Files
web-terminal/control-plane/src/pairing/issue.ts
Yaojia Wang 2af57e6686 feat(relay): rendezvous-relay service — 7 packages + plans (contracts/transport/agent/control-plane/e2e/auth/web)
Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.

Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
  capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay:   native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent:        host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e:    browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth:   Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web:    browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering

Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.

NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
2026-07-02 06:10:16 +02:00

53 lines
1.9 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* T7 — pairing-code issuance (INDEX §4.5 step 1). Mints a single-use short-TTL code; stores
* `{ code_hash, account_id, expires_at, redeem_attempts:0 }` — the RAW code is never stored
* (INV5). `accountId` comes from the authenticated principal (INV3), never a request field.
*/
import type { PairingCodeRecord } from '../model/records.js'
import type { PairingStore } from '../store/ports.js'
import type { AuditWriter } from '../audit/log.js'
import { noopAuditWriter } from '../audit/log.js'
import { generatePairingCode, formatPairingCode } from './code.js'
import { sha256Hex } from '../util/hash.js'
import { nowIso } from '../util/ids.js'
export interface IssuedPairing {
readonly code: string // display-grouped, returned ONCE
readonly expiresAt: string
}
export interface PairingIssuer {
issuePairingCode(accountId: string): Promise<IssuedPairing>
}
export interface PairingIssuerDeps {
readonly pairing: PairingStore
readonly pairingTtlSec: number
readonly audit?: AuditWriter
readonly actor?: string
}
export function createPairingIssuer(deps: PairingIssuerDeps): PairingIssuer {
const audit = deps.audit ?? noopAuditWriter()
const actor = deps.actor ?? 'system'
return {
async issuePairingCode(accountId) {
const canonical = generatePairingCode()
const codeHash = sha256Hex(canonical) // deterministic hash of a 130-bit input (INV5)
const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + deps.pairingTtlSec * 1000).toISOString()
const record: PairingCodeRecord = { codeHash, accountId, expiresAt, redeemedAt: null }
await deps.pairing.insert(record)
await audit.writeAuditEvent({
action: 'pairing.issue',
principalId: actor,
accountId,
hostId: null,
ts: nowIso(),
meta: { expiresAt },
})
// Raw code returned ONCE, display-grouped; never persisted.
return { code: formatPairingCode(canonical), expiresAt }
},
}
}