2af57e6686
Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.
Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay: native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent: host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e: browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth: Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web: browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering
Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.
NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
82 lines
3.2 KiB
TypeScript
82 lines
3.2 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* T1 · Data-plane config — env → frozen DataPlaneConfig (INV9 fail-fast, no secret logged).
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*
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* Startup MUST fail if TLS server material, the AGENT_CA_CERT_PATH mTLS trust-anchor, or
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* BASE_DOMAIN is absent (a missing CA would silently degrade "mTLS" to accept-any-cert,
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* Finding-4). Zod validates at the boundary; the returned object is frozen (immutable).
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*/
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import { z } from 'zod'
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const MAX_FRAME_BYTES_DEFAULT = 1024 * 1024 // 1 MiB (§4.1 payloadLen ceiling)
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const INITIAL_WINDOW_BYTES_DEFAULT = 256 * 1024 // 256 KiB (§4.1 credit window)
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const HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_MS_DEFAULT = 15_000 // §4.1: PING every 15s
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const ROUTE_TTL_MS_DEFAULT = 45_000 // Redis route:{host_id} TTL
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const BIND_HOST_DEFAULT = '0.0.0.0'
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const BIND_PORT_DEFAULT = 8443
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const AGENT_BIND_PORT_DEFAULT = 8444
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export interface DataPlaneConfig {
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readonly baseDomain: string
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readonly bindHost: string
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readonly bindPort: number
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readonly agentBindPort: number
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readonly tlsCertPath: string
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readonly tlsKeyPath: string
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readonly agentCaCertPath: string
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readonly agentCaChainPath: string
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readonly relayNodeId: string
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readonly maxFrameBytes: number
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readonly initialWindowBytes: number
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readonly heartbeatIntervalMs: number
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readonly routeTtlMs: number
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}
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const requiredPath = z.string().min(1)
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const port = z.coerce.number().int().gt(0).max(65535)
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const positiveInt = z.coerce.number().int().positive()
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const ConfigSchema = z.object({
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baseDomain: z.string().min(1),
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bindHost: z.string().min(1).default(BIND_HOST_DEFAULT),
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bindPort: port.default(BIND_PORT_DEFAULT),
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agentBindPort: port.default(AGENT_BIND_PORT_DEFAULT),
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tlsCertPath: requiredPath,
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tlsKeyPath: requiredPath,
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agentCaCertPath: requiredPath,
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agentCaChainPath: requiredPath,
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relayNodeId: z.string().min(1),
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maxFrameBytes: positiveInt.default(MAX_FRAME_BYTES_DEFAULT),
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initialWindowBytes: positiveInt.default(INITIAL_WINDOW_BYTES_DEFAULT),
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heartbeatIntervalMs: positiveInt.default(HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_MS_DEFAULT),
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routeTtlMs: positiveInt.default(ROUTE_TTL_MS_DEFAULT),
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})
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/**
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* Load + validate the data-plane config from `env`. Throws a clear, secret-free error
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* (fail-fast, INV9) when a required key is missing or a numeric key is non-numeric.
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* `agentCaChainPath` falls back to `agentCaCertPath` when unset (single-tier CA).
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*/
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export function loadDataPlaneConfig(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): DataPlaneConfig {
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const parsed = ConfigSchema.safeParse({
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baseDomain: env.BASE_DOMAIN,
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bindHost: env.BIND_HOST,
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bindPort: env.BIND_PORT,
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agentBindPort: env.AGENT_BIND_PORT,
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tlsCertPath: env.TLS_CERT_PATH,
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tlsKeyPath: env.TLS_KEY_PATH,
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agentCaCertPath: env.AGENT_CA_CERT_PATH,
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agentCaChainPath: env.AGENT_CA_CHAIN_PATH ?? env.AGENT_CA_CERT_PATH,
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relayNodeId: env.RELAY_NODE_ID,
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maxFrameBytes: env.MAX_FRAME_BYTES,
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initialWindowBytes: env.INITIAL_WINDOW_BYTES,
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heartbeatIntervalMs: env.HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_MS,
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routeTtlMs: env.ROUTE_TTL_MS,
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})
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if (!parsed.success) {
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// Report only WHICH keys are wrong — never echo values (INV9: no secret in logs).
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const fields = parsed.error.issues.map((i) => i.path.join('.')).join(', ')
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throw new Error(`invalid data-plane config: ${fields}`)
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}
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return Object.freeze(parsed.data)
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}
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