANG: 'zh_CN.UTF-8' });
+
+    expect(out.LANG).toBe('zh_CN.UTF-8');
+  });
+
+  it('accepts lowercase / hyphen-less spellings of utf8', () => {
+    expect(withUtf8Locale({ LANG: 'en_US.utf8' }).LANG).toBe('en_US.utf8');
+    expect(withUtf8Locale({ LANG: 'C.UTF8' }).LANG).toBe('C.UTF8');
+  });
+
+  it('replaces a non-UTF-8 LANG (C / POSIX / latin1) with the default', () => {
+    expect(withUtf8Locale({ LANG: 'C' }).LANG).toBe(DEFAULT_UTF8_LOCALE);
+    expect(withUtf8Locale({ LANG: 'POSIX' }).LANG).toBe(DEFAULT_UTF8_LOCALE);
+    expect(withUtf8Locale({ LANG: 'en_US.ISO8859-1' }).LANG).toBe(DEFAULT_UTF8_LOCALE);
+  });
+
+  it('respects LC_ALL — it outranks LANG, so a UTF-8 LC_ALL is enough', () => {
+    const out = withUtf8Locale({ LC_ALL: 'ja_JP.UTF-8', LANG: 'C' });
+
+    expect(out.LC_ALL).toBe('ja_JP.UTF-8');
+    expect(out.LANG).toBe('C'); // untouched — LC_ALL already decides the charset
+  });
+
+  it('respects a UTF-8 LC_CTYPE (macOS Terminal.app sets only this)', () => {
+    const out = withUtf8Locale({ LC_CTYPE: 'UTF-8' });
+
+    expect(out.LC_CTYPE).toBe('UTF-8');
+    expect(out.LANG).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('overrides LANG when LC_CTYPE is present but not UTF-8', () => {
+    const out = withUtf8Locale({ LC_CTYPE: 'C' });
+
+    expect(out.LANG).toBe(DEFAULT_UTF8_LOCALE);
+  });
+
+  it('does not mutate the input env (immutability)', () => {
+    const input = { PATH: '/usr/bin' };
+    const out = withUtf8Locale(input);
+
+    expect(input).toEqual({ PATH: '/usr/bin' });
+    expect(out).not.toBe(input);
+  });
+
+  it('ignores an empty-string locale (unset in practice)', () => {
+    expect(withUtf8Locale({ LANG: '' }).LANG).toBe(DEFAULT_UTF8_LOCALE);
+    expect(withUtf8Locale({ LC_ALL: '' }).LANG).toBe(DEFAULT_UTF8_LOCALE);
+  });
+});