Files
Yaojia Wang 2af57e6686 feat(relay): rendezvous-relay service — 7 packages + plans (contracts/transport/agent/control-plane/e2e/auth/web)
Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.

Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
  capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay:   native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent:        host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e:    browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth:   Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web:    browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering

Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.

NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
2026-07-02 06:10:16 +02:00

74 lines
3.3 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* T11 · Graceful drain + GOAWAY (INV7/INV12). GOAWAY on streamId 0 to every (or one) tunnel,
* then teardown. The grace window is REASON-DIFFERENTIATED (Finding-2):
* effectiveGraceMs = (reason === revoked) ? 0 : inFlightGraceMs
* `revoked` is a SECURITY action against a compromised host/device — it forces immediate teardown
* (RST/close now, deregister now) regardless of any caller-supplied grace, so INV12's "its live
* tunnel drops within seconds" holds even when operator-drain grace is tuned to tens of seconds.
* `operatorDrain`/`shutdown` keep a grace window purely for clean migration.
*/
import type { AgentTunnel, RouteRegistrar } from './agent-listener.js'
/** Drain reason ⇄ §4.1 GOAWAY wire code (frozen in relay-contracts as GOAWAY_REASON_TO_CODE). */
export const DRAIN_REASON = { operatorDrain: 1, revoked: 2, shutdown: 3 } as const
export type DrainReason = (typeof DRAIN_REASON)[keyof typeof DRAIN_REASON]
export interface DrainDeps {
tunnels(): ReadonlyMap<string, AgentTunnel>
registrar: RouteRegistrar
reason: DrainReason
inFlightGraceMs: number
// Injected timer for the grace window (default global setTimeout); testability seam.
setTimeoutFn?: (fn: () => void, ms: number) => unknown
}
export interface DrainHostDeps extends DrainDeps {
// single-host target resolved by drainHost's first arg
}
function effectiveGrace(reason: DrainReason, inFlightGraceMs: number): number {
return reason === DRAIN_REASON.revoked ? 0 : Math.max(0, inFlightGraceMs)
}
async function tearDownTunnel(t: AgentTunnel, registrar: RouteRegistrar): Promise<void> {
t.closeTunnel() // socket close (agent side sees the streams die)
await registrar.deregister(t.hostId) // ingress stops routing to this host on this node
}
/** GOAWAY then teardown one tunnel, honoring the reason-differentiated grace. */
function drainOne(
t: AgentTunnel,
reason: DrainReason,
inFlightGraceMs: number,
registrar: RouteRegistrar,
setTimeoutFn: (fn: () => void, ms: number) => unknown,
): Promise<void> {
t.session.drain(0, reason) // §4.1 GOAWAY on streamId 0; refuses new streams thereafter
const grace = effectiveGrace(reason, inFlightGraceMs)
if (grace === 0) {
return tearDownTunnel(t, registrar) // immediate (revoked, or zero-grace operator drain)
}
setTimeoutFn(() => {
void tearDownTunnel(t, registrar)
}, grace)
return Promise.resolve() // grace scheduled; drain initiated
}
/** Drain EVERY tunnel on the node (operator drain / shutdown / node-wide revocation). */
export async function drainNode(deps: DrainDeps): Promise<void> {
const setTimeoutFn = deps.setTimeoutFn ?? ((fn, ms) => setTimeout(fn, ms))
await Promise.all(
[...deps.tunnels().values()].map((t) =>
drainOne(t, deps.reason, deps.inFlightGraceMs, deps.registrar, setTimeoutFn),
),
)
}
/** Drain exactly ONE host, leaving siblings running (whole-host revocation / operator drain, INV12). */
export async function drainHost(hostId: string, deps: DrainHostDeps): Promise<void> {
const setTimeoutFn = deps.setTimeoutFn ?? ((fn, ms) => setTimeout(fn, ms))
const t = deps.tunnels().get(hostId)
if (t === undefined) return // no-op: already gone (deny-by-default, never a broader kill)
await drainOne(t, deps.reason, deps.inFlightGraceMs, deps.registrar, setTimeoutFn)
}