/**
 * A6 (FIX H-host-3) — leaf RENEWAL routes (registerable fastify plugin; testable standalone via
 * `app.inject`, wired into `main.ts` later). Both routes are authenticated by the CURRENT valid client
 * certificate the mTLS terminator (nginx / frps) already verified — NEVER by anything in the request
 * body. Deny-by-default, uniform reject.
 *
 *   POST /renew                [mTLS current frp-client cert]
 *     Identity (accountId, subdomain, current pubkey) is extracted from the PRESENTED cert's SANs
 *     (SPIFFE URI `.../host/<sub>` via relay-auth `parseSpiffeId`, subject key from the cert), NOT the
 *     body. Look the host up BY THAT SUBDOMAIN, require active + account-consistent, then re-issue via
 *     the host signer with the CURRENT cert's key as the subject key — so the delegated gate enforces
 *     the SAME-KEY rule (no key swap) and stamps `host.subdomain` (the SAME subdomain — no smuggling).
 *     201 { cert, caChain, notAfter }.
 *
 *   POST /device/:id/renew     [mTLS current device cert]
 *     Identity (accountId, deviceId, current pubkey) from the presented device cert's SANs. Look the
 *     device record up by :id, require active + account/deviceId/key-consistent with the presented
 *     cert, then re-issue via the device signer (stamps `record.subdomainScope`). 201.
 *
 * CRITICAL (A4 anti-smuggling lesson): a renew can NEVER change the subdomain, account, or key. The
 * identity comes from the authenticated current cert + the existing registry record; the body carries
 * ONLY the new CSR. The re-issued SAN is built from the registry record, never from client input.
 *
 * `reflect-metadata` must load before `@peculiar/x509` (tsyringe polyfill) — keep the side-effect first.
 */
import 'reflect-metadata'
import * as x509 from '@peculiar/x509'
import { webcrypto, X509Certificate as NodeX509Certificate } from 'node:crypto'
import { z } from 'zod'
import type { FastifyPluginAsync, FastifyReply, FastifyRequest } from 'fastify'
import { parseSpiffeId, type SpiffeKind } from 'relay-auth/src/agent/spiffe.js'
import { verifyChain } from 'relay-auth/src/agent/verify-mtls.js'
import type { HostRegistry } from '../registry/hosts.js'
import type { DeviceRegistry } from '../registry/devices.js'
import type { LeafRenewer } from '../ca/rotate.js'
import { decodeCsrWire } from '../ca/csr.js'
import { bytesToBase64, timingSafeEqualBytes } from '../util/bytes.js'

x509.cryptoProvider.set(webcrypto)

/** Default per-identity renewal budget (window). Renewal is ~2/3-TTL cadence — abuse is a signal. */
export const DEFAULT_RENEW_RATE_MAX = 30
/** Renewal rate window (ms). */
export const DEFAULT_RENEW_RATE_WINDOW_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000
/**
 * Hard cap on distinct identities the in-memory limiter tracks. Without a bound the `hits` Map grows
 * one entry per unique presented identity forever (memory-DoS); at the cap we sweep fully-expired
 * windows and, if still over, evict the least-recently-seen entries. Evicting an idle entry only
 * resets a limiter that was about to expire anyway, so the rate guarantee for active identities holds.
 */
export const RENEW_RATE_MAX_IDENTITIES = 10_000
/** Max base64 length of a submitted CSR (a P-256 PKCS#10 is well under 1 KB; this is generous slack). */
export const MAX_CSR_B64_LEN = 8192
/** Max wire length of a body-carried certificate (a P-256 leaf PEM is ~1 KB; generous slack). */
export const MAX_PRESENTED_CERT_LEN = 16384
/**
 * Default header the mTLS terminator forwards the verified client cert in (base64 DER). The terminator
 * MUST set this from `$ssl_client_cert` AND strip any client-supplied copy — a client can never provide
 * its own current cert. Production wiring can swap in a socket-peer-cert resolver instead.
 */
export const DEFAULT_CLIENT_CERT_HEADER = 'x-client-cert'
/**
 * How long after `notAfter` a presented leaf may still authenticate its OWN re-issuance (30 days).
 *
 * `/renew` is authenticated by the very leaf it renews, so a strict expiry check means a host whose
 * leaf lapsed can never renew it — it is bricked until an operator re-pairs (this happened: a laptop
 * slept through its renewal window and the tunnel stayed down for 8 days). Accepting a recently
 * expired leaf FOR RE-ISSUANCE ONLY breaks that deadlock.
 *
 * Nothing else is relaxed: the leaf must still chain to the CA anchor set, its SPIFFE identity must
 * still resolve to a registry record that is `active` and account-consistent, and `notBefore` is NOT
 * graced. The residual risk is that a stale stolen leaf stays usable for this window — an attacker
 * holding an unexpired stolen leaf can already renew indefinitely, so this widens an existing
 * exposure rather than opening a new one. Set to 0 to restore the strict behaviour.
 */
export const DEFAULT_EXPIRED_RENEW_GRACE_MS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000

