2af57e6686
Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.
Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay: native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent: host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e: browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth: Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web: browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering
Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.
NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
94 lines
3.5 KiB
TypeScript
94 lines
3.5 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest'
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import { startRegistration, finishRegistration } from '../src/human/webauthn/register.js'
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import { startAuthentication, finishAuthentication } from '../src/human/webauthn/authenticate.js'
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import {
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WebAuthnError,
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type WebAuthnVerifier,
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type AuthenticationResponse,
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type RegistrationResponse,
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} from '../src/human/webauthn/verifier.js'
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import type { WebAuthnCredential } from '../src/types.js'
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const RP_ID = 'alice.term.example.com'
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const ORIGIN = 'https://alice.term.example.com'
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const NOW = 1_700_000_000
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const verifier: WebAuthnVerifier = {
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verifyRegistration: async () => ({
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verified: true,
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credentialId: 'cred-1',
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publicKey: new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]),
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signCount: 0,
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transports: ['internal'],
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}),
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verifyAuthentication: async (_r, _c, _rp, _o, stored) => ({ verified: true, newSignCount: stored + 1 }),
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}
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function regResp(over: Partial<RegistrationResponse> = {}): RegistrationResponse {
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return { clientChallenge: 'chal', origin: ORIGIN, rpId: RP_ID, ...over }
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}
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function authResp(over: Partial<AuthenticationResponse> = {}): AuthenticationResponse {
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return { clientChallenge: 'chal', origin: ORIGIN, rpId: RP_ID, ...over }
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}
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const cred: WebAuthnCredential = {
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credentialId: 'cred-1',
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accountId: 'acct-A',
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publicKey: new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]),
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signCount: 5,
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transports: ['internal'],
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createdAt: '2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z',
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}
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describe('WebAuthn / Passkey (T5, primary)', () => {
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it('startRegistration issues rpId + a challenge', async () => {
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const opts = await startRegistration('acct-A', RP_ID)
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expect(opts.rpId).toBe(RP_ID)
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expect(opts.challenge.length).toBeGreaterThan(0)
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expect(opts.userId).toBe('acct-A')
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})
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it('finishRegistration mints a credential bound to the account', async () => {
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const c = await finishRegistration('acct-A', regResp(), 'chal', RP_ID, ORIGIN, verifier)
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expect(c.accountId).toBe('acct-A')
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expect(c.credentialId).toBe('cred-1')
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})
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it('rejects a challenge mismatch (single-use / replayed challenge)', async () => {
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await expect(finishRegistration('acct-A', regResp({ clientChallenge: 'other' }), 'chal', RP_ID, ORIGIN, verifier)).rejects.toThrow(
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WebAuthnError,
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)
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})
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it('rejects an origin mismatch (assertion from evil.com)', async () => {
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await expect(
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finishAuthentication(cred, authResp({ origin: 'https://evil.com' }), 'chal', RP_ID, ORIGIN, verifier, NOW),
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).rejects.toThrow('origin')
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})
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it('happy path auth yields a principal with amr:[passkey]', async () => {
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const startOpts = await startAuthentication('acct-A', RP_ID)
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expect(startOpts.rpId).toBe(RP_ID)
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const p = await finishAuthentication(cred, authResp(), 'chal', RP_ID, ORIGIN, verifier, NOW)
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expect(p.accountId).toBe('acct-A')
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expect(p.amr).toEqual(['passkey'])
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expect(p.authAt).toBe(NOW)
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})
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it('rejects a signCount regression (cloned authenticator signal)', async () => {
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const regressing: WebAuthnVerifier = {
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...verifier,
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verifyAuthentication: async () => ({ verified: true, newSignCount: 3 }), // < stored 5
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}
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await expect(
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finishAuthentication(cred, authResp(), 'chal', RP_ID, ORIGIN, regressing, NOW),
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).rejects.toThrow('signCount')
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})
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it('rejects when the verifier reports not-verified', async () => {
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const bad: WebAuthnVerifier = { ...verifier, verifyAuthentication: async () => ({ verified: false, newSignCount: 99 }) }
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await expect(finishAuthentication(cred, authResp(), 'chal', RP_ID, ORIGIN, bad, NOW)).rejects.toThrow(
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WebAuthnError,
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)
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})
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})
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