import ClientTLS import Foundation import WireProtocol /// T-iOS-15 · Production `HTTPTransport` (the WireProtocol seam's doc reserves /// the URLSession wrapper for the production side; no package owns it, so the /// assembly layer provides it). Deliberately logic-free: `APIClient` builds /// every request — including the Origin-iff-G rule (plan §3.4 铁律) — and this /// type only performs the exchange. Adding ANY header/URL logic here would /// bypass that single audited point (review CRITICAL). struct URLSessionHTTPTransport: HTTPTransport { private let session: URLSession /// Strong reference to the mTLS delegate. URLSession retains its delegate /// until invalidated, but this ephemeral session is never explicitly /// invalidated, so holding it here documents the ownership and keeps the /// transport a self-contained value. private let tlsDelegate: LazyClientTLSSessionDelegate /// Fixed-identity convenience (snapshot callers / tests): wraps a constant /// provider, so behaviour is identical to capturing the identity directly. init(identity: ClientIdentity? = nil) { self.init(identityProvider: { identity }) } /// C-iOS-2 (MEDIUM no-relaunch fix) · The session's mTLS delegate resolves /// the device identity LAZILY, per client-certificate challenge, from /// `identityProvider`. A `ClientCertificate` challenge from a tunneled host /// is thus answered with whatever cert is installed AT CHALLENGE TIME — so a /// certificate imported mid-run is presented on the NEXT TLS handshake /// without an app relaunch (a snapshot captured here would stay stale). The /// session itself stays a single long-lived value (no per-request churn). /// Local http/https hosts never issue that challenge, so the provider is /// never even consulted for them (and a `nil` result is inert regardless). /// /// EPHEMERAL, not `.shared` (T-iOS-19 finding): RO GET bodies include /// `/live-sessions/:id/preview` — raw terminal ring-buffer bytes that may /// contain printed secrets — and `.shared`'s default URLCache writes /// responses to disk. Ephemeral keeps them memory-only, matching the WS /// transport and the privacy-shade posture. init(identityProvider: @escaping @Sendable () -> ClientIdentity?) { let delegate = LazyClientTLSSessionDelegate(identityProvider: identityProvider) self.tlsDelegate = delegate self.session = URLSession( configuration: .ephemeral, delegate: delegate, delegateQueue: nil ) } func send(_ request: URLRequest) async throws -> (Data, HTTPURLResponse) { let (data, response) = try await session.data(for: request) guard let httpResponse = response as? HTTPURLResponse else { // http(s)-only endpoints (HostEndpoint validates) always produce // an HTTPURLResponse; anything else is a transport-level anomaly. throw URLError(.badServerResponse) } return (data, httpResponse) } } /// C-iOS-2 (MEDIUM no-relaunch fix) · Session-level mTLS delegate that resolves /// the device identity FRESH per client-certificate challenge — the App-layer /// twin of ClientTLS's fixed-identity `ClientTLSSessionDelegate` (which captures /// the identity once). The provider is only consulted for a `ClientCertificate` /// challenge, so a `ServerTrust` challenge never triggers a keychain read; the /// pure decision itself is delegated to the shared `MutualTLSChallengeResponder` /// (single truth table, unit-tested in ClientTLS). /// /// `@unchecked Sendable`: URLSession retains its delegate and invokes it from /// arbitrary queues; every stored field is an immutable `let` over a `@Sendable` /// value (the provider is `@Sendable`, the responder is stateless). private final class LazyClientTLSSessionDelegate: NSObject, URLSessionDelegate, @unchecked Sendable { private let identityProvider: @Sendable () -> ClientIdentity? private let responder = MutualTLSChallengeResponder() init(identityProvider: @escaping @Sendable () -> ClientIdentity?) { self.identityProvider = identityProvider super.init() } func urlSession( _ session: URLSession, didReceive challenge: URLAuthenticationChallenge, completionHandler: @escaping (URLSession.AuthChallengeDisposition, URLCredential?) -> Void ) { // Only a client-certificate challenge needs the identity; resolving it // for a server-trust challenge would do a needless keychain read/import // on every HTTPS handshake. let isClientCert = challenge.protectionSpace.authenticationMethod == NSURLAuthenticationMethodClientCertificate let identity = isClientCert ? identityProvider() : nil let resolution = responder.resolve(challenge, identity: identity) completionHandler(resolution.disposition, resolution.credential) } }