Customers install one command / log in once; hardware-generated keys never leave the device; CSRs return certs + subdomain; frpc + base-app run as durable services. No .p12, no manual cert import. Implements the MVP fast-path of docs/PLAN_TUNNEL_AUTOMATION.md. Control-plane / PKI (control-plane/): - ca/x509-assembler.ts: single KMS-signed real X.509 issuance primitive (Ed25519 + P-256) - ca/csr-ec.ts: P-256 PKCS#10 proof-of-possession (verifyCsrPoPEc) + CSR-key routing - ca/frpclient-issue.ts, ca/device-issue.ts: P-256 frp-client + device leaf signers - ca/rotate.ts + api/renew.ts: real-X.509 /renew + /device/:id/renew (mTLS current cert) - registry/devices.ts: device registry + per-account cap/rate-limit - auth/session.ts: device:enroll capability token mint/verify - api/device-enroll.ts: POST /device/enroll (ownership-gated, deny-by-default) - pairing/native-redeem.ts + shared gateAndConsumePairingCode; api/provision.ts native arm - boot/native-ca.ts + main.ts: wire two P-256 CAs + issuers + routers (dev / KMS fail-fast) Contracts: relay-contracts enroll right; relay-auth SPIFFE /device/ arm + spiffeIdFor(kind) Host agent (agent/): - transport/frpcToml.ts; provision/frpcBinary.ts + untar.ts (verify-download + traversal-safe extract) - keys P-256 keygen/CSR/loadIdentity; service two-unit install + BIND_HOST loopback S-GATE - net/loopbackLiteral.ts strict guard; health/probe.ts + transport/frpSupervise.ts; cli pair --install iOS (ios/Packages/ClientTLS): SecureEnclaveKey + CertificateSigningRequest + DeviceEnrollmentClient + Keychain enroll refactor (SecKey/Security.framework end-to-end, avoids the -25300 trap) Isolation (deploy/nginx): njs/getCertSub.js SAN parser + zone-anchored map -> 403 Verified: 758 tests green (control-plane 246, agent 267, relay-auth 133, relay-contracts 85, iOS ClientTLS 27), all tsc clean; real nginx+njs docker 403/200/400; Swift CSR accepted by the real control-plane verifier; frpc extract byte-identical to `tar -xO`. Cross-validation caught + fixed 5 real defects (1 critical, 4 high). Remaining = infra (KMS, nginx deploy, VPS frps, physical iPhone) per PROGRESS_LOG runbook. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
201 lines
8.9 KiB
Swift
201 lines
8.9 KiB
Swift
import Foundation
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import os
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import Security
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/// C-iOS · A P-256 signing key that lives ENTIRELY inside SecKey /
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/// Security.framework — never CryptoKit.
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///
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/// **`[FIX C-native, ClientTLS trap]`** — the enrollment path deliberately avoids
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/// `CryptoKit.SecureEnclave.P256.Signing.PrivateKey` and `SecKeyCreateWithData`
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/// over a Secure-Enclave token: either route mints a key the keychain cannot
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/// later match to a stored certificate, so `SecItemCopyMatching(kSecClassIdentity)`
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/// fails with `errSecItemNotFound (-25300)` and the whole mTLS identity silently
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/// never assembles. Staying on `SecKeyCreateRandomKey` + `SecKeyCreateSignature`
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/// keeps the private key a first-class, permanent keychain resident that the leaf
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/// certificate binds to automatically.
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public protocol P256HardwareKey: Sendable {
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/// The public key in ANSI X9.63 uncompressed form: `0x04 || X || Y`
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/// (65 bytes for P-256). This is exactly what wraps into a SubjectPublicKeyInfo.
