Implements the fixes from docs/REVIEW_REPORT.md (4-agent parallel review). typecheck clean; 341 tests pass (16 files, +113); build:web ok; coverage thresholds (80%) enforced in vitest.config.ts. Critical: - multi-device approval race: release held approval only when the last client detaches (closing one mirror no longer cancels another's prompt) - unbounded session creation (DoS): Config.maxSessions cap (env MAX_SESSIONS), enforced in manager via the existing M4 exit(-1) path - signal-handler leak: named SIGINT/SIGTERM/uncaughtException refs removed in close() - terminal-session initialInput timer tracked + cleared on dispose - tabs.addEntry null-as-cast type hole removed (build session before entry) Should-fix: - security-headers middleware + Origin/CSRF guard on DELETE /live-sessions[/:id] - history.ts converted to fs/promises (async /sessions handler) - removed dead clientDims map + blur protocol message end-to-end - per-connection WS message rate limit (Config.maxMsgsPerSec) - /sessions behavior kept; documented as accepted LAN risk (TECH_DOC §7) Tests: - new tmux / preview-grid / terminal-session (jsdom) / tabs (jsdom) suites - extended history/config/manager/integration coverage incl. regressions Hygiene: - parsePositiveInt -> parseNonNegativeInt; ALLOWED_ORIGINS scheme validation - log-injection sanitize; isLoopback handles 127.0.0.0/8 + IPv4-mapped - operational constants moved into Config - extracted public/preview-grid.ts (DRY launcher/manage) - doc sweeps: ARCHITECTURE §8 runtime-handle exception, stale comments
188 lines
6.3 KiB
TypeScript
188 lines
6.3 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* src/protocol.ts — WebSocket message codec + validation (T5, pure functions)
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*
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* Invariant #3 (ARCHITECTURE §8): parseClientMessage NEVER throws.
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* All invalid input flows through ParseResult.ok=false.
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*
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* Imports only from src/types.ts (frozen shared contract, T2).
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*/
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import type { ClientMessage, ServerMessage, ParseResult } from './types.js'
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// ─── SESSION_ID_RE (M7) ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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/**
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* UUID v4 pattern.
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* - 8-4-4-4-12 hex groups
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* - version nibble must be '4'
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* - variant nibble must be 8, 9, a, or b (10xx in binary)
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*
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* M7: strings like "abc123" must be rejected; crypto.randomUUID() values must pass.
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*/
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export const SESSION_ID_RE =
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/^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-4[0-9a-f]{3}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
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// ─── Type whitelist ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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const ALLOWED_TYPES = new Set<string>(['attach', 'input', 'resize', 'approve', 'reject'])
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// ─── parseClientMessage ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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/**
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* Parse and validate a raw WS text frame as a ClientMessage.
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*
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* Steps (ARCHITECTURE §3.2 / TECH_DOC §5.3):
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* 1. JSON.parse — bad JSON → ok=false
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* 2. Must be a plain object (not null, array, etc.)
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* 3. type must be in whitelist {'attach','input','resize'}
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* 4. Per-type field validation:
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* - resize: cols and rows are integers in [1, 1000]
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* - input: data is a string (passed through verbatim, invariant #9)
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* - attach: sessionId is null OR a string matching SESSION_ID_RE (M7)
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*
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* NEVER throws — all errors return { ok: false, error: <message> }.
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*/
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export function parseClientMessage(raw: string): ParseResult {
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// Step 1: JSON parse
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let parsed: unknown
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try {
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parsed = JSON.parse(raw)
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} catch {
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return { ok: false, error: 'invalid JSON' }
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}
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// Step 2: Must be a plain object
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if (parsed === null || typeof parsed !== 'object' || Array.isArray(parsed)) {
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return { ok: false, error: 'message must be a JSON object' }
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}
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const obj = parsed as Record<string, unknown>
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// Step 3: type whitelist
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const type = obj['type']
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if (typeof type !== 'string' || !ALLOWED_TYPES.has(type)) {
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return { ok: false, error: `unknown or missing type: ${String(type)}` }
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}
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// Step 4: per-type validation
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if (type === 'resize') {
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return validateResize(obj)
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}
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if (type === 'input') {
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return validateInput(obj)
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}
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// approve/reject (H3) carry no payload.
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if (type === 'approve') {
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return { ok: true, message: { type: 'approve' } }
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}
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if (type === 'reject') {
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return { ok: true, message: { type: 'reject' } }
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}
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// type === 'attach'
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return validateAttach(obj)
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}
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// ─── Per-type validators ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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function validateResize(obj: Record<string, unknown>): ParseResult {
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const { cols, rows } = obj
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if (!isValidDimension(cols)) {
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return {
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ok: false,
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error: `resize.cols must be an integer in [1, 1000], got ${String(cols)}`,
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}
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}
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if (!isValidDimension(rows)) {
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return {
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ok: false,
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error: `resize.rows must be an integer in [1, 1000], got ${String(rows)}`,
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}
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}
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return {
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ok: true,
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message: { type: 'resize', cols: cols as number, rows: rows as number },
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}
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}
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function isValidDimension(value: unknown): value is number {
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return typeof value === 'number' && Number.isInteger(value) && value >= 1 && value <= 1000
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}
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function validateInput(obj: Record<string, unknown>): ParseResult {
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const { data } = obj
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if (typeof data !== 'string') {
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return { ok: false, error: `input.data must be a string, got ${typeof data}` }
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}
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// Invariant #9: data passed through verbatim, no content filtering
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return { ok: true, message: { type: 'input', data } }
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}
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function validateAttach(obj: Record<string, unknown>): ParseResult {
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const { sessionId } = obj
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// sessionId must be explicitly present as null or a UUID v4 string (M7)
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if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(obj, 'sessionId')) {
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return { ok: false, error: 'attach.sessionId field is required' }
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}
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// Optional cwd (M6): must be an absolute path string if present.
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// NOTE (Sec L2): the only check here is a leading '/'. Any further path
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// normalisation (e.g. path.resolve) stays on the backend (session.ts), because
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// this module is shared with the browser bundle and must NOT import node:path.
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// Within the current threat model this is informational — the caller already
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// has a full shell, so a crafted cwd grants nothing beyond what they can type.
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const rawCwd = obj['cwd']
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let cwd: string | undefined
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if (rawCwd !== undefined) {
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if (typeof rawCwd !== 'string' || !rawCwd.startsWith('/')) {
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return { ok: false, error: 'attach.cwd must be an absolute path string' }
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}
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cwd = rawCwd
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}
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if (sessionId === null) {
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return {
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ok: true,
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message: cwd !== undefined ? { type: 'attach', sessionId: null, cwd } : { type: 'attach', sessionId: null },
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}
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}
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if (typeof sessionId !== 'string') {
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return {
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ok: false,
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error: `attach.sessionId must be null or a UUID v4 string, got ${typeof sessionId}`,
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}
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}
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if (!SESSION_ID_RE.test(sessionId)) {
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return {
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ok: false,
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error: `attach.sessionId is not a valid UUID v4: ${sessionId}`,
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}
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}
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return {
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ok: true,
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message: cwd !== undefined ? { type: 'attach', sessionId, cwd } : { type: 'attach', sessionId },
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}
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}
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// ─── serialize ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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/**
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* Serialize a ServerMessage to a JSON text frame.
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*
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* Internal trusted data — JSON.stringify directly (ARCHITECTURE §3.2).
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*/
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export function serialize(msg: ServerMessage): string {
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return JSON.stringify(msg)
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}
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