/*
 * A3 / FIX C-native-3 — the SINGLE load-bearing tenant-isolation control.
 *
 * Runs INSIDE nginx as njs (an ECMAScript subset). `js_set $cert_sub certsub.getCertSub` exposes the
 * leftmost dNSName SAN label of the (already CA-verified) client certificate to an nginx `map`, which
 * compares it against the requested `$ssl_server_name` and `return 403`s on mismatch. A cert stamped
 * `dNSName alice.terminal.yaojia.wang` may ONLY reach the `alice.*` subdomain; a cert for tenant A
 * presented to tenant B's host is denied. This binding runs AFTER `ssl_verify_client` — by the time
 * this code sees the cert, nginx has already proven it was signed by the device-CA.
 *
 * DESIGN: `extractLeftmostDnsLabel` is a PURE function using ONLY APIs common to njs AND Node, so the
 * SAME source is unit-tested under Node/vitest (control-plane/test/getcertsub.test.ts against real
 * A1-minted P-256 leaves) and runs unchanged under njs. No `Buffer`, no `atob`, no typed-array-only
 * APIs: base64 decode and X.509/ASN.1 (DER) walking are hand-rolled over plain arrays of byte numbers.
 *
 * FAIL-CLOSED: ANY malformed input, missing SAN, missing dNSName, non-hostname bytes, or truncated DER
 * returns '' (empty). An empty `$cert_sub` can never satisfy the map regex `^(?<s>[^:]+):(?P=s)\.`
 * (which requires a non-empty label), so an empty result always DENIES. Never throws; never allows on
 * doubt. Conservative by construction — this is the one control between tenants.
 */

/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* PEM → base64 body                                                          */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */

/**
 * Extract the base64 body between the FIRST `-----BEGIN ... CERTIFICATE-----` header and the next
 * `-----END`. We anchor on `CERTIFICATE-----` (the tail of the BEGIN line) so the header letters
 * (B,E,G,I,N,C — all valid base64 chars) can never leak into the decoded body. '' on absence.
 */
function pemBody(pem) {
  var marker = 'CERTIFICATE-----'
  var b = pem.indexOf(marker)
  if (b < 0) return ''
  b += marker.length
  var e = pem.indexOf('-----END', b)
  if (e < 0) return ''
  return pem.substring(b, e)
}

/** Map one base64 alphabet char code to its 6-bit value; -1 for anything else (whitespace, '=', …). */
function b64Val(c) {
  if (c >= 65 && c <= 90) return c - 65 // A-Z → 0..25
  if (c >= 97 && c <= 122) return c - 71 // a-z → 26..51
  if (c >= 48 && c <= 57) return c + 4 // 0-9 → 52..61
  if (c === 43) return 62 // '+'
  if (c === 47) return 63 // '/'
  return -1
}

/**
 * Decode base64 text to a plain array of byte numbers. Non-alphabet characters (newlines, the TAB that
 * nginx `$ssl_client_cert` prepends to continuation lines, spaces, '=' padding) are skipped. The bit
 * accumulator is masked to 24 bits every step so it never grows past double precision.
 */
function base64ToBytes(s) {
  var out = []
  var buffer = 0
  var bits = 0
  for (var i = 0; i < s.length; i++) {
    var v = b64Val(s.charCodeAt(i))
    if (v < 0) continue
    buffer = ((buffer << 6) | v) & 0xffffff
    bits += 6
    if (bits >= 8) {
      bits -= 8
      out.push((buffer >> bits) & 0xff)
    }
  }
  return out
}

/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* Minimal DER (definite-length) reader                                       */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */

/** Read a DER length starting at `pos`. Returns { len, next } or null (indefinite / overlong / OOB). */
function readLen(bytes, pos) {
  var first = bytes[pos]
  if (first === undefined) return null
  if (first < 0x80) return { len: first, next: pos + 1 }
  var numBytes = first & 0x7f
  if (numBytes === 0 || numBytes > 4) return null // 0 = indefinite (illegal in DER); >4 = absurd
  var len = 0
  for (var i = 0; i < numBytes; i++) {
    var b = bytes[pos + 1 + i]
    if (b === undefined) return null
    len = len * 256 + b
  }
  return { len: len, next: pos + 1 + numBytes }
}

/**
 * Read one TLV at `pos`, bounded by `parentEnd` (the contentEnd of the immediate container; callers
 * pass it so a child can never claim to extend past its parent even while still fitting the overall
 * buffer — a crafted nested-length-inconsistent cert must not let the walk read sibling/trailing bytes
 * as a child's content). `parentEnd` defaults to the total buffer length for top-level reads. Returns
 * { tag, contentStart, contentEnd, next } or null on any inconsistency (out of bounds, high-tag-number
 * form, length overrun past the parent OR the buffer). Single-byte tags only — every tag this walk
 * cares about (SEQUENCE 0x30, [3] 0xA3, OID 0x06, BOOLEAN 0x01, OCTET STRING 0x04, dNSName 0x82) is
 * single-byte, so a high-tag-number tag is treated as malformed (fail-closed).
 */
function readTlv(bytes, pos, parentEnd) {
  var limit = parentEnd === undefined ? bytes.length : parentEnd
  if (limit > bytes.length) limit = bytes.length // never trust a parent bound wider than the buffer
  if (pos < 0 || pos >= limit) return null
  var tag = bytes[pos]
  if ((tag & 0x1f) === 0x1f) return null // high-tag-number form — unexpected → fail-closed
  var l = readLen(bytes, pos + 1)
  if (l === null) return null
  var contentStart = l.next
  var contentEnd = contentStart + l.len
  if (contentEnd > limit) return null // overruns the parent container (or buffer) → fail-closed
  return { tag: tag, contentStart: contentStart, contentEnd: contentEnd, next: contentEnd }
}