/** Uniform reject: 401 = no/invalid current cert (unauthenticated); 403 = cert valid but not allowed. */
export class RenewRejectError extends Error {
  constructor(public readonly status: 401 | 403) {
    super('renew rejected') // uniform message — never leak which check failed
    this.name = 'RenewRejectError'
  }
}

/** Per-identity renewal rate exceeded → 429. */
export class RenewRateLimitError extends Error {
  constructor() {
    super('renew rate limited')
    this.name = 'RenewRateLimitError'
  }
}

/** The authenticated identity extracted from a presented client cert (never from the body). */
interface CertIdentity {
  readonly accountId: string
  /** SPIFFE id segment: the subdomain for a host cert, the deviceId for a device cert. */
  readonly id: string
  readonly kind: SpiffeKind
  /** SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER of the current cert's subject key (the SAME-KEY anchor). */
  readonly publicKeySpki: Uint8Array
}

/** Seam for the current mTLS client cert. The terminator provides it; tests inject it. */
export interface PresentedClientCert {
  /** DER of the client cert the mTLS layer verified for THIS request, or null if none was presented. */
  presentedCertDer(req: FastifyRequest): Uint8Array | null
}

/** Per-identity sliding-window rate limiter for renewals. */
export interface RenewRateLimiter {
  /** Throws `RenewRateLimitError` when `identity` is over its renewal budget. */
  check(identity: string): void
  /** Number of identities currently tracked (bounded) — for tests/observability. */
  size(): number
}

export interface RenewRateLimitOpts {
  readonly max?: number
  readonly windowMs?: number
  /** Clock (ms) — injectable for tests. */
  readonly now?: () => number
}

/** Optional cap override — defaults to `RENEW_RATE_MAX_IDENTITIES`. */
export interface RenewRateLimitBoundOpts extends RenewRateLimitOpts {
  readonly maxIdentities?: number
}

/**
 * In-process sliding-window renewal limiter (mirrors `registry/devices.ts` `checkRateLimit`), with a
 * bounded `hits` Map (memory-DoS guard). Each check drops the identity's timestamps older than the
 * window; when the Map reaches `maxIdentities` it sweeps every fully-expired identity and, if still at
 * the cap, evicts the least-recently-seen entries so the Map can never grow without bound.
 */
export function createRenewRateLimiter(opts: RenewRateLimitBoundOpts = {}): RenewRateLimiter {
  const max = opts.max ?? DEFAULT_RENEW_RATE_MAX
  const windowMs = opts.windowMs ?? DEFAULT_RENEW_RATE_WINDOW_MS
  const maxIdentities = opts.maxIdentities ?? RENEW_RATE_MAX_IDENTITIES
  const now = opts.now ?? (() => Date.now())
  const hits = new Map<string, number[]>()

  /** Drop identities whose entire window has expired; if still at the cap, evict oldest-seen entries. */
  function boundMap(cutoff: number): void {
    for (const [id, arr] of hits) {
      const recent = arr.filter((t) => t > cutoff)
      if (recent.length === 0) hits.delete(id)
      else hits.set(id, recent)
    }
    if (hits.size < maxIdentities) return
    // All remaining windows are still active but we are at the cap — evict the least-recently-seen
    // (smallest max-timestamp) down to below the cap. This bounds memory under a distinct-identity flood.
    const byRecency = [...hits.entries()].sort((a, b) => Math.max(...a[1]) - Math.max(...b[1]))
    const evict = hits.size - maxIdentities + 1
    for (let i = 0; i < evict && i < byRecency.length; i++) hits.delete(byRecency[i]![0])
  }

  return {
    check(identity) {
      const ts = now()
      const cutoff = ts - windowMs
      // Sweep before inserting a NEW identity so the Map can never exceed the cap.
      if (!hits.has(identity) && hits.size >= maxIdentities) boundMap(cutoff)
      const recent = (hits.get(identity) ?? []).filter((t) => t > cutoff)
      if (recent.length >= max) {
        hits.set(identity, recent) // persist the pruned window; do NOT record this rejected attempt
        throw new RenewRateLimitError()
      }
      recent.push(ts)
      hits.set(identity, recent)
    },
    size() {
      return hits.size
    },
  }
}

