2af57e6686
Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.
Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay: native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent: host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e: browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth: Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web: browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering
Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.
NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
58 lines
2.2 KiB
TypeScript
58 lines
2.2 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, test, expect } from 'vitest'
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import { loadDataPlaneConfig } from '../data-plane/config.js'
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const base = {
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BASE_DOMAIN: 'term.example.com',
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TLS_CERT_PATH: '/etc/relay/cert.pem',
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TLS_KEY_PATH: '/etc/relay/key.pem',
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AGENT_CA_CERT_PATH: '/etc/relay/ca.pem',
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RELAY_NODE_ID: 'node-1',
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} satisfies NodeJS.ProcessEnv
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describe('loadDataPlaneConfig (T1, INV9 fail-fast)', () => {
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test('happy path returns a frozen typed config with defaults applied', () => {
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const cfg = loadDataPlaneConfig(base)
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expect(cfg.baseDomain).toBe('term.example.com')
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expect(cfg.bindHost).toBe('0.0.0.0')
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expect(cfg.maxFrameBytes).toBe(1024 * 1024)
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expect(cfg.initialWindowBytes).toBe(256 * 1024)
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expect(cfg.heartbeatIntervalMs).toBe(15_000)
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expect(cfg.routeTtlMs).toBe(45_000)
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// agentCaChainPath falls back to agentCaCertPath when unset.
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expect(cfg.agentCaChainPath).toBe('/etc/relay/ca.pem')
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expect(Object.isFrozen(cfg)).toBe(true)
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})
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test('throws when BASE_DOMAIN is missing', () => {
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expect(() => loadDataPlaneConfig({ ...base, BASE_DOMAIN: undefined })).toThrow(/baseDomain/)
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})
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test('throws when TLS_CERT_PATH / TLS_KEY_PATH missing (fail-fast)', () => {
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expect(() => loadDataPlaneConfig({ ...base, TLS_CERT_PATH: undefined })).toThrow(/tlsCertPath/)
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expect(() => loadDataPlaneConfig({ ...base, TLS_KEY_PATH: undefined })).toThrow(/tlsKeyPath/)
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})
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test('throws when AGENT_CA_CERT_PATH (mTLS trust-anchor) missing — Finding-4 footgun', () => {
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expect(() => loadDataPlaneConfig({ ...base, AGENT_CA_CERT_PATH: undefined })).toThrow(
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/agentCaCertPath/,
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)
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})
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test('throws on non-numeric MAX_FRAME_BYTES', () => {
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expect(() => loadDataPlaneConfig({ ...base, MAX_FRAME_BYTES: 'not-a-number' })).toThrow(
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/maxFrameBytes/,
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)
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})
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test('error message never echoes secret values (INV9)', () => {
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try {
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loadDataPlaneConfig({ ...base, TLS_KEY_PATH: undefined, MAX_FRAME_BYTES: 'xyz' })
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throw new Error('should have thrown')
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} catch (e) {
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const msg = (e as Error).message
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expect(msg).not.toContain('/etc/relay/key.pem')
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expect(msg).not.toContain('xyz')
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}
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})
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})
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