Correction to the previous commit. Its recovery vhost could not work: nginx
will not forward an expired client certificate in ANY `ssl_verify_client` mode.
`optional` answers a bare `400 The SSL certificate error` before any location
runs, and `optional_no_ca` only tolerates CHAIN failures — see nginx's
`ngx_ssl_verify_error_optional()`, which covers self-signed / unknown-issuer /
unverifiable-leaf and NOT `X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED`. Verified live against
the deployed :8472 server, which rejected the real expired leaf.
So recovery drops mTLS instead of trying to bend it:
- agent: `buildTlsOptions` and the mTLS renew transport go back to being
strictly fail-closed on expiry — the relaxation is gone from the TLS layer
entirely. The rotator now decides per attempt: valid → mTLS `/renew`,
expired-inside-grace → plain `/recover`, expired-beyond-grace → terminal
`onExhausted` with no request issued at all.
- new `recoverCert` POSTs `{cert, csr}` with no client certificate. Possession
of the private key is still proven: the CSR is self-signed by it and the host
signer already enforces CSR PoP plus `CSR key == registered key`, so a
replayed (public) cert without the key yields at most a certificate the
attacker cannot authenticate with.
- control-plane: `/renew` is strict again (grace 0, matching the terminator).
The grace lives on the new `POST /recover`, which reads the cert from the BODY
and ignores the `x-client-cert` header, then runs the identical trust
pipeline: X.509 path validation to the frp-client-CA anchors, SPIFFE parse,
`notBefore` (never graced), registry `active` + account match. Revocation
still bites.
- deploy: no new vhost, no new SNI, no DNS. One `location = /recover` merged
into the existing enroll vhost, documented in
`deploy/nginx/enroll-recover-location.md` with the nginx source citation.
The load-bearing new test is "a self-signed cert with a FORGED SPIFFE SAN is
refused → 401": nginx no longer validates the chain on this path, so that
assertion is what keeps `/recover` from being a cert vending machine.
Verified: agent 289/289, control-plane 290/290, tsc clean on both.
113 lines
3.9 KiB
TypeScript
113 lines
3.9 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
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import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs'
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import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
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import { join } from 'node:path'
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import type { AgentConfig } from '../src/config/agentConfig.js'
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import { generateIdentity } from '../src/keys/identity.js'
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import { openKeystore } from '../src/keys/keystore.js'
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import {
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CertExpiredError,
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NotEnrolledError,
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buildTlsOptions,
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dialRelay,
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type RawTlsWs,
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type TlsWsConstructor,
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} from '../src/transport/dial.js'
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const CFG: AgentConfig = {
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relayUrl: 'wss://relay.example.com/agent',
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enrollUrl: 'https://example.com/enroll',
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stateDir: '/tmp/x',
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localTargetUrl: 'ws://127.0.0.1:3000',
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subdomain: 'host-42',
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hostId: 'h-1',
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}
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function enrolledKs() {
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const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'wta-dial-'))
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const ks = openKeystore(dir)
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ks.saveIdentity(generateIdentity())
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ks.saveCert('CERTPEM', 'CAPEM')
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return { dir, ks }
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}
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const future: () => { validTo: Date } = () => ({ validTo: new Date(Date.now() + 86_400_000) })
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const past: () => { validTo: Date } = () => ({ validTo: new Date(Date.now() - 1000) })
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describe('buildTlsOptions (T12, INV14/INV4)', () => {
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it('wires cert + key + CA and forces rejectUnauthorized true', () => {
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const { dir, ks } = enrolledKs()
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const tls = buildTlsOptions(ks, { certParser: future })
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expect(tls.cert).toBe('CERTPEM')
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expect(tls.ca).toBe('CAPEM')
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expect(tls.key).toContain('PRIVATE KEY') // in-process key PEM
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expect(tls.rejectUnauthorized).toBe(true)
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rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
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})
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it('carries NO bearer/agent token (mTLS is the auth)', () => {
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const { dir, ks } = enrolledKs()
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const tls = buildTlsOptions(ks, { certParser: future })
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expect(JSON.stringify(tls)).not.toMatch(/token|authorization|bearer/i)
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rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
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})
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it('missing cert → NotEnrolledError (fail-fast)', () => {
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const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'wta-dial-'))
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expect(() => buildTlsOptions(openKeystore(dir))).toThrow(NotEnrolledError)
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rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
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})
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it('expired cert → CertExpiredError', () => {
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const { dir, ks } = enrolledKs()
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expect(() => buildTlsOptions(ks, { certParser: past })).toThrow(CertExpiredError)
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rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
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})
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})
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describe('dialRelay (T12)', () => {
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it('constructs the wss client with the TLS options and resolves on open', async () => {
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const { dir, ks } = enrolledKs()
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let capturedUrl = ''
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let capturedOpts: unknown
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class FakeTlsWs implements RawTlsWs {
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constructor(url: string, opts: unknown) {
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capturedUrl = url
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capturedOpts = opts
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queueMicrotask(() => this.openCb?.())
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}
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private openCb?: () => void
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send(): void {}
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close(): void {}
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on(): void {}
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once(ev: string, cb: () => void): void {
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if (ev === 'open') this.openCb = cb
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}
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}
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const ws = await dialRelay(CFG, ks, { Ctor: FakeTlsWs as unknown as TlsWsConstructor, certParser: future })
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expect(capturedUrl).toBe('wss://relay.example.com/agent')
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expect((capturedOpts as { rejectUnauthorized: boolean }).rejectUnauthorized).toBe(true)
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expect(ws).toBeDefined()
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rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
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})
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it('rejects when the server errors before open (bad chain / MITM)', async () => {
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const { dir, ks } = enrolledKs()
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class FakeTlsWs implements RawTlsWs {
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private errCb?: (e: unknown) => void
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constructor() {
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queueMicrotask(() => this.errCb?.(new Error('unable to verify leaf signature')))
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}
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send(): void {}
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close(): void {}
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on(): void {}
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once(ev: string, cb: (e: unknown) => void): void {
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if (ev === 'error') this.errCb = cb
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}
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}
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const p = dialRelay(CFG, ks, { Ctor: FakeTlsWs as unknown as TlsWsConstructor, certParser: future })
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await expect(p).rejects.toThrow(/verify/)
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rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
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})
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})
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