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func publicKeyX963() throws -> Data
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/// ECDSA sign `message` over SHA-256, returning the X9.62 DER signature
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/// (`SEQUENCE { r INTEGER, s INTEGER }`) — the exact shape a PKCS#10
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/// `signature` BIT STRING and `verifyCsrPoPEc` expect. The digest is computed
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/// by the algorithm (`.ecdsaSignatureMessageX962SHA256`), so callers pass the
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/// raw message (the DER of `CertificationRequestInfo`), NOT a pre-hash.
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func sign(_ message: Data) throws -> Data
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}
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public enum SecureEnclaveKeyError: Error, Equatable, Sendable {
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/// The Secure Enclave is absent (Simulator) or the app lacks the entitlement.
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/// Carries the underlying `SecKeyCreateRandomKey` failure for diagnostics.
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case secureEnclaveUnavailable(String)
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/// Key generation failed for a reason other than SE-unavailability.
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case keyGenerationFailed(String)
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/// The public key could not be derived from the private key.
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case publicKeyUnavailable
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/// Exporting the public key to X9.63 bytes failed.
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case exportFailed(String)
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/// Signing failed (algorithm unsupported, user-presence denied, …).
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case signatureFailed(String)
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/// A keychain `SecItem*` lookup/delete failed with this status.
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case keychain(OSStatus)
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}
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/// A `SecKey`-backed P-256 key. The wrapped `SecKey` is a Secure-Enclave key in
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/// production (via `SecureEnclaveKeyFactory.generate`) and an in-process software
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/// key on Simulator/tests (via `.generateSoftware`) — both drive the SAME
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/// `SecKeyCreateSignature` path, so the CSR encoder is exercised identically.
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///
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/// `@unchecked Sendable`: `SecKey` is an immutable, thread-safe CoreFoundation
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/// handle once created; this wrapper only ever reads it.
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public final class SecureEnclaveKey: P256HardwareKey, @unchecked Sendable {
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/// The (non-exportable, in production) private key. Never leaves the device.
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private let privateKey: SecKey
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/// Wrap an existing `SecKey`. Public so tests can inject a software P-256 key
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/// created via `SecKeyCreateRandomKey` without the SE token.
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public init(privateKey: SecKey) {
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self.privateKey = privateKey
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}
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public func publicKeyX963() throws -> Data {
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guard let publicKey = SecKeyCopyPublicKey(privateKey) else {
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throw SecureEnclaveKeyError.publicKeyUnavailable
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}
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var error: Unmanaged<CFError>?
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guard let data = SecKeyCopyExternalRepresentation(publicKey, &error) as Data? else {
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throw SecureEnclaveKeyError.exportFailed(Self.describe(error))
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}
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return data
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}
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public func sign(_ message: Data) throws -> Data {
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var error: Unmanaged<CFError>?
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guard
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let signature = SecKeyCreateSignature(
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privateKey,
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.ecdsaSignatureMessageX962SHA256,
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message as CFData,
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&error
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) as Data?
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else {
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throw SecureEnclaveKeyError.signatureFailed(Self.describe(error))
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}
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return signature
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}
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static func describe(_ error: Unmanaged<CFError>?) -> String {
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guard let error else { return "unknown" }
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return String(describing: error.takeRetainedValue())
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}
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}
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/// Creates / loads / deletes the device's P-256 key.
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///
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/// Production generation is **Secure-Enclave, non-exportable, permanent** so the
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/// private key never leaves hardware and survives relaunch as a keychain
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/// resident. `generateSoftware` is the documented **non-device fallback** (the SE
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/// is unavailable on the Simulator and — per plan §3.3 — desktop is explicitly
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/// downgraded to a best-effort OS-keychain key); it is the SAME `SecKey` API
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/// minus the SE token, so the CSR/signature code path is unchanged.
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public enum SecureEnclaveKeyFactory {
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private static let log = Logger(subsystem: "com.yaojia.webterm", category: "se-key")
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/// Generate a NON-EXPORTABLE P-256 key inside the Secure Enclave, marked
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/// permanent + tagged so the keychain can later bind the enrolled leaf to it.