/**
 * Default `PresentedClientCert` reading the base64-DER cert the mTLS terminator forwarded in a header.
 * The terminator is trusted to set the header from the VERIFIED client cert and to strip any inbound
 * copy; this resolver never trusts a client-supplied value on an unterminated path.
 */
export function headerPresentedCert(headerName: string = DEFAULT_CLIENT_CERT_HEADER): PresentedClientCert {
  const name = headerName.toLowerCase()
  return {
    presentedCertDer(req) {
      const raw = req.headers[name]
      const value = Array.isArray(raw) ? raw[0] : raw
      if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.length === 0) return null
      return certWireToDer(value)
    },
  }
}

/**
 * Normalize a certificate carried over the wire to raw DER. Accepts base64 DER, PEM, and nginx's
 * header-safe `$ssl_client_escaped_cert` (URL-encoded PEM): URL-decode if escaped, then strip PEM
 * armor + whitespace to recover the base64 body. Returns null on anything unparseable.
 */
export function certWireToDer(value: string): Uint8Array | null {
  try {
    let s = value.includes('%') ? safeDecodeUri(value) : value
    if (s.includes('BEGIN CERTIFICATE')) {
      s = s.replace(/-----[^-]+-----/g, '').replace(/\s+/g, '')
    }
    const der = Buffer.from(s, 'base64')
    return der.length > 0 ? new Uint8Array(der) : null
  } catch {
    return null
  }
}

/** URL-decode `value`, returning it unchanged if it is not valid percent-encoding. */
function safeDecodeUri(value: string): string {
  try {
    return decodeURIComponent(value)
  } catch {
    return value
  }
}

/**
 * Trust-anchor verification of the presented current cert (defense in depth: the mTLS terminator has
 * already verified it, but this route must not trust a cert the terminator would never have accepted).
 * Mirrors relay-auth `verify-mtls` `verifyChain`: full path validation to a self-signed CA anchor in
 * the supplied set (the frp-client-CA for host renews, the device-CA for device renews) PLUS the
 * cert's own notBefore/notAfter validity window. ANY failure throws `RenewRejectError(401)`.
 */
function assertPresentedCertTrusted(
  der: Uint8Array,
  caAnchorsDer: readonly Uint8Array[],
  nowMs: number,
  expiredGraceMs: number,
): void {
  let leaf: NodeX509Certificate
  let anchors: NodeX509Certificate[]
  try {
    leaf = new NodeX509Certificate(Buffer.from(der))
    anchors = caAnchorsDer.map((a) => new NodeX509Certificate(Buffer.from(a)))
  } catch {
    throw new RenewRejectError(401)
  }
  if (!verifyChain(leaf, anchors)) throw new RenewRejectError(401)
  const notBefore = new Date(leaf.validFrom).getTime()
  const notAfter = new Date(leaf.validTo).getTime()
  if (Number.isNaN(notBefore) || Number.isNaN(notAfter)) throw new RenewRejectError(401)
  // `notBefore` is never graced — a not-yet-valid cert is nonsense, not a recoverable lapse. Only
  // `notAfter` gets the bounded renewal grace (see DEFAULT_EXPIRED_RENEW_GRACE_MS).
  if (nowMs < notBefore) throw new RenewRejectError(401)
  if (nowMs > notAfter + Math.max(0, expiredGraceMs)) throw new RenewRejectError(401)
}

/**
 * Extract the authenticated identity from a presented client cert. Parses the DER, reads the SPIFFE URI
 * SAN through relay-auth's OWN `parseSpiffeId` (so it can never drift from the verifier), requires the
 * expected kind, and returns the subject public key SPKI. ANY failure → 401 (unauthenticated). This is
 * the ONLY identity source — no client-supplied field is ever consulted. When `verify` is supplied (the
 * kind's CA anchor set + clock), the presented cert is additionally chain- and expiry-validated against
 * that anchor BEFORE its identity is trusted; production wiring MUST supply anchors.
 */
function parsePresentedCertIdentity(
  der: Uint8Array,
  expectedKind: SpiffeKind,
  verify?: {
    readonly caAnchorsDer: readonly Uint8Array[]
    readonly nowMs: number
    readonly expiredGraceMs: number
  },
): CertIdentity {
  let leaf: x509.X509Certificate
  try {
    leaf = new x509.X509Certificate(der)
  } catch {
    throw new RenewRejectError(401)
  }
  if (verify !== undefined)
    assertPresentedCertTrusted(der, verify.caAnchorsDer, verify.nowMs, verify.expiredGraceMs)
  const san = leaf.getExtension(x509.SubjectAlternativeNameExtension)
  const uri = san?.names.toJSON().find((n) => n.type === 'url')?.value
  if (uri === undefined) throw new RenewRejectError(401)
  let parsed: { accountId: string; id: string; kind: SpiffeKind }
  try {
    parsed = parseSpiffeId(uri)
  } catch {
    throw new RenewRejectError(401)
  }
  if (parsed.kind !== expectedKind) throw new RenewRejectError(401)
  return {
    accountId: parsed.accountId,
    id: parsed.id,
    kind: parsed.kind,
    publicKeySpki: new Uint8Array(leaf.publicKey.rawData),
  }
}

