Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.
Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay: native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent: host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e: browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth: Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web: browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering
Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.
NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
151 lines
6.7 KiB
TypeScript
151 lines
6.7 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach } from 'vitest'
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import { onUpgrade, onReattach, type EnforceDeps, type UpgradeContext } from '../src/index.js'
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import { verifyCapabilityToken, resetDpopCacheForTest } from '../src/capability/verify.js'
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import { needsStepUp } from '../src/human/stepup/stepup.js'
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import type { StepUpPolicy } from '../src/types.js'
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import {
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setupP5SigningKey,
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makeHost,
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principal,
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fakeHostRegistry,
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fakeSessionRegistry,
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fakeRevocationStore,
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fakeTokenBucket,
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fakeAuditSink,
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issueWithDpop,
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uuid,
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} from './_helpers.js'
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const NOW = 1_700_000_000
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const AUD_A = 'alice.term.example.com'
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const ORIGIN_A = `https://${AUD_A}`
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const ALLOWED = [ORIGIN_A]
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const NEVER_REQUIRED: StepUpPolicy = { maxAgeSeconds: Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER, requiredMethod: 'passkey' }
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describe('enforcement onUpgrade/onReattach (T12)', () => {
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let signingKey: CryptoKey
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let hostA: string
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let deps: EnforceDeps
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let rev: ReturnType<typeof fakeRevocationStore>
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let audit: ReturnType<typeof fakeAuditSink>
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beforeEach(async () => {
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;({ signingKey } = await setupP5SigningKey())
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resetDpopCacheForTest()
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hostA = uuid()
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rev = fakeRevocationStore()
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audit = fakeAuditSink()
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deps = {
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hosts: fakeHostRegistry([makeHost('acct-A', hostA)]),
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sessions: fakeSessionRegistry([]),
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revocation: rev,
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buckets: fakeTokenBucket(),
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audit,
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stepUpPolicyFor: () => NEVER_REQUIRED,
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}
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})
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function ctxFor(bundle: { raw: string; dpop: UpgradeContext['dpop'] }, over: Partial<UpgradeContext> = {}): UpgradeContext {
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return {
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capabilityRaw: bundle.raw,
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originHeader: ORIGIN_A,
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expectedAud: AUD_A,
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requestedHostId: hostA,
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requiredRight: 'attach',
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remoteAddrHash: 'ip-hash',
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activeSessionCount: 0,
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dpop: bundle.dpop,
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principal: null,
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...over,
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}
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}
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it('foreign Origin → 401 even with a valid token (INV15 retained)', async () => {
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const b = await issueWithDpop(signingKey, { accountId: 'acct-A', host: hostA, aud: AUD_A, now: NOW })
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const out = await onUpgrade(ctxFor(b, { originHeader: 'https://evil.com' }), deps, ALLOWED, NOW)
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expect(out).toMatchObject({ ok: false, status: 401, reason: 'bad_origin' })
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expect(audit.events).toHaveLength(1)
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expect(audit.events[0]!.outcome).toBe('deny')
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})
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it('valid Origin, no/garbage token → 401', async () => {
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const out = await onUpgrade(ctxFor({ raw: 'garbage', dpop: { proofJws: 'a.b.c', htu: 'h', htm: 'GET' } }), deps, ALLOWED, NOW)
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expect(out).toMatchObject({ ok: false, status: 401 })
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})
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it('cross-tenant (A token, host B) → 403 with exactly one cross-tenant-attempt audit event', async () => {
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const hostB = uuid()
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deps = { ...deps, hosts: fakeHostRegistry([makeHost('acct-B', hostB)]) }
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const b = await issueWithDpop(signingKey, { accountId: 'acct-A', host: hostB, aud: AUD_A, now: NOW })
