Files
web-terminal/control-plane/src/util/hash.ts
Yaojia Wang 2af57e6686 feat(relay): rendezvous-relay service — 7 packages + plans (contracts/transport/agent/control-plane/e2e/auth/web)
Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.

Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
  capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay:   native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent:        host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e:    browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth:   Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web:    browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering

Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.

NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
2026-07-02 06:10:16 +02:00

45 lines
1.9 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Secret hashing at rest (INV5). Pairing codes and v0.8 tokens are stored as salted scrypt
* hashes, never raw. Verification is constant-time. scrypt is a Node builtin (no native dep);
* argon2id would be the production upgrade (integration note) but scrypt satisfies INV5 here.
*/
import { randomBytes, scryptSync, timingSafeEqual, createHash } from 'node:crypto'
/**
* Deterministic hash for high-entropy lookup keys (pairing codes: ≥128-bit input, so a fast
* preimage-resistant hash is safe at rest — the input space is infeasible to brute-force, INV5).
* A salted scrypt cannot be used here because redemption must find the row by hash of the
* presented code. Production may HMAC this with a server-side pepper (integration note).
*/
export function sha256Hex(raw: string): string {
return createHash('sha256').update(raw, 'utf8').digest('hex')
}
const SCRYPT_KEYLEN = 32
const SCRYPT_COST = 1 << 14 // N=16384 — modest, fast enough for tests, memory-hard
const SALT_LEN = 16
/** Produce a self-describing `scrypt$<saltHex>$<hashHex>` string. Raw secret is discarded. */
export function hashSecret(raw: string): string {
const salt = randomBytes(SALT_LEN)
const hash = scryptSync(raw, salt, SCRYPT_KEYLEN, { N: SCRYPT_COST })
return `scrypt$${salt.toString('hex')}$${hash.toString('hex')}`
}
/** Constant-time verify a raw secret against a stored `scrypt$salt$hash`. */
export function verifySecret(raw: string, stored: string): boolean {
const parts = stored.split('$')
if (parts.length !== 3 || parts[0] !== 'scrypt') return false
const saltHex = parts[1] as string
const hashHex = parts[2] as string
let expected: Buffer
try {
expected = Buffer.from(hashHex, 'hex')
const salt = Buffer.from(saltHex, 'hex')
const actual = scryptSync(raw, salt, expected.length, { N: SCRYPT_COST })
return timingSafeEqual(actual, expected)
} catch {
return false
}
}