The recoverable replay key was stable per (hostContentSecret, sessionId) while the agent-side sealer resets its deterministic-nonce seq to 0 on every restart/re-attach → two sealer generations sealed distinct plaintext under the SAME (key, nonce). Add a required 'epoch' to ReplayKeyParams, fold it into the K_content HKDF salt (sessionId U+001F epoch), mint a fresh epoch per createReplaySealer generation and expose it, and thread it through ReplaySource so the browser re-derives the matching key. Fresh epoch per generation ⇒ fresh key ⇒ seq=0 can never collide; recoverability within a generation is preserved. Touches relay-contracts/relay-e2e/agent/relay-web. Green: contracts 81, e2e 78, agent 133, web 99; tsc clean. Regression proves same seq-0 nonce, different key.
148 lines
5.5 KiB
TypeScript
148 lines
5.5 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
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import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs'
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import { join } from 'node:path'
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import type {
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AeadAlg,
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ClientHello,
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E2ESession,
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HandshakeResult,
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HostHello,
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} from 'relay-contracts'
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import { generateIdentity } from '../src/keys/identity.js'
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import {
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MitmAbortError,
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createE2ETransform,
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makeHostHello,
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type CreateHostHandshake,
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type VerifyDeviceProof,
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} from '../src/e2e/hostEndpoint.js'
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import type { ReplaySealer } from '../src/e2e/replaySeal.js'
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const ALG: AeadAlg = 'aes-256-gcm'
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function clientHello(proof: string): ClientHello {
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return {
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clientEphPub: new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]),
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clientNonce: new Uint8Array([4, 5, 6]),
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aeadOffer: [ALG],
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deviceAuthProof: proof,
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}
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}
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function fakeHandshake(keysByte: number): CreateHostHandshake {
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return () => ({
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async respond(): Promise<{ hello: HostHello; result: HandshakeResult }> {
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const result: HandshakeResult = {
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keys: {
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c2h: new Uint8Array([keysByte]) as never,
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h2c: new Uint8Array([keysByte + 1]) as never,
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},
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aead: ALG,
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transcript: new Uint8Array([0xff]),
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}
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const hello: HostHello = {
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hostEphPub: new Uint8Array([7]),
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hostNonce: new Uint8Array([8]),
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aeadChoice: ALG,
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enrollFpr: 'fpr',
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sig: new Uint8Array([9]),
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}
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return { hello, result }
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},
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})
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}
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// The load-bearing MITM verifier: only a specific proof passes.
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const realVerifier: VerifyDeviceProof = async (proof) => proof === 'VALID-PROOF'
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describe('makeHostHello (T15, anti-MITM)', () => {
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it('derives DirectionalKeys{c2h,h2c} on a valid proof (FIX 2 — no single sessionKey)', async () => {
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const { result } = await makeHostHello(clientHello('VALID-PROOF'), generateIdentity(), realVerifier, {
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createHostHandshake: fakeHandshake(0x10),
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})
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expect(result.keys).toHaveProperty('c2h')
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expect(result.keys).toHaveProperty('h2c')
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expect(result).not.toHaveProperty('sessionKey')
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})
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it('ABORTS on a forged proof: no keys, no HostHello (MitmAbortError)', async () => {
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const respond = vi.fn()
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const spyHandshake: CreateHostHandshake = () => ({ respond: respond as never })
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await expect(
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makeHostHello(clientHello('FORGED'), generateIdentity(), realVerifier, {
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createHostHandshake: spyHandshake,
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}),
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).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(MitmAbortError)
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expect(respond).not.toHaveBeenCalled() // no key derivation reached
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})
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it('no-stub guard: swapping the verifier for always-true makes the MITM test FAIL', async () => {
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const stub: VerifyDeviceProof = async () => true
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// With the stubbed verifier, the forged proof WRONGLY completes — proving the verifier is
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// load-bearing (a real build forbids this stub via the import guard below).
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const out = await makeHostHello(clientHello('FORGED'), generateIdentity(), stub, {
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createHostHandshake: fakeHandshake(0x20),
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})
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expect(out.result.keys).toBeDefined()
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})
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it('no-stub CI guard: hostEndpoint.ts imports NO verifier from relay-e2e (FIX 6b)', () => {
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const raw = readFileSync(join(import.meta.dirname, '..', 'src', 'e2e', 'hostEndpoint.ts'), 'utf8')
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const src = raw.replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, '').replace(/\/\/.*$/gm, '') // strip comments
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expect(src).not.toMatch(/import[^\n]*verifyDeviceAuthProof/)
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expect(src).not.toMatch(/from ['"]relay-e2e['"]/)
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})
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})
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describe('createE2ETransform (T15)', () => {
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function fakeSession(): E2ESession {
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// Reversible transform that HIDES the plaintext (XOR) so INV2 assertions are meaningful.
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return {
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role: 'host',
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seal: (pt) => Uint8Array.from([0xe0, ...pt.map((b) => b ^ 0x55)]),
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open: (ct) => Uint8Array.from(ct.slice(1)).map((b) => b ^ 0x55),
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rederive: () => {},
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}
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}
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function fakeReplay(): ReplaySealer & { calls: number } {
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const r = {
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calls: 0,
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epoch: 'test-epoch',
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seal(_pt: Uint8Array) {
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r.calls += 1
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return { seq: 0n, nonce: new Uint8Array(), ciphertext: new Uint8Array([0xde]), tag: new Uint8Array() }
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},
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}
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return r
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}
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it('outbound seals under BOTH the live session and the replay key (FIX 3, INV2)', () => {
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const replay = fakeReplay()
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const t = createE2ETransform(generateIdentity(), realVerifier, replay)
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t.openStream(1)
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t.seedSession(1, fakeSession(), new Uint8Array([0x48])) // HostHello control frame
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const marker = new TextEncoder().encode('PLAIN')
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const sealed = t.outbound(1, marker)
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expect(replay.calls).toBe(1) // replay-bound seal happened
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expect(Buffer.from(sealed).includes(Buffer.from(marker))).toBe(false) // ciphertext, not plaintext
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expect(t.takeControlFrames!(1)).toEqual([new Uint8Array([0x48])]) // HostHello flushed once
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expect(t.takeControlFrames!(1)).toEqual([])
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})
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it('inbound before seeding returns null (handshake pending); after, opens opaque', () => {
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const t = createE2ETransform(generateIdentity(), realVerifier, fakeReplay())
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const session = fakeSession()
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t.openStream(1)
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expect(t.inbound(1, new Uint8Array([1, 2]))).toBeNull()
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t.seedSession(1, session, new Uint8Array([0x48]))
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const ct = session.seal(new Uint8Array([9, 9])) // c2h ciphertext
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expect([...t.inbound(1, ct)!]).toEqual([9, 9])
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})
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it('outbound before the session is established aborts (no silent plaintext leak)', () => {
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const t = createE2ETransform(generateIdentity(), realVerifier, fakeReplay())
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t.openStream(1)
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expect(() => t.outbound(1, new Uint8Array([1]))).toThrow(MitmAbortError)
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})
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})
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