2af57e6686
Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.
Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay: native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent: host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e: browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth: Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web: browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering
Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.
NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
37 lines
1.4 KiB
TypeScript
37 lines
1.4 KiB
TypeScript
import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
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import { createHostPinStore } from '../src/host-pin-store'
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describe('createHostPinStore (T8) — cache/audit of the API-sourced fingerprint', () => {
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beforeEach(() => localStorage.clear())
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it('record/get round-trips the API-verified fingerprint', () => {
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const pins = createHostPinStore(localStorage)
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expect(pins.get('h1')).toBeNull()
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pins.record('h1', 'fpr-api')
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expect(pins.get('h1')).toBe('fpr-api')
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})
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it('detects drift: a caller comparing get() vs a fresh API value sees the rotation', () => {
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const pins = createHostPinStore(localStorage)
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pins.record('h1', 'fpr-old')
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const cached = pins.get('h1')
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const freshApi = 'fpr-new'
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expect(cached).not.toBe(freshApi) // caller surfaces this as a 'cache' mismatch for review
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})
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it('keeps hosts isolated — one host_id never returns another host\'s pin', () => {
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const pins = createHostPinStore(localStorage)
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pins.record('h1', 'fpr-1')
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pins.record('h2', 'fpr-2')
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expect(pins.get('h1')).toBe('fpr-1')
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expect(pins.get('h2')).toBe('fpr-2')
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})
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it('persists only the public fingerprint (no key/secret material at rest)', () => {
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const pins = createHostPinStore(localStorage)
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pins.record('h1', 'fpr-abc')
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expect(JSON.stringify(localStorage)).toContain('fpr-abc')
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expect(JSON.stringify(localStorage)).not.toMatch(/BEGIN|PRIVATE|secret/i)
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})
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})
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