The client built to an APK and 617 JVM tests passed, but nothing had ever
run on hardware, and three defects made it unusable the moment it did. All
three were invisible to the JVM suite because none of those tests
instantiate an Android View.
1. Every key press crashed. `RemoteTerminalView` bound the forked emulator
but never installed a `TerminalViewClient`, and the stock Termux view
dereferences `mClient` with no null guard on the first line of the paths
a user actually hits (`onKeyDown` offset 82, `onCreateInputConnection`
offset 0, `onKeyUp`, `onKeyPreIme`). Installing any client is not enough:
returning false continues into `mTermSession.write()` at offset 150, and
`mTermSession` is null forever because `TerminalSession` is final and
forking a process is what this app must not do. So the client consumes
the key itself and `KeyRouting` has no defer-to-stock branch at all —
the crash is unrepresentable, not merely avoided. Termux's `KeyHandler`
stays the authority for the key tables, so DECCKM still emits `ESC O A`.
2. The PTY never learned the real size. Nothing called
`RemoteTerminalSession.updateSize`, and the stock fallback is dead
(`TerminalView.updateSize` early-returns without a session), so every
full-screen TUI rendered into 80x24. `TerminalResizeDriver` now drives
it from real cell metrics — read through the public `getFontWidth()` /
`getFontLineSpacing()` accessors rather than reflection, which would
break silently under R8, or a re-measured Paint, which would drift from
what the renderer actually draws (plan risk R5).
3. Bare-LAN connections were impossible. `network_security_config.xml` was
a self-labelled STUB denying all cleartext while `HostEndpoint` accepts
http and derives ws://. The format has no CIDR syntax, so the allowlist
its own comment promised cannot be written; cleartext is permitted in
base-config, the tunnel domain keeps a TLS block, trust anchors are
pinned to system-only, and the guard moves to the §5.4 pairing tiers.
Adversarial review then found three more, and one it got wrong:
- Swipe-scrolling inside an alternate-screen TUI still crashed. The touch
path bypasses `TerminalViewClient` entirely: `doScroll` turns a scroll
into `handleKeyCode` whenever the alternate buffer is active, and that
dereferences `mTermSession`. Claude Code is an alternate-screen TUI, so
this was a crash during normal use on the app's main screen.
`TerminalScrollGesture` claims the vertical drag first and reproduces
all three `doScroll` branches, closing the fling runnable and
`onGenericMotionEvent` with it.
- `autofill()` dereferences `mTermSession` unguarded while the view
advertises itself autofillable, so any password manager crashed it.
The subtree is excluded from the autofill structure.
- The review asked for stock text selection to be restored. It cannot be:
the ActionMode's own Copy and Paste handlers dereference the absent
session, so a reachable selection UI has an NPE on its Copy button.
Long press stays consumed and copy-out is recorded as a feature gap.
Also: the WEBTERM_TOKEN cookie is carried on REST and the WS upgrade and
sealed with Tink AEAD under an AndroidKeyStore key (fail-closed — a seal
failure persists nothing rather than falling back to plaintext), and
`allowBackup=false` keeps a 30-day shell credential off Google Drive.
Verified: ./gradlew test :app:assembleDebug -> 757 JVM tests, 0 failures.
Nothing here is device-verified yet; that is the next step.
3e5cfdc1cf