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/// Throws `.secureEnclaveUnavailable` on Simulator / missing entitlement so
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/// callers can fall back to `generateSoftware` for non-device builds.
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public static func generateSecureEnclave(tag: Data) throws -> SecureEnclaveKey {
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try generate(tag: tag, inSecureEnclave: true, permanent: true)
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}
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/// Software P-256 key (NO Secure Enclave token). Simulator / desktop
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/// best-effort / unit tests. `permanent == false` keeps it in-process only.
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public static func generateSoftware(tag: Data? = nil, permanent: Bool = false) throws
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-> SecureEnclaveKey {
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try generate(tag: tag, inSecureEnclave: false, permanent: permanent)
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}
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private static func generate(
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tag: Data?, inSecureEnclave: Bool, permanent: Bool
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) throws -> SecureEnclaveKey {
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var privateKeyAttrs: [String: Any] = [kSecAttrIsPermanent as String: permanent]
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if let tag {
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privateKeyAttrs[kSecAttrApplicationTag as String] = tag
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}
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if inSecureEnclave {
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var accessError: Unmanaged<CFError>?
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guard
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let access = SecAccessControlCreateWithFlags(
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kCFAllocatorDefault,
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kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly,
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.privateKeyUsage,
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&accessError
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)
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else {
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throw SecureEnclaveKeyError.keyGenerationFailed(
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"access control: \(SecureEnclaveKey.describe(accessError))"
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)
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}
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privateKeyAttrs[kSecAttrAccessControl as String] = access
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}
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var attributes: [String: Any] = [
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kSecAttrKeyType as String: kSecAttrKeyTypeECSECPrimeRandom,
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kSecAttrKeySizeInBits as String: 256,
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kSecPrivateKeyAttrs as String: privateKeyAttrs,
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]
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if inSecureEnclave {
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attributes[kSecAttrTokenID as String] = kSecAttrTokenIDSecureEnclave
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}
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var error: Unmanaged<CFError>?
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guard let key = SecKeyCreateRandomKey(attributes as CFDictionary, &error) else {
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let description = SecureEnclaveKey.describe(error)
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if inSecureEnclave {
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log.error(
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"Secure Enclave keygen failed (simulator / no entitlement?): \(description, privacy: .public)"
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)
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throw SecureEnclaveKeyError.secureEnclaveUnavailable(description)
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}
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throw SecureEnclaveKeyError.keyGenerationFailed(description)
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}
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return SecureEnclaveKey(privateKey: key)
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}
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/// Load a previously-generated key (SE or software) by its keychain tag.
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/// `nil` if none exists (the normal pre-enroll state).
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public static func load(tag: Data) throws -> SecureEnclaveKey? {
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let query: [String: Any] = [
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kSecClass as String: kSecClassKey,
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kSecAttrKeyType as String: kSecAttrKeyTypeECSECPrimeRandom,
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kSecAttrApplicationTag as String: tag,
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kSecReturnRef as String: true,
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]
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var result: CFTypeRef?
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let status = SecItemCopyMatching(query as CFDictionary, &result)
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if status == errSecItemNotFound { return nil }
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guard status == errSecSuccess, let value = result else {
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throw SecureEnclaveKeyError.keychain(status)
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}
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// Safe: the query pins kSecClassKey, so a match is always a SecKey.
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let key = value as! SecKey
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return SecureEnclaveKey(privateKey: key)
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}
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/// Delete the device key by tag. Idempotent.
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public static func delete(tag: Data) throws {
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let query: [String: Any] = [
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kSecClass as String: kSecClassKey,
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kSecAttrKeyType as String: kSecAttrKeyTypeECSECPrimeRandom,
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kSecAttrApplicationTag as String: tag,
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]
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let status = SecItemDelete(query as CFDictionary)
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guard status == errSecSuccess || status == errSecItemNotFound else {
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throw SecureEnclaveKeyError.keychain(status)
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}
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}
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}
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