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const out = await onUpgrade(ctxFor(b, { requestedHostId: hostB }), deps, ALLOWED, NOW)
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expect(out).toMatchObject({ ok: false, status: 403, reason: 'cross_tenant' })
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expect(audit.events).toHaveLength(1)
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expect(audit.events[0]!.action).toBe('cross-tenant-attempt')
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})
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it('pre-auth throttle fires BEFORE token verification (Finding-5)', async () => {
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const buckets = fakeTokenBucket()
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buckets.blocked.add('preauth:ip:ip-hash')
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deps = { ...deps, buckets }
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// even a totally invalid token is thrown out at the pre-auth stage
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const out = await onUpgrade(ctxFor({ raw: 'garbage', dpop: { proofJws: 'a.b.c', htu: 'h', htm: 'GET' } }), deps, ALLOWED, NOW)
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expect(out).toMatchObject({ ok: false, status: 403, reason: 'pre_auth_throttled' })
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})
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it('per-account rate-limited → deny', async () => {
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const buckets = fakeTokenBucket()
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buckets.blocked.add('connect:acct:acct-A')
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deps = { ...deps, buckets }
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const b = await issueWithDpop(signingKey, { accountId: 'acct-A', host: hostA, aud: AUD_A, now: NOW })
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const out = await onUpgrade(ctxFor(b), deps, ALLOWED, NOW)
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expect(out).toMatchObject({ ok: false, status: 403, reason: 'rate_limited' })
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})
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it('replayed single-use token (jti already consumed) → 403 token_replayed', async () => {
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const b = await issueWithDpop(signingKey, { accountId: 'acct-A', host: hostA, aud: AUD_A, now: NOW })
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const tok = await verifyCapabilityToken(b.raw, AUD_A, NOW)
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await rev.consumeOnce(tok.jti, tok.exp) // pre-consume
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const out = await onUpgrade(ctxFor(b), deps, ALLOWED, NOW)
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expect(out).toMatchObject({ ok: false, status: 403, reason: 'token_replayed' })
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})
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it('happy path → ok:true with an allow audit event', async () => {
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const b = await issueWithDpop(signingKey, { accountId: 'acct-A', host: hostA, aud: AUD_A, now: NOW })
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const out = await onUpgrade(ctxFor(b), deps, ALLOWED, NOW)
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expect(out.ok).toBe(true)
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expect(audit.events).toHaveLength(1)
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expect(audit.events[0]!.outcome).toBe('allow')
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expect(audit.events[0]!.action).toBe('attach')
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})
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it('reattach to a foreign session → 403', async () => {
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const sessionB = uuid()
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deps = { ...deps, sessions: fakeSessionRegistry([{ sessionId: sessionB, hostId: uuid(), accountId: 'acct-B' }]) }
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const b = await issueWithDpop(signingKey, { accountId: 'acct-A', host: hostA, aud: AUD_A, now: NOW })
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const out = await onReattach({ ...ctxFor(b), sessionId: sessionB }, deps, ALLOWED, NOW)
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expect(out).toMatchObject({ ok: false, status: 403, reason: 'cross_tenant_session' })
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})
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describe('v0.10 step-up augmentation (Finding-3)', () => {
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const STRICT: StepUpPolicy = { maxAgeSeconds: 300, requiredMethod: 'passkey' }
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it('fresh login but stale step-up → 403 step_up_required at onUpgrade', async () => {
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deps = { ...deps, stepUpPolicyFor: () => STRICT }
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const b = await issueWithDpop(signingKey, { accountId: 'acct-A', host: hostA, aud: AUD_A, now: NOW })
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const freshLogin = principal('acct-A', { authAt: NOW, stepUpAt: null, amr: ['passkey'] })
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const out = await onUpgrade(ctxFor(b, { principal: freshLogin }), deps, ALLOWED, NOW)
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expect(out).toMatchObject({ ok: false, status: 403, reason: 'step_up_required' })
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expect(audit.events.some((e) => e.action === 'stepup' && e.outcome === 'deny')).toBe(true)
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})
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it('after a fresh step-up the same request → ok:true', async () => {
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deps = { ...deps, stepUpPolicyFor: () => STRICT }
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const b = await issueWithDpop(signingKey, { accountId: 'acct-A', host: hostA, aud: AUD_A, now: NOW })
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const steppedUp = principal('acct-A', { authAt: NOW, stepUpAt: NOW, amr: ['passkey', 'stepup'] })
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expect(needsStepUp(steppedUp, STRICT, NOW)).toBe(false)
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const out = await onUpgrade(ctxFor(b, { principal: steppedUp }), deps, ALLOWED, NOW)
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expect(out.ok).toBe(true)
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})
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})
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})
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