/** True iff this OID TLV's content is exactly `55 1d 11` = OID 2.5.29.17 (subjectAltName). */
function isSanOid(der, oid) {
  if (oid.contentEnd - oid.contentStart !== 3) return false
  return (
    der[oid.contentStart] === 0x55 && der[oid.contentStart + 1] === 0x1d && der[oid.contentStart + 2] === 0x11
  )
}

/** Valid hostname byte? [0-9A-Za-z.-] only — anything else rejects the whole label (fail-closed). */
function isHostByte(c) {
  return (
    (c >= 0x30 && c <= 0x39) || // 0-9
    (c >= 0x41 && c <= 0x5a) || // A-Z
    (c >= 0x61 && c <= 0x7a) || // a-z
    c === 0x2d || // '-'
    c === 0x2e // '.'
  )
}

/** Decode the dNSName value bytes to a hostname string, or '' if any byte is outside [0-9A-Za-z.-]. */
function hostString(der, start, end) {
  var s = ''
  for (var i = start; i < end; i++) {
    var c = der[i]
    if (!isHostByte(c)) return ''
    s += String.fromCharCode(c)
  }
  return s
}

/**
 * Walk the certificate DER structurally to the SubjectAlternativeName extension and return the FIRST
 * dNSName value. Structure:
 *   Certificate ::= SEQUENCE { tbsCertificate SEQUENCE { ..., extensions [3] EXPLICIT }, ... }
 *   Extensions  ::= SEQUENCE OF Extension { extnID OID, critical BOOLEAN OPTIONAL, extnValue OCTET STRING }
 *   extnValue (for SAN) = GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE OF GeneralName; dNSName is [2] IA5String (tag 0x82)
 * Returns '' on any structural deviation, missing SAN, or SAN-without-dNSName.
 */
function firstDnsSan(der) {
  var cert = readTlv(der, 0)
  if (cert === null || cert.tag !== 0x30) return ''
  var tbs = readTlv(der, cert.contentStart, cert.contentEnd)
  if (tbs === null || tbs.tag !== 0x30) return ''

  // Walk the DIRECT children of TBSCertificate for the [3] (0xA3) explicit extensions container.
  var pos = tbs.contentStart
  var extsContainer = null
  while (pos < tbs.contentEnd) {
    var child = readTlv(der, pos, tbs.contentEnd)
    if (child === null) return ''
    if (child.tag === 0xa3) {
      extsContainer = child
      break
    }
    pos = child.next
  }
  if (extsContainer === null) return '' // no extensions → no SAN

  var exts = readTlv(der, extsContainer.contentStart, extsContainer.contentEnd)
  if (exts === null || exts.tag !== 0x30) return ''

  // Iterate each Extension looking for the SAN OID.
  var epos = exts.contentStart
  while (epos < exts.contentEnd) {
    var ext = readTlv(der, epos, exts.contentEnd)
    if (ext === null || ext.tag !== 0x30) return ''
    var oid = readTlv(der, ext.contentStart, ext.contentEnd)
    if (oid === null || oid.tag !== 0x06) {
      epos = ext.next
      continue
    }
    if (isSanOid(der, oid)) {
      // Skip an optional BOOLEAN `critical`, then require the OCTET STRING `extnValue` — both bounded
      // to THIS Extension's content so a lying extnValue length can't reach into a sibling extension.
      var vpos = oid.next
      var val = readTlv(der, vpos, ext.contentEnd)
      if (val !== null && val.tag === 0x01) {
        vpos = val.next
        val = readTlv(der, vpos, ext.contentEnd)
      }
      if (val === null || val.tag !== 0x04) return ''
      // The GeneralNames SEQUENCE and every GeneralName are bounded to the OCTET STRING's content:
      // a GeneralNames length that overruns extnValue (but still fits the buffer) must NOT be read.
      var gnames = readTlv(der, val.contentStart, val.contentEnd)
      if (gnames === null || gnames.tag !== 0x30) return ''
      var gpos = gnames.contentStart
      while (gpos < gnames.contentEnd) {
        var gn = readTlv(der, gpos, gnames.contentEnd)
        if (gn === null) return ''
        if (gn.tag === 0x82) return hostString(der, gn.contentStart, gn.contentEnd) // dNSName [2]
        gpos = gn.next
      }
      return '' // SAN present but carries no dNSName (e.g. URI-only)
    }
    epos = ext.next
  }
  return '' // no SAN extension
}

/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* Public surface                                                             */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */

/**
 * Decode a PEM client certificate and return the LEFTMOST label of its FIRST dNSName SAN
 * (e.g. 'alice.terminal.yaojia.wang' → 'alice'). '' on ANY failure (fail-closed → the map denies).
 */
function extractLeftmostDnsLabel(pemClientCert) {
  if (!pemClientCert || typeof pemClientCert !== 'string') return ''
  var body = pemBody(pemClientCert)
  if (body === '') return ''
  var der = base64ToBytes(body)
  if (der.length === 0) return ''
  var dns = firstDnsSan(der)
  if (dns === '') return ''
  var dot = dns.indexOf('.')
  return dot < 0 ? dns : dns.substring(0, dot)
}

/** njs entrypoint referenced by `js_set $cert_sub certsub.getCertSub`. */
function getCertSub(r) {
  return extractLeftmostDnsLabel(r.variables.ssl_client_cert || '')
}

export default { getCertSub: getCertSub, extractLeftmostDnsLabel: extractLeftmostDnsLabel }