Files
web-terminal/control-plane/src/routing/bus.ts
Yaojia Wang 2af57e6686 feat(relay): rendezvous-relay service — 7 packages + plans (contracts/transport/agent/control-plane/e2e/auth/web)
Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.

Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
  capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay:   native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent:        host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e:    browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth:   Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web:    browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering

Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.

NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
2026-07-02 06:10:16 +02:00

50 lines
1.8 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* RevocationBus implementations over the FROZEN `relay:revocations` channel (INDEX §4.2 FIX 4).
* P3 only PUBLISHES (P1 owns the subscriber that injects §4.1 CLOSE+RST / GOAWAY). Drain (T10)
* and revoke (T13) use the SAME named channel. The KillSignal shape + channel name are imported
* from relay-contracts and NEVER redefined.
*/
import {
RELAY_REVOCATIONS_CHANNEL,
KillSignalSchema,
type KillSignal,
type RevocationBus,
} from 'relay-contracts'
/** In-memory bus with a subscribe hook — used by tests and single-process wiring. */
export interface TestableRevocationBus extends RevocationBus {
subscribe(handler: (signal: KillSignal) => void): () => void
readonly channel: typeof RELAY_REVOCATIONS_CHANNEL
}
export function createInMemoryRevocationBus(): TestableRevocationBus {
const handlers = new Set<(signal: KillSignal) => void>()
return {
channel: RELAY_REVOCATIONS_CHANNEL,
async publish(signal) {
// Validate at the boundary before it hits the wire (INV10: reason is metadata only).
const parsed = KillSignalSchema.parse(signal)
for (const h of handlers) h(parsed as KillSignal)
},
subscribe(handler) {
handlers.add(handler)
return () => handlers.delete(handler)
},
}
}
/** Minimal publisher surface of an ioredis client (integration seam; typed, not unit-tested). */
export interface RedisPublisher {
publish(channel: string, message: string): Promise<number>
}
/** Redis-backed publisher (production). P1 relay nodes SUBSCRIBE to the same channel. */
export function createRedisRevocationBus(redis: RedisPublisher): RevocationBus {
return {
async publish(signal) {
const parsed = KillSignalSchema.parse(signal)
await redis.publish(RELAY_REVOCATIONS_CHANNEL, JSON.stringify(parsed))
},
}
}