Files
web-terminal/relay-web/test/preview-client.test.ts
Yaojia Wang 2af57e6686 feat(relay): rendezvous-relay service — 7 packages + plans (contracts/transport/agent/control-plane/e2e/auth/web)
Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.

Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
  capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay:   native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent:        host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e:    browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth:   Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web:    browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering

Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.

NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
2026-07-02 06:10:16 +02:00

101 lines
3.7 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
import { deriveContentKey, openReplayCiphertext, sealReplayFrame } from 'relay-e2e'
import { randomBytes } from 'relay-e2e'
import {
mountPreviewClient,
type PreviewDeps,
type ReadonlyTerminalLike,
type ReplaySource,
} from '../src/preview-client'
const HOST_SECRET = randomBytes(32)
const SESSION_ID = 'sess-1'
const ALG = 'aes-256-gcm' as const
/** Seal a screen (as a P2 agent stub would) under K_content with sealReplayFrame. */
function sealedReplay(lines: readonly string[], secret = HOST_SECRET): ReplaySource {
const k = deriveContentKey({ hostContentSecret: secret, sessionId: SESSION_ID, alg: ALG })
const frames = lines.map((line, i) =>
// sealReplayFrame → E2EEnvelope, encoded to a DATA payload the browser opens.
// openReplayCiphertext decodes+opens; we mirror the encode via the session envelope codec.
encodeReplayFrame(sealReplayFrame(k, BigInt(i), new TextEncoder().encode(line))),
)
return { sessionId: SESSION_ID, alg: ALG, frames }
}
// The replay codec: relay-e2e's openReplayCiphertext expects the encoded envelope bytes.
import { encodeEnvelope } from 'relay-e2e'
function encodeReplayFrame(env: ReturnType<typeof sealReplayFrame>): Uint8Array {
return encodeEnvelope(env)
}
const realDeps: PreviewDeps = { deriveContentKey, openReplayCiphertext }
function mockTerminal(): ReadonlyTerminalLike & { written: string[] } {
const written: string[] = []
return { written, open: () => {}, write: (d) => written.push(d), dispose: () => {} }
}
describe('mountPreviewClient (T9)', () => {
it('recoverable-key decrypt: sealReplayFrame frames render into the read-only xterm (FIX 3)', async () => {
const card = document.createElement('div')
const term = mockTerminal()
const client = mountPreviewClient(
card,
sealedReplay(['line-A', 'line-B']),
HOST_SECRET,
{ cols: 80, rows: 24 },
{ ...realDeps, createTerminal: () => term },
)
await client.render()
expect(term.written).toEqual(['line-A', 'line-B'])
})
it('wrong/host-mismatched secret → openReplayCiphertext throws → "unavailable", never garbled', async () => {
const card = document.createElement('div')
const term = mockTerminal()
const replay = sealedReplay(['secret-screen']) // sealed under HOST_SECRET
const client = mountPreviewClient(
card,
replay,
randomBytes(32), // a DIFFERENT host secret → derives a different K_content
{ cols: 80, rows: 24 },
{ ...realDeps, createTerminal: () => term },
)
await client.render()
expect(card.querySelector('.preview-unavailable')?.textContent).toBe('unavailable')
expect(term.written).toEqual([]) // never wrote a torn screen
})
it('read-only: the preview terminal exposes NO input path (no onData/send)', async () => {
const card = document.createElement('div')
const term = mockTerminal()
mountPreviewClient(
card,
sealedReplay(['x']),
HOST_SECRET,
{ cols: 80, rows: 24 },
{ ...realDeps, createTerminal: () => term },
).render()
expect('onData' in term).toBe(false)
expect('send' in term).toBe(false)
})
it('never writes hostContentSecret to localStorage/console', async () => {
const spy = vi.spyOn(console, 'log').mockImplementation(() => {})
const card = document.createElement('div')
await mountPreviewClient(
card,
sealedReplay(['x']),
HOST_SECRET,
{ cols: 80, rows: 24 },
{ ...realDeps, createTerminal: () => mockTerminal() },
).render()
expect(spy).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
expect(JSON.stringify(localStorage)).not.toContain(
Array.from(HOST_SECRET.slice(0, 4)).join(','),
)
spy.mockRestore()
})
})