Customers install one command / log in once; hardware-generated keys never leave the device; CSRs return certs + subdomain; frpc + base-app run as durable services. No .p12, no manual cert import. Implements the MVP fast-path of docs/PLAN_TUNNEL_AUTOMATION.md. Control-plane / PKI (control-plane/): - ca/x509-assembler.ts: single KMS-signed real X.509 issuance primitive (Ed25519 + P-256) - ca/csr-ec.ts: P-256 PKCS#10 proof-of-possession (verifyCsrPoPEc) + CSR-key routing - ca/frpclient-issue.ts, ca/device-issue.ts: P-256 frp-client + device leaf signers - ca/rotate.ts + api/renew.ts: real-X.509 /renew + /device/:id/renew (mTLS current cert) - registry/devices.ts: device registry + per-account cap/rate-limit - auth/session.ts: device:enroll capability token mint/verify - api/device-enroll.ts: POST /device/enroll (ownership-gated, deny-by-default) - pairing/native-redeem.ts + shared gateAndConsumePairingCode; api/provision.ts native arm - boot/native-ca.ts + main.ts: wire two P-256 CAs + issuers + routers (dev / KMS fail-fast) Contracts: relay-contracts enroll right; relay-auth SPIFFE /device/ arm + spiffeIdFor(kind) Host agent (agent/): - transport/frpcToml.ts; provision/frpcBinary.ts + untar.ts (verify-download + traversal-safe extract) - keys P-256 keygen/CSR/loadIdentity; service two-unit install + BIND_HOST loopback S-GATE - net/loopbackLiteral.ts strict guard; health/probe.ts + transport/frpSupervise.ts; cli pair --install iOS (ios/Packages/ClientTLS): SecureEnclaveKey + CertificateSigningRequest + DeviceEnrollmentClient + Keychain enroll refactor (SecKey/Security.framework end-to-end, avoids the -25300 trap) Isolation (deploy/nginx): njs/getCertSub.js SAN parser + zone-anchored map -> 403 Verified: 758 tests green (control-plane 246, agent 267, relay-auth 133, relay-contracts 85, iOS ClientTLS 27), all tsc clean; real nginx+njs docker 403/200/400; Swift CSR accepted by the real control-plane verifier; frpc extract byte-identical to `tar -xO`. Cross-validation caught + fixed 5 real defects (1 critical, 4 high). Remaining = infra (KMS, nginx deploy, VPS frps, physical iPhone) per PROGRESS_LOG runbook. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
118 lines
4.8 KiB
TypeScript
118 lines
4.8 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* A4 (session subsystem, FIX C-native-1) — the minimal device:enroll token mint/verify + the login
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* stub seam. Proves: a minted token round-trips through relay-auth's REAL §4.3 verifier; a token
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* lacking the 'enroll' right is rejected (403); a wrong audience is rejected (401); an expired token
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* is rejected (401); and the single-tenant login stub resolves a credential → accountId (deny-by-default
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* on a wrong / empty credential).
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*/
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import { describe, test, expect, beforeEach } from 'vitest'
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import { configureVerifyKey } from 'relay-auth'
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import { resetVerifyKeyForTest } from 'relay-auth/src/config/keys.js'
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import { generateEd25519KeyPair } from 'relay-auth/src/crypto/ed25519.js'
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import { signPaseto } from 'relay-auth/src/crypto/paseto.js'
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import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto'
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import {
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mintDeviceEnrollToken,
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verifyDeviceEnrollToken,
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loginToAccountId,
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requireEnrollRight,
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DeviceEnrollAuthError,
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DEVICE_ENROLL_AUD,
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} from '../src/auth/session.js'
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const NOW = 1_700_000_000
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const ACCOUNT_A = '11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111'
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/** 43-char base64url placeholder (satisfies the shared §4.3 verifier's `cnf.jkt` requirement). */
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function jkt(): string {
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return Buffer.from(randomBytes(32)).toString('base64url')
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}
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let signingKey: CryptoKey
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beforeEach(async () => {
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resetVerifyKeyForTest()
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const pair = await generateEd25519KeyPair()
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await configureVerifyKey(pair.publicKey)
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signingKey = pair.privateKey
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})
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describe('A4 device:enroll session token', () => {
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test('mint → verify round-trips and yields the accountId (rights:[enroll])', async () => {
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const raw = await mintDeviceEnrollToken(ACCOUNT_A, { signingKey, now: NOW })
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const { accountId } = await verifyDeviceEnrollToken(raw, { now: NOW + 5 })
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expect(accountId).toBe(ACCOUNT_A)
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})
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test('a token missing the enroll right is rejected (403)', async () => {
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// Mint an otherwise-valid device-enroll-aud token but with rights:['attach'] (no enroll).
