Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.
Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay: native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent: host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e: browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth: Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web: browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering
Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.
NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
52 lines
1.8 KiB
TypeScript
52 lines
1.8 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* T1 — isomorphic crypto provider: entropy + constant-time compare + WebCrypto handle.
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*
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* Uses ONLY the WHATWG `globalThis.crypto` surface (present in browsers and Node >=20), so the
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* package stays isomorphic with zero `node:crypto` import. `timingSafeEqual` is hand-rolled
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* (no `Buffer`) so it runs unchanged in the browser bundle.
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*/
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import { CryptoUnavailableError } from './errors.js'
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function globalCrypto(): Crypto {
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const c = (globalThis as { crypto?: Crypto }).crypto
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if (!c || typeof c.getRandomValues !== 'function') {
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throw new CryptoUnavailableError('globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues is unavailable')
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}
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return c
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}
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/** Return the WebCrypto SubtleCrypto (browser `crypto.subtle` / Node `webcrypto.subtle`). */
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export function getWebCrypto(): SubtleCrypto {
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const subtle = globalCrypto().subtle
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if (!subtle) {
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throw new CryptoUnavailableError('WebCrypto SubtleCrypto is unavailable')
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}
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return subtle
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}
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/** CSPRNG bytes via `crypto.getRandomValues`. */
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export function randomBytes(len: number): Uint8Array {
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if (!Number.isInteger(len) || len < 0) {
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throw new CryptoUnavailableError(`randomBytes length must be a non-negative integer; got ${len}`)
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}
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const out = new Uint8Array(len)
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globalCrypto().getRandomValues(out)
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return out
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}
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/**
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* Constant-time, length-safe byte equality. Returns `false` on any length mismatch WITHOUT a
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* content-dependent early exit: both branches XOR-accumulate over a fixed number of iterations.
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*/
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export function timingSafeEqual(a: Uint8Array, b: Uint8Array): boolean {
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const lenDiff = a.length ^ b.length
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const n = Math.max(a.length, b.length)
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let acc = lenDiff
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for (let i = 0; i < n; i++) {
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const av = i < a.length ? a[i]! : 0
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const bv = i < b.length ? b[i]! : 0
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acc |= av ^ bv
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}
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return acc === 0
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}
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