2af57e6686
Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.
Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay: native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent: host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e: browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth: Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web: browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering
Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.
NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
73 lines
3.2 KiB
TypeScript
73 lines
3.2 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
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import type { AeadKey, E2EEnvelope, ReplayKeyParams } from 'relay-contracts'
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import { createReplaySealer, type ReplayCrypto } from '../src/e2e/replaySeal.js'
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/** Fake AEAD: key = tagged secret‖sessionId; ciphertext = plaintext XOR keyByte (marker hidden). */
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function fakeCrypto(): ReplayCrypto & { derivations: ReplayKeyParams[] } {
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const derivations: ReplayKeyParams[] = []
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return {
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derivations,
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deriveContentKey(params: ReplayKeyParams): AeadKey {
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derivations.push(params)
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const tag = new TextEncoder().encode(`${Buffer.from(params.hostContentSecret).toString('hex')}:${params.sessionId}`)
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return tag as unknown as AeadKey
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},
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sealReplayFrame(key: AeadKey, seq: bigint, plaintext: Uint8Array): E2EEnvelope {
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const kb = (key as unknown as Uint8Array)[0] ?? 0x5a
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const ciphertext = plaintext.map((b) => b ^ kb)
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return { seq, nonce: new Uint8Array([Number(seq & 0xffn)]), ciphertext, tag: new Uint8Array([0xaa]) }
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},
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}
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}
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const SECRET = new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3, 4])
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describe('createReplaySealer (T19, FIX 3)', () => {
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it('derives K_content deterministically from (secret, sessionId, alg)', () => {
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const c1 = fakeCrypto()
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createReplaySealer(SECRET, 'sess-1', 'aes-256-gcm', c1)
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const c2 = fakeCrypto()
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createReplaySealer(SECRET, 'sess-1', 'aes-256-gcm', c2)
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expect(c1.derivations[0]).toEqual(c2.derivations[0])
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})
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it('a different sessionId → a different key (per-session separation)', () => {
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const c = fakeCrypto()
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createReplaySealer(SECRET, 'sess-1', 'aes-256-gcm', c)
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createReplaySealer(SECRET, 'sess-2', 'aes-256-gcm', c)
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expect(c.derivations[0]!.sessionId).not.toBe(c.derivations[1]!.sessionId)
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})
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it('emits a monotonic seq (INV13) and never leaks the plaintext marker (INV2)', () => {
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const sealer = createReplaySealer(SECRET, 'sess-1', 'aes-256-gcm', fakeCrypto())
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const marker = new TextEncoder().encode('SECRET-MARKER')
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const e0 = sealer.seal(marker)
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const e1 = sealer.seal(marker)
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expect(e0.seq).toBe(0n)
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expect(e1.seq).toBe(1n)
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expect(Buffer.from(e0.ciphertext).includes(Buffer.from(marker))).toBe(false)
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})
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it('replay seal is DISTINCT from a live h2c seal for the same plaintext (FIX 3)', () => {
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const replay = createReplaySealer(SECRET, 'sess-1', 'aes-256-gcm', fakeCrypto())
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// model a live seal with a different key byte
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const liveKey = new Uint8Array([0x11]) as unknown as AeadKey
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const live = fakeCrypto().sealReplayFrame(liveKey, 0n, new Uint8Array([0x41, 0x42]))
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const rep = replay.seal(new Uint8Array([0x41, 0x42]))
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expect(Buffer.from(rep.ciphertext).equals(Buffer.from(live.ciphertext))).toBe(false)
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})
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it('the hostContentSecret is never mutated', () => {
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const secret = new Uint8Array([9, 9, 9])
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const spy = vi.fn()
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createReplaySealer(secret, 's', 'aes-256-gcm', {
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deriveContentKey: (p) => {
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spy(p.hostContentSecret)
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return new Uint8Array([1]) as unknown as AeadKey
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},
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sealReplayFrame: (_k, seq, pt) => ({ seq, nonce: new Uint8Array(), ciphertext: pt, tag: new Uint8Array() }),
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})
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expect([...secret]).toEqual([9, 9, 9])
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})
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})
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