const RenewBodySchema = z.object({ csr: z.string().min(1).max(MAX_CSR_B64_LEN) }).strict()
/** `/recover` additionally carries the EXPIRED leaf itself (base64 DER or PEM). */
const RecoverBodySchema = z
  .object({
    cert: z.string().min(1).max(MAX_PRESENTED_CERT_LEN),
    csr: z.string().min(1).max(MAX_CSR_B64_LEN),
  })
  .strict()

export interface RenewDeps {
  readonly hosts: HostRegistry
  readonly devices: DeviceRegistry
  readonly renewer: LeafRenewer
  /** Current-cert seam (mTLS terminator provides it). Defaults to the header resolver. */
  readonly presentedCert?: PresentedClientCert
  /** Per-identity renewal rate limiter. Defaults to an in-process sliding window. */
  readonly rateLimiter?: RenewRateLimiter
  /**
   * frp-client-CA anchor DER(s). When supplied, the presented current HOST cert is chain- and
   * expiry-validated against these before its identity is trusted (defense in depth). Production
   * wiring MUST supply them; omitted only by legacy callers/tests that inject an already-trusted cert.
   */
  readonly hostCaAnchorsDer?: readonly Uint8Array[]
  /** device-CA anchor DER(s) — same role for the DEVICE renew path. */
  readonly deviceCaAnchorsDer?: readonly Uint8Array[]
  /**
   * Window after `notAfter` in which a presented leaf may still authenticate its own re-issuance.
   * Defaults to `DEFAULT_EXPIRED_RENEW_GRACE_MS`; 0 restores the strict fail-closed behaviour.
   */
  readonly expiredRenewGraceMs?: number
}

/** Map any thrown error to a uniform HTTP reject — never leak which internal check failed. */
function sendError(reply: FastifyReply, err: unknown): void {
  if (err instanceof RenewRejectError) {
    void reply.code(err.status).send({ error: 'rejected' })
    return
  }
  if (err instanceof RenewRateLimitError) {
    void reply.code(429).send({ error: 'rate_limited' })
    return
  }
  // LeafSignError / DeviceLeafSignError / ZodError / decode failures / anything else → uniform 400.
  void reply.code(400).send({ error: 'rejected' })
}

export function buildRenewRouter(deps: RenewDeps): FastifyPluginAsync {
  const presentedCert = deps.presentedCert ?? headerPresentedCert()
  const rateLimiter = deps.rateLimiter ?? createRenewRateLimiter()
  // `/renew` stays STRICT (0): the mTLS terminator would never forward an expired cert to it anyway.
  // The grace belongs to `/recover`, the route built for exactly that case.
  const recoverGraceMs = deps.expiredRenewGraceMs ?? DEFAULT_EXPIRED_RENEW_GRACE_MS

  return async (app) => {
    app.post('/renew', async (req, reply) => {
      try {
        const der = presentedCert.presentedCertDer(req)
        if (der === null) throw new RenewRejectError(401)
        const identity = parsePresentedCertIdentity(
          der,
          'host',
          deps.hostCaAnchorsDer
            ? { caAnchorsDer: deps.hostCaAnchorsDer, nowMs: Date.now(), expiredGraceMs: 0 }
            : undefined,
        )
        rateLimiter.check(`host:${identity.accountId}:${identity.id}`)

