2af57e6686
Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.
Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay: native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent: host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e: browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth: Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web: browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering
Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.
NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
95 lines
2.7 KiB
TypeScript
95 lines
2.7 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest'
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import { buildAuditEvent, audit } from '../src/audit/log.js'
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import { assertZeroPayload, ZeroPayloadViolation } from '../src/audit/redact.js'
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import type { AuditEvent, AuditSink } from '../src/types.js'
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import { principal, fakeAuditSink } from './_helpers.js'
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const NOW = 1_700_000_000
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describe('audit log (INV10)', () => {
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it('builds a well-formed attach allow event and appends it', async () => {
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const sink = fakeAuditSink()
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const e = buildAuditEvent({
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action: 'attach',
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principal: principal('acct-A'),
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hostId: 'host-1',
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sessionId: null,
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jti: 'jti-1',
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outcome: 'allow',
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reason: 'ok',
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remoteAddrHash: 'hash',
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now: NOW,
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})
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await audit(sink, e)
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expect(sink.events).toHaveLength(1)
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expect(sink.events[0]!.action).toBe('attach')
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expect(sink.events[0]!.accountId).toBe('acct-A')
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})
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it('records a deny event with a reason', () => {
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const e = buildAuditEvent({
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action: 'cross-tenant-attempt',
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principal: null,
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hostId: 'host-B',
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sessionId: null,
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jti: null,
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outcome: 'deny',
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reason: 'cross_tenant',
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remoteAddrHash: 'hash',
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now: NOW,
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})
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expect(e.outcome).toBe('deny')
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expect(e.reason).toBe('cross_tenant')
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expect(e.principalId).toBe('')
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})
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it('throws (zero-payload guard) when a field contains ESC bytes', () => {
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const e: AuditEvent = {
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ts: new Date(NOW * 1000).toISOString(),
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action: 'attach',
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principalId: 'p',
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accountId: 'a',
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hostId: null,
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sessionId: null,
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jti: null,
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outcome: 'allow',
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reason: 'output:' + String.fromCharCode(0x1b) + '[31mred',
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remoteAddrHash: 'h',
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}
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expect(() => assertZeroPayload(e)).toThrow(ZeroPayloadViolation)
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})
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it('throws when a field exceeds the metadata length cap', () => {
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const e: AuditEvent = {
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ts: new Date(NOW * 1000).toISOString(),
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action: 'attach',
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principalId: 'p',
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accountId: 'a',
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hostId: null,
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sessionId: null,
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jti: null,
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outcome: 'allow',
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reason: 'x'.repeat(300),
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remoteAddrHash: 'h',
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}
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expect(() => assertZeroPayload(e)).toThrow(ZeroPayloadViolation)
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})
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it('audit() refuses to append a payload-bearing event', async () => {
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const bad: AuditEvent = {
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ts: new Date(NOW * 1000).toISOString(),
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action: 'attach',
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principalId: 'p',
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accountId: 'a',
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hostId: ']0;title',
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sessionId: null,
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jti: null,
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outcome: 'allow',
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reason: 'ok',
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remoteAddrHash: 'h',
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}
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const sink: AuditSink = { append: async () => undefined }
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await expect(audit(sink, bad)).rejects.toThrow(ZeroPayloadViolation)
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})
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})
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