Files
Yaojia Wang 2af57e6686 feat(relay): rendezvous-relay service — 7 packages + plans (contracts/transport/agent/control-plane/e2e/auth/web)
Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.

Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
  capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay:   native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent:        host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e:    browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth:   Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web:    browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering

Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.

NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
2026-07-02 06:10:16 +02:00

50 lines
2.2 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* T12 · frp server-plugin HTTP shim (v0.8 MVP stepping-stone). A THIN adapter implementing frp's
* `Login` / `NewProxy` / `NewUserConn` server-plugin hooks by DELEGATING the decision to P3's
* control-plane authz endpoint. NO tenancy logic lives here — it forwards and enforces the
* deny-by-default answer. Malformed hook bodies are rejected at the Zod boundary.
*
* Retirement (v0.9): frp login plugin → T8 upgrade gate; frp subdomain vhost → T7 router;
* frp yamux → the native §4.1 mux. This shim is deleted when the native mux lands.
*/
import { z } from 'zod'
export type FrpOp = 'Login' | 'NewProxy' | 'NewUserConn'
/** frp server-plugin request envelope: `{ version, op, content }` (content shape varies by op). */
const FrpHookRequestSchema = z
.object({
version: z.string().min(1),
op: z.enum(['Login', 'NewProxy', 'NewUserConn']),
content: z.record(z.unknown()),
})
.strict()
export type FrpHookRequest = z.infer<typeof FrpHookRequestSchema>
/** frp plugin response: reject (deny) OR pass-through unchanged. */
export type FrpHookResponse =
| { readonly reject: true; readonly reject_reason: string }
| { readonly reject: false; readonly unchange: true }
/** The control-plane (P3) decision the shim forwards to — it owns ALL tenancy logic. */
export interface ControlPlaneAuthz {
authorize(op: FrpOp, content: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>): Promise<{ allow: boolean }>
}
const REJECT_MALFORMED: FrpHookResponse = { reject: true, reject_reason: 'malformed hook request' }
const REJECT_DENIED: FrpHookResponse = { reject: true, reject_reason: 'denied by control plane' }
const ALLOW: FrpHookResponse = { reject: false, unchange: true }
/**
* Handle one frp server-plugin hook call. Validates the body (deny-by-default on malformed),
* forwards the decision to P3, and maps allow→pass-through / deny→reject. Never decides tenancy.
*/
export async function handleFrpHook(raw: unknown, authz: ControlPlaneAuthz): Promise<FrpHookResponse> {
const parsed = FrpHookRequestSchema.safeParse(raw)
if (!parsed.success) return REJECT_MALFORMED
const { op, content } = parsed.data
const decision = await authz.authorize(op, content)
return decision.allow ? ALLOW : REJECT_DENIED
}