Customers install one command / log in once; hardware-generated keys never leave the device; CSRs return certs + subdomain; frpc + base-app run as durable services. No .p12, no manual cert import. Implements the MVP fast-path of docs/PLAN_TUNNEL_AUTOMATION.md. Control-plane / PKI (control-plane/): - ca/x509-assembler.ts: single KMS-signed real X.509 issuance primitive (Ed25519 + P-256) - ca/csr-ec.ts: P-256 PKCS#10 proof-of-possession (verifyCsrPoPEc) + CSR-key routing - ca/frpclient-issue.ts, ca/device-issue.ts: P-256 frp-client + device leaf signers - ca/rotate.ts + api/renew.ts: real-X.509 /renew + /device/:id/renew (mTLS current cert) - registry/devices.ts: device registry + per-account cap/rate-limit - auth/session.ts: device:enroll capability token mint/verify - api/device-enroll.ts: POST /device/enroll (ownership-gated, deny-by-default) - pairing/native-redeem.ts + shared gateAndConsumePairingCode; api/provision.ts native arm - boot/native-ca.ts + main.ts: wire two P-256 CAs + issuers + routers (dev / KMS fail-fast) Contracts: relay-contracts enroll right; relay-auth SPIFFE /device/ arm + spiffeIdFor(kind) Host agent (agent/): - transport/frpcToml.ts; provision/frpcBinary.ts + untar.ts (verify-download + traversal-safe extract) - keys P-256 keygen/CSR/loadIdentity; service two-unit install + BIND_HOST loopback S-GATE - net/loopbackLiteral.ts strict guard; health/probe.ts + transport/frpSupervise.ts; cli pair --install iOS (ios/Packages/ClientTLS): SecureEnclaveKey + CertificateSigningRequest + DeviceEnrollmentClient + Keychain enroll refactor (SecKey/Security.framework end-to-end, avoids the -25300 trap) Isolation (deploy/nginx): njs/getCertSub.js SAN parser + zone-anchored map -> 403 Verified: 758 tests green (control-plane 246, agent 267, relay-auth 133, relay-contracts 85, iOS ClientTLS 27), all tsc clean; real nginx+njs docker 403/200/400; Swift CSR accepted by the real control-plane verifier; frpc extract byte-identical to `tar -xO`. Cross-validation caught + fixed 5 real defects (1 critical, 4 high). Remaining = infra (KMS, nginx deploy, VPS frps, physical iPhone) per PROGRESS_LOG runbook. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
98 lines
4.7 KiB
TypeScript
98 lines
4.7 KiB
TypeScript
/**
|
|
* A1 acceptance — ECDSA-P256 PKCS#10 parse + proof-of-possession (`ca/csr-ec.ts`), mirroring the
|
|
* Ed25519 `ca/csr.ts` tests. Gate (d): a valid P-256 CSR yields `ok:true` with the correct embedded
|
|
* pubkey; any tampered / mismatched / non-P256 / malformed CSR yields the UNIFORM `ok:false` result
|
|
* with an empty embedded pubkey and no distinguishing detail (fail-closed).
|
|
*/
|
|
import 'reflect-metadata'
|
|
import { describe, test, expect } from 'vitest'
|
|
import * as x509 from '@peculiar/x509'
|
|
import { webcrypto } from 'node:crypto'
|
|
import { verifyCsrPoPEc, buildCsrEc } from '../src/ca/csr-ec.js'
|
|
|
|
x509.cryptoProvider.set(webcrypto)
|
|
|
|
/** WebCrypto key pair (the `CryptoKeyPair` global is not in this project's TS lib set). */
|
|
type KeyPair = { readonly publicKey: CryptoKey; readonly privateKey: CryptoKey }
|
|
|
|
describe('verifyCsrPoPEc — gate (d): valid P-256 CSR', () => {
|
|
test('a valid P-256 CSR → ok:true with the embedded SPKI matching the generating key', async () => {
|
|
const { der, keys } = await buildCsrEc('CN=alice')
|
|
const res = await verifyCsrPoPEc(der)
|
|
expect(res.ok).toBe(true)
|
|
expect(res.embeddedPubSpki.length).toBeGreaterThan(0)
|
|
const exported = new Uint8Array(await webcrypto.subtle.exportKey('spki', keys.publicKey))
|
|
expect(Buffer.from(res.embeddedPubSpki).equals(Buffer.from(exported))).toBe(true)
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
test('the embedded SPKI re-imports as an EC P-256 verifying key', async () => {
|
|
const { der } = await buildCsrEc('CN=bob')
|
|
const { embeddedPubSpki } = await verifyCsrPoPEc(der)
|
|
const key = await webcrypto.subtle.importKey('spki', new Uint8Array(embeddedPubSpki), { name: 'ECDSA', namedCurve: 'P-256' }, true, ['verify'])
|
|
expect(key.type).toBe('public')
|
|
})
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
describe('verifyCsrPoPEc — fail-closed & uniform rejection', () => {
|
|
test('a tampered CSR (flipped signature byte) → ok:false uniform', async () => {
|
|
const { der } = await buildCsrEc('CN=carol')
|
|
const tampered = new Uint8Array(der)
|
|
tampered[tampered.length - 5]! ^= 0xff
|
|
const res = await verifyCsrPoPEc(tampered)
|
|
expect(res).toEqual({ ok: false, embeddedPubSpki: new Uint8Array(0) })
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
test('a CSR whose embedded key was swapped (PoP mismatch) → ok:false uniform', async () => {
|
|
// Splice: take request-A's body but leave request-B's signature by concatenating mismatched
|
|
// parts is fragile; instead flip several bytes inside the public-key region to break PoP.