        // Identity is the SUBDOMAIN from the cert — resolve the host the registry actually holds for it.
        // A revoked, unknown, or account-inconsistent binding is forbidden (deny-by-default). 403.
        const host = await deps.hosts.getHostBySubdomain(identity.id)
        if (host === null || host.status === 'revoked' || host.accountId !== identity.accountId) {
          throw new RenewRejectError(403)
        }

        const body = RenewBodySchema.parse(req.body)
        // Pass the CURRENT cert's key as the subject key → the delegated gate enforces CSR key ==
        // current cert key (SAME-KEY, no swap) AND registered key == current cert key; it stamps
        // host.subdomain (SAME subdomain — the body cannot smuggle a different one).
        const leaf = await deps.renewer.renewHostLeaf(host.hostId, identity.publicKeySpki, decodeCsrWire(body.csr))
        await reply.code(201).send({
          cert: bytesToBase64(leaf.cert),
          caChain: leaf.caChain.map((c) => bytesToBase64(c)),
          notAfter: leaf.notAfter.toISOString(),
        })
      } catch (err) {
        sendError(reply, err)
      }
    })

    /**
     * Expired-leaf recovery. The lapsed cert arrives in the BODY because no TLS terminator will
     * forward an expired client certificate (nginx `optional` → bare 400; `optional_no_ca` tolerates
     * only chain errors, never `X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED`). That makes this route the SOLE
     * verifier, so it runs the identical trust pipeline as `/renew` — real X.509 path validation to
     * the frp-client-CA anchors, SPIFFE parse, `notBefore`, registry `active` + account match — and
     * differs ONLY in allowing a bounded overrun on `notAfter`.
     *
     * Possession of the private key is still proven: the CSR is self-signed by it, and the host
     * signer's delegated gate enforces CSR PoP plus `CSR key == registered key`. A replayed cert
     * without the key therefore yields, at most, a certificate the attacker cannot authenticate with.
     * The header channel is deliberately IGNORED here — on this route only the body speaks.
     */
    app.post('/recover', async (req, reply) => {
      try {
        const body = RecoverBodySchema.parse(req.body)
        const der = certWireToDer(body.cert)
        if (der === null) throw new RenewRejectError(401)
        const identity = parsePresentedCertIdentity(
          der,
          'host',
          deps.hostCaAnchorsDer
            ? {
                caAnchorsDer: deps.hostCaAnchorsDer,
                nowMs: Date.now(),
                expiredGraceMs: recoverGraceMs,
              }
            : undefined,
        )
        rateLimiter.check(`recover:${identity.accountId}:${identity.id}`)

        const host = await deps.hosts.getHostBySubdomain(identity.id)
        if (host === null || host.status === 'revoked' || host.accountId !== identity.accountId) {
          throw new RenewRejectError(403)
        }

        const leaf = await deps.renewer.renewHostLeaf(
          host.hostId,
          identity.publicKeySpki,
          decodeCsrWire(body.csr),
        )
        await reply.code(201).send({
          cert: bytesToBase64(leaf.cert),
          caChain: leaf.caChain.map((c) => bytesToBase64(c)),
          notAfter: leaf.notAfter.toISOString(),
        })
      } catch (err) {
        sendError(reply, err)
      }
    })

    app.post('/device/:id/renew', async (req, reply) => {
      try {
        const der = presentedCert.presentedCertDer(req)
        if (der === null) throw new RenewRejectError(401)
        const identity = parsePresentedCertIdentity(
          der,
          'device',
          deps.deviceCaAnchorsDer
            ? { caAnchorsDer: deps.deviceCaAnchorsDer, nowMs: Date.now(), expiredGraceMs: 0 }
            : undefined,
        )
        const id = (req.params as { id: string }).id
        rateLimiter.check(`device:${identity.id}`)

        // The registry record for :id is the identity source of truth. Require it active AND that the
        // presented cert genuinely belongs to it: same account, same deviceId as the path, same key.
        const record = await deps.devices.getDevice(id)
        if (
          record === null ||
          record.status === 'revoked' ||
          record.accountId !== identity.accountId ||
          identity.id !== id ||
          !timingSafeEqualBytes(record.ecPubkeySpki, identity.publicKeySpki)
        ) {
          throw new RenewRejectError(403)
        }

        const body = RenewBodySchema.parse(req.body)
        // The delegated gate re-checks CSR key == record.ecPubkeySpki (== current cert key, verified
        // above) → SAME-KEY; it stamps record.subdomainScope (SAME scope — no smuggling).
        const leaf = await deps.renewer.renewDeviceLeaf(id, decodeCsrWire(body.csr))
        await reply.code(201).send({
          cert: bytesToBase64(leaf.cert),
          caChain: leaf.caChain.map((c) => bytesToBase64(c)),
          notAfter: leaf.notAfter.toISOString(),
        })
      } catch (err) {
        sendError(reply, err)
      }
    })
  }
}