Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.
Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay: native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent: host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e: browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth: Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web: browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering
Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.
NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
100 lines
4.3 KiB
TypeScript
100 lines
4.3 KiB
TypeScript
import { readFileSync, readdirSync } from 'node:fs'
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import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'
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import { dirname, join } from 'node:path'
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import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
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import { createClientHandshake, createHostHandshake } from '../src/handshake.js'
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import { nobleEd25519Signer, nobleEd25519Verifier } from '../src/ed25519.js'
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import { createE2ESession } from '../src/session.js'
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import { MemoryDevicePinStore } from '../src/keystore.js'
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import { MAX_FRAME_BYTES } from '../src/envelope.js'
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import { boundProofProvider, fromUtf8, makeHostIdentity, utf8, verifyBoundProof } from './helpers.js'
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const HERE = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url))
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const SRC = join(HERE, '..', 'src')
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/** A passthrough "relay" that records every byte payload it forwards (the INV2 spy). */
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class RelaySpy {
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readonly captured: Uint8Array[] = []
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forward(payload: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
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expect(payload.length).toBeLessThanOrEqual(MAX_FRAME_BYTES) // §4.1 payloadLen guard
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this.captured.push(payload.slice())
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return payload
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}
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snapshot(): string {
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return this.captured.map((b) => Buffer.from(b).toString('latin1')).join(' |