Files
web-terminal/agent/test/hostEndpoint.test.ts
Yaojia Wang 3020184054 fix(relay): close F6 replay K_content nonce reuse via per-generation epoch-in-key
The recoverable replay key was stable per (hostContentSecret, sessionId) while the
agent-side sealer resets its deterministic-nonce seq to 0 on every restart/re-attach
→ two sealer generations sealed distinct plaintext under the SAME (key, nonce).

Add a required 'epoch' to ReplayKeyParams, fold it into the K_content HKDF salt
(sessionId U+001F epoch), mint a fresh epoch per createReplaySealer generation and
expose it, and thread it through ReplaySource so the browser re-derives the matching
key. Fresh epoch per generation ⇒ fresh key ⇒ seq=0 can never collide; recoverability
within a generation is preserved.

Touches relay-contracts/relay-e2e/agent/relay-web. Green: contracts 81, e2e 78,
agent 133, web 99; tsc clean. Regression proves same seq-0 nonce, different key.
2026-07-02 16:41:19 +02:00

148 lines
5.5 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs'
import { join } from 'node:path'
import type {
AeadAlg,
ClientHello,
E2ESession,
HandshakeResult,
HostHello,
} from 'relay-contracts'
import { generateIdentity } from '../src/keys/identity.js'
import {
MitmAbortError,
createE2ETransform,
makeHostHello,
type CreateHostHandshake,
type VerifyDeviceProof,
} from '../src/e2e/hostEndpoint.js'
import type { ReplaySealer } from '../src/e2e/replaySeal.js'
const ALG: AeadAlg = 'aes-256-gcm'
function clientHello(proof: string): ClientHello {
return {
clientEphPub: new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]),
clientNonce: new Uint8Array([4, 5, 6]),
aeadOffer: [ALG],
deviceAuthProof: proof,
}
}
function fakeHandshake(keysByte: number): CreateHostHandshake {
return () => ({
async respond(): Promise<{ hello: HostHello; result: HandshakeResult }> {
const result: HandshakeResult = {
keys: {
c2h: new Uint8Array([keysByte]) as never,
h2c: new Uint8Array([keysByte + 1]) as never,
},
aead: ALG,
transcript: new Uint8Array([0xff]),
}
const hello: HostHello = {
hostEphPub: new Uint8Array([7]),
hostNonce: new Uint8Array([8]),
aeadChoice: ALG,
enrollFpr: 'fpr',
sig: new Uint8Array([9]),
}
return { hello, result }
},
})
}
// The load-bearing MITM verifier: only a specific proof passes.
const realVerifier: VerifyDeviceProof = async (proof) => proof === 'VALID-PROOF'
describe('makeHostHello (T15, anti-MITM)', () => {
it('derives DirectionalKeys{c2h,h2c} on a valid proof (FIX 2 — no single sessionKey)', async () => {
const { result } = await makeHostHello(clientHello('VALID-PROOF'), generateIdentity(), realVerifier, {
createHostHandshake: fakeHandshake(0x10),
})
expect(result.keys).toHaveProperty('c2h')
expect(result.keys).toHaveProperty('h2c')
expect(result).not.toHaveProperty('sessionKey')
})
it('ABORTS on a forged proof: no keys, no HostHello (MitmAbortError)', async () => {
const respond = vi.fn()
const spyHandshake: CreateHostHandshake = () => ({ respond: respond as never })
await expect(
makeHostHello(clientHello('FORGED'), generateIdentity(), realVerifier, {
createHostHandshake: spyHandshake,
}),
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(MitmAbortError)
expect(respond).not.toHaveBeenCalled() // no key derivation reached
})
it('no-stub guard: swapping the verifier for always-true makes the MITM test FAIL', async () => {
const stub: VerifyDeviceProof = async () => true
// With the stubbed verifier, the forged proof WRONGLY completes — proving the verifier is
// load-bearing (a real build forbids this stub via the import guard below).
const out = await makeHostHello(clientHello('FORGED'), generateIdentity(), stub, {
createHostHandshake: fakeHandshake(0x20),
})
expect(out.result.keys).toBeDefined()
})
it('no-stub CI guard: hostEndpoint.ts imports NO verifier from relay-e2e (FIX 6b)', () => {
const raw = readFileSync(join(import.meta.dirname, '..', 'src', 'e2e', 'hostEndpoint.ts'), 'utf8')
const src = raw.replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, '').replace(/\/\/.*$/gm, '') // strip comments
expect(src).not.toMatch(/import[^\n]*verifyDeviceAuthProof/)
expect(src).not.toMatch(/from ['"]relay-e2e['"]/)
})
})
describe('createE2ETransform (T15)', () => {
function fakeSession(): E2ESession {
// Reversible transform that HIDES the plaintext (XOR) so INV2 assertions are meaningful.
return {
role: 'host',
seal: (pt) => Uint8Array.from([0xe0, ...pt.map((b) => b ^ 0x55)]),
open: (ct) => Uint8Array.from(ct.slice(1)).map((b) => b ^ 0x55),
rederive: () => {},
}
}
function fakeReplay(): ReplaySealer & { calls: number } {
const r = {
calls: 0,
epoch: 'test-epoch',
seal(_pt: Uint8Array) {
r.calls += 1
return { seq: 0n, nonce: new Uint8Array(), ciphertext: new Uint8Array([0xde]), tag: new Uint8Array() }
},
}
return r
}
it('outbound seals under BOTH the live session and the replay key (FIX 3, INV2)', () => {
const replay = fakeReplay()
const t = createE2ETransform(generateIdentity(), realVerifier, replay)
t.openStream(1)
t.seedSession(1, fakeSession(), new Uint8Array([0x48])) // HostHello control frame
const marker = new TextEncoder().encode('PLAIN')
const sealed = t.outbound(1, marker)
expect(replay.calls).toBe(1) // replay-bound seal happened
expect(Buffer.from(sealed).includes(Buffer.from(marker))).toBe(false) // ciphertext, not plaintext
expect(t.takeControlFrames!(1)).toEqual([new Uint8Array([0x48])]) // HostHello flushed once
expect(t.takeControlFrames!(1)).toEqual([])
})
it('inbound before seeding returns null (handshake pending); after, opens opaque', () => {
const t = createE2ETransform(generateIdentity(), realVerifier, fakeReplay())
const session = fakeSession()
t.openStream(1)
expect(t.inbound(1, new Uint8Array([1, 2]))).toBeNull()
t.seedSession(1, session, new Uint8Array([0x48]))
const ct = session.seal(new Uint8Array([9, 9])) // c2h ciphertext
expect([...t.inbound(1, ct)!]).toEqual([9, 9])
})
it('outbound before the session is established aborts (no silent plaintext leak)', () => {
const t = createE2ETransform(generateIdentity(), realVerifier, fakeReplay())
t.openStream(1)
expect(() => t.outbound(1, new Uint8Array([1]))).toThrow(MitmAbortError)
})
})