Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.
Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay: native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent: host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e: browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth: Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web: browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering
Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.
NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
53 lines
1.9 KiB
TypeScript
53 lines
1.9 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* T7 — pairing-code issuance (INDEX §4.5 step 1). Mints a single-use short-TTL code; stores
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* `{ code_hash, account_id, expires_at, redeem_attempts:0 }` — the RAW code is never stored
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* (INV5). `accountId` comes from the authenticated principal (INV3), never a request field.
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*/
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import type { PairingCodeRecord } from '../model/records.js'
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import type { PairingStore } from '../store/ports.js'
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import type { AuditWriter } from '../audit/log.js'
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import { noopAuditWriter } from '../audit/log.js'
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import { generatePairingCode, formatPairingCode } from './code.js'
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import { sha256Hex } from '../util/hash.js'
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import { nowIso } from '../util/ids.js'
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export interface IssuedPairing {
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readonly code: string // display-grouped, returned ONCE
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readonly expiresAt: string
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}
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export interface PairingIssuer {
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issuePairingCode(accountId: string): Promise<IssuedPairing>
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}
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export interface PairingIssuerDeps {
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readonly pairing: PairingStore
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readonly pairingTtlSec: number
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readonly audit?: AuditWriter
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readonly actor?: string
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}
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export function createPairingIssuer(deps: PairingIssuerDeps): PairingIssuer {
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const audit = deps.audit ?? noopAuditWriter()
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const actor = deps.actor ?? 'system'
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return {
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async issuePairingCode(accountId) {
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const canonical = generatePairingCode()
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const codeHash = sha256Hex(canonical) // deterministic hash of a 130-bit input (INV5)
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const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + deps.pairingTtlSec * 1000).toISOString()
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const record: PairingCodeRecord = { codeHash, accountId, expiresAt, redeemedAt: null }
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await deps.pairing.insert(record)
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await audit.writeAuditEvent({
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action: 'pairing.issue',
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principalId: actor,
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accountId,
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hostId: null,
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ts: nowIso(),
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meta: { expiresAt },
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})
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// Raw code returned ONCE, display-grouped; never persisted.
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return { code: formatPairingCode(canonical), expiresAt }
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},
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}
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}
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