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const body = {
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sub: ACCOUNT_A,
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aud: DEVICE_ENROLL_AUD,
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host: 'device-enroll',
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rights: ['attach'],
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iat: NOW,
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exp: NOW + 600,
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jti: 'jti-noenroll',
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cnf: { jkt: jkt() },
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}
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const raw = await signPaseto(body, signingKey)
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await expect(verifyDeviceEnrollToken(raw, { now: NOW + 5 })).rejects.toMatchObject({ status: 403 })
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})
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test('a token with the wrong audience is rejected (401)', async () => {
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const raw = await mintDeviceEnrollToken(ACCOUNT_A, { signingKey, now: NOW, aud: 'not-device-enroll' })
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await expect(verifyDeviceEnrollToken(raw, { now: NOW + 5 })).rejects.toMatchObject({ status: 401 })
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})
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test('an expired token is rejected (401)', async () => {
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const raw = await mintDeviceEnrollToken(ACCOUNT_A, { signingKey, now: NOW, ttlSeconds: 60 })
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await expect(verifyDeviceEnrollToken(raw, { now: NOW + 120 })).rejects.toMatchObject({ status: 401 })
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})
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test('a garbage token is rejected (401), uniform reject', async () => {
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await expect(verifyDeviceEnrollToken('not-a-token', { now: NOW })).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(DeviceEnrollAuthError)
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})
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test('requireEnrollRight throws 403 without enroll, passes with it', () => {
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const base = { sub: ACCOUNT_A, aud: DEVICE_ENROLL_AUD, host: 'x', iat: NOW, exp: NOW + 1, jti: 'j' }
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expect(() => requireEnrollRight({ ...base, rights: ['attach'] })).toThrow(DeviceEnrollAuthError)
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expect(() => requireEnrollRight({ ...base, rights: ['enroll'] })).not.toThrow()
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})
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test('ttl is minutes-scale (separate from the 30–60s connect clamp)', async () => {
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// A 10-minute token must still verify well past the 60s connect clamp horizon.
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const raw = await mintDeviceEnrollToken(ACCOUNT_A, { signingKey, now: NOW })
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const { accountId } = await verifyDeviceEnrollToken(raw, { now: NOW + 5 * 60 })
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expect(accountId).toBe(ACCOUNT_A)
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})
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})
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describe('A4 loginToAccountId stub seam (single-tenant MVP)', () => {
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test('resolves an operator credential → accountId', () => {
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const acct = loginToAccountId('op-secret', { operatorCredential: 'op-secret', accountId: ACCOUNT_A })
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expect(acct).toBe(ACCOUNT_A)
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})
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test('rejects a wrong credential (401)', () => {
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expect(() => loginToAccountId('wrong', { operatorCredential: 'op-secret', accountId: ACCOUNT_A })).toThrow(
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DeviceEnrollAuthError,
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)
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})
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test('rejects an empty credential (401)', () => {
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expect(() => loginToAccountId('', { operatorCredential: 'op-secret', accountId: ACCOUNT_A })).toThrow(
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DeviceEnrollAuthError,
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)
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})
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test('supports an injected resolver seam (real login layer later)', () => {
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const acct = loginToAccountId('pairing-xyz', { resolve: (c) => (c === 'pairing-xyz' ? ACCOUNT_A : null) })
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expect(acct).toBe(ACCOUNT_A)
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})
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test('rejects when not configured (deny-by-default)', () => {
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expect(() => loginToAccountId('anything', {})).toThrow(DeviceEnrollAuthError)
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})
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})
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