|
|
const { der } = await buildCsrEc('CN=dave')
|
|
const mangled = new Uint8Array(der)
|
|
// Corrupt a byte early in the structure (subject/pubkey area) so the self-signature no longer
|
|
// matches the tbs — still parseable DER shape but PoP fails.
|
|
mangled[25]! ^= 0xff
|
|
const res = await verifyCsrPoPEc(mangled)
|
|
expect(res).toEqual({ ok: false, embeddedPubSpki: new Uint8Array(0) })
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
test('malformed / non-DER garbage → ok:false uniform (no throw)', async () => {
|
|
const res = await verifyCsrPoPEc(Uint8Array.from([1, 2, 3, 4, 5]))
|
|
expect(res).toEqual({ ok: false, embeddedPubSpki: new Uint8Array(0) })
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
test('empty input → ok:false uniform', async () => {
|
|
const res = await verifyCsrPoPEc(new Uint8Array(0))
|
|
expect(res).toEqual({ ok: false, embeddedPubSpki: new Uint8Array(0) })
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
test('a valid non-P256 CSR (Ed25519 key) → ok:false uniform (curve enforced)', async () => {
|
|
const keys = (await webcrypto.subtle.generateKey({ name: 'Ed25519' }, true, ['sign', 'verify'])) as unknown as KeyPair
|
|
const csr = await x509.Pkcs10CertificateRequestGenerator.create({
|
|
name: 'CN=ed-device',
|
|
keys,
|
|
signingAlgorithm: { name: 'Ed25519' },
|
|
})
|
|
const res = await verifyCsrPoPEc(new Uint8Array(csr.rawData))
|
|
expect(res).toEqual({ ok: false, embeddedPubSpki: new Uint8Array(0) })
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
test('a valid P-384 CSR → ok:false uniform (only P-256 accepted)', async () => {
|
|
const keys = (await webcrypto.subtle.generateKey({ name: 'ECDSA', namedCurve: 'P-384' }, true, ['sign', 'verify'])) as unknown as KeyPair
|
|
const csr = await x509.Pkcs10CertificateRequestGenerator.create({
|
|
name: 'CN=p384-device',
|
|
keys,
|
|
signingAlgorithm: { name: 'ECDSA', hash: 'SHA-384' },
|
|
})
|
|
const res = await verifyCsrPoPEc(new Uint8Array(csr.rawData))
|
|
expect(res).toEqual({ ok: false, embeddedPubSpki: new Uint8Array(0) })
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
test('CP3: each rejection returns a FRESH failure object (no shared module-level singleton)', async () => {
|
|
const a = await verifyCsrPoPEc(new Uint8Array(0))
|
|
const b = await verifyCsrPoPEc(new Uint8Array(0))
|
|
expect(a).toEqual({ ok: false, embeddedPubSpki: new Uint8Array(0) })
|
|
// Distinct instances (result AND its embedded array) so one caller can never mutate another's.
|
|
expect(a).not.toBe(b)
|
|
expect(a.embeddedPubSpki).not.toBe(b.embeddedPubSpki)
|
|
})
|
|
})
|